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Uniquely in the Western world, Australia relies on an ‘exclusively parliamentary’ model of 
rights protection at the federal level, which relies heavily on Parliament rather than the courts 
to protect and promote rights. Central to this model of rights protection is the system of 
parliamentary committees that inquire into and scrutinise proposed laws.  
This thesis tests the limits of the parliamentary model of rights protection, using a case study 
that includes 12 counter-terrorism-related Acts. In particular, this thesis explores whether 
parliamentary committees have had a rights-enhancing impact on these laws and whether the 
rights-enhancing impact of parliamentary committees can be improved. 
The methodology employed in this research considers a range of evidence to provide a holistic 
account of the impact of the parliamentary committee system on the case study Acts.  This 
includes consideration of the legislative impact of parliamentary committees on the content 
of the Acts, evidenced by legislative amendments attributed to the work of committees in 
parliamentary debates or Explanatory Memoranda.  This research also considers the role 
parliamentary committees play in the public and parliamentary debate on the case study Acts, 
for example by considering references to individual committees in Hansard debates and media 
articles.  In addition, this research investigates the hidden impact parliamentary committees 
may be having on policy development and legislative drafting, considering both documentary 
materials such as guidelines and manuals, as well as material obtained from interviews with 
key participants in the law-making process.  This material is then considered against the 
backdrop of a broader analysis of the multiple stages of rights review that occur within the 
Australian Parliament, in the context of counter-terrorism law making at the federal level.  
This thesis finds that parliamentary committees have had a rights-enhancing (although rarely 
rights-remedying) impact on the case study Acts, and that the nature of this impact varies 
across the different committees studied.  Further, this thesis finds that the hidden or behind-
the-scenes impact of parliamentary committees on the development of proposed laws provides 
a particularly fertile ground for improving the rights-protecting capacity of the committee 
system.  Most significantly, this thesis finds that the rights-enhancing impact of parliamentary 
committees is most strongly felt when individual parliamentary committees work together as 
a system. This has important implications for the types of reforms that should be pursued to 
improve the rights-protecting capacity of the Australian Parliament.  
vii 
This thesis concludes by offering a range of practical recommendations designed to improve 
the rights-enhancing capacity of the parliamentary committee system, while also solidifying 
the system’s respected and valued place with the Australian Parliament.  These system-wide 
recommendations are complemented by proposed committee-specific changes that aim to 
build upon the strengths of individual committees and maximise the potential for multiple 
committees to work collaboratively.  
When taken together, this research shows that the parliamentary committee system is worth 
investing in as a way to improve the current parliamentary model of rights protection, and 
when exploring alternative models of rights protection at the federal level.  
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1 
PART I: PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES AND 
RIGHTS PROTECTION IN AUSTRALIA 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
A Why Study Parliamentary Committees? 
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the role parliamentary committees play in Australia’s 
parliamentary model of rights protection, and to identify practical options for improving the 
rights-enhancing capacity of the parliamentary committee system. In short, it is a study of the 
work and role of federal parliamentary committees. My research uses the experience of 
developing, debating and enacting counter-terrorism laws in the period from 2001 to 2015 as a 
canvas to investigate the rights-enhancing impact of parliamentary committees. It focuses on 
four committees that have been particularly prominent in scrutinising Australia’s counter-
terrorism laws. These are the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills (SSCSB), 
the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation and References 
Committees (LCA Committees), the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security (PJCIS) and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (PJCHR). Using 
documentary and interview-based material, I argue that only by considering parliamentary 
committees working together as a system can we develop realistic proposals for substantive 
improvement in the parliamentary model of rights protection. 
For many, parliamentary committees conjure banal images of bored parliamentarians drudging 
through piles of paperwork or harried public servants forced to answer seemingly never-ending 
questions about stationary purchases or office furnishings. The Senate Estimates process, 
which has left many a public servant shaking in their boots,1 is perhaps the most well 
                                                 
 
1 See, eg, Simon Tatz, ‘Senate estimates: We’re all losers in this game of “gotcha”’, The Drum (online), 19 October 
2015 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-19/tatz-senate-estimates:-were-all-losers-in-this-game-of-
gotcha/6860784>; ‘Senate Committee tests skills of top public servants’, Australian Financial Review (online), 
10 February 2016 <http://www.afr.com/news/policy/budget/senate-committee-tests-the-skills-of-top-public-
servants-20160209-gmq26t>. 
2 
recognised committee activity by those not intimately involved in the legislative process. 
However, a closer look at parliamentary committees reveal that they both reflect and feed into 
the fundamental features and values of our federal Parliament. They provide a forum for all 
parliamentarians to play a role in the legislative process. They analyse proposed laws and 
policies and produce vital, independent information about their purpose, effectiveness and 
impact. They also provide a forum for experts and members of the community to share their 
views on a proposed law, and document the views of a wide range of individuals and 
organisations on matters critical to the lives and rights of Australians. In this way, 
parliamentary committees have both deliberative attributes (such as facilitating forums for the 
public to engage in the law-making process) and authoritative attributes (such as the power to 
publicly scrutinise the government’s spending, or proposed laws or policies). As explored in 
detail below, these attributes can be present within individual committees, and across the 
committee system, and help explain the challenges and opportunities presented by 
parliamentary committees undertaking a rights-protecting role.2 
As a rights advocate and law reformer,3 this makes parliamentary committees particularly 
interesting to me. Like many other rights advocates,4 when I started this research I was sceptical 
of the extent to which Australia’s exclusively parliamentary model of rights protection 
(discussed below) could deliver meaningful outcomes for Australians.5 I shared the orthodox 
                                                 
 
2 See discussion in Chapter 4, Section B(3). 
3 I am currently employed as a Senior Project Officer at the South Australian Law Reform Institute and an 
Associate Teacher at the University of Adelaide. Prior to commencing work at the institute, I was employed at 
the Law Council of Australia including as Director of Criminal Law and Human Rights. I have held policy roles 
at AusAID and the South Australian Attorney-General’s Department. I have also worked as a legal policy advisor 
to former Australian Greens Senator Penny Wright. During my employment, former Senator Wright was the Chair 
of the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee and a member of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights. 
4 See, eg, Simon Evans and Carolyn Evans, ‘Australian Parliaments and the Protection of Human Rights’ (Paper 
presented in the Department of the Senate Occasional Lecture Series, Canberra, 8 December 2006). See also James 
Stellios and Michael Palfrey, ‘A New Federal Scheme for the Protection of Human Rights’ (2012) 69 Australian 
Institute of Administrative Law Forum 13; David Kinley and Christine Ernst, ‘Exile on Main Street: Australia’s 
Legislative Agenda for Human Rights’ (2012) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 58; Rosalind Dixon, ‘A 
New (Inter)national Human Rights Experiment for Australia’ (2012) 23 Public Law Review 75; Hugh Mannreitz, 
‘Commonwealth Statements of Compatibility – Small Steps, Early Days’ (2012) 71 Human Rights Law Centre 
Bulletin 8; Bryan Horrigan, ‘Reforming Rights-Based Scrutiny and Interpretation of Legislation’ (2012) 37 
Alternative Law Journal 228; Lisa Burton and George Williams, ‘Australia’s Exclusive Parliamentary Model of 
Rights Protection’ (2013) 34(1) Statute Law Review 58, 81.  
5 This scepticism seems to be shared by many in the Australian community, with around 80 per cent of those 
polled during the National Consultation on Human Rights calling for the courts to play a more active role in rights 
protection in Australia. See Colmar Brunton Social Research, Final Report, National Human Rights Consultation 
3 
view that within a system of representative and responsible government like Australia, which 
provides ideal conditions for executive dominance, parliamentary committees have very little 
influence on the legislative process and limited means of providing rights protection unless 
backed up by judicial intervention.6 Having participated in many parliamentary committee 
proceedings from a range of standpoints, I was sceptical of the extent to which parliamentary 
committees could improve the overall effectiveness of the parliamentary model of rights 
protection.  
However, after undertaking this research, and in particular, having spoken to a broad range of 
key participants in the committee system,7 I have changed my view. I am convinced that 
parliamentary committees can and do have a significant rights-enhancing impact on the 
development and content of our laws and, when considered as a system, provide fertile ground 
for improving the overall capacity of the parliamentary model of rights protection to deliver 
real results for the Australian community. 
As discussed below, this does not mean I am advocating the retention of the status quo when it 
comes to rights protection in Australia. Important changes must be made to the way individual 
parliamentary committees go about their work, and to the way committees interact as a system.8 
In addition, it is important to note the limits of the rights impact shown by research. My 
research suggests that parliamentary committees can have an important rights-enhancing 
impact on the development and content of counter-terrorism laws that is different in character 
and scope to the rights-remedying changes that would be necessary to ensure that Australia 
complies with its full range of international human rights obligations. Broader structural 
reforms, such as the introduction of a more explicit role for the judiciary in rights protection, 
may still be necessary to guarantee comprehensive rights protection in Australia. In other 
words, I am not arguing that the current system of parliamentary committees should be relied 
upon as a comprehensive rights-protection regime, but rather that this system has the potential 
                                                 
 
– Community Research Phase (2009) 10. See also Philip Lynch, ‘Rights bill is long overdue Sydney Morning 
Herald, 1 March 2010. 
6 For a comparative perspective see Andrew C Banfield and Rainer Knopff, ‘Legislative Versus Judicial Checks 
and Balances: Comparing Rights Policies Across Regimes’ (2009) 44(1) Australian Journal of Political Science 
13. 
7 The interview material is introduced in further detail in Chapter 2 and Appendix A. 
8 These changes are outlined in Part III, and summarised in Table 9.1. 
4 
to deliver meaningful rights outcomes and thus should be carefully considered by rights 
advocates, including those arguing for more radical structural change.  
For these reasons, I suggest that studying parliamentary committees is particularly important 
for any scholar interested in rights protection, as well as any lawyer seeking to understand how 
laws are made at the federal level. Studying parliamentary committees tells us something useful 
about how the Parliament balances competing public interests and rights, and how the 
legislature approaches its task of giving legal effect to public policy.9 Looking at how 
parliamentary committees operate, as well as how policy makers and parliamentary counsel 
interact with these committees, also allows lawyers to gain important perspectives about the 
extent to which the legal principles they take for granted are reflected in the legislative process 
at the federal level. This is particularly relevant in the area of counter-terrorism law, which 
comprises the central case study for this thesis, as is evident by the robust public law 
scholarship on these laws,10 which has included a sustained focus on legislative scrutiny and 
reform.11  
Although my research focuses on the role parliamentary committees play in scrutinising and 
developing legislation, these committees play a range of other important roles in the 
parliamentary system, including as forums to hold the executive to account for public spending 
and to investigate and resolve transgressions in parliamentary rules and procedures.12 This 
means that there is a clear public interest in ensuring that parliamentary committees are 
                                                 
 
9 A number of scholars have identified this type of inquiry as central to the modern understanding of ‘public law’. 
See, eg, Melissa Castan and Kate Galloway, ‘Extending Public Law: Digital Engagement, Education and 
Academic Identity’ (2015) 25 Legal Education Review 331, 331. See also James Spigelman, ‘Public Law and the 
Executive’ (2010) 34 Australian Bar Review 10, 13. 
10 Dominique Dalla-Pozza, ‘Refining the Australian Counter-terrorism Legislative Framework: How Deliberative 
has Parliament Been?’ (2016) 27(4) Public Law Review 271; Gabrielle Appleby, ‘The 2014 Counter-terrorism 
Reforms in Review’ (2015) 26(1) Public Law Review 4; Alexander Reilly and Andrew Lynch, ‘The Constitutional 
Validity of Terrorism Orders of Control and Preventative Detention’ (2007) 10 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 
105.  
11 See, eg, Security Legislation Review Committee, Commonwealth, Report of the Security Legislation Review 
Committee (2006); Council of Australian Governments Counter-Terrorism Review Committee, Review of 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation (2013); Mark John Clarke, Report of the Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed 
Haneef (2008); Bret Walker, Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Annual Report (2011) 
<http://www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/INSLM/index.cfm>.  
12 See Chapter 3, Section A. 
5 
performing efficiently and effectively in each of these roles, and a need to understand how 
individual committees perform their various functions within the broader committee system. 
Improving the effectiveness of parliamentary committees is also of interest to those who spend 
a large proportion of their time engaged in committee work. Interviews with parliamentarians 
suggest that for opposition Senators and government backbenchers, committee work represents 
the major aspect of their parliamentary life.13 For some submission makers, engagement with 
parliamentary committees is a key plank of their advocacy strategy,14 and entire units of public 
servants are dedicated to ensuring effective engagement with these committees.15 Some of 
these people have expressed views about how to improve the parliamentary committee system. 
By listening carefully to their views, and reflecting on other sources of evidence of how the 
committee system works, I can identify practical options for improving the impact and 
efficiency of the committee system. 
1 Why Is This Research Unique? 
The scope, methodology and findings of this thesis are unique, primarily because this research 
evaluates the rights-protecting role of parliamentary committees working together as a system, 
rather than simply focusing on the effectiveness of a particular committee.16 In addition, this 
                                                 
 
13 See, eg, Interview with Don Farrell, Australian Labor Party Senator for South Australia (Adelaide, 15 November 
2016); Interview with Patricia Crossin, former Chair and Deputy Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, former Australian Labor Party Senator for Northern Territory (telephone, 10 
August 2016). 
14 See, eg, Interview with Bill Rowlings, Civil Liberties Australia (Canberra, 24 May 2016); Interview with Nicola 
McGarrity, Gilbert & Tobin Centre for Public Law (Sydney, 31 May 2016); Interview with Legal Submission 
Maker (Canberra, 24 May 2016). 
15 See, eg, Department of Parliamentary Services, Employment: Department of Parliamentary Services 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Employment/Department_of_Parliamentary_Services>. 
16 For examples of committee-specific studies see Adam Fletcher, ‘Human Rights Scrutiny in the Australian 
Parliament’ (Paper presented at ‘Evaulating Inquests, Commissions and Inquiries’ Symposium, La Trobe 
University, Melbourne, 1 November 2017); George Williams and Lisa Burton, ‘Australia’s Parliamentary 
Scrutiny Act: An Exclusive Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Jane Hooper and 
Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart Publishing, 2015) 
258; George Willams and Daniel Reynolds, ‘The Operation and Impact of Australia’s Parliamentary Scrutiny 
Regime for Human Rights’ (2016) 41(2) Monash University Law Review 469; Tom Campbell and Stephen Morris, 
‘Human rights for democracies: a provisional assessment of the Australian Human Rights (Parliamentary 
Scrutiny) Act 2011’ (2015) 34(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 7; Catherine Rodgers, ‘A Comparative 
Analysis of Rights Scrutiny of Bills in New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom: Is New Zealand Lagging 
Behind its Peers?’ (2012) 1 Australasian Parliamentary Review 4; Stephen Argument, ‘Of Parliament, Pigs and 
Lipstick (Slight Return): A Defence of the Work of Legislative Scrutiny Committees in Human Rights Protection’ 
(Paper presented at the Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum, Canberra, 21–22 July 2011).  
6 
thesis looks for evidence of three different types of impact parliamentary committees have on 
proposed laws and employs a specifically developed, transparent assessment framework that 
addresses the challenges identified in previous attempts to evaluate parliamentary committees. 
In particular, my research collects and analyses the legislative, public and hidden impact of 
parliamentary committees on Australia’s counter-terrorism laws. This allows my research to 
transcend the typical inquiry into whether parliamentary committees influence the content of 
the law.17 I look ‘behind the scenes’ to uncover whether parliamentary committees have an 
influence on the development of proposed laws at the pre-introduction phase. To do this, I use 
evidence obtained from interviews with those responsible for developing Australia’s counter-
terrorism laws, and those who support and advise parliamentary committees, in addition to 
public sources such as Drafting Directions18 and the Legislation Handbook.19 The interview 
material also shapes the recommendations made in Part III and provides a unique source of 
information against which to test findings derived from my analysis of Hansard debates, 
committee transcripts and reports. 
My thesis also explicitly recognises that individual committees have distinct functions and 
goals, which influence their potential to have a strong rights-enhancing impact, and allow them 
to contribute in different ways to the parliamentary committee system. As Chapter 3 explains, 
understanding how committees contribute to the broader functions of Parliament helps to 
elucidate realistic options for improving the capacity of the system to contribute to Australia’s 
parliamentary model of rights protection.  
2 Why Use Counter-Terrorism Law as a Case Study? 
My research does not aim to evaluate every experience of formal parliamentary scrutiny at the 
federal level. This would be a near impossible task. Rather, I focus on one particularly powerful 
                                                 
 
17 See, eg, Ian Holland, ‘Senate Committees and the Legislative Process’ (Parliamentary Studies Paper No 7, 
Crawford School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, 2009) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/05%20About%20Parliament/52%20Sen/524%20Research%20and%20educati
on/Other%20Publications/PSP07_Holland.ashx>.  
18 Drafting Directions are instructions that are issued by First Parliamentary Counsel. See, eg, Office of 
Parliamentary Counsel (Cth), Drafting Direction No 3.1 (January 2017) 
<https://www.opc.gov.au/about/draft_directions.htm>. 
19 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Legislation Handbook (February 2017) 
<https://www.dpmc.gov.au/resource-centre/government/legislation-handbook>. 
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case study, 12 counter-terrorism Acts,20 to demonstrate how multiple committees work 
together, and to highlight the circumstances in which these committees have a particularly 
strong rights-enhancing impact. 
I selected the counter-terrorism case study following a careful review of past efforts to evaluate 
parliamentary committees in Australia and elsewhere.21 While no consistent criteria for 
selecting case studies emerges from these past evaluations,22 it is clear that the most useful case 
studies are those that provide the maximum opportunity to gather a diverse range of 
information relating to the evaluation criteria being applied.23 Past studies also suggest that, in 
order to offer a sufficiently robust evaluation, it is necessary to select a case study that: 
 is appropriate for the jurisdiction being considered (in this case, federal); 
 has a predominantly legislative, rather than regulatory, character; 
 addresses subject matter that generates strong parliamentary attention, evokes public 
discussion and engages a broad range of individual rights and freedoms; 
 engages a range of government department and agencies, as well as non-government 
organisations and community groups; and 
                                                 
 
20 The 12 case study Acts are the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Act 2015 (Cth); 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Act 2014 (Cth); Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment Act (No 1) 2014 (Cth); Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) 
Act 2015 (Cth); National Security Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Cth); Independent National Security 
Legislation Monitor Act 2010 (Cth); Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth); National Security Information 
(Criminal Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth); Anti-terrorism Act 2004 (Cth); Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth); Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth); Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) 
(and related Acts). As discussed further in Chapter 2, I selected these 12 Bills from more than 50 counter-terrorism 
related laws introduced during the period 2001–15. One of the case study ‘Acts’, the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth), is more correctly described as a 
‘Bill’ as it was not enacted into legislation. As discussed further below, this Bill is included in the case study Acts 
as it was subject to rigorous multi-committee scrutiny and preceded the enactment of the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth). 
21 These studies are described in Chapter 2. 
22 A number of past evaluations of parliamentary committees are considered in detail in Chapter 2. 
23 See, eg, J Smookler, ‘Making a Difference? The Effectiveness of Pre-Legislative Scrutiny’ (2006) 59 
Parliamentary Affairs 522, 533. 
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 extends across a range of governments, parliaments and individual political 
personalities.24 
Unlike other examples of prolific legislative activity over the past 15 years, the counter-
terrorism case study easily meets the full range of criteria necessary to undertake a robust and 
systematic evaluation of the parliamentary scrutiny system in action.25  
Some have suggested that selecting case studies that involve the implementation of popularist, 
bipartisan policies, or that respond to particularly significant domestic or international events, 
may present risks when seeking to analyse or assess formal parliamentary scrutiny.26 There 
may be an assumption, for example, that the strong bipartisan support for ‘tough on terror’ 
policies sidelines or excludes any meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. However, the analysis 
undertaken in this thesis suggests that this is not the case in practice. In fact, as Part II 
                                                 
 
24 These criteria have been deduced from consideration of a range of past studies of parliamentary committees 
discussed in Chapter 2, in particular Section B. These studies include: Malcolm Aldons, ‘Rating the Effectiveness 
of Parliamentary Committee Reports: The Methodology’ (2000) 15(1) Legislative Studies 22; Malcolm Aldons, 
‘Problems with Parliamentary Committee Evaluation: Light at the End of the Tunnel?’ (2003) 18(1) Australasian 
Parliamentary Review 79; Meghan Benton and Meg Russell, ‘Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight 
Committees: The Select Committees in the British House of Commons’ (2013) 66 Parliamentary Affairs 772; 
Carolyn Evans and Simon Evans, ‘Evaluating the Human Rights Performance of Legislatures’ (2006) 6 Human 
Rights Law Review 545; Carolyn Evans and Simon Evans, ‘Legislative Scrutiny Committees and Parliamentary 
Conceptions of Human Rights’ (2006) Public Law 785; David Feldman, ‘The Impact of Human Rights on the UK 
Legislative Process’ (2004) 25 Statute Law Review 91; Gareth Griffith, ‘Parliament and Accountability: The Role 
of Parliamentary Oversight Committes’ (Briefing Paper No 12/05, Parliamentary Library Research Service, New 
South Wales, 2005); John Halligan, ‘Parliamentary Committee Roles in Facilitating Public Policy at the 
Commonwealth Level’ (2008) 23(2) Australasian Parliamentary Review 135; D Hawes, ‘Parliamentary Select 
Committees: Some Case Studies in Contingent Influence’ (1992) 20 Policy & Politics 227; Holland, above n 17; 
Geoffrey Lindell, ‘How (and Whether?) to Evaluate Parliamentary Committees – From a Lawyer’s Perspective’ 
(2005) August About the House 55; Lawrence D Longley and Roger H Davidson, ‘Parliamentary committees: 
Changing perspectives on changing institutions’ (1998) 4(1) Journal of Legislative Studies 1; Ian Marsh, 
‘Australia’s Representation Gap: A Role for Parliamentary Committees?’ (Speech delivered at the Department of 
the Senate Occasional Lecture Series, Parliament House, Canberra, 26 November 2004); David Monk, ‘A 
Framework for Evaluating the Performance of Committees in Westminster Parliaments’ (2010) 16 Journal of 
Legislative Studies 1; Meg Russell and Meghan Benton, ‘Assessing the Policy Impact of Parliament: 
Methodological Challenges and Possible Future Approaches’ (Paper presented at the Public Service Association 
Legislative Studies Specialist Group Conference, London, United Kingdom, 24 June 2009); Meg Russell and 
Meghan Benton, ‘Does the Executive Dominate the Westminster Legislative Process? Six Reasons for Doubt’ 
(2016) 69 Parliamentary Affairs 28; J Smookler, above n 23; Michael C Tolley, ‘Parliamentary scrutiny of rights 
in the United Kingdom: assessing the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ (2009) 44(1) Australian 
Journal of Political Science 41; John Uhr, ‘Parliamentary measures: Evaluating parliament’s policy role’ in Ian 
Marsh (ed), Governing in the 1990s: An agenda for the decade (Longman, 1993) 347. 
25 This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 2. 
26 A number of scholars have sought to avoid these issues by selecting a broad spectrum of thematic areas for their 
evaluations of parliamentary committees including: Evans and Evans, ‘Evaluating the Human Rights Performance 
of Legislatures’, above n 24; Benton and Russell, ‘Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight Committees’, 
above n 24; Williams and Burton, above n 16; Willams and Reynolds, above n 16. 
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demonstrates, the impact of parliamentary committee scrutiny on the case study Acts was 
significant and multi-faceted, despite – and in some cases because of – the particular legal and 
socio-political characteristics of the case study Acts. 
The 12 Acts comprising this case study have some exceptional features. For example, many of 
the Acts were introduced in response to extraordinary international or domestic events or 
particular threats to Australia’s national security,27 and propose novel powers for intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies, and/or new criminal offences.28 The majority of these laws 
remove or at least limit a large number of individual rights and freedoms, change the parameters 
of criminal liability and extend the powers of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. They 
have also been introduced against an international context where it is important that a ‘state of 
trust’ exists between the Australian community and the national security agencies charged with 
protecting them from the threat of terrorism.29 Taken together, the 12 case study Acts represent 
one of the most significant and rights-engaging areas of federal legislative activity over the last 
two decades, making it a particularly important subject area for detailed legal analysis.  
Australia’s counter-terrorism laws also provide the perfect canvas for evaluating the rights-
protecting role of parliamentary committees. In the absence of a charter or bill of rights at the 
federal level, scrutiny by parliamentary committees is one of the only practical means by which 
the rights-intrusive scope of these laws can be curtailed and the state of trust between the 
community and the national security agencies preserved. This makes studying the impact of 
parliamentary committees on the content and development of counter-terrorism laws not just 
interesting, but also critically important. As Evans and Evans observe: 
Around the world the commitment of legislatures to human rights is being tested as they 
respond to terrorism, national security concerns and natural disasters. It is essential to develop 
strong, credible methodologies that will assist in assessing and strengthening the capacity of 
                                                 
 
27 For example, the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth) (and related Bills) were 
introduced as the Howard Government’s legislative response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the 
United States; and the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (Cth) was 
introduced in response to the threat posed by Australians engaged in terrorist activity overseas.  
28 For example, the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (Cth) introduced a system of control orders and preventative 
detention orders available to law enforcement officers; and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2003 introduced questioning and detention powers for ASIO officers. 
29 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Independent Intelligence Review (2017). See also David Omand, 
Securing the State (Hart Publishing, 2010). 
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legislatures to protect rights and in assessing the need for other institutions to supplement or 
oversee legislatures in carrying out this role.30 
In order to maximise the potential for my findings to have broader application, I have chosen 
Acts with a diversity of content and contextual background. For example, many of the Acts 
studied attracted the scrutiny of multiple parliamentary committees despite short time frames 
between introduction and enactment.31 Many of these Acts also attracted large numbers of 
public submissions, gave rise to multiple days of public hearings and generated large numbers 
of second reading speeches in Parliament. Other Acts in the case study reflect longer-term 
efforts to review and reform Australia’s counter-terrorism framework, to improve its 
effectiveness, or to improve its rights compliance.32 The case study Acts also include examples 
of proposed laws that are more technical in character, which attract less public attention, but 
still undergo robust parliamentary scrutiny and substantive legislative change.33 This diversity 
of scrutiny experiences contributes to the strength of this case study for examining the work of 
parliamentary committees.  
I have also employed a range of methodological strategies to ensure that the exceptional legal 
and socio-political character of my case study does not unduly restrict the broader applicability 
of my research.34 For example, my methodology incorporates interview and documentary 
material that contains reflections on the workings of the committee system more broadly, not 
just limited to the counter-terrorism experience. In addition, Part III sets out a range of 
recommendations designed to facilitate further research to confirm the broader applicability of 
the findings made in this thesis.35  
                                                 
 
30 Evans and Evans, ‘Evaluating the Human Rights Performance of Legislatures’, 569 above n 24. 
31 See, eg, Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Act 2015 (Cth); Counter-Terrorism 
Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Act 2014 (Cth); Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 (Cth); Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth); Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth); Security Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) (and related Acts). 
32 See, eg, National Security Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Cth); Independent National Security Legislation 
Monitor Act 2010 (Cth). 
33 See, eg, National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth); Anti-terrorism Act 2004 (Cth). 
34 These strategies are outlined in further detail in Chapter 2. 
35 See in particular Chapter 9 and Table 9.1. 
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3 What ‘Rights’ Are Considered in This thesis? 
My research focuses on the rights-enhancing impact of parliamentary committees. I use the 
term ‘rights’ inclusively to span those human rights recognised under the international 
conventions to which Australia is a party, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.36 It also includes those rights recognised 
under the Constitution37 and the common law. This is important because, as will be discussed 
further in Part II, the Australian Parliament uses a range of language to describe individual 
rights and freedoms, some of which draws on common law and constitutional concepts. These 
articulations of rights form part of what Spigelman has described as the Common Law Bill of 
Rights.38 They commonly include: 
 legal professional privilege;  
 the privilege against self-incrimination;  
 the right to access legal counsel when accused of a serious crime;  
 the right to procedural fairness when affected by the exercise of public power;  
                                                 
 
36 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, [1980] ATS 23; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, [1976] 
ATS 5. 
37 These constitutional rights include: the implied freedom of communication, see, eg, Australian Capital 
Television v Commonwealth (1992) 1777 CLR 106; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 
CLR 250; the right to vote and equality of voting power, see Constitution ss 7, 24, 41; religious rights, see 
Constitution ss 116, 117; Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461; economic rights such as the 
right to be compensated for the acquisition of property, see Constitution s 51(xxxi); Trade Practices Commission 
v Tooth & Co Ltd (1979) 142 CLR 397; and the right to trial by jury, see Constitution s 80; Cole v Whitfield (1988) 
165 CLR 360. For commentary on and analysis of the nature of these rights see David Hume and George Williams, 
Human Rights under the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2013). 
38 James Spigelman, ‘The Common Law Bill of Rights’ (Speech delivered at the University of Queensland, 
Brisbane, 10 March 2008). See also Robert French, ‘The Common Law and the Protection of Human Rights’ 
(Speech delivered at the Anglo-Australasian Lawyers Society, Sydney, 4 September 2009) 2; Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 17. The 
Common Law Bill of Rights is also reflected in what the previous Attorney-General Brandis describes as 
‘traditional rights and freedoms’. See Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms – 
Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws, Report No 129 (2016). See also George Brandis, ‘New Australian Law 




 freedom from retrospective operation of criminal laws; and 
 the principle that the prosecution should bear the onus of proof in criminal matters. 
A similar list of rights is regularly included in the ‘principle of legality’, which can be applied 
by the courts as a tool for interpreting ambiguous legislation.39 
In this thesis I also use the phrase ‘rule of law’, a phrase that is commonplace in Australian 
political and legal discourse, but one rarely clearly articulated or unpacked into discrete, 
accessible components.40 In more modern times, the notion of ‘rule of law’ generally contains 
the following key features: 
No one should be above the law, and all are equal before it, whatever their position or standing. 
All public officials should be subject to the law, and act within the terms of legally prescribed 
duties, powers and procedures.  
Parliamentary law-making should conform to constitutionally defined procedures and limits. 
The judiciary should be clearly independent of both executive and parliament in order to 
interpret and enforce the law without fear or favour.  
All law should be certain and its provision and penalties known in advance. 
No one should be held or punished without a specific charge and a fair hearing before a duly 
constituted court.41 
As will be discussed further below,42 cultural familiarly with this notion of the rule of law has 
infused the way Australian parliamentarians talk about individual rights and liberties, and the 
                                                 
 
39 Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514, 523; Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437 (Mason CJ, 
Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). For commentary on this principle see James Spigelman, ‘The Principle of 
Legality and the Clear Statement Principle’ (2005) 79 Australian Law Journal 769, 775; Brendan Lim, ‘The 
Normativity of the Principle of Legality’ (2013) 37 Melbourne University Law Review 372, 373; Dan Meagher 
and Matthew Groves (eds), The principle of legality in Australia and New Zealand (Federation Press, 2017). For 
further commentary on the relationship between the principle of legality, the parliament and the courts see Dan 
Westbury, ‘The Principle of Legality as a Reflection of the Constitutional Relationship between Parliament and 
the Courts’ on AUSPUBLAW  (19 February 2018) <https://auspublaw.org/2018/2/the-principle-of-legality. 
40 Albert V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 10th ed, 1959) 187–8, 193, 
195.  
41 Marian Sawer, Norman Abjorensen and Phil Larkin, Australia: The State of Democracy (Federation Press, 
2009) 25. 
42 See in particular Chapter 6, Section C and Chapter 9.  
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types of rights issues they focus on most closely when undertaking their scrutiny role. 
Parliamentary committees remain heavily influenced by this notion of the rule of law, as is 
evident both in the language used and findings made by the committees examined below. Rule 
of law principles also feature prominently in the prescribed terms of reference for a number of 
scrutiny committees, including the SSCSB. 
B Parliamentary Committees and Rights Protection in Australia 
At the federal level Australia has an ‘exclusively’ parliamentary model of rights protection,43 
which exists within a constitutional framework that limits the law-making powers of the 
Commonwealth, but is in sharp contrast to most other Western nations which have 
constitutional or statutory bills of rights. In other words, Australia recognises the Parliament as 
the only legitimate arbiter of human rights. The judicial contribution to the conversation on 
rights is restricted to the resolution of particular disputes, the application of established rules 
of statutory interpretation,44 and the determination of a more limited range of constitutional or 
common law rights.45 While these constitutional and common law rights may cross over with 
the list of rights contained in international human rights instruments, they are nonetheless 
considered quite separate in both a legal and normative sense. As Davis observes: 
[A]n historic commitment to parliamentary sovereignty has resulted in the Federal Parliament 
rejecting judicial oversight of human rights. Instead Australia has a firm commitment to 
political rights review. Federal Parliament is empowered … to act as the sole body responsible 
for the scrutiny of legislation to ensure compliance with human rights standards.46  
Parliamentary committees – whether specifically assigned a rights-protecting role, or 
performing another scrutiny or inquiry function – are central to this parliamentary model as 
they provide the most practical forum for detailed consideration of the purpose, content and 
                                                 
 
43 Williams and Burton, ‘Australia’s Parliamentary Scrutiny Act: An Exclusive Parliamentary Model of Rights 
Protection’, above n 16. 
44 These include the common law principle of legality (discussed above n 38) and the presumption of compliance 
with treaty obligations, see Minister of State for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, [26] 
(Mason CJ and Deane J). 
45 See, eg, those rights listed above n 37. 
46 Fergal F Davis, ‘Political Rights Review and Political Party Cohesion’ (2016) 69 Parliamentary Affairs 213, 
213–14. 
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rights impact of proposed new laws. They also provide a source of concrete recommendations 
for legislative or policy change that regularly have the effect of improving the rights 
compliance of proposed federal laws. For these reasons, studying the impact of parliamentary 
committees is a useful way to evaluate how the parliamentary model of rights protection works 
in practice.  
C Scepticism About the Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection  
While Australia’s human rights record is relatively strong from an international perspective,47 
many rights advocates in Australia and elsewhere have expressed scepticism about the extent 
to which parliamentary committees can have a rights-enhancing impact on the development 
and content of laws and question the capacity of a parliamentary model of rights protection to 
deliver meaningful rights outcomes.48  
At the heart of this scepticism is the fact that the parliamentary model of rights protection 
depends largely on the executive, via the Parliament, determining rights disputes and 
addressing gaps in rights protection. In practice, the executive government can be focused 
strongly on electoral outcomes, and may be particularly poor at promoting and protecting the 
rights of unpopular minorities.49 According to this argument, parliamentary committees, public 
servants and human rights commissions cannot hope to exert the type of political influence 
necessary to control the executive government, and thus constitute weak forms of rights 
protection. For example, Debeljak explains that, under the current parliamentary model, there 
is an ‘under-enforcement’ of rights at the federal level and ‘aggrieved persons and groups are 
denied an effective rights-focussed, non-majoritarian forum within which their human rights 
claims can be assessed’.50  
                                                 
 
47 See, eg, Melissa Castan and Paula Gerber, ‘Human Rights Landscape in Australia’ in Paula Gerber and Melissa 
Castan (eds), Contemporary Perspectives on Human Rights in Australia (Lawbook Co, 2013) 1, 15. 
48 See authors listed above n 4. See also Julie Debeljak, ‘Does Australia Need a Bill of Rights?’ in Paula Gerber 
and Melissa Castan (eds), Contemporary Perspectives on Human Rights in Australia (Lawbook Co, 2013) 37. 
49 See, eg, Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Democratic objections to bills of rights’ (2008) 20(3) Sydney Papers 124, 127; 
see also Hilary Charlesworth, Writing in rights: Australia and the protection of human rights (UNSW Press, 2002) 
74–5. 
50 Debeljak, ‘Does Australia Need a Bill of Rights?’, above n 48, 57. 
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This has led many scholars to call for broader structural reform at the federal level that would 
see the judiciary invested with an explicit rights-protecting or rights-oversight role.51 In other 
words, many rights advocates want to move from the current model, where Parliament has a 
monopoly on rights protection, to one where each branch of government is involved in 
‘institutional dialogue’ about the content, scope and limits of human rights.52 This push for 
reform has also been reflected in community views, including during the 2008–09 National 
Consultation on Human Rights (the National Consultation), which recorded that: 
Most of the people who attended the community roundtables and presented written 
submissions to the [National Consultation] Committee wanted to see greater protection and 
promotion of human rights and responsibilities. Only a minority believed that our current 
protections are adequate.53 
Rights advocates in favour of structural reform at the federal level have often been divided on 
whether a constitutional or statutory statement of rights is preferable, depending on whether 
they support the courts or the Parliament having the final say on rights disputes or the rights 
compatibility of laws. For example, those that prefer the constitutionally entrenched model 
argue that giving the courts the final say on the rights compatibility of a law is the only way to 
successfully guard against unjustified legislative or executive interference with fundamental 
rights, particularly those of minorities.54 In contrast, those in favour of the statutory model55 
                                                 
 
51 See, eg, Alexander Williams and George Williams, ‘The British Bill of Rights Debate: Lessons from Australia’ 
(2016) Public Law 471; Daniel Reynolds and George Williams, A Charter of Rights for Australia (NewSouth 
Books, 4th ed 2017); Megan Davis and George Williams, ‘A Statutory Bill of Rights for Australia? Lessons from 
the United Kingdom’ (2002) 22(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 1; Pamela Tate, ‘Human Rights in 
Australia: What Would a Federal Charter of Rights Look Like?’ (2009) 13 Southern Cross University Law Review 
1; George Williams, ‘Constructing a Community-Based Bill of Rights’ in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey Goldsworthy 
and Adrienne Stone (eds), Protecting Human Rights: Instruments and Institutions (Oxford University Press, 2003) 
247; George Williams, The Case for an Australian Bill of Rights: Freedom in the War on Terror (University of 
New South Wales Press, 2004); George Williams, A Charter of Rights for Australia (University of New South 
Wales Press, 2007); Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Who Wins Under a Bill of Rights?’ (2006) 25 University of Queensland 
Law Journal 39; Debeljak, ‘Does Australia Need a Bill of Rights?’, above n 48. 
52 Debeljak, ‘Does Australia Need a Bill of Rights?’, above n 8, 59. 
53 Human Rights Consultation Committee, National Human Rights Consultation Report (2009) 15. See also 
Castan and Gerber, above n 7, 1. 
54 See, eg, B Burdekin, ‘Foreword’ in P Alston (ed), Towards an Australian Bill of Rights (Australian National 
University, 1994) v. 
55 See Jeremy Webber, ‘A Modest (but Robust) Defence of Statutory Bills of Rights’ in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone, Protecting Rights without A Bill of Rights (Ashgate, 2006), 276, 266; P Alston 
(ed), Towards an Australian Bill of Rights (Australian National University, 1994) 88, 93; Charlesworth, Writing 
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often describe it as addressing the ‘democratic deficit’ inherent in a constitutional bill of rights 
because, under many statutory models, the courts have a role in assessing and interpreting the 
rights compatibility of laws, but the Parliament has the final say on whether rights-intrusive 
legislative provisions can be enacted.56 Hiebert also argues that the statutory model ensures 
that the focus of those involved in policy development is on utilising rights standards to 
improve the quality of the proposed law, rather than avoiding potential constitutional 
litigation.57  
At least until 2010, proposals for statutory statements of rights generated support in a number 
of Australian jurisdictions and dominated the debate on rights protection at the federal level. A 
number of unsuccessful efforts were made to introduce human rights Acts at the federal level,58 
and in 2004 the Human Rights Act was introduced in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), 
followed by the introduction of the Victorian Charter of Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 
(Vic) (the Victorian Charter) in 2006. However, this forward momentum behind the push for a 
federal human rights Act was stymied by two key events: the first was the decision of the Rudd 
Government not to implement a federal human rights Act following the National 
Consultation.59 The second was the High Court’s decision in Momcilovic v The Queen 
(Momcilovic),60 which involved consideration of a number of key features of the Victorian 
Charter61 and sounded a warning for rights advocates keen to implement similar legislation at 
the federal level. In Momcilovic, the majority of the High Court upheld the constitutional 
validity of the relevant provisions of the Victorian Charter, but took a conservative approach 
                                                 
 
in rights, above n 49, 73–4; Louise Chappell, John Chesterman and Lisa Hill, The Politics of Human Rights in 
Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 74. 
56 George Williams and Lisa Burton, ‘Australia’s Parliamentary Scrutiny Act: An Exclusive Parliamentary Model 
of Rights Protection’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Jane Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human 
Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart Publishing, 2015) 257; Webber, above n 55, 276, 275. 
57 Janet Hiebert, ‘Parliamentary Engagement with the Charter’ (2012) 58 Supreme Court Law Review 87. 
58 See e.g. See George Williams, ‘The Federal Parliament and the Protection of Human Rights’ (Parliamentary 
Research Paper No 20 of 1998-99, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 11 May 1999).  See also George 
Williams, A Bill of Rights for Australia (UNSW Press, 2000); Chappell, Chesterman and Hill, above n 555, 72-
73. 
59 Human Rights Consultation Committee, National Human Rights Consultation Report, above n 533. 
60 (2011) 245 CLR 1. 
61 For example, the High Court considered the validity of ss 7(2) (the ‘reasonable limits’ provision), 32 (the 
‘interpretive obligation’ provision) and 36 (the ‘declaration of incompatibility provision’) of the Charter of Rights 
and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). 
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to the courts’ role in relying upon these provisions to ‘remedy’ rights-infringing laws, and 
displayed a clear deference to Parliament when it comes to interpreting statutory provisions.62 
Debeljak has described the Momcilovic decision as sanctioning a ‘rights-reductionist method 
to the statute-related Charter mechanisms’ and ‘muting’ the institutional dialogue between the 
courts and the legislature, particularly in so far as it limits the remedial reach of the obligation 
in the Charter to interpret statutory provisions in a manner consistent with international human 
rights.63 Other commentators agree that the High Court’s decision is likely to have a restrictive 
impact on the design of any future statutory model of rights protection in Australia.64 
In light of this stalled momentum behind the push for a federal human rights Act, many rights 
advocates have turned their focus to the package of reforms introduced by the Rudd 
Government in response to the National Consultation, including the establishment of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (PJCHR).65 Many hoped that the PJCHR, 
and related mechanisms such as the requirement to introduce laws with statements of rights 
compatibility, would help overcome some of the weaknesses identified in past studies of the 
parliamentary model of rights protection at the federal level.66 However, a number of early 
studies of the PJCHR and the requirement to table Statements of Compatibility (SoCs) suggest 
                                                 
 
62 The High Court’s decision in Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1 is complex, with differently 
constituted majorities forming on the different questions of validity relating to the Victorian Charter. For example, 
five justices upheld the validity of s 32(1) of the Victorian Charter (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel 
and Bell JJ); however, their views differed on how this provision should interact with the ‘reasonable limitations’ 
provision in s 7(2). Four justices upheld the validity of the declaration provision in s 36 of the Victorian Charter 
(French CJ, with whom Bell J agreed on this point, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). However, the declaration made by the 
Victorian Court of Appeal in this case was set aside. For an analysis of this decision see Julie Debeljak, ‘Who is 
Sovereign Now? The Momcilovic Court Hands Back Power Over Human Rights that Parliament Intended it to 
have’ (2011) 22(1) Public Law Review 15; Julie Debeljak, ‘Proportionality, Rights-Consistent Interpretation and 
Declarations under the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: The Momcilovic Litigation and 
Beyond’ (2014) 40(2) Monash University Law Review 340; Victorian Government Solicitors Office, Case Note: 
Momcilovic v The Queen (September 2011). 
63 Debeljak, ‘Who is Sovereign Now?’, above n 62. 
64 See, eg, Suzanne Zhou, ‘Momcilovic v. the Queen: Implications for a Federal Human Rights Charter’ (Working 
Paper, Social Science Research Network, 2012) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2128005>; Will Bateman and James Stellios ‘Chapter III 
of the Constitution, Federal Jurisdiction and Dialogue Charters of Human Rights’ (2012) 36(1) Melbourne 
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66 These past studies include Evans and Evans, ‘Australian Parliaments and the Protection of Human Rights’, 
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that these reforms have largely failed to live up to expectations.67 For example, in their 2016 
study of the post-PJCHR parliamentary model of rights protection,68 Williams and Reynolds 
found that, when it comes to improving the content of proposed laws, the PJCHR’s findings 
had a minimal impact.69 The authors also found that the PJCHR’s ‘deliberative impact’ on 
rights protection in Australia was also minimal, reflecting a ‘slow improvement from a low 
base’, and that much of this improvement was attributable to a ‘few outspoken advocates for 
the human rights scrutiny regime’.70 The authors also found that judicial use of the scrutiny 
regime has been extremely limited71 and that ‘[p]ublic awareness of the scrutiny regime appears 
to be low’.72 The authors observed that: 
[I]n a system in which Parliament, or at least the lower house, remains weak with respect to 
the executive, it is hard to see any parliamentary based scheme for human rights protection 
producing major alterations to executive proposals for new laws. It is simply not realistic in 
such a system to expect that a parliamentary scrutiny regime will overcome the power 
imbalance between these two arms of government. 
In addition, in the absence of independent judicial supervision of Parliament’s work, the 
incentives to comply with the regime are few.73 
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These findings echo earlier warnings74 about the limits of Australia’s parliamentary model of 
rights protection.75 This experience has also solidified the scepticism of many rights advocates 
about the capacity of the parliamentary model to deliver real rights outcomes for Australians. 
As will be discussed below, my research challenges a number of findings made in these studies, 
and suggests that there is value in overcoming this scepticism at least when it comes to 
understanding the rights-enhancing impact of the parliamentary committee system.  
D Overcoming Scepticism About the Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection  
As noted above, when commencing this research I shared the views of many of the scholars 
discussed above. The rights-abrogating content and operation of many federal laws, including 
counter-terrorism laws,76 seemed proof enough that the parliamentary model of rights 
protection simply was not working, and would be nearly impossible to fix. However, after 
undertaking a careful analysis of the three tiers of impact parliamentary committees have had 
on the development of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws, and listening to those with direct 
experience working within the committee system, I changed my view. It became clear that 
individual committees have had a significant rights-enhancing (although rarely rights-
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remedying) impact on these laws and, more interestingly, when multiple committees worked 
together this impact was stronger and longer lasting. It also it became clear that the way 
parliamentary committees operate (including how they engage key participants and the way 
they talk about rights) is making a discernible contribution to Australia’s parliamentary model 
of rights protection.  
My analysis directly challenges findings made by past studies of Australian parliamentary 
committees and rights protection or, at the very least, presents a different picture of their overall 
rights-enhancing impact. For example, unlike the 2006 findings made by Evans and Evans,77 
Part II of the thesis presents evidence that the scrutiny criteria applied by some parliamentary 
committees are deeply entrenched in policy making and parliamentary drafting practice, and 
that this has tangible rights-enhancing results. It also finds that some committees have the 
capacity to make a long-term contribution to the development of proposed laws, and provide a 
deliberative forum to debate rights-related issues. This thesis also documents instances of 
consistently strong rights-enhancing legislative impact by particular committees in the system. 
Key among my findings is that, when different committees work together as a system, the 
rights-enhancing impacts can be particularly strong. This suggests that, rather than looking 
exclusively at the rights-protecting capacity of one committee, such as the PJCHR, many 
committees in the system may be well placed to play an active role in rights protection.  
These findings are important as they point to the need to carefully consider the parliamentary 
committee system when evaluating options for improving rights protection in Australia. They 
also highlight the merit in some of the arguments made by scholars who claim that the existing 
parliamentary model of rights protection has distinct advantages over constitutionally 
entrenched or statutory enshrined charters of rights.78 For example, prior to the introduction of 
the PJCHR, Campbell advocated the establishment of a ‘democratic’ human rights committee 
at the federal level, with wide-ranging inquiry powers and the capacity to proactively generate 
rights-protecting legislation, in additional to the power to scrutinise proposed laws for 
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compliance with human rights standards.79 Such a committee would have constitutional 
backing, not in the form of a prescribed bill of rights, but to entrench its place in the Parliament 
and preserve its procedural integrity, regardless of the views of the executive government.80 
The rights standards to be applied by such a committee would be generated by the committee 
itself and popularly endorsed.81 The proposed committee would also have the power to delay 
legislation to ensure that human rights considerations are addressed and to require rights-
protecting legislation to be brought forward within a specific time frame.82 While the proposed 
committee would have no power to block legislation, it would be able to require ministers to 
respond to its requests for information, call witnesses, conduct inquiries and obtain expert 
advice.83 For Campbell, a committee-based approach to rights protection, where the rights 
standards to be applied are generated and articulated by the committee itself, ‘avoids overly 
legalistic formulations of rights’ and gives rise to ‘superior democratic legitimacy’ than other 
models of rights protection.84  
While my recommendations depart from those made by Campbell in important respects,85 my 
findings on the role parliamentary committees can play in enhancing the deliberative quality86 
of the law-making process align with many of Campbell’s arguments. In particular, the findings 
in Part II demonstrate the ways in which the parliamentary committee system aims to resolve 
difficult decisions about ‘balancing rights’87 and to encourage public participation in rights 
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discussions.88 The material I present in Part II suggests that often alternative, less rights-
intrusive options are identified through committee processes that are later adopted as successful 
legislative amendments to proposed laws. This suggests that the way rights issues are debated 
between the executive and the Parliament can be nuanced and meaningful, even in the context 
of strong bipartisan support for ‘tough on terror’ policies. As discussed further in Part III,89 this 
organically developing dialogue may have advantages over other rights-protecting models 
where the judiciary enters this dialogue in a more explicit way, such as under statutory or 
constitutional models where the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with a list of protected 
rights without offering policy alternatives.  
In this way, my findings share similarities with scholars such as Kinley, who support models 
of rights protection that focus on developing a culture of rights compliance at the pre-legislative 
phase, rather than rights-protection models that include remedial, post-introduction judicial 
determination of rights disputes.90 For Kinley, these pre-legislative scrutiny models of rights 
protection are preferable because they are more ‘democratic’ than constitutional or statutory 
charters of rights: they work to exert ‘electoral pressure in respect of unacceptable legislation, 
where the electorate is aware of such legislation and cognizant of its impact on human rights’.91 
Morris and Campbell share this perspective, as is evident from their 2015 evaluation of the 
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PJCHR, where the authors found that during its first few years of operation the PJCHR had 
‘improved Australia’s human rights institutional performance’ and provided ‘significant 
opportunities for political leaders, parliamentary members, political parties and their public 
supporters to contribute effectively to the enhancement of Australia’s democratic human rights 
framework’.92 My research builds upon this finding by suggesting that when parliamentary 
committees, including the PJCHR, work together as a system their capacity to contribute to a 
pre-legislative culture of rights compliance at the federal level is considerably enhanced.  
My research can also been considered within the analytical framework of ‘multi-stage rights 
review’ employed by Stephenson in his comparative analysis of different common law 
jurisdictions’ approaches to rights protection.93 Unlike many other scholars, Stephenson rejects 
the idea of analysing models of rights protection with reference to institutional dialogue on 
rights (where the system is categorised as either one of legislative supremacy or judicial 
supremacy) in favour of focusing on the direct and indirect disagreements that occur between 
different institutions of government on rights issues (where systems are understood as 
involving multiple stages of rights review by different institutions of government).94 This 
approach helps to reveal similarities and differences across models of rights protection that 
may not be visible under the ‘dialogue’ approach. For example, applying the ‘dialogue’ 
analytical approach to the Australian federal experience, the Parliament (and not the courts) 
has the final say on rights issues or rights-abrogating laws. However, this can mask the 
contribution other branches of government may make along the way to the final resolution of 
the rights issue by Parliament. As Stephenson explains: 
A legislature that resolves rights issues in an informal manner with little interference from 
other institutions is in a markedly different position from a legislature that resolves rights 
issues only after the executive, a specialist legislative committee and the courts have offered 
their views and placed pressure on the legislature to heed them.95 
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Stephenson’s approach highlights the importance of identifying and analysing both direct and 
indirect inter-institutional disagreement on rights that occur in different jurisdictions.96 
Although, like other scholars, I continue to describe the Australian model of rights protection 
as ‘parliamentary’, my research helps to illustrate the multi-stage rights review that occurs at 
the federal level, by documenting the important direct and indirect contribution parliamentary 
committees make to resolving rights issues within this system. In addition, my research 
provides an example of some of the ‘points of tension between forms of institutional 
disagreement’ that Stephenson discusses in his comparative analysis.97 For example, the 
analysis undertaken in Part II of my research exposes how the bureaucracy anticipates rights 
scrutiny when providing advice to Ministers, and how the rights-intrusive nature of proposed 
provisions can be removed by the legislative implementation of recommendations made by 
parliamentary committees. Like Stephenson, my research suggests that these tensions between 
or within the institutions of government on rights issues provide an opportunity for improving 
the quality of rights review in Australia, rather than pointing to a fundamental flaw in the rights 
dialogue between these institutions.98 
This more nuanced approach to analysing the way institutions of government engage in rights 
review also provides an important context for examining whether a particular rights-scrutiny 
culture may exist within a particular jurisdiction, which in turn has important implications for 
what types of rights reforms may be accepted or rejected by that culture. For example, the 
material set out in Part III suggests that there are a range of common rights-scrutiny principles 
that appear to be consistently applied by the federal Parliament and the public service when 
formulating and scrutinising counter-terrorism laws that may have application beyond the case 
study examined in this thesis. If substantiated by further research, this emerging rights-scrutiny 
culture may be particularly important for those seeking to articulate an Australian list or 
statement of rights or for those seeking to engage the full range of political decision makers in 
rights protection. In summary, by focusing on the way multiple committees work together as a 
system, my research explores the Australian parliamentary model of rights protection in a deep 
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and nuanced way, and reveals important new perspectives on the current and future capacity 
of this model to deliver meaningful rights protection at the federal level.  
I want to be clear that the findings made in this thesis do not obviate the need to consider other 
rights-protecting mechanisms at the federal level. Indeed, the rights-abrogating content of 
Australia’s counter-terrorism laws is a stark reminder that the current system is not producing 
consistent rights-protecting results. A number of domestic and international scholars have 
undertaken detailed analysis of the extent to which Australia’s counter-terrorism laws comply 
with the international human rights obligations Australia has voluntarily assumed, and the 
principles of established Australian criminal or constitutional law.99 These scholars have 
overwhelmingly found Australia’s counter-terrorism laws to be non-compliant with a large 
range of these rights and principles.100 In addition, scholars such as Williams, Golder, Joseph 
and Zifcak have compared Australia’s counter-terrorism laws to those in comparative 
jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom (UK), New Zealand (NZ) and Canada, and found 
that Australia’s counter-terrorism framework is broader in scope101 and more rights-
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intrusive.102 For example, as Williams and Burton note, Australia’s control order regime103 is 
based on a regime introduced in the UK in 2005104 that was later ‘heavily criticised and found 
to violate the European Convention on Human Rights’, including on the basis that it 
unjustifiably interfered with the right to liberty, the right to a fair trial and freedom from 
discrimination.105 The UK control orders regime was abolished in 2011 and replaced with a 
new regime of terrorism prevention and investigation measures; however, the Australian 
control order regime remains in force, and has been extended on multiple occasions since 
2011.106 The authors note that this is just one example of an Australian counter-terrorism law 
with serious rights defects.107 These scholars demand that Australia do something more than 
improve its parliamentary committee system if it is serious about protecting rights, pointing to 
comparable jurisdictions with statutory and constitutional statements of rights, such as the UK, 
NZ and Canada.108  
This research has a different focus. It seeks to understand the multi-stage rights protection 
system currently in place at the federal level, and to identify its strengths and weaknesses. It 
asks whether or not parliamentary committees have had an impact on the case study Acts and, 
                                                 
 
102 See, eg, Spencer Zifcak, ‘Counter-terrorism Laws and Human Rights’ in Paula Gerber and Melissa Castan 
(eds), Contemporary Perspectives on Human Rights in Australia (Lawbook Co, 2013) 418; Ben Golder and 
George Williams, ‘Balancing National Security and Human Rights: Assessing the Legal Response of Common 
Law Nations to the Threat of Terrorism’ (2006) 8 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 43; Lisa Burton and 
George Williams, ‘What Future for Australia’s Control Order Regime?’ (2013) 24 Public Law Review 182; Sarah 
Joseph, ‘Australian Counter-Terrorism Legislation and the International Human Rights Framework’ (2004) 27 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 428; Cephas Lumina, ‘Counter-Terrorism Legislation and the 
Protection of Human Rights: A Survey of Selected International Practice’ (2007) 7 African Human Rights Law 
Journal 35. 
103 Control orders were introduced in Australia by the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth).  
104 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK). 
105 Burton and Williams, ‘What Future for Australia’s Control Order Regime?’, above n 102, 183. See also Ed 
Bates, ‘Anti-terrorism Control Orders: Liberty and Security Still in the Balance’ (2009) 29 Legal Studies 99, 100; 
H Fenwick and G Phillipson, ‘UK Counter-terror Law Post-9/11: Initial Acceptance of Extraordinary Measures 
and the Partial Return to Human Rights Norms’ in V Ramraj, M Hor, K Roach and G Williams (eds), Global 
Anti-terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 481; Alexander Carlile, Final Report of the 
Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) (Stationary Office, 
2006), 13, 15–16. 
106 See, eg, Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (Cth); Criminal Code 
Amendment (High Risk Terrorist Offenders) Bill 2016 (Cth). 
107 For example, the authors also describe the rights-abrogating features of the National Security Information 
(Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth): Burton and Williams, ‘What Future for Australia’s Control 
Order Regime?’, above n 105, 205.  
108 See, eg, authors listed above n 105. 
27 
if so, whether this impact was rights-enhancing. In so doing, it seeks evidence-based findings 
about what is working well, and what reforms could be made to improve the rights-enhancing 
impact of the parliamentary committee system.  
My research also uncovers important features of the rights-scrutiny culture that appear to be 
organically developing at the federal level, which may have implications for those considering 
broader structural reform. As Stephenson has noted, each model of rights protection – whether 
‘exclusively parliamentary’, statutorily prescribed or constitutionally entrenched – generates 
its own particular rights-scrutiny culture, and exists within its own particular institutional 
context.109 This can make each system resistant to broader structural change, or inclined to 
revert back to its ‘original’ rights culture even when structural change occurs.110 My research 
suggests that there is value in understanding the cultural and contextual features of the current 
Australian model of rights protection, including by understanding the hidden or behind-the-
scenes impact of the parliamentary committee system. As Part III explores, this helps to 
identify how the rights-enhancing capacity of the committee system can be improved, and 
highlights what types of considerations should be kept in mind by those advocating more 
radical reform.  
E Structure and Overview of Chapters 
This thesis is comprised of three parts. Part I contains three chapters, commencing with this 
introduction. Chapter 2 sets out the methodology employed in this thesis, introduces the case 
study Acts and particular committees studied, and analyses the Australian parliamentary 
landscape in which laws are developed, debated and enacted.  
Chapter 2 includes a critical overview of past evaluations of parliamentary committees and 
describes how the assessment framework111 used in my research is designed to overcome some 
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of the weaknesses and challenges previously encountered. Chapter 2 explains that the 
assessment framework seeks to measure three ‘tiers’ of impact:  
 legislative (focused on whether the content of proposed laws changes as a result of 
parliamentary committee activity); 
 public (focused on whether the public and/or parliamentary debate on proposed laws is 
influenced by the work of parliamentary committees); and  
 hidden (focused on whether the work of parliamentary committees has an impact on 
how proposed laws are developed prior to introduction into Parliament). 
This framework demands consideration of a range of evidence, including Hansard debates, 
parliamentary committee reports, public service guidelines and manuals and, perhaps most 
importantly, direct testimony from those individuals involved in various stages of the 
parliamentary committee process. When taken together this methodology allows for a holistic 
insight into the impact of parliamentary committees on the development and enactment of 
legislation. 
Part 1 also recognises the need to have a sound understanding of the legal and political context 
in which parliamentary committees operate in order to be confident about measuring the type 
of impact they may be having on the development, debate and enactment of Australia’s 
counter-terrorism law. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the international and domestic 
context in which Australia’s counter-terrorism laws and policies have been developed since 
September 2001.  
Part II presents evidence with respect to each component of the assessment framework, 
allowing findings to be made about the overall impact of parliamentary committees on the case 
study Acts. Chapter 4 identifies the key participants in the four committees studied, and looks 
for evidence of whether these participants consider these committees to be legitimate. The term 
‘legitimate’ is discussed further in Chapter 4 and is generally used in this research to denote 
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political authority.112 In other words, a committee that is seen by its key participants as a 
respected, effective and authoritative part of the federal Parliament would be described as 
attracting high levels of legitimacy. Understanding the views and perspectives of key 
participants in the system helps provide a more holistic picture of the nature of the impact each 
committee has had on the case study Acts. It also helps to set the parameters of realistic options 
for improving the rights-enhancing impact of each committee, discussed in Part III of the thesis. 
Chapter 5 sets out evidence of the legislative impact of the four parliamentary committees on 
the case study Acts, providing a powerful indicator of their overall influence. Chapter 6 sets 
out evidence of the public impact of the four parliamentary committees on the case study Acts, 
including evidence that committees influenced or were considered in public or parliamentary 
debate or post-enactment review. Chapter 7 considers evidence of the hidden or ‘behind-the-
scenes’ impact of the four parliamentary committees on the case study Acts, including whether 
or not the work of these committees influenced or was considered in the pre-introduction phase.  
Taken together, Part II presents a complex picture where individual committees have particular 
strengths and weaknesses, and the interaction of committees was critical to the overall strength 
of their impact on the case study Acts. For example, it demonstrates that some committees, 
such as the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS), had a strong 
impact on the content of proposed counter-terrorism laws, but struggle to be viewed as 
legitimate by all key participants in the system. Part II also finds that other committees, such 
as the SSCSB, may have a strong behind-the-scenes impact on legislative development, even 
if they are rarely able to directly influence parliamentary debates or effect legislative change. 
Part II demonstrates that the impact of parliamentary committees on the case study Acts was 
generally rights-enhancing (and sometimes significantly so), but rarely rights-remedying, as is 
clear from the rights-infringing content of the enacted laws. In other words, this thesis does not 
contest the work of scholars such as Williams,113 McGarrity114 and Lynch115 that documents 
                                                 
 
112 Fabienne Peter, ‘Political Legitimacy’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(online, last updated 24 April 2017) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/>. 
113 See, eg, Williams, ‘The Legal Assault on Australian Democracy’, above n 76; Williams, ‘Ten Years of Anti-
Terror Laws in Australia’, above n 766. See also George Williams, ‘Anti-Terrorism Laws and Human Rights’ 
(2015) 19 Review of Constitutional Studies 127. 
114 See, eg, McGarrity, ‘From Terrorism to Bikies’, above n 100. 
115 See, eg, Lynch, ‘Legislating with urgency’, above n 7. 
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the rights-abrogating features of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws. However, it demonstrates 
that but for the work of parliamentary committees, the case study Acts would be more rights-
intrusive and less compatible with rights standards. Part II also uncovers evidence of an 
emerging rights-scrutiny culture within the federal Parliament that has a close connection with 
the work of, and language employed by, parliamentary committees. 
Part III of this thesis uses the evidence presented in Part II to substantiate the central claim of 
this thesis. It argues that only by considering parliamentary committees working together as a 
system can we propose realistic substantive improvements in the parliamentary model of rights 
protection. It demonstrates that making changes to the processes, mandates or powers of 
individual committees provides only limited scope to improve the committee’s rights-
protecting capacity. Instead, it is the system of parliamentary committees that provides the most 
realistic and practical options for meaningful, short-term reform. Part III concludes by setting 
out a range of practical options for improving the capacity of the parliamentary committee 
system to contribute to rights protection in Australia. Some of the recommendations made in 
Part III are directed at individual committees, and some at the system as a whole. All aim to:  
 encourage multi-committee scrutiny of rights-engaging Bills, draft Bills and discussion 
papers; 
 increase committee resources, address high workloads and ensure timely tabling of 
reports; 
 improve communication and collaboration between individual committees, and 
between committees and their key participants; and  
 acknowledge and document parliamentary committees’ contribution to establishing a 
common rights-scrutiny culture within the Australian Parliament. 
These recommendations have the advantage of improving the rights-enhancing capacity of the 
parliamentary committee system, while also enhancing and solidifying the system’s respected 
and valued place with the Australian Parliament. It is hoped, therefore, that these changes can 
be implemented without encountering the barriers faced by past recommendations made by 
scholars of Australia’s parliamentary committee system. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter outlines the challenges identified by scholars when seeking to evaluate the 
effectiveness of parliamentary committees and articulates the strategies I employed to address 
these challenges in the assessment framework used in this thesis. The assessment framework 
used in my research builds upon a framework developed by the Dickson Poon School of Law, 
and incorporates material obtained through targeted interviews with key participants in the 
committee system. 
A Assessing Parliamentary Committees 
As Russell and Benton observe in their work on UK parliamentary committees, ‘much of 
Parliament’s influence is subtle, largely invisible, and frequently even immeasurable’.1 Given 
the complex and dynamic nature of parliamentary committees, evaluating their performance is 
not always straightforward. It can be difficult to define precisely what a high-performing 
committee looks like and there is a risk that the assessor’s approach will influence what a 
‘good’ committee means.2 However, these challenges should not diminish the importance of 
understanding how these committees work, particularly when they have the potential to have a 
real and significant impact on people’s rights and lives.3  
                                                 
 
1 Meg Russell and Meghan Benton, ‘Assessing the Policy Impact of Parliament: Methodological Challenges and 
Possible Future Approaches’ (Paper presented at the Public Service Association Legislative Studies Specialist 
Group Conference, London, United Kingdom, 24 June 2009), cited in Aileen Kavanagh, ‘The Joint Committee 
on Human Rights: A Hybrid Breed of Constitutional Watchdog’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Jane Hooper and Paul 
Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart Publishing, 2015) 111, 
131. See also George Williams and Daniel Reynolds, ‘The Operation and Impact of Australia’s Parliamentary 
Scrutiny Regime for Human Rights’ (2016) 41(2) Monash University Law Review 469. 
2 Philippa Webb and Kirsten Roberts, ‘Effective Parliamentary Oversight of Human Rights: A Framework for 
Designing and Determining Effectiveness’ (Paper presented at the Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College 
London, University of London, June 2014) 3 <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-
institute/projects/government/assets/Human-Rights-Policy-DocumentV5.pdf>.  
3 See Phillip Larkin, Andrew Hindmoor and Andrew Kenyon, ‘Assessing the Influence of Select Committees in 
the UK: The Education and Skills Committee 1997–2005’ (2009) 15(1) Journal of Legislative Studies 71. 
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Many scholars have grappled with these challenges when seeking to evaluate the performance 
of parliamentary committees in a range of different areas.4 For example, Alvey has focused on 
the role of committees in ‘safeguarding the public interest’,5 Evans and Evans have evaluated 
committees’ role in rights protection,6 Halligan has considered the contribution of committees 
to the development of public policy,7 Marsh has asked whether committees could or should fill 
‘Australia’s representation gap’,8 Tolley has considered the extent to which committees 
contribute to more informed parliamentary debate,9 and Uhr10 and Dalla-Pozza11 have 
investigated the role of committees in enhancing deliberative democracy within the Australian 
counter-terrorism law-making process. 
This thesis aims to learn from these past studies to develop a transparent, methodical approach 
to assessing the impact parliamentary committees had on the case study Acts. This in turn will 
                                                 
 
4 See, eg, Williams and Reynolds, above n 1, 488. See also Aileen Kavanagh, ‘The Joint Committee on Human 
Rights: A Hybrid Breed of Constitutional Watchdog’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Jane Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), 
Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart Publishing, 2015) 111; Meghan Benton 
and Meg Russell, ‘Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight Committees: The Select Committees in the 
British House of Commons’ (2013) 66 Parliamentary Affairs 772; Gareth Griffith, ‘Parliament and 
Accountability: The Role of Parliamentary Oversight Committes’ (Briefing Paper No 12/05, Parliamentary 
Library Research Service, New South Wales, 2005); John Halligan, ‘Parliamentary Committee Roles in 
Facilitating Public Policy at the Commonwealth Level’ (2008) 23(2) Australasian Parliamentary Review 135; 
Janet L Hiebert, ‘Parliamentary Review of Terrorism Measures’ (2005) 68(4) Modern Law Review 676; Janet L 
Hiebert, ‘Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR help facilitate a culture of rights?’ (2006) 4(1) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 1; Michael C Tolley, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Rights in the United 
Kingdom: Assessing the Work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ (2009) 44(1) Australian Journal of 
Political Science 41; Carolyn Evans and Simon Evans, ‘Legislative Scrutiny Committees and Parliamentary 
Conceptions of Human Rights’ (2006) Public Law 785; J Smookler, ‘Making a Difference? The Effectiveness of 
Pre-Legislative Scrutiny’ (2006) 59 Parliamentary Affairs 522. 
5 John Alvey, ‘Parliament’s Accountability to the People, The Role of Committees: A Queensland View’ (Speech 
delivered at the Australian Study of Parliament Group Conference, Parliament House, Adelaide, 23–25 August 
2007) 6–7, 26. 
6 Carolyn Evans and Simon Evans, ‘Evaluating the Human Rights Performance of Legislatures’ (2006) 6 Human 
Rights Law Review 546. 
7 Halligan, above n 4. 
8 Ian Marsh, ‘Australia’s Representation Gap: A Role for Parliamentary Committees?’ (Speech delivered at the 
Department of the Senate Occasional Lecture Series, Parliament House, Canberra, 26 November 2004). 
9 Tolley, above n 4. 
10 John Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia: The Changing Place of Parliament (Cambridge University 
Press, 1998) ch 6. 
11 Dominique Dalla-Pozza, ‘The Conscience of Democracy? The Role of Australian Parliamentary Committees 
in Enacting Counter-Terrorism Laws’ (Paper presented at the Australasian Law and Society Conference, 
Wollongong, December 2006) <www.aspg.org.au/conferences/adelaide2007/Dalla-pozzo.pdf>. 
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help identify the contribution these committees make to Australia’s parliamentary model of 
rights protection.12  
B Challenges Associated with Assessing Parliamentary Committees 
The most commonly identified challenges associated with evaluating parliamentary 
committees can be summarised as follows: 
 difficulties associated with identifying the roles, functions and objectives of a specific 
parliamentary committee or a system of parliamentary scrutiny;13 
 the structural dynamics of Australia’s executive-dominated Westminster parliamentary 
system;14 
 difficulties associated with attributing executive or parliamentary action (such as 
accepting a recommendation or enacting a legislative amendment) to the work of a 
parliamentary committee;15 
                                                 
 
12 For examples of other evaluations of the role parliamentary committees play in rights protection see Benton 
and Russell, ‘Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight Committees’, above n 4; Griffith, above n 4; 
Halligan, above n 4; Williams and Reynolds, above n 1; Hiebert, ‘Parliamentary Review of Terrorism Measures’, 
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(2005) August About the House 55; Michael Rush, ‘Studies of Parliamentary Reform’ (1982) 20(2) Journal of 
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Hunt, Hayley Jane Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic 
Deficit (Hart Publishing, 2015) 39. David Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’ 
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Opportunity’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Jane Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights: 
Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart Publishing, 2015) 95; David Monk, ‘A Framework for Evaluating the 
Performance of Committees in Westminster Parliaments’ (2010) 16 Journal of Legislative Studies 1. 
15 See, eg, Malcolm Aldons, ‘Rating the Effectiveness of Parliamentary Committee Reports: The Methodology’ 
(2000) 15(1) Legislative Studies 22. 
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 the need to consider carefully whether all recommendations should be treated equally 
or whether some have greater or lesser importance;16 and 
 the lack of a clear or consistently applied conceptual framework or methodological 
approach.17 
The strategies employed in this thesis to address these challenges are set out below. 
1 Addressing the Challenge of Identifying an Agreed Function or Objective of Parliamentary 
Committees 
Given their dynamic membership and the political context in which they operate, it is not 
always easy to precisely identify the function or objective of an individual committee, 
particularly when the functions of the committee may be set out in broad or abstract terms. 
However, this does not mean that parliamentary committees do not have functions or 
objectives, or that their effectiveness cannot be measured. Rather, as discussed further below, 
it requires a careful analytical approach to draw together and distil the central features of the 
parliamentary committee system, and the specific role each individual committee plays within 
that system. This is addressed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, which articulates the key features of 
the Australian Parliament and explains how these features are reflected in the parliamentary 
committee system. Chapter 3 also traces the history of the development of the four 
parliamentary committees that form the focus of this research, specifying their particular 
functions and objectives from the perspective of a range of participants in the committee 
system, as well as the legal framework for their membership, powers and processes.18 
2 Addressing the Challenge of Executive Dominance 
Many scholars who examine parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms and parliamentary models of 
rights protection point to the challenge of overcoming the perceived structural weakness in the 
Australian Westminster system, derived from the dominance of the executive government over 
                                                 
 
16 Ibid; Monk, above n 14. 
17 Aldons, ‘The Methodology’, above n 15. 
18 This is complemented by the analysis in Chapter 4 relating to participation and legitimacy. 
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the legislature.19 As Feldman explains, governments generally seek to avoid scrutiny because 
they ‘value the freedom to make policy and to use their party’s majority in the Parliament to 
give legislative force to it’.20 This executive control can dominate the outcomes generated by 
parliamentary committees, particularly when combined with the ‘fact that Australian political 
parties have some of the strongest party discipline among their Westminster cousins in the UK, 
Canada and New Zealand’.21  
In addition, where governments are able to secure bipartisan support for their Bills, which in 
the federal Parliament is the case with at least 80 per cent of all Bills,22 the government may 
see no value in having legislation delayed by formal scrutiny or amendments.23 This can lead 
to findings that parliamentary committees in Australia generally enjoy a low level of influence 
and generate relatively few legislative amendments.24 It can also lead some to query the 
viability and desirably of measuring the impact of parliamentary committees at all.25  
But not all commentators consider Australia’s executive-centric parliamentary landscape to 
impede the capacity of parliamentary committees to effect change. For example, Longley and 
Davidson note that it is this potential for the executive to dominate the Parliament that makes 
the work of parliamentary committees so valuable within the constitutional context.26 Marsh 
also argues that parliamentary committees are well placed to fill the ‘representation gap’ that 
has emerged from Australia’s dominant political party system and an increasingly 
                                                 
 
19 See, eg, Hiebert, ‘Legislative Rights Review: Addressing the Gap Between Ideals and Constraints’, above n 14, 
41; Monk, above n 14, 7. 
20 Feldman, above n 14, 98. 
21 John Hirst, ‘A Chance to End the Mindless Allegiance of Party Discipline’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), 25 August 2010; see also Bruce Stone, ‘Size and Executive-Legislative Relations in Australian 
Parliaments’ (1998) 33(1) Australian Journal of Political Science 37. 
22 Bruce Stone, ‘Opposition in Parliamentary Democracies: A Framework For Comparison’ (2014) 29 
Australasian Parliamentary Review 19. 
23 See, eg, Hiebert, above n 14, 52; Janet Hiebert, ‘Governing Like Judges’ in Tom Campbell (ed), The Legal 
Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (2011) 40, 60-1. 
24 Williams and Reynolds, above n 1.  
25 Lindell, above n 13, 55. 
26 Lawrence D Longley and Roger H Davidson, ‘Parliamentary committees: Changing perspectives on changing 
institutions’ (1998) 4(1) Journal of Legislative Studies 1, 2.  
36 
 
differentiated and pluralised voting public it seeks (but largely fails) to serve.27 For other 
scholars, such as Aldons, the reality of executive dominance of Australian legislatures is of 
central relevance to evaluations of the effectiveness of parliamentary committees, but is not 
necessarily evidence of a fatal weakness in the system of parliamentary scrutiny.28 Rather, it 
should form part of the institutional context within which the roles and objectives of the 
parliamentary scrutiny system should be determined. 
In my research, I accept the reality of executive-dominated Australian parliaments, but this 
does not deter my investigation into the impact parliamentary committees have on the 
development and content of federal laws, or the contribution such committees make to rights 
protection in Australia. Rather, I seek to factor the executive-centric nature of the Australian 
landscape into my assessment framework in the following ways: 
(1) outlining the institutional context in which the parliamentary committee system 
operates and identifying the limitations this may place on the capacity of these 
committees to influence the content of proposed laws, and/or contribute to rights 
protection (addressed in Chapter 3); 
(2) identifying the key participants involved in the parliamentary committee system and 
documenting their views on the variations in legitimacy afforded to the four committees 
studied (addressed in Chapter 4); and 
(3) assessing three tiers of impact – legislative, public and hidden – of parliamentary 
scrutiny on counter-terrorism laws, acknowledging both the direct and indirect 
influence committees can have on the multi-stage rights review that occurs at the federal 
level in Australia (addressed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7). 
Having analysed the impact of the parliamentary committee system on the case study Acts, my 
research suggests that there is reason to take a slightly optimistic view of the Parliament’s 
capacity to resist the will of the executive, even when dealing with policy issues attracting 
                                                 
 
27 Marsh, above n 8. 
28 Aldons, ‘Problems with Parliamentary Committee Evaluation: Light at the End of the Tunnel?’ (2003) 18(1) 
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broad bipartisan support. Indeed, as discussed in Part III, it is this sometimes surprising 
capacity of the Parliament to push back against the will of the executive in the area of counter-
terrorism laws that makes this case study so pertinent when seeking to evaluate the role the 
committee system plays in rights protection in Australia.  
3 Addressing the Challenge of Attributing Executive or Parliamentary Action to 
Parliamentary Committees 
A number of scholars who have examined parliamentary committees in Australia and 
elsewhere have pointed to the difficulties associated with attributing particular executive or 
parliamentary action (including legislative amendments) to parliamentary scrutiny.29 For 
example, Benton and Russell have warned that: 
it is impossible to determine accurately whether a committee was causally responsible for 
recommendations being implemented or whether the government was influenced by the wider 
policy community. Often the same groups giving evidence to committees are lobbying 
government as well. In this sense counting recommendation success could overestimate 
committee influence. On the other hand, there are ways in which counting successful 
recommendations may underestimate the committee’s importance. For example, if there is 
behind-the-scenes influence by the chair during telephone calls and meetings with ministers, 
or changes in policy as a result of ministers and officials preparing for committee hearings.30 
Others have noted that executive acceptance of parliamentary committees’ recommendations 
cannot always be taken at face value and may not in fact translate into legislative or policy 
change.31  
The assessment framework employed in this thesis incorporates features that address these 
salient warnings. Most significantly, this thesis tests findings relating to the legislative impact 
of parliamentary committees against empirical evidence obtained through interviews with 
                                                 
 
29 See, eg, Hiebert, above n 14, 39; Janet L Hiebert, Charter Conflicts: What Is Parliament’s Role? ( McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2002); Murray Hunt, ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act on the Legislature: A 
Diminution of Democracy or a New Voice for Parliament?’ (2010) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 601; 
Feldman, above n 14. 
30 Benton and Russell, ‘Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight Committees’, above n 12, 766–7. 
31 Ibid; D Hawes, ‘Parliamentary Select Committees: Some Case Studies in Contingent Influence’ (1992) 20 
Policy & Politics 227.  
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public servants, parliamentary staff, parliamentary counsel, committee members and Chairs, 
submission makers and parliamentarians. This is in line with the approach endorsed by 
Tolley,32 Aldons,33 and Benton and Russell,34 who suggest that this kind of qualitative approach 
is crucial to making an objective and holistic assessment of a committee’s impact. As former 
Committee Secretary to the SSCSB Stephen Argument has noted, these behind-the-scenes 
perspectives on the parliamentary scrutiny system can be critical both to determining how 
parliamentary committees work in practice and to evaluating their impact and effectiveness.35 
As noted above, this also aligns with Stephenson’s approach to analysing models of rights 
protection,36 as it prompts an investigation into both the direct and indirect contributions 
parliamentary committees make to rights review at the federal level in Australia. 
In addition to drawing upon empirical evidence in publicly available sources to substantiate 
findings, the assessment framework also has regard to the following considerations identified 
by Benton and Russell: 
 the style, reputation and culture of the committee, including the personality, 
effectiveness and partisan affiliation of the Chair (addressed in Chapter 4);37 
 the nature of the policy area, and the broader policy community, being considered by 
the committee (addressed in Chapter 3);38 
                                                 
 
32 Tolley, above n 4, 48.  
33 Aldons, ‘The Methodology’, above n 15. 
34 Benton and Russell, ‘Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight Committees’, above n 12, 793. 
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38 Ibid 782. 
39 
 
 the media attention given to the findings and recommendations made by committees 
(addressed in Chapter 5).39  
4 Addressing the Lack of a Clear Methodological Approach 
Some scholars have lamented the lack of a clear or consistently applied methodological 
approach to evaluating the effectiveness of parliamentary committees.40 For example, Aldons 
said: ‘What I find lacking from my research on and familiarity with parliamentary committees 
in the past two decades is the general absence of sound methodology. The Australian academic 
evaluation cupboard is bare.’41 
In this context, my research provides a unique opportunity to articulate a methodical, 
transparent template for evaluating parliamentary committees that responds to the challenges 
posed by past scholars and is capable of being adapted to apply in comparable jurisdictions. 
The assessment framework set out below adopts a transparent method of evidence collection 
and evaluation across three different tiers of impact (discussed below), and incorporates the 
common features of successful past evaluation models. These common features are:  
(1) clearly articulates the functions of parliamentary committees within their respective 
institutional context (addressed in Chapter 3);42  
(2) considers the power or status of the individual committee, within the broader political 
context (addressed in Chapters 3 and 4);43 
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(3) analyses a broad range of evidence, including direct testimony from those involved in 
the committee process, as well as evidence of legislative change that can be attributed 
to the work of committees44 (addressed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7); and 
(4) differentiates between significant and non-significant committee impact (addressed in 
Chapters 5 and 6).45  
The key features of the assessment framework employed in my research are outlined below. 
C The Assessment Framework Adopted in this Thesis  
As noted above, in this thesis I adopt an assessment framework specifically designed to 
evaluate the impact of parliamentary committees on the development and content of federal 
laws. Like Stephenson, my research recognises the multi-stage rights review that occurs at the 
federal level in Australia, and the assessment framework actively looks for direct and indirect 
contributions to resolving disagreements on rights between and within institutions of 
government.46 My assessment framework also shares features with the approach adopted by 
Evans and Evans in their 2006 research investigating the Australian Parliament’s role in rights 
protection. Like the Evans and Evans model, my assessment framework is multi-staged and 
specifically designed to take account of the ‘particular conceptual complexities of rights and 
the institutional peculiarities of legislatures’.47 By building on the qualitative strategies 
                                                 
 
44 See, eg,Benton and Russell, ‘Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight Committees’, above n 12, 793. 
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employed by Evans and Evans and adopting an explicit three-tiered impact analysis,48 my 
methodology identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the parliamentary model of rights 
protection and uncovers new opportunities for the model to be improved.49 The contextualised 
features of my assessment framework (such as inquiries into a committee’s legitimacy or 
political authority among key participants) also allows for considerations of what Campbell 
and Morris have described as the ‘political approach’ to human rights, where value is attributed 
to the political protection and promotion of human rights, as an alternative to, or in addition to, 
specific legislative or judicial protection of legally enforceable rights.50 As discussed below, 
my methodology has also been developed with close regard to the international rights-
mechanism evaluation model developed by the Dickson Poon School of Law. 
D The Dickson Poon School’s Effectiveness Framework  
In 2013 the Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London, commenced an 18-month 
project looking at the effectiveness of the UK’s Joint Committee on Human Rights (the UK 
JCHR).51 The project involved academics and high-level policy makers from nine countries as 
well as the United Nations, and aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of parliaments in overseeing 
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Executive Summary; see also 2. 
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human rights.52 The key output from the project was the development of a framework for 
determining the effectiveness of parliamentary human rights oversight mechanisms (‘the 
Dickson Poon Framework’).53 
The Dickson Poon Framework relies on the identification of a clear goal for the system of 
parliamentary oversight of human rights being assessed or developed, and recognises that this 
goal may have both ‘aspirational’ and ‘operative’ elements.54 It also has regard to the system’s 
relevant stakeholders and constituencies, and their needs and interactions with the oversight 
mechanism.55 The legitimacy of the oversight mechanism – that is, the level of political 
authority and respect it receives from its stakeholders and constituencies – is also critical to the 
Dickson Poon Framework.56 
Importantly, the Dickson Poon Framework aims to take into account the institutional context 
of the Parliament within which the mechanism operates, recognising the law and policy-making 
power of the executive branch of government.57 With this in mind, the Dickson Poon 
Framework sets out three tiers of ‘impacts’ that can be used to measure the oversight 
mechanism’s effectiveness. These three tiers are ‘legislative impacts’, ‘public impacts’ and 
‘invisible impacts’. This tiered approach allows the Dickson Poon Framework to consider 
methodically the pre-introduction as well as the post-introduction impact of the mechanism. 
These features of the Dickson Poon Framework are particularly useful in the context of 
evaluating parliamentary committees in Australia and directly address a range of the evaluation 
challenges identified above.58 In addition, the Dickson Poon Framework has been developed 
and tested by a group of multi-disciplinary experts across a range of international 
                                                 
 
52 Ibid 2. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid Executive Summary.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid 3.  
58 For example, the Dickson Poon Framework recognises the importance of legislative impacts, but acknowledges 
that this should form only one part of a broader effectiveness analysis and demands consideration of the ‘real-life’ 
experiences of those working behind the scenes as part of this process. Ibid 3, 6–9. 
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jurisdictions,59 and provides a template that facilitates the collection and analysis of a range of 
different sources of evidence, including interview material. As discussed below, the tiered 
approach to determining impact employed in the Dickson Poon Framework is reflected in the 
key steps in the assessment framework used in this thesis. 
E Key Steps in the Assessment Framework  
The four key steps of the assessment framework employed in this thesis are summarised in 
Table 1.1. 
Figure 1 Steps in the Assessment Framework 
 
 
1 Step 1: Set Out the Institutional Context in Which the Parliamentary Committee System 
Operates 
As discussed above, the first step in any successful evaluation of the effectiveness of 
parliamentary models of rights protection is to understand the institutional context in which 
                                                 
 
59 This group of experts also included Professor Andrew Byrnes, who has extensive experience working with 
parliamentary committees in Australia, including through his role as the inaugural legal advisor to the PJCHR. 
1: Understand the institutional context
The Australian 
institutional context is 
described in Chapter 3.
2: Identify the role, funtion and objectives of the parliamentary committee system
The functions and 
objectives of the 
Australian committee 
system are set out in 
Chapter 3.
3: Identify key participants and test legitimacy of the 
four committees studied
Key participants are 
identified and views on 
legitimacy are considered 
in Chapter 4.
4: Consider three tiers of 
impact on case study Acts
Legislative impact is 
considered in Chapter 5.
Public impact is 
considered in Chapter 6.
Hidden impact is 
considered in Chapter 7.
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such models operate. The Australian federal parliamentary landscape is set out in Chapter 3, 
along with the Australian experience of enacting counter-terrorism laws since 2001. Chapter 3 
also briefly outlines the history of federal parliamentary committees, providing important 
contextual information about why and when particular committees were established and the 
role the committee system plays within Australia’s federal parliamentary model of rights 
protection.  
The counter-terrorism case study used in this thesis necessitates a focus on the following four 
parliamentary committees that are regularly involved in scrutinising or inquiring into 
Australia’s counter-terrorism laws: the SSCSB, the Senate Standing Committees on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs (the LCA Committees), the PJCIS and the PJCHR. 
The history, functions and legal frameworks governing these committees are outlined in detail 
in Chapter 3. The contribution of other parliamentary committees to Australia’s federal 
parliamentary model of rights protection is also noted in Chapter 3, but these other committees 
are not evaluated in detail.60 As discussed in Part III, further research is needed to confirm 
whether the findings made in this thesis apply across the full range of Australian parliamentary 
committees tasked with reviewing or scrutinising proposed laws. 
2 Step 2: Identifying the Role, Functions and Objectives of the Australian Parliamentary 
Committee System and the Particular Committees Studied 
Step 2 of the assessment framework, also undertaken in Chapter 3, clearly articulates the role, 
function and objective of each of the committees studied, and explains how these individual 
committees feed into Australia’s parliamentary model of rights protection. This is important as 
it demonstrates that not all of the four parliamentary committees are specifically designed to 
consider the rights compatibility of proposed laws. Some committees have other less rights-
                                                 
 
60 For example, this thesis focuses primarily on joint and Senate parliamentary committees, rather than House 
committees. This weighting towards Senate or joint committees is a consequence of the broader institutional and 
political dynamic operating at the federal level that regularly works to bypass robust scrutiny by committees in 
the House (wherein the government of the day often completely controls the references, time frames and 
membership of committees) in favour of references to Senate or joint committees (wherein the government has 
less control). I also note that, as the case studies employed in this thesis concern legislation, I will not directly 
evaluate the impact of the Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances (SSCRO); however, the 
key features of the SSCRO are considered in Chapter 3, Section B. For further discussion, see Dennis Pearce and 
Stephen Argument, Delegated Legislation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2012) 93. 
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explicit functions and objectives, such as improving the operational effectiveness of the 
proposed law (in the case of the PJCIS) or providing a deliberative forum for the public to 
express their views on a proposed law (in the case of the LCA Committees). As discussed in 
Part III, these other roles can offer important opportunities for individual committees to 
contribute to Australia’s parliamentary model of rights protection, particularly when they are 
undertaken in conjunction with the work of rights-specific scrutiny committees such as the 
PJCHR and the SSCSB. 
3 Step 3: Identifying Key Participants and Determining Legitimacy 
The next step in the assessment framework identifies the key participants in the parliamentary 
committee system and looks for evidence of whether particular committees are seen as 
legitimate61 by some or all of these participants. The key participants in the parliamentary 
committee system include: 
 parliamentarians; 
 elected members of the executive government; 
 submission makers and witnesses to parliamentary committee inquiries; 
 public servants and government officers; 
 government agencies, including law enforcement and intelligence agencies; 
 independent oversight bodies; and 
 the media. 
As Chapter 4 explains, rates of participation and diversity of participants differ across the 
committees studied, as does the level of legitimacy attributed to each body. This provides 
important insights into how each committee contributes to the parliamentary model of rights 
protection.62  
                                                 
 
61 The concept of ‘legitimacy’ is outlined further below and in Chapter 4.  
62 See, eg, Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia, above n 10, 2; John Uhr, ‘Parliamentary Measures: 
Evaluating Parliament’s Policy Role’ in Ian Marsh (ed), Governing in the 1990s: An agenda for the decade 
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(a) The Idea of Legitimacy  
According to the Macquarie Dictionary definition, something is seen as ‘legitimate’ when it is 
in ‘accordance with established rules, standards or principles’ or ‘genuine’ or ‘proper’.63 
However, the term ‘legitimacy’ has different meanings and attributes depending on the context 
in which it is used.64 In this thesis, as in the Dickson Poon Framework, ‘legitimacy’ refers to 
‘political legitimacy’, which generally denotes a quality of political institutions, political actors 
and the laws and policies that they make.65 A wealth of literature exists on the topic of political 
legitimacy and the meaning attributed to this term has been contested and developed over 
time.66 Some scholars, such as Weber, interpret political legitimacy descriptively, using it to 
describe how people feel about political authority and/or their political obligations (such as 
whether they accept the authority of a particular political institution, and the need to obey its 
commands).67 Others, such as Rawls and Ripstein, see political legitimacy as a normative 
concept: a way to measure whether the exercise of political power or authority is accepted or 
seen as justified by the community it serves.68 Political legitimacy has also been discussed in 
                                                 
 
(CEDA/Longman, 1993) 347; Dominique Dalla-Pozza, ‘Promoting Deliberative Debate? The Submissions and 
Oral Evidence Provided to Australian Parliamentary Committees in the Creation of Counter-terrorism Laws’ 
(2008) 23(1) Australasian Parliamentary Review 39. 
63 C Yallop, J R L Bernard, D Blair, S Butler, A Delbridge, P Peters and N Witton (eds), Macquarie Dictionary 
(Macquarie Library, 4th edn, 2012) 817.  
64 For an overview of these different meanings see Fabienne Peter, ‘Political Legitimacy’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online, last updated 24 April 2017) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/>. 
65 Ibid. 
66 See, eg, David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Palgrave, 2002); Allan Buchanan, ‘Political Legitimacy 
and Democracy’ (2002) 112(4) Ethics 689; Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy (Mary J Gregor ed, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); Jack Knight and James Johnson, ‘Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of 
Democratic Legitimacy’ (1994) 22 Political Theory 277; Bernard Manin, ‘On Legitimacy and Political 
Deliberation’ (1987) 15 Political Theory 338; Thomas Nagel, ‘Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy’ (1987) 
16(3) Philosophy and Public Affairs 215; Patrick Riley, Will and Political Legitimacy (Harvard University Press, 
1982); Piers Norris Turner, ‘“Harm” and Mill’s Harm Principle’ (2014) 124(2) Ethics 299; Francis Fukuyama, 
‘Why Is Democracy Performing So Poorly?’ (2015) 26(1) Journal of Democracy 11. 
67 Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in H H Gerth and C Wright Mills (eds), Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 
(Routledge, 1991); Talcott Parsons (ed), Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Free 
Press, 1964). 
68 See, eg, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1993); John Rawls, Political Liberalism 
(Columbia University Press, 1993); John Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas’ (1995) 92(3) Journal of Philosophy 132; 
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, 1999); Johan Rawls, Lectures on the History of 
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the context of representative democracy and deliberative democracy theories, connecting the 
process of political decision making with the notion of legitimacy, as well as (or sometimes 
instead of) the substance of the political decision itself.69 It is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to explore these different articulations of ‘political legitimacy’; however, the use of the term in 
this thesis is infused with both descriptive and normative aspects and, as discussed further in 
Chapter 4, has a clear connection to deliberative democracy theory, particularly in so far as it 
intersects with the above discussion relating to rates of participation.  
For many years, the scholarly debate on political legitimacy has typically focused on 
developing nations or supranational structures such the European Union or the United Nations 
(UN).70 The political legitimacy of modern Western liberal democracies such as Australia – 
with its stable, democratic features, enduring Constitution and relatively high levels of public 
accountability – has generally been taken for granted. Within the political discourse in 
Australia, the legitimacy of any given executive government at the federal level may be subject 
to more public debate, such as where a major political party fails to secure a strong majority in 
the House or an individual parliamentarian is elected on a particularly tight margin.71 But even 
                                                 
 
Political Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 2007); Arthur Ripstein, ‘Authority and Coercion’ (2004) 31(1) 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 2. 
69 See, eg, Bernard Manin, ‘On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation’ (1987) 15 Political Theory 338; Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract (Hackett, 1988); Philip Pettit, ‘Deliberative Democracy and the 
Discursive Dilemma’ (2001) 11 Philosophical Issues 268; James Boham, Public Deliberation (MIT Press, 1996); 
James Boham, ‘Deliberative Democracy and Effective Social Freedom: Capabilites, Resources, and 
Opportunities’ in James Bohman and William Rehg (eds), Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and 
Politics (MIT, 1997) 321; Ron Levy and Grahame Orr, The Law of Deliberative Democracy (Routledge, 2016) 
4-7, 196-200. 
70 See, eg, Fukuyama, above n 68; Isabelle Ley, ‘Opposition in International Law – Alternativity and Revisibility 
as Elements of a Legitimacy Concept for Public International Law’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 717; David Beetham and Christopher Lord, Legitimacy and the EU (Longman, 1998); Cristian Niţoiu, The 
EU foreign policy analysis: democratic legitimacy, media, and climate change (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); 
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Public Contestation’ (2013) 39(1) Review of International Studies 71; Shaun Nairne, ‘State Sovereignty, Political 
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71 See Brenton Prosser and Richard Dennis, ‘Minority Government and Marginal Members: New issues for 
Political and Policy Legitimacy in Australia’ (2015) 36(4) Policy Studies 434; Brenton Prosser and Richard 
Dennis, ‘Policy in the Margins: New Issues for Parliamentary Legitimacy and Accountability’ (Paper presented 
at the Policy and Politics Conference 2014, Bristol, United Kingdom, September 2014) 1–14. 
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in this context, the political authority of the Australian Government in the descriptive or 
normative sense is rarely seriously questioned.  
Having said this, in recent years, some scholars and commentators have begun to question 
whether we are moving into an era in which citizens no longer trust their national governments, 
and are disillusioned with their state’s political institutions, even in stable Western democracies 
such as Australia.72 Political phenomena such as ‘Brexit’,73 the election of Donald Trump as 
the President of the United States,74 the re-emergence of far right parties such as One Nation75 
and growing socio-economic inequality within nation-states76 have all been cited as examples 
of voter dissatisfaction with conventional politics and parliamentary processes, and may be 
seen as indicators of a loss of political legitimacy by national governments or parliaments.  
This thesis does not seek to elucidate these issues or evaluate the overall legitimacy attributed 
to the Australian Government, focusing instead on the particular question of the legitimacy of 
the parliamentary committee system as seen by its key participants. The findings made with 
respect to legitimacy are also limited by the characteristics of the key participants considered 
in this study, many of whom could be described as parliamentary ‘insiders’, and may not be 
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representative of the broader community.77 Despite this, there is no doubt that the findings 
reported in Chapter 4 have relevance to the broader question of the political legitimacy of the 
Australian Parliament. This is because the views of those working within the parliamentary 
system tell us something important about which features of the system attract the most respect, 
and generate the most political authority. The attributes of the parliamentary committee system 
that give rise to high levels of legitimacy in the eyes of a range of participants may, for example, 
point to opportunities for building resilience within the broader parliamentary system in the 
face of emerging global and local political challenges. Similarly, those attributes of the 
committee system that are seen as less legitimate by key participants may uncover particular 
vulnerabilities within the broader Australian Parliament. The broader implications of these 
findings are discussed further in Part III, where further research is recommended to help 
determine their relevance beyond the case study considered in my research. 
One of the additional benefits of explicitly considering rates of participation and views on 
legitimacy is to guard against the some of the methodological challenges identified above, 
particularly those relating to the structural power dynamic occurring between the Parliament 
and the executive and within the executive itself. The level of legitimacy attributed to a 
particular committee can both indicate and reflect a shift in this structural power dynamic that 
will be relevant to evaluating the impact of the committee, and its capacity to play a rights-
enhancing role. For example, the evidence presented in Part II suggests that, when submission 
makers consistently prioritise one parliamentary committee over another (extending it greater 
legitimacy), the preferred committee has a much stronger legislative impact, and important 
rights-enhancing changes can be made to the laws it scrutinises or reviews. 
4 Step 4: Measuring the Impact of Formal Parliamentary Scrutiny 
Step 4 is the most intensive and detailed step in the assessment framework. It aims to determine 
what impact a particular committee, and the committee system more broadly, is having on the 
proposed law. This step, which is addressed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, examines the three levels 
of impact across the twelve Bills in the counter-terrorism case study. 
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(a) Legislative Impact 
Legislative impact focuses on whether a committee, or the committee system, has done 
something that has directly changed the content of a law. There are many reasons why 
legislative impact is an attractive basis for evaluating the effectiveness of parliamentary 
committees. Chief among these is the fact that legislative impact can be expressed in 
quantitative terms. For example, it is possible to look at the recommendations made by a 
parliamentary committee and compare these to any amendments made to a Bill prior to 
enactment and reach a conclusion on whether the committee has had an impact. However, as 
discussed above, if legislative change is the sole impact measured, the evaluation may be blind 
to other, potentially more significant, impacts of the parliamentary committee system, and can 
in turn miss identifying precisely how the system contributes to Australia’s parliamentary 
model of rights protection. For these reasons, the assessment framework adopted in this thesis 
also considers public impact and impacts largely hidden from public view.  
(b) Public Impact 
As Halligan observes, ‘the extent to which parliamentary committees contribute to discourse 
and deliberation on public policies is a highly important aspect of their work, by which they 
should be judged’.78 In this thesis, this is described as ‘public impact’. In other words, my 
research looks for evidence that the work of the parliamentary committee has influenced or 
been considered in public or parliamentary debate on a case study Bill, or in subsequent 
commentary or review of a case study Act. For example, evidence of public impact could 
include: 
 unsuccessful amendments introduced to address parliamentary committee 
recommendations; 
 changes to an Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Bill as a result of a 
committee recommendation; and  
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 reference to the findings or recommendations of a committee in parliamentary and 
public debates on the Bill, reports or transcripts of other parliamentary committees, or 
reports of other relevant oversight bodies or non-parliamentary review mechanisms. 
‘Public impact’ also considers the capacity of the parliamentary committees to gather and 
disperse information, or bring new voices into the public debate.79 As discussed in Chapter 6, 
there is a strong relationship between evidence of ‘public impact’ and parliamentary 
committees’ role in providing a deliberative forum for the consideration of a wide range of 
views on a proposed law.80 When considered in concert with Step 2 (relating to legitimacy), 
evidence of ‘public impact’ can also be used to demonstrate what Aldons has described as the 
‘power’ or ‘influence’ of the committee in its institutional context.81 
(c) Hidden Impact 
The most unique and arguably most valuable aspect of the assessment framework employed in 
this thesis is the use of empirical evidence gained from targeted interviews with participants to 
uncover the ‘hidden impact’ of parliamentary committees on the content and development of 
the case study Acts. This part of the framework asks whether those at the coalface of developing 
and drafting counter-terrorism laws turn their mind to the work of parliamentary committees 
when undertaking their tasks, and considers whether this has a rights-enhancing impact.  
The ‘hidden impact’ of the parliamentary committee system, and particular components of that 
system, is considered in detail in Chapter 7. Evidence of ‘hidden impact’ includes evidence of: 
 improved or growing ‘rights literacy’ among those directly involved in the legislative 
and policy development process; 
                                                 
 
79 See, eg, Malcolm Shaw, ‘Parliamentary Committees: A Global Perspective’ (1998) 4(1) Journal of Legislative 
Studies 225; Griffith, above n 4. 
80 This is discussed further in Chapter 6 where the work of Dalla-Pozza and Uhr is considered. See, eg, Uhr, 
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 scrutiny principles or criteria, or past committee findings, being taken into account or 
anticipated in the legislative and policy development process; and/or 
 scrutiny principles or criteria, or past committee findings, being incorporated into 
public servant training manuals or guidelines. 
As discussed above, collecting evidence of the hidden impact of parliamentary committees can 
be challenging due to the need to look beyond documentary sources and consider more 
subjective material including interviews but, as Evans and Evans and Benton and Russell have 
shown in their empirical-based work,82 it is not impossible. Much publicly available material 
exists that points to the hidden impacts of scrutiny, including training manuals, published 
guidelines, information in annual reports, and submissions and oral evidence given at 
parliamentary and other public inquiries and hearings. This material can then be tested against 
a range of targeted individual interviews I conducted with key participants in this process.  
5 Conduct of Interviews  
As outlined in detail in Appendices A and B, I conducted a total of 40 interviews as part of this 
research. These interviews were conducted with public servants (including departmental 
officers and agency officials), parliamentary counsel, parliamentary committee secretariat 
staff, other parliamentary staff, current and former parliamentarians, submission makers, and 
independent oversight bodies. The information derived from these interviews has proven 
critical to testing the veracity of all forms of impact measured in this thesis, as well as testing 
the findings and recommendations made in Part III. Formal ethics approval was obtained to 
conduct the interviews, as detailed in Appendix A. 
The interviews are not designed to provide a statistically significant or fully representative 
sample of the views of the key participants in the parliamentary committee system. The 
selection of interviewees was no doubt influenced by subjective factors including location, 
availability and familiarity. Having said this, efforts were made to ensure that the views of a 
broad spectrum of participants were considered, and that a balance was struck in terms of 
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experience, expertise and political allegiance. A full list of interviewees is provided in 
Appendix B. 
Each interview was designed to be approximately one hour in duration and semi-structured in 
form, covering the following general topics: 
 the participant’s involvement in either (a) the development or review of the case study 
Acts or (b) parliamentary committees; 
 any specific parliamentary committee experiences the participant has been involved in, 
with a focus on the development, scrutiny or review of the case study Acts;  
 the participant’s views on the (a) legislative impact, (b) other visible impacts and (c) 
hidden impacts of parliamentary committees on proposed laws; and 
 the participant’s perspective on which particular features of the committee system work 
well and why. 
The interviews were not designed to illicit any confidential or security-sensitive information, 
but rather to gain an insight into how the parliamentary committee system works in practice. 
All interviewees were provided with the opportunity to participate on an anonymous or semi-
anonymous basis, and to review the material published in this thesis. I am sincerely grateful to 
all interviewees for participating in my research.  
6 Risk Mitigation Components of the Assessment Framework 
As noted above, my assessment framework has been carefully developed to address the 
challenges associated with evaluating parliamentary committees discussed earlier in this 
chapter. However, a number of additional strategies are employed to strengthen the findings 
made in this thesis, and to demonstrate their broader applicability beyond the particular 
committees studied and the case study Acts. These strategies include applying a high threshold 
to attributing legislative change to the work of parliamentary committees, for example by 
requiring evidence of either direct attribution to the work of the committee in the revised 
Explanatory Memorandum accompanying any successful legislative amendments, or a direct 
quotation from a relevant first-hand participant, such as the responsible Minister. As noted 
above, the assessment framework also tests information gained as a result of interviews against 
54 
 
publicly available written materials to help identify any subjective factors that may influence 
the views or perspectives offered by particular participants in the committee system. 
Finally, this thesis actively addresses the potential limitations of the counter-terrorism case 
study. As noted in Chapter 1, while the counter-terrorism case study has some exceptional 
socio-political features, it also contains Bills of diverse character and content and allows for a 
variety of scrutiny experiences to be examined over a 15-year period and across different 
governments and parliaments. This helps guard against any risk that the findings made in this 
thesis will have limited broader application. Part III also sets out a range of recommendations 
designed to facilitate further research to confirm the broader applicability of the findings made 
in this thesis. 
Taken together, the methodology employed in this thesis is deliberately designed to respond to 
the challenges identified by other scholars with experience in evaluating parliamentary 
committees. This in turn allows for robust findings to be made regarding the impact of the 
parliamentary committees on the development and content of proposed laws, and the 
contribution the system makes to Australia’s parliamentary model of rights protection. While 
I acknowledge that further research is necessary to confirm that my findings have applicability 
beyond the case study example, I am confident that the methodology I employ provides a useful 
template for others wishing to understand or evaluate the performance of parliamentary 
committees in Australia and in other comparable jurisdictions. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE AUSTRALIAN LANDSCAPE AND THE MAKING OF COUNTER-
TERRORISM LAWS 
As outlined in Chapter 2, understanding the institutional context of Australia’s parliamentary 
committee system is critical when evaluating the impact of this system on the case study Acts 
and identifying options to improve its rights-enhancing capacity. This chapter introduces the 
Australian parliamentary committee system, with a particular focus on the four committees 
studied and how they fit within the broader parliamentary landscape. It also sketches some of 
the domestic and international circumstances in which Australia’s modern counter-terrorism 
framework was developed and introduced. This chapter lays the foundation for a more detailed 
exploration of how parliamentary committees interact with the different law-making 
institutions at the federal level and the role they played in directly and indirectly identifying 
and addressing rights issues within the case study Acts.1 
A The Parliamentary Committee System and the Australian Parliament 
1 Parliamentary Committees and the Features of the Australian Parliament 
The Australian Constitution diffuses power in two different ways: through its bicameral, 
federal structure and through the doctrine of the separation of powers.2 Both of these features 
inform the structure and function of the modern parliamentary committee system, and provide 
an important source of its legitimacy. For example, the bicameral, federal nature of Australia’s 
constitutional structure gives rise to two differently constituted Houses of Parliament, which in 
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turn work as an effective check on each other in the law-making process.3 The parliamentary 
committee system provides the practical forum for both Houses to fulfil these roles, and is 
particularly critical to the Senate’s role in providing a ‘check’ on the legislative activities of 
the House of Representatives, which is in practice dominated by members of the executive 
government.  
The doctrine of responsible government4 is also a defining feature of the Constitution and 
informs the character of the parliamentary committees considered in this thesis.5 For example, 
by subjecting government legislative proposals to public scrutiny and by providing a forum for 
Ministers and their delegates to be questioned, the system provides a ‘fairly direct line of 
accountability from the people who elect the members of parliament to the executive’.6 The 
doctrine of responsible government also helps to explains why the parliamentary committee 
                                                 
 
3 See James Odgers, Australian Senate Practice (Commonwealth of Australia, 13th ed, 2012) ch 1, in particular 
4–5. See also D Shell, ‘The history of bicameralism’ (2001) 7(1) Journal of Legislative Studies 13; S Bennett, 
‘The Australian Senate’ (Research Paper No 6, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2004) 2. For 
judicial consideration of the bicameral features of the Constitution see, eg, Western Australia v Commonwealth 
(1975) 134 CLR 201 (Barkwick CJ); Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424; McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 
186 CLR 140; Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 81. 
4 Generally speaking, ‘responsible government’ means that the constitutionally enshrined Head of State (in 
Australia’s case the Queen represented by the Governor-General) acts on the advice of his or her Ministers who 
are directly responsible for their actions to the Parliament, and the people. Commonwealth v Kreglinger & Fernau 
Ltd (1926) 37 CLR 393, 413. See also Hume and Williams, above n 2, 127. For a historical perspective see Samuel 
Griffith, ‘Notes on Australian Federation: Its Nature and Probable Effects’ [1896] Australian Colonial Law 
Monographs 2, 17, quoted in John Quick and Robert Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian 
Commonwealth (Lexis Nexus, Revised ed, 2014) 704. 
5 For judicial consideration of the doctrine of ‘responsible government’ in Australia see, eg, Egan v Willis (1996) 
40 NSWLR 650, 660 (Gleeson CJ), 447–5 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ) and 501 (Kirby J); Egan v 
Chadwick (1999) 46 NSWLR 563. See also Robert Menzies, Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth 
(Cassell, 1967) 54; Hume and Williams, above n 2, 127; Brian Galligan, Senate Committees – can they halt the 
decline of Parliament, Parl Paper No 12 (1990); Bill Hayden, ‘Senate Committee and Responsible Government’ 
(Speech delivered at the Conference to mark the twentieth anniversary of Senate Legislative and General Purpose 
Standing Committees and Senate Estimates Committees, Canberra, 3 October 1990). For further background on 
the origins of the doctrine see Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 262–
7; for commentary on the doctrine’s operation in Australia see, eg, M Spry, ‘Ministerial Responsibility: Its 
Changing Content’ (Research Note No 8, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 1995). 
6 Brian Galligan, Parliamentary Responsible Government and the Protection of Rights, Parl Paper No 18 (1992). 
See also Samuel Griffith, ‘Notes on Australian Federation: Its Nature and Probable Effects’ [1896] Australian 
Colonial Law Monographs 2, 17, quoted in Quick and Garran, above n 4, 704; R G Menzies, Central Power in 
the Australian Commonwealth (Cassell, 1967) 54. The doctrine of responsible government is also reflected in 
parliamentary practices such as question time, and the requirement that the executive government provide 
information to parliamentary committees: see Hume and Williams, above n 2, 217. 
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system is seen by some as an attractive form of rights protection, when compared with other 
models that incorporate specific roles for the judiciary in the determination of rights disputes.7  
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty8 is also at the heart of Australia’s exclusively 
parliamentary model of rights protection, and provides an important legitimising basis for the 
parliamentary committee system. This principle was the primary practical and normative focus 
of the framers of the Constitution, and it remains at the centre of modern democratic discourse 
in Australia.9 As Goldsworthy explains, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty invests a 
single law-making body elected by the people with the power to respond to emerging issues 
and needs, and to modify outdated laws.10 A sovereign parliament also forms part of what Hart 
has described as a ‘rule of recognition’,11 providing the criteria for determining the validity of 
other laws, and seen as binding by the most senior participants in the system.12 
The final feature of the Australian Parliament that is particularly relevant to the committee 
system is the role and dominance of political parties.13 Australia’s strong party-political culture 
                                                 
 
7 See, eg, Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Legislative Sovereignty and the Rule of Law’ in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing 
and Adam Tomkins (eds), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2001) 69; Adrienne Stone 
‘The Australian Free Speech Experiment and Scepticism about the UK Human Rights Act’ in Tom Campbell, 
Keith Ewing and Adam Tomkins (eds), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2001) 391. 
See also Louise Chappell, John Chesterman and Lisa Hill, The Politics of Human Rights in Australia (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) 67–9. 
8 In his seminal 1885 work, Albert V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 
1889), Dicey explained that the principle of parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament has the 
constitutional ‘right to make or unmake any law whatever’, and, further, that no person or body has the legal right 
to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament, at 39–40. For a modern interpretation of this principle by the 
English Courts see R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2006] 1 AC 262, 302 (Lord Steyn). See also Hume and 
Williams, above n 2, 68.  
9 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Clarendon Press, 1999) 1. For 
judicial consideration of the application of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty in Australia see, eg, McGinty 
v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, [22], [38], [42], [58], [65]–[69]; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd 
v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106. 
10 Goldsworthy, above n 9, 1; see also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010) 17. 
11 H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1994) 92; Goldsworthy, above n 9, 1, 239.  
12 Goldsworthy, above n 9, 1, 239. See also Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates, 
above n 10, 17.  
13 Although political parties are not mentioned in the text of the Constitution, it is clear that the framers were alive 
to the dominant political philosophies of the time. Goldsworthy, above n 9, 185. See also G S Reid and Martyn 
Forrest, Australia’s Commonwealth Parliament 1901–1988: Ten Perspectives (Melbourne University Press, 
1989); John Hirst, ‘A Chance to End the Mindless Allegiance of party Discipline’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), 25 August 2010; Bruce Stone, ‘Size and Executive-Legislative Relations in Australian Parliaments’ 
(1998) 33 Australian Journal of Political Science 37, 38.  
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informs the functions and objectives of the committee system and helps to define the limits of 
what it can realistically achieve. Party politics can mean that the law-making functions of the 
House are regularly synonymous with the will of the executive. In that case the Senate – and 
in particular the Senate committee system – becomes the only real forum for debating laws and 
contesting policy.14 Alternatively, the electorate can elect candidates who are not aligned with 
the major political parties, leading to a ‘hung Parliament’ (where neither major party holds a 
clear majority in the House), or a scenario where a minor party or a group of independents 
holds the balance of power in the Senate. The influence of party politics may also be evident 
within parliamentary committees, particularly in the case of joint committees dominated by 
members of the House, or Senate committees that enjoy government majorities or that are 
chaired by powerful minority party or independent Senators.  
Some take the view that, as the dominance of political parties rises, the potential for the 
carefully designed Australian parliamentary system to offer robust scrutiny of executive action 
decreases.15 However, like all of the features of the Parliament discussed in this chapter, the 
rise and dominance of political parties is a dynamic rather than static phenomenon. As will be 
explored further in Part III, party politics is thus crucial to understanding how the Parliament 
and its subsidiary bodies work, but it too can be contested and subject to change.  
2 Parliamentary Committees and the Functions of the Parliament 
The key features of the Parliament discussed above help inform the Parliament’s primary 
functions, which are to represent the people of Australia, and to make laws for those people.16 
The Parliament also has features designed to delineate law-making power (such as the 
separation of powers that is evident in Chapter 3 of the Constitution) and to protect the rights 
of citizens from the unbridled will of the executive (such as the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty and the bicameral structure of the Parliament). It is in this context that the 
                                                 
 
14 Marian Sawer, Norman Abjorensen and Philip Larkin, Australia: The State of Democracy (Federation Press, 
2009) 153–4. See also Bruce Stone, Australian Bicameralism: Potential and Performance in State Upper Houses, 
Parl Paper No 40 (2005). 
15 See, eg, David Feldman, ‘Democracy, Law and Human Rights: Politics as Challenge and Opportunity’ in 
Murray Hunt et al (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart Publishing 
2015) 95, 98. 
16 See, eg, Commonwealth v Tasmania (‘Tasmanian Dam case’) (1983) 158 CLR 1, [6], [29]; Lange (1997) 189 
CLR 520, 557; see also Parliament of Australia, About Parliament, Parliament of Australia (2016) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament>; Hume and Williams, above n 2, 127. 
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parliamentary committee system plays a crucial role.17 For example, both Houses regularly rely 
on the committee system to fulfil their law-making function. This is because, as Griffith and 
Ryle note, both Houses spend most of their time responding to the policy initiatives or 
legislative proposals of the government of the day.18 In this way, Parliament’s law-making 
function can be described as a scrutiny function. It is a forum to debate the content, effect and 
policy merits of laws proposed by the executive government. The committee system allows the 
Parliament to ‘outsource’ this legislative scrutiny function at key points in the process, by 
referring a Bill to a particular Senate, House or joint committee for inquiry and report. As 
Marinac has observed, the committee system is the ‘means by which the Senate can deal with 
its massive workload without sacrificing the detailed scrutiny which is the raison d’être of a 
house of review’.19  
The Parliament also relies heavily on the committee system to give meaning to its constitutional 
commitment to representative democracy by providing a forum for members to hear directly 
from the people they represent.20 The committee system offers all members the opportunity to 
contribute to the law-making process, regardless of their ministerial or shadow ministerial 
status. In this way, the committee system can also be described as a means of facilitating 
deliberative democracy,21 which is based on the notion that democracies should provide for 
informed, reflective and cooperative decision making and policy development.22 As Levy and 
Orr explain, ideally deliberative law making should be inclusive, and open-minded, where key 
participants speak and well as listen and reach ‘beyond rudimentary, majortarianism to 
                                                 
 
17 See, eg, Simon Evans and Carolyn Evans, ‘Australian Parliaments and the Protection of Human Rights’ (Paper 
presented in the Department of the Senate Occasional Lecture Series, Canberra, 8 December 2006). 
18 J A G Griffith and Michael Ryle with M A J Wheeler-Booth, Parliament: functions, practice and procedures 
(Sweet and Maxwell, 1989) 5. 
19 Anthony Marinac, ‘The Usual Suspects? Civil Society and Senate Committees’ (Paper submitted for the Senate 
Baker Prize, 2003) 129. For example, in the year 2015, the Senate sat for a total of 60 days and passed 177 separate 
Acts. In 2010, the Senate sat for only 46 days and passed 150 Acts. 
20 In House and joint committees, the government of the day generally holds the position of Chair and enjoys the 
support of the majority of members. For further discussion see Elaine Thompson, ‘The Senate and Representative 
Democracy’ (Senate Brief No 10, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 1998).  
21 John Uhr, Deliberative democracy in Australia: the changing place of parliament (Cambridge University Press, 
1998) 10–11. See also Ron Levy and Graeme Orr, The Law of Deliberative Democracy (Routledge, 2016). 
22 Ron Levy, ‘The Law of Deliberative Democracy: Seeding the Field’ (2013) 12(4) Election Law Journal 355, 
355; Levy and Orr, above n 21, 22-23. See also Sawer, Abjorensen and Larkin, above n 14, 4. 
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accommodate other democratic values’.23  Dalla-Pozza suggests that there are two primary 
ways in which the parliamentary committee system helps the Parliament to achieve its 
deliberative function.24 The first is through the practical capacity of committees to ‘reach out’ 
to the community by inviting written submissions and holding public hearings. This ensures 
that a wider range of interests are consulted25 and also provides what Odgers has described as 
‘an opportunity for proponents of divergent views to find common ground’.26 This also has 
similarities to what Marsh has called an ‘understanding of policy issues amongst relevant 
participants, including legislators, public servants, ministers, interest groups, the media and the 
broader community’.27 The second is through the act of scrutiny itself, which Uhr describes as 
‘at the heart of the work of a deliberative assembly’.28  
The parliamentary committee system also allows the Parliament to fulfil its constitutional role 
of holding the executive government to account for its exercise of legislative power.29 Senate 
committees play a particularly important role in holding the executive to account and have 
developed procedural features that guard against the type of executive dominance that often 
infects the House committee system.30 Among these are the standing ‘technical’ scrutiny 
committees that inquire into every Bill and regulation (rather than waiting for a referral from 
one of the Houses of Parliament) and the powers of Senate committees to hold hearings into 
estimates of government expenditure.31  
                                                 
 
23 Levy and Orr, above n 21, 4. 
24 Dominique Dalla-Pozza, ‘The Conscience of Democracy? The Role of Australian Parliamentary Committees 
in Enacting Counter-Terrorism Laws’ (Paper presented at the Australasian Law and Society Conference, 
December 2006) 20–1.  
25 Kelly Paxman, Referral of Bills to Senate Committees: An Evaluation, Parl Paper No 31 (1998) 76. 
26 Odgers, above n 3, 366. See also Marinac, above n 19, 129. 
27 Ian Marsh, Can Senate Committees Contribute to Social Learning, Parl Paper No 45 (2006) 1. 
28 John Uhr, Deliberative democracy in Australia: the changing place of parliament (Cambridge University Press, 
1998) 149–50. 
29 Gabrielle Appleby, Alexander Reilly and Laura Grenfell (eds), Australian Public Law (Oxford University Press, 
2nd ed, 2014) 103–4. See also Hayden, above n 5.  
30 Reid and Forrest, above n 13, 190. 
31 Gabrielle Appleby, Alexander Reilly and Laura Grenfell (eds), Australian Public Law (Oxford University Press, 
2nd ed, 2014) 106. While not the focus of this thesis, Senate Estimates hearings constitute one of the primary ways 
the Parliament can fulfil its function of holding the executive to account as they provide ‘an opportunity for 
opposition Senators to question directly officers of the public service who are proposing the items of expenditure 
under consideration’: at 106. 
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Finally, as discussed in Chapter 1, the parliamentary committee system also makes a central 
contribution to Parliament’s rights-protecting function.32 Committees are tasked with alerting 
the Parliament to executive actions that unduly interfere with individual rights or freedoms, or 
abrogate certain rule of law principles.33 Committees also arm members of the public, including 
sophisticated submission makers, with the information they need to challenge or question the 
merits of proposed law or policy that may have particular rights implications for groups within 
the Australian community.34 As discussed in Chapter 1, many scholars have questioned both 
the effectiveness of the committee system at performing this function, and the appropriateness 
of relying on this form of rights protection in Australia.35 However, regardless of whether 
Australia’s parliamentary model of rights protection is viewed as strong or weak, the committee 
system is an undisputed and central component of Australia’s parliamentary model of rights 
protection. This makes evaluating the impact of parliamentary committees on rights-engaging 
laws particularly important.  
                                                 
 
32 Even before the introduction of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2010, the parliamentary 
committee system was regularly identified as the central pillar in the Australian parliamentary model of rights 
protection. See, eg, Commonwealth of Australia, Common Core Document forming part of the Reports of State 
Parties – Australia – incorporating the Fifth Report under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the Fourth Report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (June 
2006) 5–6 <http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/themes/human-rights/Documents/core_doc.pd>.  
33 As Galligan notes: ‘Much of what the Senate actually does has more to do with protecting individual citizens’ 
rights than states’ rights or executive responsibilities. … An institution such as the Senate can help make 
government responsible by defending and promoting individuals’ interests in having duly processed government’: 
Galligan, above n 6.  
34 For example, in its submission to the PJCIS challenging key features of the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014, the Law Council of Australia referred to the PJCHR’s previous analysis of the 
human rights compatibility of the control order regime (submission 16), and its submission to the PJCIS’s 2010 
inquiry into the potential reforms of National Security Legislation. The Gilbert and Tobin Centre for Public Law 
(submission 36) referred to a range of past committee inquiries, including the Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs Committee’s 2006 inquiry into amendments to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 
1979 (Cth). Further examples are provided in Chapter 6. 
35 See Evans and Evans, ‘Australian Parliaments and the Protection of Human Rights’, above n 17, 543–69. See 
also James Stellios and Michael Palfrey, ‘A New Federal Scheme for the Protection of Human Rights’ (2012) 69 
Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 13; David Kinley and Christine Ernst, ‘Exile on Main Street: 
Australia’s Legislative Agenda for Human Rights’ (2012) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 58; Rosalind 
Dixon, ‘A New (Inter)national Human Rights Experiment for Australia’ (2012) 23 Public Law Review 75; Hugh 
Mannreitz, ‘Commonwealth Statements of Compatibility – Small Steps, Early Days’ (2012) 71 Human Rights 
Law Centre Bulletin 8; Bryan Horrigan, ‘Reforming Rights-Based Scrutiny and Interpretation of Legislation’ 
(2012) 37 Alternative Law Journal 228; George Williams and Lisa Burton, ‘Australia’s Exclusive Parliamentary 
Model of Rights Protection’ (2013) 34 Statute Law Review 58, 81.  
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B The Emergence of the Australian Parliamentary Committee System 
From the above discussion, it may be tempting to think that committees have always been a 
part of the Australian Parliament; however, in reality it took many years to establish the 
sophisticated system of committees that operates today.36 The first Standing Committee37 to be 
established was the Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances (SSCRO) in 
1930.38 It was tasked with scrutinising proposed regulations to ensure that they are: 
(a) in accordance with the statute; 
(b) do not unduly trespass on personal rights and liberties; 
(c) do not unduly make the rights and liberties of citizens dependent upon administrative and 
not upon judicial decisions; and  
(d) do not contain matter more appropriate for parliamentary enactment.39 
As Grenfell documents, these scrutiny principles initially attracted criticism, including on the 
basis that they invited inquiries of a ‘political character that would be better dealt with by 
lawyers, judges or the Senate as a whole’.40 However, over time the SSCRO has emerged as ‘a 
pioneering chapter in legislative scrutiny across the Westminster world’41 and proven 
influential in the development of future committees, including those considered in my research. 
                                                 
 
36 Odgers, above n 3, ch 16. 
37 Select Committees of the Senate emerged as the first parliamentary committees on the Commonwealth scene, 
followed by the establishment of two joint committees (Public Accounts and Public Works) in 1913. Subsequently, 
a third category, Standing Committees, was introduced to provide for committees with more permanent 
membership and powers. See Reid and Forrest, above n 13, 368–70; Odgers, above n 3, ch 16.  
38 Laura Grenfell, ‘An Australian Spectrum of Political Rights Scrutiny: Continuing to Lead by Example?’ (2015) 
26(1) Public Law Review 19, 21. 
39 See SSCRO, Parliament of Australia, Report (1930) 23. The original 1930 wording of the fourth principle 
provided: ‘that they are concerned with administrative detail and do not amount to substantive legislation which 
should be a matter for parliamentary enactment’. See Grenfell, above n 3838, 22. 
40 As Grenfell observes, the acceptance of these scrutiny principles was not automatic across the Parliament and 
attracted attention from the Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, Senator Pearce, who expressed the view that 
the Committee’s prescribed terms of reference were of a legal or political character that would be better dealt with 
by lawyers, judges or the Senate as a whole. Grenfell, above n 38, 22, quoting from Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, Senate (8 May 1930); Evidence to Senate Select Committee on Standing Committees, 
Parliament of Australia (Canberra, 4 February 1930); and Senate Standing Committee on Standing Committees, 
Parliament of Australia, Report (1930).  
41 John Uhr, ‘The Performance of Australian Legislatures in Protecting Rights’ in Tom Campbell, Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy and Adrienne Stone (eds), Protecting Rights Without a Bill of Rights: Institutional Performance and 
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The next significant development in the history of the federal committee system occurred in 
the late 1950s when the well-respected Clerk of the Senate, James Odgers, travelled to the 
United States to study the American committee system.42 Upon his return, he provided a report 
to the Senate43 recommending the introduction of a system of Senate Standing Committees to 
‘watch and appraise the administration of the laws and to inform public opinion in relation to 
certain defined fields of governmental operations’.44 No action was taken for many years, until 
parliamentary committees made a cameo appearance in Gough Whitlam’s 1967 federal election 
campaign, with the Labor Party promising to establish a Senate committee system if elected to 
office.45  
Following the election, Senator Lionel Murphy became Leader of the Opposition in the Senate 
and, with the support of Odgers and a band of backbenchers, began a robust campaign to 
establish a strong Senate committee system.46 Proposals were put for both Estimates and 
General Purpose committees, and in a single night in 1970 (with the help of the Queensland 
Liberal dissident Ian Wood who crossed the floor) seven Legislative General Purpose 
Committees and five Estimates Committees were established in the Senate.47 Each of these 
committees had six members, three chosen by the government and three nominated by the 
Leader of the Opposition in the Senate in consultation with any minority group or groups, or 
independent Senators or Senator.48 This system was later reflected in the Standing Orders, and 
                                                 
 
Reform in Australia (Ashgate, 2006) 41, 50. This was the first of the single House standing committees in 
Australia. See J Halligan, R Miller and J Power, Parliament in the Twenty-First Century: Institutional Reform 
and Emerging Roles (Melbourne University Press, 2007) 44. 
42 Outside of the establishment of the SSCRO, until World War II ‘both Houses of Parliament were relatively 
passive about the use of select, standing and joint committees’. It was the war-time political environment that 
prompted the most strident innovations in parliamentary oversight of executive action. See Reid and Forrest, 
above n 13, 373. 
43 Parliament of Australia, Report on the United States, Senate, Parliamentary Paper No 36 (1956). 
44 Parliament of Australia, Report on the United States, Senate, Parliamentary Paper No 36 (1956), quoted in Anne 
Millar, The World of Senate Committees, Parl Paper No 12 (1991) vi. 
45 Millar, above n 44, vii. 
46 Ibid. A report prepared by Odgers was tabled in March 1970, which led to a Senate debate in June 1970 wherein 
general agreement was reached with respect to the need for a comprehensive standing committee system.  
47 Following the resolution, the Sydney Morning Herald reported on 3 November 1970 that the introduction of the 
new, wide-ranging committee system would ‘make the red-carpeted Upper House potentially the most powerful 
parliamentary chamber in Australia’. Millar, above n 44, vi–vii. 
48 Reid and Forrest, above n 13, 375. 
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the Senate’s Legislative and General Purpose Standing Committees became an entrenched part 
of the Australian parliamentary culture, particularly in the Senate.49 
The next important landmark occurred in 1981, with the establishment of the SSCSB. The 
SSCSB’s origins are intrinsically linked to the work of the SSCRO, which had become 
increasingly active in its scrutiny of delegated legislation. It became clear to some 
parliamentarians that legislative provisions were being enacted that ‘would never have survived 
the scrutiny of the [SSCRO]’50 and that a specific committee tasked with scrutinising Bills 
against a similar set of criteria was urgently needed.51 This was reflected in a recommendation 
made by the Senate Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee in 1978 that a new Joint 
Committee on Scrutiny of Bills be established.52 The initial scrutiny criteria recommended for 
the proposed joint committee were ambitious in scope and the recommendation was not well 
received at the time.53 Despite this, support began to build for the new committee54 and 
sometime later a compromise proposal was put. It involved the Senate Constitutional and Legal 
Affairs Committee undertaking the work of the proposed SSCSB for a six-month probationary 
period, applying a narrower range of scrutiny to mirror that of the SSCRO. This was accepted 
by the Parliament, and the scrutiny of Bills work commenced.55 The early SSCSB was able to 
survive its probationary period, and became a separate committee. It also began to produce one 
of its most valued outputs, the Alert Digest.56 
The late 1980s saw the beginning of a number of procedural reforms to the committee system, 
including changes in 1989 to provide for ‘the systematic referral of bills to legislative and 
general purpose standing committees’ through what became the Senate Standing Committee 
                                                 
 
49 Ibid 467. 
50 Dennis Pearce, ‘Ten Years of Scrutiny’ (Seminar to mark the tenth anniversary of the Senate Standing 
Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Canberra, 25 November 1991) 4 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Scrutiny_of_Bills/Completed_inquiries>. 
51 Senator Alan Missen was one of these parliamentarians and the Chair of the Senate Constitutional and Legal 
Affairs Committee at that time. Ibid 5. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid; Barney Cooney, ‘Ten Years of Scrutiny’ (Seminar to mark the tenth anniversary of the Senate Standing 
Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Canberra, 25 November 1991) 13–14. See also Grenfell, above n 38, 25. 
54 Senator Missen slowly built up support for the idea among a broader group of parliamentarians, including 
Senators Tate and Hamer. Pearce, above n 51. 
55 Ibid 6. 
56 The SSCSB’s practice of issuing Alert Digest reports is discussed further below. 
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on the Selection of Bills.57 The implementation of these reforms saw a rapid increase in the 
number of Bills referred to Senate Standing Committees for inquiry and report.58 Then, in 1994, 
the previously separate Estimates and Senate General Purpose Standing Committees 
amalgamated. This gave rise to the system of ‘paired’ committees that we see today. Under this 
system, committees are allocated subject areas (such as legal and constitutional affairs) and 
perform functions of estimates and legislative and general-purpose standing committees. These 
pairs of committees include one with responsibilities for reviewing legislation (with 
government Chairs and government majorities) and the other for reference inquiries (with non-
government Chairs and non-government majorities).59 These pairs of committees are also 
supported by professional secretariat staff and sometimes external expert advisors.60  
By the time the Howard Government won the 2004 federal election, the paired standing 
committee system had resulted in dozens of public hearings and numerous reports each year, 
compared with the much smaller handful of reports the committee system had procedure prior 
to the pairing reforms.61 Bills were regularly referred to standing committees for inquiry – 
including at times to references committees, who often took a more critical approach to review 
and scrutiny.62 The Howard Government responded by making changes to the system that 
would effectively revert to the pre-1994 arrangements. Instead of a system of ‘pairs’ of 
                                                 
 
57 Kelly Paxman, Referral of Bills to Senate Committees: An Evaluation, Parl Paper No 31 (1998) 76; see also 
Odgers, above n 3, 446–7. According to Senator Childs, the system also aimed to ‘replace some of the time-
consuming debate in the committee of the whole by referring legislation to the appropriate standing committee 
where the relevant minister may, at times, be in attendance’: Bruce Childs, The Truth About Parliamentary 
Committees, Parl Paper No 18 (1992). 
58 Up from 30 Bills in the period 1970–80 to 279 Bills during the time between 1990 and 1996. See Odgers, above 
n 3, 446–7. 
59 Each committee was comprised of six Senators: three appointed by government, and the other three by the 
Leader of the Opposition in the Senate in consultation with independents and minor parties. The legislation 
committees had government-appointed Chairs with casting votes, assuring a government majority. In contrast, the 
references committees had non-government Chairs, and thus non-government majorities. Odgers, above n 3, 446–
7.  
60 See, eg, Senate Standing Committees on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, About this committee (2017) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs>. 
61 For example, during the period 2002–04 the Senate Standing Committees on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
conducted a total of 23 inquiries (9 conducted by the References Committee and 14 by the Legislation Committee) 
compared with a total of 17 inquiries that were conducted by the committee during the entire period between 1987 
and 1996. 
62 For example, from 1996 to 2005 legislation was referred to references committees on 146 occasions instead of 
legislation committees. Nick Minchin and Claire Moore, Committees Under a Government-Controlled Senate: 
Lessons From 2005–08, Parl Paper No 54 (2010). 
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committees, each standing committee would resume both legislative and general purpose 
functions and be chaired exclusively by a government member, effectively providing each 
committee with a government majority.63 Unsurprisingly, this change was strongly opposed by 
the Labor opposition and the minor parties, who accused the government of ‘completely 
trashing the Senate committee system and destroying the accountability of government to the 
Senate’.64 However the move did not appear to lead to a substantive decrease in committee 
inquiries into government Bills.65 By 2009, the Rudd Government had reversed the relevant 
changes66 and the refreshed ‘paired’ committee system was reflected in the Senate Standing 
Orders.67 This remains the broad structure for the Senate standing committees operating today. 
C Committees Examined in Detail in this Thesis 
1 Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee 
(a) Membership, Scrutiny Mandate and Outputs 
The modern SSCSB is established under Senate Standing Order 24, and comprises six Senators, 
three nominated by the government, and three members nominated by the opposition in 
consultation with any minor parties or independent senators.68 The Chair of the SSCSB is 
appointed on the nomination of the Leader of the Opposition in the Senate and enjoys a casting 
vote.69 The SSCSB is supported by a secretary, secretariat staff and an external legal advisor. 




65 For example, under the ‘paired’ system, the Senate Standing Committees on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
conducted 28 inquiries during the period December 2004 until March 2006. The ‘unpaired’ Legislation Committee 
then conducted 23 inquiries from September 2006 until October 2007. 
66 In 2008 the Senate Standing Committee on Procedure recommended reverting back to the post-1994 system of 
paired committees, but with some changes designed to limit the ‘doubling up’ of inquiries into the same Bill by 
legislation and references committees. Senate Standing Committee on Procedure, Parliament of Australia, First 
Report 2008 (2008). 
67 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order, Chapter 5, Orders 17 to 39. 
68 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 24(2)(a) (2017).  
69 SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the future direction and role of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee 
(2012) [2.5]. 
67 
Standing Order 24 also sets out the committee’s scrutiny mandate.70 It requires the SSCSB to 
consider whether Bills or Acts: 
 trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties; 
 make rights, liberties or obligations unduly dependent upon insufficiently defined 
administrative powers; 
 make rights, liberties or obligations unduly dependent upon non-reviewable decisions; 
 inappropriately delegate legislative powers; or 
 insufficiently subject the exercise of legislative power to parliamentary scrutiny.71  
The SSCSB has recently described its five scrutiny principles as broadly reflecting ‘themes of 
good governance; administrative fairness and accountability; and parliamentary propriety 
(maintaining appropriate parliamentary engagement with the legislative process)’.72 While the 
committee exercises its discretion when it comes to articulating the detail of its scrutiny 
criteria,73 it has recently provided examples of some of the issues it has commented on with 
respect to the scrutiny principle relating to personal rights and liberties. These include the use 
of coercive powers; breaches of the privacy of individuals; the right to vote; the use of strict 
liability provisions; and the abrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination.74 As will be 
                                                 
 
70 See Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Orders 23, 24. 
71 Unlike the SSCRO, the SSCSB does not produce guidance material detailing the content of the scrutiny 
principles it applies; however, since 2015 it has published an online newsletter Scrutiny News, along with its 
regular alerts and reports to ‘highlight key aspects of the Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee’s work’. SSCSB, 
Scrutiny News (2017) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Scrutiny_of_Bills/Scrutiny_News>. 
72 SSCSB, Submission to ALRC, Traditional Rights and Freedoms – Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws 
(2014). 
73 Ibid. For example, in the committee’s submission to the Australian Law Reform Commission’s Traditional 
Rights and Freedoms Inquiry, it explained that ‘[I]t is also open to committee members (within the scope of 
standing order 24) and the Senate to determine the scope and focus of the committee’s work. The committee is 
not constrained by any specific framework for determining matters falling within its principles (unlike, for 
example, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights whose work is based in international human rights 
standards and jurisprudence).’. 
74 SSCSB, Future direction and role of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee, above n 69, [3.5]. The SSCSB’s heavy 
focus on legal process rights was noted by Evans and Evans in their 2006 study of Australia’s parliamentary model 
of rights protection. For example, in their 2006–07 study on Australian parliaments and the protection of human 
rights, Evans and Evans observed that the SSCSB ‘comments on one-half to two-thirds of the ICCPR issues raised 
by legislative proposals. It, and to an even greater extent its counterpart delegated legislation committee, are 
sometimes able to secure amendments to legislation to better secure protection of some rights and liberties. But 
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discussed further in Parts II and III, the types of rights the SSCSB focuses on, and the way it 
talks about rights, gives the committee particular advantages when it comes to having a strong 
hidden impact on counter-terrorism laws, and in contributing Australia’s parliamentary model 
of rights protection.  
When conducting its scrutiny work, the SSCSB employs a ‘dialogue model’ in which the 
committee and ministers ‘communicate through correspondence published in the committee’s 
publications’.75 This is supported by the provision of swift legal analysis by the legal advisor 
to the committee, which forms the basis of the SSCSB’s Alert Digest on the Bill.76 This short 
summary report alerts the reader to the key issues or questions arising from the Bill relevant to 
the SSCSB’s scrutiny criteria. This is then followed by a final report, which contains the 
committee’s conclusions, having considered any responses it may have received from 
questions posed to the proponent Minister. The SSCSB’s conclusions are generally couched in 
terms of ‘raising scrutiny concerns with particular provisions of a Bill’, and the committee 
regularly leaves the question of whether and how the provision should be amended ‘to the 
Senate as a whole to consider’.77 It very rarely recommends specific legislative amendments.  
The requirement to scrutinise all Bills and legislative instruments gives rise to a heavy 
workload for the committee.78 This means it can be difficult for the SSCSB to table its final 
report on a Bill prior to the completion of parliamentary debate. As discussed in Chapter 6, this 
                                                 
 
its approach is narrowly focused on civil liberties issues and its coverage is far from complete.’ Evans and Evans, 
above n 17. 
75 Senator Cooney, ‘Ten Years of Scrutiny’ (Seminar to mark the tenth anniversary of the Senate Standing 
Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Canberra, 25 November 1991) 17–18. See also SSCSB, Ten Years of Scrutiny 
– A Seminar to Mark the Tenth Anniversary of the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills (1991); 
ALRC, Traditional rights and Freedoms report, above n 71, [2.23]; SSCSB, Future direction and role of the 
Scrutiny of Bills Committee, above n 69, [3.5], [2.12]–[2.14]. 
76 In 2017, the SSCSB began publishing its scrutiny comments on recently introduced Bills (including responses 
received on matters previously considered by the committee) in one report, the Scrutiny Digest. However, the 
Scrutiny Digest continues to be divided into initial reports on the Bill (previously called ‘Alert Digests’, now 
called ‘Initial Scrutiny’) and concluding reports on the Bill (previously called ‘Reports’ now called ‘Commentary 
on Ministerial Responses’). See, eg, SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Scrutiny Digest No 7 of 2017 (21 June 
2017).  
77 See e.g. SSCSB, Submission to the ALRC, Traditional Rights and Freedoms – Encroachments by 
Commonwealth Laws (2014). 
78 For example, the SSCSB reported that: ‘[f]rom 2001 to 2011 the committee considered a total of 2524 bills and 
commented on 1144 or 45.3 per cent of these bills. During the same period 574 bills or 22.7 per cent of all bills 
were amended. Of the amended bills the committee commented on 125 amendments or 21.8 per cent.’ SSCSB, 
Future direction and role of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee, above n 69, [2.25]. 
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often depends on the SSCSB receiving a timely response from the relevant Minister to its 
requests for further information.79 
To address these challenges, the SSCSB pushed for Standing Order 24 to be amended to 
empower the committee to ‘maintain on its website a list of bills in relation to which the 
committee has sought advice from the responsible minister and not yet received a response’.80 
The Standing Order was amended in November 2017 and also provides that, where the SSCSB 
has not been able to complete a final report on the Bill because a ministerial response has not 
been received, then any senator may ask the Minister for an explanation why a response was 
not received,81 which can be followed by a motion without notice, recording the Minister’s 
response or failure to respond.82 
In addition to producing and tabling Alert Digests and reports, the SSCSB also reports on 
matters which have been referred to it by the Senate, such as the 2006 Inquiry into Entry, Search 
and Seizure Provisions in Commonwealth Legislation,83 and produces a regular ‘scrutiny news’ 
newsletter on key issues arising from its scrutiny work.84  
As discussed further in Part III, one of the particular strengths of the SSCSB is the way it 
provides accessible analysis of a Bill to other committees, and to submission makers to inquiry-
                                                 
 
79 See SSCSB, Submission to the ALRC, Traditional Rights and Freedoms – Encroachments by Commonwealth 
Laws (2014). The SSCSB recently explained that: ‘Processes relevant to the committee’s work are substantially 
based on cooperation, and founded on expectations and practices the committee has built of the years in terms of 
requests for information and the desirability of being able to report fully before legislation is considered by 
Parliament. The scrutiny committee does not have any formal procedure measures available to it to ensure a timely 
response from Ministers (in contrast with the Regulations and Ordinances Committee, which can utilize the 
disallowance process under the Legislative Instruments Act 2003), and ultimately it is a question for the Senate 
and Parliament as a whole as to the final form of a bill as passed.’ 
80 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 24(1)(d) (17 November 2017). See also Interview with B 
(Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
81 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 24(1)(e) (17 November 2017). 
82 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 24(1)(f)–(g) (17 November 2017). 
83 This inquiry was one of only five public inquiries conducted by the SSCSB, the others being SSCSB, Future 
direction and role of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee, above n 70; SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Accountability 
and Standing Appropriations (2005); SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, The Quality of Explanatory Memoranda 
Accompanying Bills (2004); SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into absolute and strict liability offences in 
Commonwealth Legislation (2002). 
84 SSCSB, Scrutiny News (2017) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Scrutiny_of_Bills/Scrutiny_News>. Since 
October 1993, SSCSB has also issued annual reports and undertaken a monitoring role with respect to certain 
areas of legislative activity, including national scheme legislation and legislation that includes standing 
appropriations. SSCSB, Future direction and role of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee, above n 70, [2.14]–[2.15]. 
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based committees. Since 2012, the SSCSB has been actively seeking to increase its 
communication with other parliamentary committees to ensure that they are alerted to issues 
raised by the SSCSB in a timely manner.85 For example, since 2012 Standing Order 24 provides 
that the SSCSB’s comments on Bills ‘stand referred to legislation committees inquiring into 
those bills’.86 The SSCSB also has ‘informal, but effective, communication channels’ to the 
SSCRO and the PJCHR,87 and, as will be explored further in Part II, the work of the SSCSB 
features frequently in the submissions to and reports of the other committees. 
(b) A Technical Scrutiny Committee? 
The SSCSB has consistently seen its role as providing ‘technical scrutiny’ of proposed laws 
rather than an evaluation of the policy merits of each Bill. For example in 2012, the SSCSB 
said that it: 
takes a strictly non-partisan, apolitical and consensual approach to its work, which has a 
significant influence on the capacity of the committee to meet its objectives. Such an approach 
is possible because the committee’s usual practice is not to focus upon policy intent but to 
undertake a focused examination of legislation in light of Standing Order 24.88 
As discussed further below, the SSCSB’s ‘technical scrutiny’ character gives it broad 
legitimacy in the eyes of a range of key participants in the committee system and important 
strengths when it comes to influencing the pre-introduction development of laws.89 However, 
it is important to keep in mind that this ‘technical scrutiny’ role is self-imposed, rather than 
prescribed by Standing Order 24. In fact, the Standing Order provides ‘considerable latitude 
for the committee to reinterpret its role’.90  
                                                 
 
85 SSCSB, Future direction and role of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee, above n 70, [7.8]; SSCSB, Submission to 
ALRC, above n 79. 
86 SSCSB, Future direction and role of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee, above n 70, Recommendation 13; SSCSB, 
Submission to ALRC, above n 71.  
87 SSCSB, Future direction and role of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee, above n 70 [7.8]; SSCSB, Submission to 
ALRC, above n 71. 
88 SSCSB, Future direction and role of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee, above n 69, [2.10]. The committee recently 
reaffirmed this view in its submission to the ALRC: see SSCSB, Submission to ALRC, above n 79. 
89 See discussion in Chapter 4, Section B and Chapter 8. 
90 SSCSB, Future direction and role of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee, above n 70, [3.22]. 
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Some key participants have debated whether the SSCSB’s role should be confined to ‘technical 
scrutiny’, or whether it should serve a broader, social justice objective by preventing undue 
legislative interference with personal rights and liberties.91 For example, when speaking at the 
tenth anniversary of the SSCSB, Uhr suggested that the committee could build upon its current 
role of ‘adding to the total information bank available to the Senate [about a Bill]’ by putting 
forward a ‘preferred outcome, actually to fix things up’.92 For Uhr, this would be a legitimate 
role for the SSCSB and necessary for the committee to maintain a relevant and respected role 
in Parliament.93  
The technical scrutiny character of the SSCSB is considered in further detail in Parts II and III 
of my thesis, and is directly relevant to both the overall impact the committee system has on 
the development and content of case study Acts and rights protection in Australia.  
2 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security 
The PJCIS is a statutory committee with origins that trace back to the 1970s. Since the 
establishment of ASIO, successive parliaments have been keen to ensure specific parliamentary 
oversight of the workings of Australia’s key national security agencies, and the country’s 
national security laws.94 The need for parliamentary oversight became even more acute 
following the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001,95 and a number of 
specialist oversight bodies have since been established at the federal level, including the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation, 
Australian Secret Intelligence Service and Defence Signals Directorate (the PJC on ASIO, 
ASIS and DSD), which was introduced to review and report on how intelligence agencies use 
                                                 
 
91 Ibid [3.26]. 
92 John Uhr, ‘Ten Years of Scrutiny’ (Seminar to mark the tenth anniversary of the Senate Standing Committee 
for the Scrutiny of Bills, Canberra, 25 November 1991) 75, 81–2. 
93 Ibid 81–2. 
94 See Parliament of Australia, History of the Intelligence and Security Committee (2016) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/History_of_the_I
ntelligence_and_Security_Committee>. See also Commonwealth, Royal Commission on Intelligence and 
Security, Final Report (1977). See also Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Independent Intelligence 
Review (2017) 112–13. 
95 Philip Flood, Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies (2004) 51 
<https://fas.org/irp/world/australia/flood.pdf>. See also Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Independent 
Intelligence Review (2017) 112–13. 
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their powers.96 In 2004 the powers of this committee were expanded to keep pace with 
legislative developments97 and in 2005, the PJC on ASIO, ASIS and DSD was renamed the 
PJCIS.98  
The functions of the PJCIS are prescribed by statute99 and have changed regularly since the 
committee’s establishment.100 They broadly relate to reviewing the administration, expenditure 
and performance of the ‘Australian Intelligence Community’101 and reviewing the operation, 
effectiveness and implications of a number of specific national security laws.102 The PJCIS is 
not authorised to initiate its own references, but may resolve to request the responsible Minister 
to refer a particular matter to it for review.103 The PCJIS’s membership is also prescribed104 
                                                 
 
96 In March 2002, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation, 
Australian Secret Intelligence Service and Defence Signals Directorate (the PJC ASIO, ASIS and DSD) was 
established, replacing the former Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, which was provided for under the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979. The committee’s first report was Advisory Report on the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (2002) which was 
followed by an annual report incorporating the committee’s first review of administration and expenditure of the 




97 For example, in March 2004, a provision was inserted into Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 requiring 
the committee to review any regulation proscribing a ‘terrorist organisation’ and report to Parliament before the 
end of the 15-day disallowance period. The review of listing of terrorist organisations under the Criminal Code 
became a core activity of the committee into the 41st Parliament. See Parliament of Australia, History of the 
Intelligence and Security Committee (2016) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/History_of_the_I
ntelligence_and_Security_Committee>.  
98 See Flood, above n 95, 51.  
99 Part 4 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) establishes the PJCIS and prescribes its membership and key 
functions. Schedule 1 of the Act provides further detail on how the PJCIS will go about its work.  
100 In the period between 2001 and 2015, the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) was amended 20 times, 
expanding the mandate of the PJCIS considerably. For example, the Australian Citizenship Amendment 
(Allegiance to Australia) Act 2015 (Cth) amended s 29 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) to require the 
PJCIS to review the operation, effectiveness and implications of ss 33AA, 35, 35AA and 35A of the Australian 
Citizenship Act 2007. Further changes to the mandate of the PJCIS were recommended by the Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, Independent Intelligence Review (2017), 8–9, 118–25, Recommendations 21 and 23.  
101 The Australian Intelligence Community is comprised of ASIO, ASIS, Australian Geospatial-Intelligence 
Organisation (AGO), Defence Intelligence organisation (DIO), Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) and Office 
of National Assessments (ONA). 
102 These include the control order and preventative detention order regime, ASIO’s questioning and detention 
powers, and the data retention regime. These reviews are discussed in further detail in Section D of this chapter. 
103 Section 29 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) also sets out matters beyond the scope of the PJCIS, 
including reviewing the intelligence gathering and assessment priorities of the intelligence agencies. 
104 Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) Part 4, s 28(2), Schedule 1 Part 3. 
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and comprises 11 members (five Senators and six members of the House) with a government 
Chair105 and a majority of government members.106 PJCIS members must be nominated by the 
Prime Minister and the Leader of the Government in the Senate. Although regard must be had 
to the ‘desirability of ensuring that the composition of the Committee reflects the representation 
of recognised political parties in the Parliament’,107 as at 2018 the membership of the PJCIS 
has been limited to Members and Senators from the major political parties. A secretary and 
professional secretariat staff support the PJCIS, including on occasion ‘secondee’ staff from 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies who provide technical assistance to the secretariat. 
Each member of the secretariat staff ‘must be cleared for security purposes to the same level 
and at the same frequency as staff members of ASIS’.108 As discussed in Part II, this tightly 
controlled membership and access to specialist staff gives the PJCIS particular strengths when 
it comes to influencing key legislative decision makers and receiving government support for 
its recommendations. It has also given rise to concerns about the nature of the PJCIS’s 
relationship with law enforcement and intelligence agencies.  
Like the LCA Committees, the PJCIS is an inquiry-based committee and has powers to call for 
witnesses and hold public and private hearings.109 The PJCIS regularly makes direct contact 
with potential submission makers, including relevant government departments, law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies, independent statutory offices such as the Inspector 
General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) and the Independent National Security Legislation 
Monitor (INSLM). However, unlike the other committees studied, the PJCIS has a specialist 
national security focus and a range of special powers that enable it to provide secure forums 
                                                 
 
105 The Chair of the PJCIS must be a government member elected by the members of the committee. Intelligence 
Services Act 2001 (Cth) Schedule 1, 16. When the committee commenced in 2005 it was chaired by the Hon 
David Jull MP. By 2015, the Chair was Mr Dan Tehan MP. 
106 Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) Schedule 1, 14. Ministers, Speakers and Presidents of the Senate are not 
eligible to become members of the PJCIS. House members of the committee must be appointed by resolution of 
the House on the nomination of the Prime Minister, following consultation with non-government parties. Senate 
members of the committee are appointed by resolution of the Senate on the nomination of the Leader of the 
Government in the Senate, following consultation with each non-government political party that is represented in 
the Senate. 
107 Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) sch 1, 14(5). 
108 Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) sch 1, 21. There is no similar requirement that members of the committee 
also have security clearance; however, as noted above, members must be appointed in accordance with sch 1(14), 
which requires appointment via resolution of the House or Senate, upon the nomination of either the Prime 
Minister or Government Leader in the Senate. 
109 Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) sch 1, pt 1. 
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for the consideration of classified national security information.110 In addition, the PJCIS must 
not publish in its report any operationally sensitive information or information that might 
prejudice Australia’s national security.111 These powers are supported by a range of offences 
for unauthorised disclosure of national security or operationally sensitive information.112 There 
are also a range of secrecy provisions that apply specifically to the members and staff of the 
PJCIS.113 As discussed in Part II, these special powers contribute to the PJCIS’s strong 
legitimacy among government departments and agencies, and help explain its comparatively 
strong impact on the content of the case study Acts. 
Like the LCA Committees, the PJCIS regularly cites the work of the SSCSB and the PJCHR 
in its reports and refers to the work of other parliamentary committees.114 There are also many 
instances where the PJCIS has carefully considered the work of other independent reviews of 
counter-terrorism laws or national security agencies.115 As discussed below, improving the 
collaborative capacity of the PJCIS is a focus of the reforms discussed in Part III of this 
research.  
3 Senate Standing Committees on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
The LCA Committees were established in 1970 pursuant to Senate Standing Order 25 and take 
the form of a pair of committees – the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation 
Committee (the LCA Legislation Committee) and the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
                                                 
 
110 For example, pt 1 of sch 1 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) provides that the PJCIS must not require 
a person or body to disclose to the committee operationally sensitive information or information that would or 
might prejudice Australia’s national security or the conduct of Australia’s foreign relations.  
111 The PJCIS is required to seek and follow the Minister’s advice on these matters prior to the publication of its 
reports. Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) sch 1, 7 
112 For example, under sch 1, cls 9–13 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) it is an offence to disclose or 
publish any evidence taken by the committee in a review conducted in private unless the disclosure is authorised 
in writing by the relevant agency head or has already been lawfully disclosed. 
113 For example, sch 1, cl 12 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) provides that the disclosure of any 
information acquired through being a member or staff member of the PJCIS for purposes other than the PJCIS’s 
function is an offence punishable by up to two years imprisonment. 
114 At times this can also include the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement, established in 
December 2013 to review the activities, functions and powers of the Australian Crime Commission and the 
Australian Federal Police. Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Act 2010 (Cth) s 5. 
115 These include independent reviews conducted by the Council of Australian Governments, the Inspector-
General of Intelligence and Security, the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor and independently 
appointed committees such as the Sheller Committee Review. These reviews are discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 5, Section A(5). 
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References Committee (the LCA References Committee) – each with a related but different 
mandate and membership. Both LCA Committees have six members and contain at least one 
member nominated by minority parties and/or independent senators.116 The LCA Legislation 
Committee has a government Chair with a casting vote (and therefore a government majority) 
and the LCA References Committee is chaired by a non-government Senator (providing it with 
a non-government majority).117 Standing Order 25 also provides that other Senators can be 
appointed to the LCA Committees as substitutes for existing committee members118 or as 
‘participating members’ for particular inquiries.119 As discussed further in Chapter 4, this gives 
the LCA Committees particular strengths when it comes to engaging a diverse range of 
Senators, who in turn help to encourage a broad range of submission makers and witnesses to 
the committees’ public inquiries. A secretary and professional secretariat staff support the LCA 
Committees, generally without an external legal advisor. 
Unlike the SSCSB, the LCA Committees are not required to review every Bill introduced into 
Parliament. Instead, the LCA Committees inquire into matters referred to them by the Senate. 
The LCA Legislation Committee is responsible for consideration of Bills, estimates processes, 
and departmental matters. The LCA References Committee deals with thematic or issues-based 
references from the Senate, which since 2008 generally do not include consideration of the 
provisions of particular Bills.120 Both LCA Committees receive guidance from the Senate about 
the focus of its inquiry and reporting times. This means that, in practice, it is the Senate 
Standing Committee for the Selection of Bills that determines the workload of the LCA 
Legislation Committee.121  
                                                 
 
116 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 25 (2000). 
117 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Senate Standing Orders 25(10) (2000). As at 2001, the References Committee 
was chaired by ALP Senator J McKiernan and the Legislation Committee was chaired by New South Wales 
Liberal Senator Marise Payne. By 2015, the Chair of the Legislation Committee was Queensland Liberal Party 
Senator the Hon Ian Macdonald and the Reference Committee was chaired by Australian Greens South Australian 
Senator Penny Wright until June 2015, when she was replaced by Independent Queensland Senator Glenn 
Lazarus. 
118 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Senate Standing Orders (2000) 25(7). 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid 25(2). 
121 The Senate Standing Committee for the Selection of Bills Committee was set up in 1988 and is effectively a 
committee of whips. It comprises the Government Whip and two other senators nominated by the Leader of the 
Government in the Senate, the Opposition Whip and two other senators nominated by the Leader of the Opposition 
in the Senate, and the whips of any minority groups. A member of the Selection of Bills Committee, typically a 
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One of the key strengths of the LCA Committees is their ability to conduct public inquiries into 
the Bills or issues referred to them by the Senate.122 The first step in the inquiry process is to 
call for written submissions through advertising its inquiry in national newspapers and online, 
as well as by directly approaching a range of potentially interested parties, including legal 
bodies, government departments and independent statutory bodies.123 The LCA Committees 
then select a range of submission makers to attend a public or private hearing and provide 
further oral evidence and answer the committee members’ questions.124 As a report marking 
the first 20 years of the LCA Committees observed: 
Because they can travel around Australia in the course of their inquiries, the Legislative and 
General Purpose Standing Committees literally take Parliament to the people. In this way they 
gather information from interested members of the public and from experts and specialists.125 
After the inquiry process is complete, the LCA Committees prepare a report to be tabled in the 
Senate typically containing a number of specific recommendations for amendments to the Bill 
or policy proposal, as well as an overview of the key issues raised during the inquiry. Unlike 
the SSCSB, whose reports are almost invariably consensus reports, the LCA Committees’ 
                                                 
 
non-government Senator, ‘proposes that a bill be referred to a committee, giving reasons for referral, nominating 
a committee and a possible reporting date, and suggesting witnesses from whom submissions or evidence may be 
obtained’. Subject to agreement by the rest of the committee, the Bill is then recommended for referral in the 
committee’s report to the Senate. Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 24A (13 February 1997). For 
further information see Senate Standing Committee for the Selection of Bills Committee, About the committee 
(2017) <http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Selection_of_Bills>; Kelly 
Paxman, Referral of Bills to Senate Committees: An Evaluation, Parl Paper No 31 (1998) 76–8.  
122 Matters for inquiry by legislative and general purpose standing committees are usually referred in accordance 
with the procedure outlined in Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 25(1) (15 July 2014). See Odgers, 
above n 3, 491–3. Once a Bill has been referred to one of the LCA Committees and a report date set, the LCA 
Committees have a range of inquiry powers at their disposal including the power to send for persons and 
documents; hold public or private hearings around the country (with public hearings recorded in Hansard); report 
on its proceedings and evidence taken and any recommendations made; and authorise the broadcasting of its 
public hearings, under such rules as the Senate provides. Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Orders 25(14)–
(19) (15 July 2014). Parliamentary privilege applies to protect witnesses to the committees from legal liability, 
harm or intimidation. See also Senate Legislative and General Purpose Standing Committees, Parliament of 
Australia, The First 20 Years 1970–1990 (1990) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Significant_Reports/first20years/index>.  
123 These categories of submission makers have been described as the ‘usual suspects’ and are discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 4. 
124 As discussed further in Parts II and III, the LCA Committees provide an important deliberative forum for 
meaningful public engagement with a proposed law or policy issue. 
125 SLGPSC, The First 20 Years, above n 122. 
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reports regularly include dissenting or additional comments by opposition or minor party 
committee members.  
Unlike the SSCSB or the PJCHR, the LCA Committees are not required to apply any particular 
analytical framework or rights-scrutiny criteria when undertaking an inquiry into a Bill or other 
matter. Despite this, common themes are evident in the approach of the LCA Committees, and 
in particular the LCA Legislation Committee. These themes are largely informed by the 
approach adopted by the most regular and influential submission makers to the LCA 
Committees, and commonly involve rights issues, even if they are not always expressed with 
reference to international human rights law.126 As explored further in Chapter 6, the themes 
commonly explored by the LCA Committees when reviewing the case study Acts include: 
consideration of relevant constitutional doctrines, particularly the doctrine of separation of 
powers; the preservation of a meaningful oversight role for Parliament over the exercise of 
executive power; consideration of relevant ‘rule of law’ principles; and the need to justify any 
significant departure from established criminal law and common law principles.  
The LCA Committees have a number of informal ways of liaising with other parliamentary 
committees, particularly those who share responsibilities for scrutinising Bills, such as the 
SSCBC and the PJCHR.127 However, the LCA Committees’ relationship with other inquiry-
based committees can be complex. Since the procedural reforms in the 2000s, efforts have been 
made to reduce the potential for more than one parliamentary committee to consider the same 
Bill or reference at the same time.128 In addition, since 2013, there has been a strong tendency 
among government Chairs of the LCA Legislation Committee to decline to inquire into 
counter-terrorism or national security Bills that are also subject to inquiry by the PJCIS. The 
                                                 
 
126 Evans and Evans, above n 17. In their 2006 (pre PJCHR) study of the role of the Australian Parliament in the 
protection and promotion of human rights, Evans and Evans observe: ‘The Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
Committee’s approach to bills appears to be influenced by the number and tenor of the submissions it receives. 
Human rights orientated submissions inflect the reports it makes. But even when the Committee receives 
numerous substantial submissions examining human rights issues, which it faithfully recounts in its report, the 
Committee rarely expresses its own reasoning and conclusions in the language of human rights.’  
127 As will be explored further in Chapter 6, submission makers to the LCA Committees, particularly the 
Legislation Committee, regularly cite the work of the SSCSB and the PJCHR and the work of these committees 
is often referred to in the LCA Committees’ reports.  
128 For example, Senate Standing Order 25(13) provides that the LCA Committees should ‘take care not to inquire 
into any matters which are being examined by a select committee of the Senate appointed to inquire into such 
matters and any question arising in this connection may be referred to the Senate for determination’. Senate, 
Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 25(13) (15 July 2014). 
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evidence presented in Part II of this thesis suggests that, while this is understandable, these 
efforts to avoid multi-committee inquiries into national security laws may dilute the potential 
for the committee system to have a rights-enhancing impact. For these reasons, Part III explores 
options for improving the opportunities for the inquiry-based committees to work efficiently 
and collaboratively when it comes to reviewing rights-engaging laws such as those relating to 
counter-terrorism. 
4 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(a) Membership, Mandate and Outputs 
The newest parliamentary committee evaluated in this thesis is the PJCHR. As noted in Chapter 
1, this committee was established by the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (the 
Parliamentary Scrutiny Act)129 as part of the Rudd Government’s response to the 2008–09 
National Consultation.130 Under the Parliamentary Scrutiny Act, the PJCHR must examine 
Acts, Bills and legislative instruments for compatibility with human rights131 and inquire into 
any matter relating to human rights which is referred to it by the Attorney-General.132  
The PJCHR’s membership is also prescribed and comprises of 10 members, five appointed by 
the Senate and five appointed by the House. The PJCHR has a government Chair with a casting 
vote.133 A secretary, professional secretariat staff and an external legal adviser assist the 
committee.134  
                                                 
 
129 The Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 also introduced the requirement for all Bills and 
disallowable instruments to be introduced with a Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights. 
130 As discussed in Chapter 1, the establishment of the PJCHR was a key element of Australia’s Human Rights 
Framework, which was launched in April 2010 as part of the Rudd Government’s response to the 
recommendations of the 2009 National Consultation on Human Rights. Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s 
Human Rights Framework (2010) 
<https://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/Publicsubmissionsonthedraftbaselinestudy/AustraliasHuman
RightsFramework.pdf>.  
131 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) s 4. 
132 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) s 7. 
133 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) s 5. Ministers, House Speakers and Senate Presidents 
(and their Deputies) are not eligible for appointment. The inaugural Chair of the PJCHR was Mr Harry Jenkins 
MP. As at 2015, the Chair of the committee was the Hon Phillip Ruddock MP. 
134 The PJCHR’s first legal adviser was Professor Andrew Byrnes, followed by Professor Simon Rice and more 
recently by Sydney Barrister Dr Aruna Sathanapally. PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, Annual Report 2012–13 
(2013) [1.15]. 
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In practice, the most frequent role of the PJCHR is to table reports on the human rights 
compatibility of a proposed Bill or legislative instrument.135 The ‘human rights’ referred to in 
the Parliamentary Scrutiny Act are those rights listed in seven core human rights conventions 
to which Australia is a party.136 These rights total over 100 in number, which posed a challenge 
for the new committee. However, having operated for a number of years, it appears that a 
smaller handful of rights consistently make up the majority of the PJCHR’s detailed scrutiny 
work.137 
Like the SSCSB, it is common for the PJCHR to express a view on a Bill’s compatibility with 
its scrutiny criteria, but leave the question of amending or removing a particular provision to 
Parliament as a whole to consider. Less frequently, the PJCHR makes specific 
recommendations for amendment to ensure the compatibility of the legislation with Australia’s 
human rights obligations.138 Like the SSCSB, the PJCHR considers all Bills and legislative 
instruments introduced to Parliament and faces a heavy and unrelenting workload.139  
In order to manage its heavy workload and maximise its capacity to table its reports prior to 
the conclusion of parliamentary debate or the requisite disallowance period, the PJCHR has 
developed strategies for prioritising its work that centre around categorising Bills and 
                                                 
 
135 See, eg, PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, Freedom of speech in Australia: Inquiry into the operation of Part 
IIA of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and related procedures under the Australian Human Rights 
Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (2017). 
136 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) s 3. These are International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 21 December 1965, [1975] ATS 40; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, [1976] 
ATS 5; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, [1980] 
ATS 23; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature 18 
December 1979, [1983] ATS 9; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, [1989] ATS 21; Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
opened for signature 20 November 1989, [1991] ATS 4; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
opened for signature 13 December 2006, [2008] ATS 12.  
137 For example, the PJCHR’s 2013–14 annual report describes the following commonly engaged human rights 
identified in legislation during this period: rights to and at work; right to a fair trial; right to privacy; right to a fair 
hearing; right to social security; right to an adequate standard of living; and right to health. The annual report 
provides that during 2013–14 the above seven rights accounted for 58 per cent of rights engaged within both 
primary and delegated legislation. PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, Annual Report 2013–14 (2016) [3.5]–[3.6]. 
138 Ibid [2.11] 
139 See, eg, Harry Jenkins, ‘Human Rights Are in Our Hands’ (Speech delivered at Australian Human Rights 
Commission, Human Rights at Your Fingertips, Online and in Practice, Sydney, 29 October 2012); Ursula 
Stephens, ‘Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights’ (Remarks delivered at University of Melbourne, 
Human Rights Class, Melbourne, 29 April 2013). 
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legislative instruments on the basis of the significance of the human rights issues they raise.140 
However, despite these strategies, the PJCHR is not always able to table its scrutiny reports 
prior to the conclusion of the second reading debate on the relevant Bill.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, two factors contribute to the occasional delay in tabling PJCHR 
reports. The first is procedural and arises from the fact that the PJCHR is a joint committee. 
This means that the PJCHR typically meets when both the House and the Senate are sitting, 
and the Chair tables the committee’s reports after each of these meetings.141 This means that 
PJCHR scrutiny reports may not be tabled in weeks when the Senate alone is sitting and 
debating Bills.142 The second factor relates to the PJCHR’s practice of waiting to receive a 
response to its requests for further information from the proponent Minister before tabling its 
reports.143 Unlike the SSCSB, which sets out its preliminary concerns with a Bill in the form 
of a short Alert Digest, at least until recently the PJCHR has typically only issued a concluded 
scrutiny report on a Bill that includes excerpts from any response received from the proponent 
Minister to requests for further information.144 Under this approach, the PJCHR sets out its 
concerns with respect to a Bill in correspondence to the proponent Minister and allows the 
Minister to respond before the PJCHR tables its report. This ‘behind-closed-doors’ exchange 
of correspondence between the committee and the proponent of the Bill on issues arising from 
the SoC is seen by some as central to the human rights ‘dialogue’ the committee is tasked with 
creating.145 However, unless the proponent Ministers respond swiftly to the PJCHR’s 
                                                 
 
140 These strategies were outlined in PJCHR, Annual Report 2013–14, above n 137, [1.19], [2.15]–[2.17] and 
Table 3.1: Legislation considered during the reporting period.  
141 Ibid [2.2] 
142 For example in 2012 there were three weeks when the House of Representatives was sitting when the Senate 
was not and two weeks when the Senate was sitting when the House was not (out of a total of 20 sitting weeks). 
See Parliamentary of Australia, Sitting Calendar 2012, Work of the Parliament (2012) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Sitting_Calendar/Sitting_2012>. 
143 However, as discussed in Parts II and III, this practice may be changing. For example, the PJCHR’s 2013-14 
annual report explains that the PJCHR may publish an initial report setting out its concerns, and seeking further 
information from the Minister responsible for the Bill. It will then consider this response, and publish it alongside 
the PJCHR’s concluding report on the matter. PJCHR, Annual Report 2013–14, above n 137, [2.10]–[2.11]. This 
practice of publishing initial scrutiny concerns followed by the final views of the committee features in the 
recommendations made in Chapter 10. 
144 Further discussion of this practice is contained in Chapters 6 and 8. See also PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, 
Twenty-Fifth Report of the 44th Parliament (2015). 
145 As the current Chair of the committee has explained, through this formal correspondence with the proponent 
of the Bill or instrument the PJCHR is able to contribute to its aim of ensuring appropriate consideration of human 
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correspondence, this approach can leave the Parliament without the benefit of the PJCHR’s 
analysis of a Bill during the critical second reading stage.146  
As discussed further below, my research suggests that this delay in the publication of the 
PJCHR’s analysis of a Bill is having a negative impact on the committee’s capacity to influence 
legislative outcomes. For this reason, in Part III of my research I recommend that the PJCHR 
consider adopting Alert Digest style reporting, such as that used by the SSCSB, along with a 
number of other strategies to improve the timeliness and accessibility of its reports. 
In addition to tabling reports on Bills and legislative instruments, the PJCHR has also published 
a Guide to Human Rights147 and two two Guidance Notes: Drafting statements of 
compatibility,148 and Offence provisions, civil penalties and human rights.149 These materials 
reflect the PJCHR’s approach to assessing human rights compliance, which, although drawn 
from international law principles, aims to be ‘practical’ and contextualised for the Australian 
experience.150 These Guidance Notes are directed primarily at public servants responsible for 
drafting and preparing SoCs and, as discussed further in Part III, provide a foundation on which 
to improve the PJCHR’s overall impact on the content and development of proposed laws. 
(b) A ‘Dialogue-Creating’ Committee? 
Although it has the power to hold public inquiries and receive private briefings,151 in its work 
practices the PJCHR has generally based itself on the ‘technical scrutiny’ approach of the 
                                                 
 
rights issues in legislative and policy development: PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, Chair’s Tabling Statement 
(11 October 2016). 
146 The PJCHR cited the timeliness of responses to its requests for information as an issue of concern, with only 
eight of the 58 requests for information provided to the committee by the requested date. See ‘Figure 3.2: 
Percentage of responses received by due date’ in PJCHR, Annual Report 2013–14, above n 137, [3.26].  
147 PJCHR, Annual Report 2012–13, above n 134, [2.26]. 
148 PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, Guidance Note 1: Drafting Statements of Compatibility (December 2014) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Human_Rights/Guidance_Notes_and_Reso
urces>. 




150 Ursula Stephens, ‘Opening Remarks’ (Speech given at the Australian Government and Non-Government 
Organisations Forum on Human Rights, Old Parliament House, Canberra, 19 June 2013). 
151 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) s 7(c) provides that the PJCHR has the power ‘to 
inquire into any matter relating to human rights which is referred to it by the Attorney-General, and to report to 
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SSCSB and does not actively advertise for, or request, written submissions on the Bills it 
considers.152 The PJCHR has also been particularly keen to foster a close working relationship 
with the SSCSB and the SSCRO153 and this has evolved to include ‘sharing’ certain secretariat 
staff and functions.154  
Successive PJCHR Chairs have also underscored the ‘technical’ character of the committee155 
and in its 2015 Guide to Human Rights publication, the PJCHR clearly states that it ‘undertakes 
its scrutiny function as a technical inquiry relating to Australia’s international human rights 
obligations’ and ‘does not consider the broader policy merits of legislation’.156 On this view, 
the human rights ‘dialogue’ the PJCHR seeks to create with the executive is based on the 
preparation and consideration of SoCs and the correspondence exchanged between the 
committee and the proponent of the Bill or instrument being scrutinised. 
                                                 
 
both Houses of the Parliament on that matter’. The PJCHR used this power in 2017: see PJCHR, Parliament of 
Australia, Freedom of Speech in Australia: Inquiry into Part IIA of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and 
related procedures under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (2017). 
152 However, the PJCHR has repeatedly said that it ‘welcomes correspondence’. PJCHR, Annual Report 2012–
13, above n 134, [1.18]. The PJCHR website includes the following: ‘Parliamentarians, interested groups and 
other stakeholders who wish to bring matters to the committee’s attention that are relevant to its functions under 
the Act are invited to do so.’ Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
Parliament of Australia (2016) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Human_Rights>. It is also noted that on 
occasion the PJCHR has used its inquiry powers with respect to specific Bills: for examples see PJCHR, Annual 
Report 2012–13, above n 134 and discussion in n 159 below. 
153 The PJCHR’s 2012–13 annual report explains that: ‘Soon after the establishment of the [PJCHR], the Chair 
and Deputy Chair met with both Senate scrutiny committees and the three committees agreed to establish a 
practice of writing to each other to draw attention to comments on particular bills and instruments. On an informal 
level the three secretariats work closely together within the Senate Legislative Scrutiny Unit.’ PJCHR, Annual 
Report 2012–13, above n 134, [1.32]. 
154 See also Tom Campbell and Stephen Morris, ‘Human rights for democracies: a provisional assessment of the 
Australian Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011’ (2015) 34(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 
7; Adam Fletcher, ‘Human Rights Scrutiny in the Australian Parliament’ (Paper presented at ‘Evaulating Inquests, 
Commissions and Inquiries’ Symposium, La Trobe University, Melbourne, 1 November 2017). 
155 For example, at the beginning of the 45th Parliament the incoming PJCHR Chair observed that the role of the 
PJCHR is to engage in ‘technical examination’, not to ‘assess the broader merits or policy objectives of particular 
measures’. PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, Report 7 of 2016 (2016). See also Interview with Dean Smith, Liberal 
Senator for Western Australia, former Chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (telephone, 
22 September 2016). 
156 PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, Guidance Note 1: Drafting Statements of Compatibility (December 2014) ii. 
See also PJCHR, Annual Report 2013–14, above n 137, ch 2.  
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However, some commentators suggest that the PJCHR should play a more active role in 
directly engaging the Australian community on human rights issues.157 These commentators 
often point to the legislation establishing the PJCHR, which clearly provides that the committee 
has the power to hold public inquiries158 into human rights matters referred to it and into 
existing Acts or proposed Bills.159 This broader community engagement role is also said to be 
reflected in the second reading speech of the proponent of the Parliamentary Scrutiny Act, the 
then Attorney-General, the Hon Robert McClelland MP, who said: 
[T]he new parliamentary committee will establish a dialogue between the parliament and its 
citizens whereby the members of the committee can canvass the views of the public, including 
affected groups, as to how they will be affected by proposed legislation. 
In that sense, these measures incrementally advance the concept of participatory democracy 
by providing additional means for citizens to have input into the legislative process.160 
For some scholars, the PJCHR’s lack of broader public engagement when undertaking its Bills 
scrutiny is a sign of its lack of effectiveness as a rights-protecting mechanism.161 As outlined 
in Part III, I take a different view. This is because the evidence collected in Part II suggests that 
the best way for the PJCHR to improve its rights-enhancing impact on proposed legislation is 
                                                 
 
157 See, eg, George Williams and Lisa Burton, ‘Australia’s Exclusive Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection’ 
(2013) 34 Statute Law Review 58; Rosalind Dixon, ‘A New (Inter)national Human Rights Experiment for 
Australia’ (2012) 23(2) Public Law Review 75; Dan Meagher, ‘The Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 
2011 (Cth) and the Courts’ (2014) 42 Federal Law Review 1; Michael Palfrey, ‘A New Federal Scheme for the 
Protection of Human Rights’ (2012) 69 AIAL Forum 13; Edward Santow, ‘The Act that Dares Not Speak Its 
Name: the National Human Rights Consultation Report’s Parallel Roads to Human Rights Reform’ (2010) 33(1) 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 8; James Stellios and Michael Palfrey, ‘A New Federal Scheme for 
the Protection of Human Rights’ (2012) 69 Australian Institute of Administrative Law 13. 
158 Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) s 7(c). 
159 As the PJCHR noted in its 2012–13 annual report: ‘While the speed with which the committee must work 
means that its analysis of legislation is primarily done on the papers, from time to time the committee has found 
it beneficial to hold public hearings. The committee held three public hearings during the year: one as part of its 
examination of the Social Security Legislation Amendment (Fair Incentives to Work) Bill 2012 and two as part 
of its examination of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) Act 2012 
and related legislation. In the case of the Social Security Bill, the committee’s hearing provided an avenue for it 
to place evidence regarding the human rights issues raised by the bill on the public record, and therefore available 
to the Parliament, in the shortest possible timeframe.’ PJCHR, Annual Report 2012–13, above n 134, [1.16]. 
160 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 September 2010, 271 (Robert 
McClelland, Attorney-General).  
161 See, eg, George Williams and Daniel Reynolds, ‘The Operation and Impact of Australia’s Parliamentary 
Scrutiny Regime for Human Rights’ (2016) 41(2) Monash University Law Review 469. 
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to invest further in its ‘technical scrutiny’ role, rather than seek to emulate the work practices 
of inquiry-based committees. This is explored further in Part III. 
5 Non-Parliamentary Scrutiny Bodies 
Although my research evaluates the rights-enhancing impact of parliamentary committees, a 
number of non-parliamentary review mechanisms also played an influential role in the 
development of the case study Acts and contribute in direct and indirect ways to Australia’s 
parliamentary model of rights protection.162 They include:  
 the INSLM163 established in 2011 to review and report on the operation, effectiveness 
and implications of Australia’s counter-terrorism and national security legislation on an 
ongoing basis, including the impact of these laws on individual rights.164 When carrying 
out his or her functions, the INSLM is required to have regard to Australia’s obligations 
under international agreements, including human rights obligations.165 
 the IGIS, an independent statutory office holder who is authorised to review the 
activities of the Australian Intelligence Community ‘to ensure that the agencies act 
legally and with propriety, comply with ministerial guidelines and directives and 
respect human rights’;166 
                                                 
 
162 For an example of consideration of the rights protective role of ‘integrity’ institutions, such as the 
Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Australian Human Rights Commission, see Gabrielle Appleby, 'Horizontal 
Accountability: The Rights Protective Promise and Fragility of the Executive Integrity Institutions' (2017) 23 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 168.  
163 The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Bill 2010 (Cth) was passed on 18 March 2010 and 
assented to on 13 April 2010. 
164 Independent Monitor of National Security Information Act 2010 (Cth) Part II. The Monitor is also responsible 
for considering if counter-terrorism and national security laws remain necessary and are proportionate to any 
threat of terrorism or to national security. See Australian Government, About the Independent Monitor of National 
Security Information, Independent Monitor of National Security information (2017) <http://www.inslm.gov.au/>.  
165 Independent Monitor of National Security Information Act 2010 (Cth) s 8. 
166 The functions of the IGIS are prescribed under the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 
(Cth) ss 8, 9, 9A. The IGIS can undertake a formal inquiry into the activities of an Australian intelligence agency 
in response to a complaint or a reference from a Minister or act independently to initiate inquiries and conduct 
regular inspections and monitoring of agency activities. Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security, About IGIS, Australian Government (2016) <https://www.igis.gov.au/about>. 
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 the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), with an explicit statutory mandate 
to provide advice about the human rights compliance of Australia’s federal laws, 
including counter-terrorism laws;167 
 the Commonwealth Ombudsman who is tasked with investigating complaints about the 
administrative actions of federal departments and agencies, including the Australian 
Federal Police (without an explicit human rights mandate);168 and  
 the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), which has played an important role 
in the development and review of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws, particularly in the 
context of considerations of the referral of state powers and the enactment of 
complementary state and territory laws. COAG invests its specialist committees with 
specific mandates which can include the consideration of the human rights implications 
of proposed or existing counter-terrorism laws.169 
                                                 
 
167 Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth). The AHRC has a range of statutory responsibilities, 
many relating to the resolution of discrimination and human rights complaints, but it is also empowered to provide 
independent legal advice to assist courts in cases that involve human rights principles and monitor human rights 
compliance. The AHRC has also produced a range of materials on human rights issues arising in the context of 
counter-terrorism laws, including Australian Human Rights Commission, A Human Rights Guide to Australia’s 
Counter Terrorism Laws (2008) <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/rights-and-
freedoms/projects/counter-terrorism-and-human-rights>. 
168 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth). Overtime the role has expanded to include special responsibilities for complaints 
relating to the Australian Federal Police and for inspecting the records of law enforcement and other enforcement 
agencies in relation to the use of covert powers, including telecommunications interceptions, stored 
communications, telecommunications data, surveillance devices and controlled operations. Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, Ombudsman Our Legislation, Australian Government (2017) 
<http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/pages/our-legislation/>. 
169 COAG has members from each Australian government, including the Prime Minister, state and territory 
Premiers and Chief Ministers and the President of the Australian Local Government Association. The decisions 
of COAG are reflected in communiqués or sometimes including National Agreements and National Partnership 
Agreements. For example, in 2004, Australia revised its National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements and through 
an Intergovernmental Agreement established the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC). The 
Agreement reached by COAG was: ‘to take whatever action is necessary to ensure that terrorists can be prosecuted 
under the criminal law, including a reference of power so that the Commonwealth may enact specific, jointly-





In addition to these bodies, a number of inquiries have been specifically established to examine, 
review and report on various aspects of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws.170 The relationship 
between these review bodies and the parliamentary committee system is described in further 
detail in Chapter 6. 
D Counter-Terrorism Law Making in Australia 
The next part of this chapter describes the key tranches of counter-terrorism law making 
between the period 2001 to 2015, setting the scene for the evaluation in Part II of the legislative, 
public and hidden impact of the parliamentary committees described above on the twelve case 
study Acts.  
Summarising the experience of counter-terrorism law making in Australia is a daunting task,171 
and I do not aim to provide a comprehensive overview of even the most significant domestic 
and international developments that have given rise to one of the most prolific areas of federal 
legislative activity in recent decades.172 Rather, I introduce the twelve case study Acts173 within 
the context of five key tranches of counter-terrorism law making in order to provide some 
                                                 
 
170 See, eg, Australian Law Reform Commission, Fighting Words:A Review of Sedition Laws in Australia, Report 
No 104 (2006); Security Legislation Review Committee, Report of the Security Legislation Review Committee 
(2006); Mark John Clarke, Report of the Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef (2008). 
171 Of the scholars who have accepted this challenge, Professor George Williams is perhaps the most prolific and 
comprehensive: see, eg, George Williams, Andrew Lynch and Nicola McGarrity, Inside Australia’s Anti-
Terrorism Laws and Trials (New South Publishing, 2015); George Williams, Andrew Lynch and Nicola 
McGarrity, Counter-Terrorism and Beyond: The Culture of Law and Justice after 9/11 (Routledge, 2010); George 
Williams and Andrew Lyncy, What Price Security? Taking Stock of Australia’s Anti-Terror Laws (UNSW Press, 
2006); George Williams, ‘A Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws’ (2011) 35(3) Melbourne University Law 
Review 1136. 
172 Since 2001 the Commonwealth Parliament has passed over 50 separate pieces of legislation dealing with 
terrorism and security. See Attorney-General’s Department, Australia’s Counter-terrorism Laws, Australian 
Government (2016) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/Counterterrorismlaw/Pages/Australiascounterterrorismlaws.aspx>. See 
also Williams, ‘A Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws’, above n 171. Australia’s national security agencies 
have also proliferated in size and number and received continual increases in resources. For example, a 2017 
Independent Intelligence Review reported that, as of 2017, there were 10 separate intelligence agencies with a 
combined annual budget ‘approaching $2 billion and about 7,000 staff’. Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, Independent Intelligence Review (2017) 7–8. 
173 One of the case study ‘Acts’, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth) is more correctly described as a Bill as it was not enacted into legislation. As discussed 
further below, this Bill is included in the case study Acts as it was subject to rigorous multi-committee scrutiny 
and preceded the enactment of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth). 
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context for why these Acts were introduced, and why they make particularly compelling case 
studies.174 These Acts are: 
 Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) (and related Acts) (SLAT 
Acts, CSA 1). 
 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 
2002 (Cth) (CSA 2); 
 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 
2003 (Cth) (CSA 3); 
 Anti-terrorism Act 2004 (Cth) (CSA 4);  
 National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) (CSA 5);  
 Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) (Control Orders Act, CSA 6);  
 Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 (Cth) (INSLM Act, CSA 
7);  
 National Security Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) (CSA 8);  
 Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 
(Cth) (Data Retention Act, CSA 9);  
 Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2014 (Cth) (CSA 10);  
 Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Act 2014 (Cth) (Foreign 
Fighters Act, CSA 11); and  
 Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Act 2015 (Cth) 
(Citizenship Act, CSA 12). 
                                                 
 
174 Further detail of the substantive provisions of these Acts is provided in Chapter 5. 
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1 The First Tranche: The Howard Government’s Response to ‘September 11’ (2001–2003) 
Prior to 11 September 2001 there were no specific terrorism offences in federal legislation.175 
However, Australia had an extensive of range of laws at the state and territory level that 
addressed many of the criminal acts associated with terrorist activity.176 For example, politically 
motivated violence was already an offence177 and a range of other relevant criminal offences 
existed at the state and federal level.178 Law enforcement and intelligence agencies also already 
had powers to collect intelligence179 and Australia had implemented a number of international 
instruments concerning different types of terrorist activity.180 Despite this, as Australia 
witnessed the horror of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, it became apparent that 
this legal landscape may not be sufficient to deal with the emerging threat of international 
terrorism.181 
Following 9/11, the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
1373 and called for ‘improved international cooperation to suppress and respond to acts of 
terrorism’.182 The resolution required States to ensure that ‘terrorist acts are established as 
serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly 
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reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts’.183 At the same time, a UN High Commissioner 
on Human Rights also emphasised that States should exercise caution when enacting new laws 
to avoid breaching their international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law 
obligations.184 The Howard Government moved quickly to respond to these new international 
standards,185 but it took some months before new legislative measures could be introduced, due 
to the proroguing of Parliament in early October 2001.186  
In December 2001 the re-elected Howard Government announced a series of measures to 
strengthen Australia’s counter-terrorism capabilities, which were introduced into Parliament 
during 2002.187 The most substantive of these became the Security Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth) (SLAT Bills, CSA 1) and the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth) (ASIO Bill 2002, CSA 2). 
These laws introduced the term ‘terrorist act’ into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and 
created a range of related criminal offences, as well as new law enforcement and intelligence-
gathering powers for government agencies, including ASIO. The Bills also set out a process 
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for proscribing an organisation as a ‘terrorist organisation’ and created a range of ‘terrorist 
organisation’ offences.188 
A number of observers described this package of legislation as being ‘rushed through 
Parliament, with disregard [for] the parliamentary process’.189 All of the Bills introduced on 12 
March 2002190 were passed by the House of Representatives in a single day, prompting Simon 
Crean, then Leader of the Opposition, to observe that the government ‘have taken six months 
to consider this legislation and they have given us 16 hours to consider their consideration’.191 
In the Senate, where the Howard Government did not have a majority, the package of Bills 
were successfully referred to the LCA Legislation Committee for inquiry and report.192 As 
discussed in Part II, despite its short time frame, this inquiry attracted over 431 submissions 
and resulted in a number of rights-enhancing amendments to the Bills.193  
Importantly, this inquiry also saw the ASIO Bill 2002 – which proposed to introduce a new 
questioning and detention regime for ASIO – separated from the package of Bills. The ASIO 
Bill 2002 was then referred for separate inquiry by both the PJC on ASIO, ASIS and DSD and 
the LCA References Committee.194 The PJC on ASIO, ASIS and DSD described the ASIO Bill 
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2002 as ‘one of the most controversial pieces of legislation considered by the Parliament in 
recent times’ and one which ‘would undermine key legal rights and erode the civil liberties that 
make Australia a leading democracy’.195 Having been reintroduced in amended form as a result 
of this multi-committee scrutiny process,196 the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2003 (Cth) (ASIO Bill 2003, CSA 3) finally passed 
both Houses in mid-2003. 
While this package of legislation was making its way through Parliament, on 12 October 2002 
a terrorist bombing incident occurred in a nightclub on the Indonesian island of Bali, killing 
202 people and injuring 209. Among the dead were 88 Australians, leading some to describe 
this incident as ‘Australia’s September 11’.197 This incident triggered the rapid enactment of 
the Criminal Code Amendment (Offences Against Australians) Bill 2002 (Cth), which made it 
an offence to harm or kill Australians overseas. The Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) 
Bill 2003 (Cth) was also introduced to ensure a sound constitutional basis for the new terrorism 
provisions in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).198  
The protection of national security information had also emerged as a priority issue for the 
Howard Government following the successful prosecutions of Australian intelligence officers 
in Australia and the US for attempting to sell classified national security information.199 On 2 
April 2003, the Attorney-General referred the issue of the protection of classified security 
information to the ALRC for inquiry and report, which, as discussed below, would later become 
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relevant to the review and scrutiny of another case study Bill (CSA 5).200 The year 2003 also 
saw the introduction of new laws to further broaden ASIO’s intelligence-gathering and 
questioning powers.201  
2 The Second Tranche: Pre-charge Detention and Protection of Security Information (2004–
2005) 
The second tranche of counter-terrorism legislation saw the Howard Government rapidly 
expand the powers of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to detain and question people 
when investigating terrorist-related activity, and the beginnings of a notable ‘push back’ from 
sections of the public, who called for greater oversight of these agencies.  
The second tranche occurred in the aftermath of the Madrid train bombings in March 2003, 
which killed 191 people and injured almost 2000.202 Legislation was introduced to address a 
range of procedural matters connected to terrorism offences, including the Anti-Terrorism Bill 
2004 (Cth) (CSA 4), which amended the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) to make special provisions in 
relation to bail and non-parole periods, investigative periods (which later became known as the 
Part IC ‘dead time’ provisions) and periods of arrest for terrorism offences. The Bill also 
introduced a strict liability component to the offence of training with a terrorist organisation 
and a new offence of associating with a terrorist organisation.203  
The Anti-Terrorism Bill 2004 also amended the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) to provide 
for the recovery of literary proceeds derived from offences committed outside Australia and 
subsequently transferred to Australia.204  
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While these laws made their way through Parliament, there was a renewed push to ensure that 
the rapidly expanding powers of ASIO and other intelligence agencies were subject to robust 
parliamentary oversight. For example, in 2003 the PJC into ASIO, ASIS and DSD 
recommended an independent inquiry into Australia’s intelligence agencies, which resulted in 
the establishment of the Flood Inquiry in 2004.205 The Flood Inquiry in turn recommended that 
the committee’s mandate be extended to cover all intelligence agencies and that the committee 
be renamed the PJCIS.206 This pattern of extension of executive power, followed by 
recommendations for increased oversight of executive agencies, has characterised Australia’s 
counter-terrorism law-making experience, and is discussed further in Part II and III. 
During 2004, the Howard Government introduced a range of other counter-terrorism laws 
designed to expand the powers of ASIO and the AFP, including increased telecommunications 
interception207 and surveillance powers.208 The National Security Information (Security 
Proceedings) Bill 2004 (Cth) (CSA 5) was also introduced to prevent or limit disclosure of 
national security information in criminal proceedings,209 without waiting for the detailed 
recommendations of the ALRC, which was at that time preparing a report on the handling of 
national security information.210 
Despite the haste at which legislation was introduced in this second tranche of counter-
terrorism law making, these Bills were subject to detailed parliamentary committee inquiries 
where recommendations were made to narrow the scope of the proposed new powers, introduce 
new safeguards to limit the laws’ impact on individual rights, and improve parliamentary 
oversight.211 The changes recommended by the parliamentary committees received strong 
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support from a range of Senators, some of whom demanded further reforms to these laws or 
completely opposed their passage. 
With a full legislative list before the Senate, the Howard Government called a federal election 
for 9 October 2004 and returned to office with a clear Senate majority for the first time since 
1980. The new government moved quickly to reintroduce and pass a number of the counter-
terrorism Bills that had previously stalled before the Senate. As discussed further in Part II, 
many of these Bills were reintroduced in amended form, taking up a significant number of the 
recommendations made by parliamentary committees prior to the election.212  
3 The Third Tranche: Control Orders and Preventative Detention Orders (2005) 
The third tranche of counter-terrorism law making further expanded the powers of law 
enforcement agencies, this time to control or restrict the movement, communications and 
associations of people suspected of involvement in or knowledge of terrorist-related activity. 
It signalled a substantive departure from established criminal law principles, and ultimately 
attracted the attention of the High Court. This third tranche also generated strong public 
interest, including in the form of high levels of participation in parliamentary committee 
inquiries into these laws. 
This third tranche of counter-terrorism law making occurred in the wake of a number of 
terrorist attacks that took the lives of Australians.213 These incidents gave the Howard 
Government the political ‘green light’ to introduce new regimes to control the movements, 
associations and communications of those thought to be involved in or have information about 
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terrorist-related activity (control order and preventative detention order regimes), as well as 
amending existing sedition laws with a view to capturing a much wider range of terrorist-
related forms of expression.214 Enacting these new laws depended upon the referral of powers 
by the states and territories to the Commonwealth, and involved multiple levels of negotiation, 
starting with COAG.215 The Howard Government sought to pursue these negotiations without 
publicly revealing the content of the proposed law. However, on 14 October 2005, the ACT 
Chief Minister, Jon Stanhope, released a version of the Bill on his website.216 Stanhope later 
explained that he pursued this course of action to provide an opportunity for rigorous public 
scrutiny of the laws: ‘[T]hey were proposing some quite draconian legislation without taking 
the people of Australia into their confidence. That’s all I was seeking to do. And I did … want 
some of the brains around the place to get to look at it.’217 Stanhope also considered it his role, 
as Chief Minister of a jurisdiction with a recently enacted Human Rights Act, to seek advice 
about the rights compatibility of the proposed law.218 
This led to the public release of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (Cth) (Control Orders Bill, 
CSA 6), which was subject to intense parliamentary debate and scrutiny, led by two specific 
groups of parliamentarians: the Attorney-General’s Backbenchers Committee219 and the LCA 
Legislation Committee.220 As Part II documents, the ‘prominence and persistence of these 
parliamentarians’ resulted in important rights-enhancing changes to the proposed laws, 
particularly those ‘elements of the legislation most offensive to traditional common law and 
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due process rights’.221 These changes, which could be described as an example of the ‘hidden 
impact’ considered in Chapter 7, occurred despite the short time frame given to the LCA 
Legislation Committee to conduct its inquiry.222 As the then Chair of the LCA Legislation 
Committee, Senator Marise Payne, observed: 
What I see played out is an intensive Senate inquiry – I acknowledge absolutely that it 
happened over a relatively short period of time – and very intense days of hearing, but an 
inquiry which still attracted almost 300 submissions and which nevertheless resulted in the 
comprehensive ventilation of a range of concerns of both individuals and organisations in the 
community in relation to the legislation.223 
As explored in Part III, the scrutiny of this Bill exemplifies both the strengths and weaknesses 
of Australia’s parliamentary model of rights protection. On the one hand, significant rights-
enhancing changes were made to the Control Orders Bill that are directly attributable to the 
work of parliamentary committees and their key participants, despite the short time frames and 
the government-controlled Senate.224 On the other hand, the enacted law still contained a range 
of rights-abrogating features, some of which have since been declared contrary to international 
human rights standards and repealed in other comparable jurisdictions such as the UK.225 These 
strengths and weaknesses of the rights-protecting role of parliamentary committees are 
considered further in Part III. 
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4 Time for Review: Parliamentary and Judicial Review of Counter-Terrorism Laws (2005–
2008) 
By 2006, some of the Howard Government’s counter-terrorism laws had been utilised by 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies, occasionally giving rise to criminal charges and 
complaints of misuse or overuse.226 In other comparable jurisdictions, such as the UK, efforts 
were being made to strengthen oversight of the use of counter-terrorism laws227 and 
international human rights bodies began to question whether Australian counter-terrorist laws 
were compliant with our international human rights obligations.228 
These factors, combined with the expiry of sunset clauses included in a number of the counter-
terrorism Acts described above,229 gave rise to a period of sustained independent review of 
Australia’s counter-terrorism regime, from both within and outside of Parliament. These 
reviews included the: 
 2006 ALRC Report No 104 Fighting Words: A Review of Sedition Laws in Australia;230 
 2006 PJCIS’s Review of Security and Counter Terrorism Legislation;231 
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 2006 report of the Security Legislation Review Committee (the Sheller Committee) into 
the operation, effectiveness and implications of the package of anti-terrorism legislation 
introduced during 2002 and 2003;232  
 2007 PJCIS inquiry into the proscription of ‘terrorist organisations’ under the Criminal 
Code;233 and 
 the 2008 inquiry by the Hon John Clarke QC into the case of Dr Mohamed Haneef (the 
Haneef Inquiry);234 
Taken together, these inquiries represent an important assessment of the key components of 
Australia’s counter-terrorism laws enacted up until 2008. They attracted significant numbers 
of submissions and generated mainstream media coverage.235 As discussed in Part II, the past 
work of parliamentary committees featured prominently in these reviews, and contributed to 
important legislative change in the form of the National Security Legislation Amendment Act 
2010 (Cth) (CSA 7) and the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 (Cth) 
(INSLM Bill, CSA 8). As discussed below, these two case study Acts contain a range of 
features that directly reflect some of the recommendations made during these reviews.  
At the same time, the courts had also begun to consider the application of some of the new 
counter-terrorism offences and procedural provisions, and had been called upon to adjudicate 
questions of their constitutionality.236 For example, in R v Lodhi,237 the defendant sought to 
challenge the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) 
on the ground that it permitted a person accused of committing terrorist offences to be 
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234 Clarke, above n 170. 
235 This is discussed further in Chapter 6, Section D. 
236 George Williams, Fergal Davis and Nicola McGarrity (eds), Surveillance, Counter-Terrorism and 
Comparative Constitutionalism (Routledge, 2014). 
237 R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 571; see also Lodhi v The Queen (2007) 179 A Crim R 470, 487 [67]. 
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sentenced through a process incompatible with the exercise of federal judicial power.238 The 
Act was found to be not inconsistent with the exercise of judicial power, on the basis that it 
was concerned with pre-trial disclosure of evidence rather than setting out a process for 
excluding evidence during the trial itself.239  
Shortly after, in Thomas v Mowbray,240 the High Court considered the constitutional validity 
of the control order regime introduced by the Control Orders Act, which was challenged on the 
basis that it did not fall within the Commonwealth’s legislative power and breached the 
separation of judicial power protected by Chapter 3 of the Constitution. The majority of the 
High Court upheld the validity of the control order regime, despite strong concerns from rights 
advocates about its potential to allow police to deprive someone of their liberty prior to being 
charged with a criminal offence.241 The constitutional validity of the terrorist organisation 
offences was also questioned and ultimately upheld in the case of Ul-Haque v The Queen,242 
where the laws were found to be validly enacted under the Commonwealth’s ‘external affairs’ 
power. 
The detention and visa cancellation of Dr Mohamed Haneef, an Indian doctor working in 
Australia,243 also gave rise to questions about the use of the extensive new counter-terrorism 
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Mowbray’ (2008) 36 Federal Law Review 209. 
242 [2006] NSWCCA 241. 
243 Dr Haneef was arrested while working in Australia on suspicion of involvement in a number of failed terrorist 
attacks in the UK and detained for 12 days before being charged with intentionally providing resources to a 
terrorist organisation. For further discussion see Sharon Pickering, and Jude McCulloch, ‘The Haneef case and 
counter-terrorism policing in Australia’ (2010) 20(1) Policing & Society 21. 
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powers provided to the AFP and intelligence agencies.244 The Haneef case involved the use of 
the so called ‘dead time’ provisions of Part IC of the Crimes Act, introduced by the Anti-
Terrorism Act 2004 (Cth), which allowed Dr Haneef to be detained by police for a prolonged 
period without charge.245 Dr Haneef was eventually charged with the offence of ‘providing 
support to a terrorist organisation’ and granted bail, but the Minister for Immigration then 
decided to cancel his visa on character grounds.246 An inquiry conducted by Michael John 
Clarke made a number of findings that were critical of the handling of the case by key 
government agencies and recommended that the federal government: 
 amend the ‘dead time’ provisions in Part IC of the Crimes Act; 
 appoint an independent reviewer of terrorism laws; and 
 amend the Criminal Code offence of providing support to a terrorist organisation.247 
As discussed further in Part II, these recommendations, combined with previous 
recommendations made by parliamentary committees, led to important changes in Australia’s 
counter-terrorism legislative framework and cemented the already popular view that rigorous 
independent oversight was necessary if executive agencies were to be invested with 
extraordinary and intrusive investigative powers. 
5 The Fourth Tranche: Updating Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Framework (2008–2010) 
The 2007 election resulted in a change of government for the first time in 11 years.248 While 
national security remained a high-ranking issue among voters, the ALP’s campaign included a 
focus on ‘getting the balance right’ between security and liberty when it came to counter-
                                                 
 
244 See, eg, Law Council of Australia, Anti-Terrorism Reform Project (October 2013) 
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terrorism laws.249 This coincided with a renewed push by rights advocates for a federal charter 
or bill of rights for Australia, spurred on by the National Consultation process.250 
In this climate, work was underway to respond to the findings of previous inquiries into 
Australia’s counter-terrorism laws. On 12 August 2009, the then Attorney-General, the Hon 
Robert McClelland, released a lengthy discussion paper outlining proposed reform options to 
Australia’s counter-terrorism laws, some of which sought to narrow the scope of key provisions 
and improve safeguards and oversight mechanisms.251 The PJCIS was asked to conduct an 
inquiry into the reforms set out in the discussion paper and produced a report that drew heavily 
from the findings and submissions made to the previous inquiries set out above.252 
In response to the PJCIS report, the government introduced the National Security Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2010 (Cth) (CSA 8) which contained some, but not all, of the reforms 
proposed by the discussion paper.253 Around this time, and also in response to earlier reviews 
of counter-terrorism laws, the government introduced legislation to establish the position of 
the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM Act 2010 (Cth), CSA 7) to 
review and report on the operation, effectiveness and implications of Australia’s 
counter-terrorism and national security legislation on an ongoing basis.254 This Act was passed 
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in advance of the 2010 federal election, but the position of INSLM was not filled until April 
2011.255 This paved the way for further independent reviews of Australia’s counter-terrorism 
laws to take place, with a specific focus on rights compatibility.256 COAG also revisited 
Australia’s counter-terrorism framework in 2012, reflecting on the changes implemented in 
2005 by the states and territories relating to the control order and preventative detention order 
regimes, along with a range of other matters.257  
This period of gradual and selective implementation of the findings of past reviews of 
Australia’s counter-terrorism laws demonstrates both the significance and limits of the rights 
protection role of the parliamentary committee system. On the one hand, the impact of the 
committee system on the content of counter-terrorism laws during this period was direct and 
generally rights-enhancing, particularly when it came to improving safeguards and enhancing 
independent oversight of the use of executive powers.258 However, it is also clear that the ALP 
government’s response left many rights-abrogating features of the legislative framework in 
place, and further entrenched some of these features (such as the control order regime) into 
Australia’s legal landscape. As Part II documents, while new rights-review bodies may have 
been established, the politics of ‘tough on terror’ continued to be persuasive, particularly as the 
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ALP entered its second term in government and confronted its second leadership change in 
three years.259 
6 The Fifth Tranche: Dealing with ‘Home-Grown’ Terrorism (2013–2015) 
The election of the Abbott Coalition Government in 2013 brought with it a new tranche of 
counter-terrorism law making, squarely focused on confronting the national security challenges 
presented by Australian citizens who were engaged in terrorist activity overseas.260 According 
to incoming Attorney-General Brandis, Australia had become one of the largest per-capita 
sources of foreign fighters in the Syrian conflict from countries outside the region.261 This led 
to significant concerns that foreign fighters returning to Australia posed a real threat to national 
security,262 underscored by terrorist attacks undertaken by so-called ‘home-grown’ terrorists in 
the UK and France.263 There was also a push at the international level for States to act to prevent 
travel and support for foreign terrorist fighters.264 This period also saw a decisive shift away 
from the previous government’s policy commitment to ‘human rights’, with the incoming 
Attorney-General instead articulating his vision for the portfolio in the language of ‘traditional 
rights and freedoms’.265 As will be discussed further in Part III, this had a noticeable impact on 
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the way key participants framed and articulated their concerns about individual rights during 
this period. 
During this period, the Abbott Government introduced a range of new counter-terrorism laws 
that significantly expanded the pre-existing regime. These included the following case study 
Acts which authorised:  
 the extension of the control order regime and the collection, use and sharing of 
intelligence information (the Counter-Terrorism Act 2014 (No 1), CSA 10);266 
 the collection, retention and sharing of telecommunications data (the Data 
Retention Act, CSA 9);267 
 the declaration of certain overseas ‘zones’ as declared areas and the criminalisation 
of those who travel to those areas (the Foreign Fighters Act, CSA 11);268 and  
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 the revocation of citizenship of Australians who travel overseas to engage in or 
support terrorist activity (the Citizenship Act, CSA 12).269  
As discussed in detail in Part II, each of these laws generated substantial public and 
parliamentary debate. After more than ten years, the Australian community had, on the one 
hand, come to expect counter-terrorism law making as part of the ordinary legislative agenda 
of incoming Australian Governments and, on the other, become increasingly explicit in its 
demands for meaningful rights scrutiny of such laws. While the broad policies underpinning 
the laws received bipartisan support, questions about the proposed laws’ infringements on the 
right to privacy, freedom of movement and the right to citizenship were raised by many 
commentators and some members of the opposition and cross bench.270 In addition, questions 
were raised about the efficacy of these laws as preventative measures, particularly in the 
context of continued concern about the experience of isolation and discrimination within 
Australia’s Islamic community, which some argued was exacerbated by the Abbott 
Government’s ‘Team Australia’ rhetoric and proposed changes to the Racial Discrimination 
Act 1975 (Cth).271 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, case study Acts 9–12 were all scrutinised by the PJCIS, as 
well as the SSCSB and the PJCHR, during their passage through Parliament.272 These PJCIS 
inquiries also drew upon the work of the INSLM, who became a source of influential 
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commentary on the legitimacy and effectiveness of proposed counter-terrorism laws, despite 
unsuccessful efforts by the Abbott Government to repeal the position.273 
As Part II also demonstrates, this multi-committee scrutiny of the case study Acts proved to 
have a significant rights-enhancing impact, despite the rights-abrogating features of many of 
the enacted provisions. The PJCIS, in particular, appeared to provide a highly influential forum 
for the major political parties to clarify and narrow the scope of key terms, improve safeguards, 
and enhance oversight and reporting requirements with respect to the proposed new powers 
and offences in these Acts. For example, during this period, the PJCIS enjoyed a 100 per cent 
‘strike rate’ in terms of having its recommendations for legislative change reflected in 
successful government amendments.274 These changes improved the rights compliance of these 
Bills in important ways, for example by:  
 requiring that telecommunications data be defined in primary legislation, and any data 
retained by authorities be de-identified or destroyed after two years;275 
 ensuring that detailed public records be kept of the use of retained telecommunications 
data;276 
 protecting the data of journalists from being accessed;277 
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Repeal Bill 2014, designed to abolish the office. However, on 17 July 2014, the government decided to withdraw 
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 increasing the oversight powers and review functions of the PJCIS, including to 
examine the counter-terrorism activities of the Australian Federal Police;278 
 narrowing the scope of the proposed ‘declared area’ offences in the Criminal Code and 
ensuring that such declarations are subject to disallowance by Parliament;279 
 preserving the safeguards relating to specifying and reviewing the conditions imposed 
as part of a control order or preventive detention order;280 
 narrowing the circumstances in which a dual national can have their citizenship 
‘renounced’ by doing something terrorist-related overseas, including by narrowing the 
range of conduct that can trigger the provisions.281 
It is important to note that these laws were debated and scrutinised against the backdrop of a 
number of reports of deeply disturbing acts of terrorism and violence.282 In addition, on 12 
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September 2014 Prime Minister Abbott announced that Australia’s national security threat 
level had been raised from ‘medium’ to ‘high’.283  
Another significant event that occurred during this period would later become known as the 
‘Sydney Siege’.284 The handling of the Sydney Siege by police and other authorities was 
subject to a joint Commonwealth/NSW Government Review.285 The review was hesitant to 
recommend sweeping changes to Australia’s counter-terrorism regime, and instead said that its 
findings would ‘maintain broadly the current balance in our existing regulatory and legislative 
framework’. It observed that: 
introducing substantial further controls involves a larger choice about the sort of society we 
wish to live in and is properly the province of the public and our elected representatives. Any 
further controls would be based on judgments as to whether increases in policing, surveillance 
and controls and the related extra burden on the taxpayer and intrusions into Australians’ lives 
would make us appreciably safer.286 
This event marks the end of the period of counter-terrorism Bills studied in this research. 
However, the experience of counter-terrorism law making in Australia and robust 
parliamentary scrutiny of that law making has continued beyond Abbott’s Prime Ministership 
and well into Malcolm Turnbull’s term in office.287 This confirms the continuing relevance of 
my research. 
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abbott/6775464>. A number of subsequent events will be particularly fertile case studies for future research, 
including (1) the introduction, scrutiny and enactment of the Counter-Terrorism Bill (No 1) 2016 (see, eg, PJCIS, 
Parliament of Australia, Advisory Report on the Counter-Terrorism Bill (No 1) 2015 (15 February 2016); George 
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E Institutional Engagement on Rights Issues and the Impact of Parliamentary 
Committees 
The above discussion highlights three essential considerations for the next parts of my research. 
First, the institutional context and political experiences summarised above explain why 
parliamentary committees exist and their role in Australia’s parliamentary model of rights 
protection. Secondly, as discussed further in Part III, the key functions and features of the 
Australian Parliament set the parameters for identifying realistic options for improving the 
rights-enhancing impact of the committee system. Finally, the rights-intrusive content and 
proliferation of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws demonstrates why we should care about the 
quality of scrutiny parliamentary committees provide. 
As Stephenson explains, if improving the quality of rights scrutiny is understood as an 
inherently positive goal, the process of identifying reform options must be sensitive to the 
constitutional principles and values of the particular jurisdiction being considered.288 This is 
because these principles and values govern how the institutions of government interact with 
each other on rights issues. As Stephenson warns, once established, the practices and structures 
that govern dialogue between different institutions of government are extremely difficult to 
shift,289 and thus rights advocates should make sure that they fully understand the pre-existing 
institutional dynamic within the jurisdiction they are studying before developing options for 
reform. As noted in Chapter 2, my research seeks to confront this challenge through integrating 
the observations made in this chapter throughout the remaining two parts of this thesis.  
By undertaking this approach, the evidence presented in Part II reveals the ‘multi-stage’ rights 
review that occurs at the federal level and exposes the direct and indirect institutional 
                                                 
 
Brandis, Attorney-General, ‘Strengthening counterterrorism legislation’ (Media Release, 25 July 2016)); (2) the 
introduction, scrutiny and enactment of the Criminal Code Amendment (High Risk Terrorist Offenders) Bill 2016 
(see PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Advisory Report on the Criminal Code Amendment (High Risk Terrorist 
Offenders) Bill 2016 (2016); see also Sarah Moulds, Committees in Dialogue: Parliamentary Scrutiny of the High 
Risk Terrorist Offenders Bill, Australian Public Law (30 January 2017) 
<https://auspublaw.org/2017/01/committees-in-dialogue/>); and (3) the 2017 terrorist attacks in Manchester and 
London, which generated discussions in Australia of the need for further counter-terrorism measures (see, eg, 
Tony Walker ‘Manchester attack: All-too-familiar scenes underscore our vulnerability to acts of terror’, The 
Conversation (online), 24 May 2017 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-23/manchester-arena-attack-
familiar-scenes-highlight-vulnerability/8550920>). 
288 Stephenson, above n 1, 212. 
289 Ibid 8. 
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interactions that form part of this process.290 For example, by looking for ‘hidden impact’, Part 
II highlights the role the bureaucracy plays in anticipating rights scrutiny by parliamentary 
committees, and the indirect interaction that occurs between the Parliament and the executive 
when engaged in this form of rights review. Similarly, by examining the impact parliamentary 
committees have on the content of proposed laws, Part II exposes the direct institutional 
engagement that occurs between the Parliament and the executive when the government fails 
to ‘get the balance right’ when seeking to enact rights-intrusive counter-terrorism laws. 
The results of this analysis identify the characteristics that give particular committees strengths 
within the Australian system of rights protection. The results also demonstrate that when 
multiple committees work together their rights-enhancing impact is stronger. These findings in 
turn inform the reform options set out in Part III. In this way, my research gives practical effect 
to the analytical approach outlined by Stephenson291 and offers jurisdiction-sensitive 
suggestions for how to enhance the quality of Australia’s multi-stage system of rights review. 
                                                 
 
290 Ibid 6–8. See also The Hon Chief Justice Robert French AC, ‘Foreword’ in ibid viiii. As discussed in Chapter 
1, for Stephenson ‘multi-stage rights review’ is a useful way of characterising the model of rights protection 
employed by countries such as Australia, as it avoids the sometimes strained dichotomies that are present in 
categories of rights protection that revolve around the ‘dialogue’ between the legislature and the courts. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the kinds of disagreement between the institutions of government on rights issues that are 
facilitated in each system can include ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ disagreement.  




PART II: APPLYING THE ASSESSMENT 
FRAMEWORK  
CHAPTER 4: PARTICIPATION AND LEGITIMACY  
A Why Look for Key Participants and Evidence of Legitimacy? 
Part II of my research applies the assessment framework set out in Chapter 2 and describes the 
overall impact of the four parliamentary committees studied on the case study Acts. This 
chapter identifies the key participants in the parliamentary committee system and looks for 
evidence of whether particular committees are seen as more legitimate by some or all of these 
participants. This provides important context for the type of influence particular committees 
can have on decision makers in the legislative process. It can also explain why some 
committees have had a stronger, or different, impact on the case study Acts than others, which 
is important when it comes to evaluating the capacity of the committee system to contribute to 
rights protection. This is because the parliamentary model of rights protection relies on the 
Parliament and the executive voluntarily developing a culture of rights scrutiny, rather than 
being required to do so by threat of judicial sanction. To contribute meaningfully to this system, 
parliamentary committees must therefore have sufficient legitimacy in the eyes of a wide range 
of participants in the process, including parliamentarians, government members, public 
servants and the broader community. As discussed below, my research suggests that 
parliamentary committees that are able to generate and sustain high levels of legitimacy among 
those responsible for developing and drafting proposed laws are well placed to maximise their 
rights-enhancing impact.  
This chapter argues that certain characteristics of individual committees provide them with a 
higher level of legitimacy or enable them to attract a more diverse range of participants, and 
this has implications for their capacity to influence the content of a Bill. For example, the 
SSCSB has well-established relationships with a narrow range of executive-dominated 
participants, which allows the committee to have strong behind-the-scenes impact on the 
content of the case study Acts. Whereas for the LCA Committees, attracting a large number of 
diverse participants to their inquiries is one of the most effective ways for the committees to 
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generate the type of public attention that sometimes translates into rights-enhancing legislative 
change. 
As discussed further below, understanding these different characteristics of particular 
committees allows practical options for reform to be identified that can improve the way 
individual committees work together to contribute to rights protection.  
1 Who Are the Key Participants? 
In many ways, the entire Australian community is a participant in the parliamentary committee 
process which forms part of Australia’s democratically elected Parliament. However, for the 
purpose of this evaluation, key participants in the parliamentary committee system are those 
individuals or organisations who either directly engage with the committees, or who rely upon 
their work when making decisions about proposed laws.  
Table 4.1 provides a snapshot of the key participants identified in each of the committees being 
evaluated in this thesis, in the context of the case study Acts. The following four tables (Tables 
4.2-4.5) provide an overview of the number and diversity of submissions and witnesses to the 
inquiry-based committees (the LCA Committees and the PJCIS). The relevance of these tables 
to my research is discussed below. 
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Table 4.2: Submission and Witness Participation Rates for Case Study Acts 
Considered By PJCIS 
Bill Submissions  Witnesses 
(organisations 
counted as 1) 
Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 43 19 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 
2014 
46 18 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014 17 8 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data 
Retention) Bill 2015 
204 29 
Inquiry into potential National Security Legislation reforms 2012 236 38 
 
Table 4.3 Submission and Witness Participation Rates for Case Study Acts and 
Related Inquiries Considered by LCA Committees 
Bill Submissions  Witnesses 
(organisations 
counted as 1) 
Comprehensive revision of the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 (conducted during 2013–2015) 
45 27 
National Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 23 10 
Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005  294 21 
National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 24 5 
Anti-terrorism Bill 2004 28 6 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 [References Committee] 
435 22 
Security Legislation (Anti-Terrorism) Bills 2002 431 34 
 
2 Rates and Diversity of Participation  
(a) Strong Performer: The LCA Committees 
The above tables tell an important story about the different forms of participation each 
committee attracts. Rates and diversity of participants in formal parliamentary scrutiny can be 
an important indicator of the capacity of the committee system to contribute to rights 
protection, particularly when it comes to the inquiry-based committees such as the LCA 
116 
Committees and the PJCIS.1 This is because a diverse range of participants in committee 
inquiries provides ‘an opportunity for proponents of divergent views to find common ground’2 
or, as Dalla-Pozza has explained, for parliamentarians to make good on their promise to ‘strike 
the right balance’ between safeguarding security and preserving individual liberty when 
enacting counter-terrorism laws.3 In her earlier study of participation in counter-terrorism 
related inquiries, Dalla-Pozza found that, while there are many examples of inquiries that 
attract a diverse range of submission makers, overall, committees had ‘mixed success’ in 
functioning as a ‘conduit for diverse interests to be heard’.4 As Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show, similar 
results emerge in the context of the case study Acts chosen for my research.  
The LCA Committees have the highest overall participation rate, engaging a broad range of 
Senators, public servants and submission makers. For example, in two of their case study Bill 
inquiries, the LCA Committees attracted over 400 submissions and heard from well over 20 
witnesses.5 A number of the LCA Committees’ features explain why this might be the case. 
First, as noted in Chapter 3, the LCA Committees are ‘inquiry-based’ committees, with specific 
powers to call for public submissions and hold public hearings into Bills or policy issues 
referred to them by the Senate. Secondly, the Standing Orders governing the LCA Committees 
enable a large number of Senators to be directly involved as participating or substitute 
members.6 For example, in the period between 1 January 2015 and 30 June 2015, 49 Senators 
                                                 
 
1 Kelly Paxman, Referral of Bills to Senate Committees: An Evaluation, Parl Paper No 31 (1998) 76. 
2 Harry Evans (ed), Odgers’ Australian Senate Procedure (Commonwealth of Australia, 10th ed, 2001) 366; see 
also Anthony Marinac, ‘The Usual Suspects? “Civil society” and Senate Committees’ (Paper submitted for the 
Senate Baker Prize, 2003) 129 <http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/pubs/pops/pop42/marinac.pdf>. 
3 Dominique Dalla-Pozza, ‘Refining the Australian Counter-terrorism Framework: How Deliberative Has 
Parliament Been?’ (2016) 27(4) Public Law Review 271, 273. 
4 Dominique Dalla-Pozza, ‘The Conscience of Democracy? The Role of Australian Parliamentary Committees in 
Enacting Counter-Terrorism Laws’ (Working Paper, Australasian Study of Parliament Group Conference, 2007) 
<http://www.aspg.org.au/conferences/adelaide2007/Dalla-pozzo.pdf>. In this study, Dalla Pozza considers 21 
separate counter-terrorism Acts made between 2002 and 2005, and looks at the number and character of 
submissions made to various parliamentary committees that were inquiring into these laws. 
5 LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Security Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 (No 2) and Related Matters (2002). In this inquiry, the LCA References Committee received 
431 submissions and heard from 65 witnesses. See also LCA References Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Inquiry into the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 and Related 
Matters (2002). In this inquiry the LCA Committee received 435 submissions and heard from 22 organisations. 
6 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 25 (15 July 2014) cl 7. 
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participated in the work of the LCA Legislation Committee.7 This high participation rate 
among Senators from diverse political and portfolio backgrounds in turn helps to attract a 
diverse range of regular submission makers, including those who may be opposed to the 
government’s policy objectives in the area of counter-terrorism. For example, representatives 
from Civil Liberties Australia said: 
The Senate Legal and Con References committee is a committee where the opposition and the 
Greens can get things up … normally the opposition or one of the Greens chairs that 
committee, so that’s where you’ll get the more interesting analysis of what should be done, 
…. So that’s a very useful committee.8 
This relatively diverse rate of participation allows the LCA Committees to contribute to 
Australia’s parliamentary model of rights protection by providing a meaningful public forum 
for the exchange of views on rights issues arising from proposed laws or policies.9 This 
diversity of participation also suggests that the LCA Committees provide an effective forum 
for holding the executive government to account, which, as noted in Chapter 3, is a key function 
of the Australian Parliament. For these reasons, the reforms I recommend in Part III are 
designed to enhance these qualities of the LCA Committees, for example by formalising 
processes for selecting witnesses to guard against unconscious bias.10 However, as explored 
further below, other changes may also be required to ensure that these relatively high rates of 
participation translate into strong legislative and public impact for the LCA Committees, 
particularly as they are forced to compete with other inquiry-based committees with cross-
cutting mandates, such as the PJCIS.11 
                                                 
 
7 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Work of the Senate (2015) 123–4. Similar rates of participation among Senators 
occurred across the whole of the period examined in this thesis.  
8 Interview with Bill Rowlings, Civil Liberties Australia (Canberra, 24 May 2016).  
9 For further discussion of deliberative democracy and the Australian Parliament see John Uhr, ‘Parliament and 
Public Deliberation: Evaluating the Performance of Parliament’ (2001) 24 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 708, 712; John Uhr, ‘The Constitutional Convention and Deliberative Democracy’ (1998) 21 University 
of New South Wales Law Journal 875, 879; John Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia: The Changing Place 
of Parliament (Cambridge University Press, 1998) 220, 227; Dalla-Pozza, ‘Refining the Australian Counter-
terrorism Framework’, above n 3, 273. 
10 These recommendations are set out in Table 10.1. 
11 Ibid. 
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(b) A Narrower Range of Participants for the Technical Scrutiny Committees  
As Table 4.1 above shows, the SSCSB and the PJCHR attract a narrower range of key 
participants, both in terms of direct participation by parliamentarians and external engagement. 
In many ways, this is completely to be expected. As outlined in Chapter 3, the SSCSB considers 
itself to be in the business of ‘technical scrutiny’, which rarely calls for the type of broad public 
or parliamentary engagement of the LCA Committees. Moreover, as the committee itself has 
indicated, the unrelenting workload faced by the SSCSB makes it practically impossible for it 
to encourage active community participation in its Bills scrutiny work.12 
As Chapter 3 explains, the SSCSB also has highly formalised ways of communicating with 
proponents of Bills that revolve around the exchange of correspondence, and it generally 
exercises deference and restraint when formulating its final advice on the compatibility of a 
Bill with its scrutiny criteria.13 As a result, the committee’s closest working relationships are 
with a relatively narrow range of public servants who are directly involved in drafting Bills, or 
providing assistance to Ministers who are required to respond to the committee’s requests for 
further information. As discussed in Chapter 3, the PJCHR also seeks to emulate this ‘technical 
scrutiny’ role, at least when it comes to its Bills scrutiny function,14 and as a result has a 
similarly limited range of participants.  
As set out in Table 4.1, the relatively limited range of participants in the Bills scrutiny functions 
of the PJCHR and the SSCSB has implications for the capacity of these committees to have a 
strong rights-enhancing impact on the content of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws. For 
example, as explored further in Chapter 7, this characteristic makes these committees much 
                                                 
 
12 See, eg, SSCSB, Submission to Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms – 
Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws (2014).  
13 As noted in Chapter 3, the SSCSB’s recommendations are generally designed to alert the Senate to key issues 
to consider, and it rarely makes specific recommendations for legislative change. 
14 As discussed in Chapter 3, the PJCHR also has specific statutory functions that include inquiring into ‘any 
matter relating to human rights which is referred to it by the Attorney-General’: Human Rights (Parliamentary 
Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) s 7(c). These powers have been used five times, eg, PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, 
Examination of the Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012 and related legislation (2013); PJCHR, 
Parliament of Australia, Review of the Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012 and related legislation 
(2016). 
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more reliant on the ‘hidden impact’ they are able to exert on those responsible for developing 
counter-terrorism laws before they are introduced into Parliament.  
(c) The PJCIS Experience 
The PJCIS sits somewhere in the middle of the spectrum when it comes to diversity of 
participation, both in terms of its membership, and the types of submissions it receives to its 
public inquiries. Unlike the LCA Committees, the membership of the PJCIS is tightly 
prescribed and leaves no room for participating or substitute members.15 The PJCIS also 
regularly attracts parliamentarians with experience in the military, law enforcement or related 
fields, and to date has included only members of the major political parties (although minor 
parties and independents are not explicitly excluded).16 This lack of diversity among the 
membership of the PJCIS led some interviewees to express concern about the potential for this 
to influence the ‘culture’ of the committee and its approach to public hearings. For example, 
the CEO of Civil Liberties Australia said: 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security is nothing other than a 
straight extension of the security forces and the police. … Of the 6–8 regulars it is headed by 
spooks, or ex-spooks or ex-military or ex-police type people. … 
It’s a total insiders club. They adopt whatever’s put up by the police and security services as 
gospel and that is taken to be virtually what will apply unless you can overturn it … with 
dramatic proof that it won’t work. … The starting point of that committee is that the police 
and security services will get 100% of what they want unless somebody from outside the 
organisation can absolutely demonstrate that it shouldn’t be that way. And that is wrong. 
Fundamentally wrong. … We would suggest that the people who should be on the committee 
like that are the ones that have voiced concerns. They should not be the ex-spooks, the ex-
                                                 
 
15 Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) pt 4, s 28 (2) provides that: ‘The Committee is to consist of 11 members, 
5 of whom must be Senators and 6 of whom must be members of the House of Representatives.’ Further details 
regarding the Chair and Membership of the PJCIS are prescribed in Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) sch 1, pt 
3.  
16 For example, as at September 2017 the Chair of the PJCIS was Mr Andrew Hastie MP, who was an army officer. 
Two other current members of the PJCIS were previously military officers (Senator David Fawcett and the Hon 
Dr Mike Kelly MP AM) and one is a former police officer (Mr Jason Wood MP). 
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police, the ex-military people, because we know what their attitudes are, we know that they 
bring to bear a particular attitude which is totally dismissive of the community point of view.17 
Lydia Shelly from the Muslim Legal Network was also ‘concerned about the membership of 
the PJCIS not being very diverse either in terms of political allegiance or life experiences’ and 
noted that this gave rise to negative experiences for witnesses,18 particularly for groups and 
individuals who fall outside of the common list of repeat submission makers to public inquiries 
into counter-terrorism law. For example, Ms Shelly explained that, for non-legally trained 
community members, even finding out about a parliamentary inquiry into a law that might 
affect their rights was challenging: 
It is very difficult for everyday Muslims to participate in parliamentary committee inquiries. 
Often these inquiries are not well known. Key community groups don’t find out about them at 
all, or if they do it is too late for them to coordinate and draft a submission. It seems that the 
process is set up to capture only a very small group of representatives.  
Being legally trained was very important, and pretty much essential to understanding the laws 
and participating in the inquiry at such short notice. Other Muslim community groups who 
were interested in participating struggled due to the time frames, and the lack of capacity to 
get across the detail of the legislation in such a short time and then confront such a hostile 
committee hearing.19 
The Muslim Legal Network’s experiences may have been shaped by the subject matter of the 
committee inquiry and the public nature of the committee hearing, as well as the lack of 
diversity in the membership of the PJCIS. However, others have also commented on the 
barriers individuals and groups face when seeking to access committee hearings and to be 
invited to appear as witnesses.20 For Paxman, these barriers arise, at least in part, from the 
dominance of sophisticated, usually legal qualified, organisations or government departments 
who are frequently invited by the committees themselves to make submissions or appear as 
                                                 
 
17 Interview with Bill Rowlings, Civil Liberties Australia (Canberra, 24 May 2016). 
18 Interview with Lydia Shelly, Muslim Legal Network (telephone, 2 June 2016).  
19 Ibid. 
20 See, eg, Interview with Bill Rowlings, Civil Liberties Australia (Canberra, 24 May 2016); Paxman, above n 1. 
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witnesses, as discussed below.21 Paxman describes these organisations and departments as the 
‘usual suspects’.22 
(d) The Usual Suspects 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 below suggest that in the case of the LCA Committees’ and the PJCIS’s 
inquiries into counter-terrorism law, the ‘usual suspects’ are government departments and 
agencies, legal bodies (such as the Law Council of Australia), statutory bodies (such as the 
AHRC and the INSLM) and academics (including groups such as the Gilbert & Tobin Centre 
for Public Law). 
  
                                                 
 
21 Paxman, above n 1. 
22 Ibid. 
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Table 4.4: Frequent Submission Makers to PJCIS as Percentage of Total Number  
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.5 Frequent Submission Makers to LCA Committees as a Percentage of 











































































































































































































While generalisations are hard to make across a range of different inquiries into different Bills, 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 suggest that, on average, the ‘usual suspects’ submission makers made up 
well over half of the witnesses to the PJCIS and LCA Committees’ inquiries into the case study 
Acts. The dominance of these categories of submission makers is particularly pronounced with 
respect to the PJCIS, which held six inquiries where 70 per cent or more witnesses were from 
the ‘usual suspects’ category.23 
This reliance on ‘the usual suspects’ may be a result of the relatively informal processes 
adopted by committees and their secretariats when it comes to calling for submissions and 
selecting witnesses. As Paxman explains: ‘Most submissions to bills inquiries are by groups or 
individuals who are already aware of the bill’s existence, or who are contacted by politicians 
or their staff, or by the committee secretariat’.24  
It is also common for the inquiry committees to develop their own ‘lists’ of submission makers, 
with whom they regularly liaise and whom they actively encourage to make submissions or 
appear as witnesses, as was confirmed by a number of interviews conducted for this thesis.25  
                                                 
 
23 It is noted that the inquiries into the early counter-terrorism reforms, in particular the LCA Legislation 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (No 
2) and Related Matters (2002) and the LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the 
Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 and Related Matters (2002) 
attracted high participation and diversity in terms of witnesses to the LCA Committee’s hearings, perhaps because 
these Bills sought to introduce considerable new, intrusive powers for law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
This can be contrasted with some of the inquiries conducted by the PJCIS, which concerned Bills that built upon 
or refined existing powers rather than introducing new powers. However, this does not fully explain the 
comparative lack of diversity seen in inquiries conducted by the PJCIS relating to the introduction of new powers 
in the case of the Foreign Fighters Bill and the Citizenship Bill, which both introduced significant new powers for 
executive agencies but failed to attract a diverse range of witnesses. See PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Advisory 
Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (2014); PJCIS, Parliament 
of Australia, Advisory Report on the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 (2015).  
24 Paxman, above n 1, 81. 
25 See, eg, Interview with Sophie Dunstone, former Secretary of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs (Canberra, 23 May 2016). See also Interview with Public Servant (Canberra, 28 September 
2016). This process was also confirmed by committee members, such as a current Liberal Senator, who said: 
‘[W]e tend to, when we’re putting an inquiry out, and this is true for all committees, [say] here’s the list of people 
who submitted, but then you also say to the professional staff, well who else has been active in this space, who’s 
writing various academic blogs or industry magazines, or who’s expressed an opinion, and then you go out to 
those people to invite comment, and then you’ve got the open invitation approach, where you know, you publish 
in the various newspapers or websites or whatever of the fact that this inquiry is coming up.’ Interview with a 
current Liberal Senator for South Australia (Adelaide, 23 August 2016). 
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A former parliamentary committee secretariat staff member explained that, in their experience, 
when selecting inquiry witnesses the secretariat would: 
look at the submissions and say, ‘Well, these are the people you have to interview or go to a 
public hearing on, and here are a selection of people you might want to contact.’ Then you 
consider the individual submissions, and unless there’s one that’s really compelling, well 
they’re just really individuals with views that you might use as references for your report.26 
For some, this reliance on a relatively narrow pool of high-quality and sophisticated submission 
makers is sensible and appropriate, particularly for committees such as the LCA Committees 
and the PJCIS, which are often required to deal with complex legal issues in their Bills scrutiny 
function. It means, for example, that those with the capacity and expertise to contribute are 
actively engaged in the scrutiny system. As the former Chair of the LCA Legislation 
Committee observed in 2010: 
A lot of legislation we deal with in this country would not be shaped into quality legislation 
were it not for the Law Reform Commission, the Law Council and some of the legal experts 
who are outside of the Parliament. We rely on their expertise heavily.27  
However, consistent reliance upon the ‘usual suspects’ can give rise to the perception that, 
when it comes to public inquiries involving these submission makers, ‘the same old paths are 
being trodden … with predictable outcomes’.28 As discussed below, this in turn dilutes the 
inquiry-based committees’ perceived legitimacy as a deliberative forum, particularly if the 
voices of those most likely to be negatively affected by the proposed law are excluded from 
the inquiry, or ‘drowned out’ by a chorus of ‘usual suspects’.  
For these reasons, I recommend changes to the practices of the inquiry-based committees to 
encourage more active engagement with potential submission makers and witnesses from a 
                                                 
 
26 Interview with Public Servant (Canberra, 28 September 2016). 
27 Patricia Crossin, ‘The Future of Senate Committees: Challenges and Opportunities’ (Speech delivered at the 
Senate Committees and Government Accountability Forum, Canberra, December 2010) 139 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/pubs/pops/pop54/c11.pdf>. 
28 Paxman, above n 1, 83–4. Paxman’s research suggests that the dominance of the ‘usual suspects’ might continue 
to increase over time, as those groups with ‘representatives who have become familiar with inquiry procedures 
by regularly writing submissions or appearing as witnesses are often able to represent their organisation’s interests 
more effectively’. This in turn allows them to attract the resources they need to continue to respond to inquiries 
in a timely fashion.  
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broader range of organisations and interest groups.29 Of course, improved engagement with a 
broader cross-section of the community may not automatically result in more (or more diverse) 
submissions: there may be some sectors of the community that are unwilling to engage or 
unaware of the benefits of engagement with parliamentary committees for their particular 
advocacy strategy or interests. For this reason, I also recommend changes to help demonstrate 
the value of committee participation for the advocacy objectives of a broader range of groups 
and individuals, for example by documenting the influence committee recommendations can 
have on the content of legislation.30 These recommendations align with the general agreement 
among past and present committee members interviewed that a more diverse range of views 
adds to the quality of the inquiry process.31 
As will be discussed further in Part III, the above analysis reveals an important tension in the 
role and impact of different types of parliamentary committees when it comes to scrutinising 
rights-engaging legislation. On the one hand, the ability to attract and reflect upon a diverse 
range of perspectives when inquiring into a Bill has positive deliberative implications for the 
capacity of the committee system to contribute to Australia’s parliamentary model of rights 
protection. On the other hand, as Chapter 5 documents, other committee attributes, such as 
specialist skills and trusted relationships with the executive, can also lead to a consistently 
strong legislative impact, which can also have important rights-enhancing results. This tension 
between committees as deliberative and authoritative forums – and in particular, how these 
different forums are viewed and used by key participants in the committee system – is discussed 
in the next part of this chapter. 
                                                 
 
29 See discussion in Chapter 10 and Tables 10.1 and 10.2. 
30 See discussion in Chapter 10 and Tables 10.1 and 10.2. 
31 See, eg, Interview with a current Liberal Senator for South Australia (Adelaide, 23 August 2016); Interview 
with Andrew Bartlett, former Australian Democrats Senator for Queensland (telephone, 4 August 2016); 
Interview with Penny Wright, former member of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, former 
Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, former 
Australian Greens Senator for South Australia (Adelaide, 11 August 2016); Interview with Patricia Crossin, 
former Chair and Deputy Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, former 
Australian Labor Party Senator for Northern Territory (telephone, 10 August 2016). 
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B Evidence of Legitimacy  
The previous section of this chapter identified the key participants in the formal parliamentary 
scrutiny system and looked at the relevance of different rates and diversity of participation in 
the inquiries conducted by the committees evaluated in this thesis. The next section asks 
whether and why those key participants consider the parliamentary committee system, or 
particular components of the system, to play a legitimate role in the features and functions of 
the Australian Parliament set out in Chapter 3. As noted above, legitimacy (or political 
authority, as discussed above)32 is critical if the committee system is going to contribute to 
Australia’s parliamentary model of rights protection and, as discussed below, the relationship 
each committee has with parliamentarians, the public and those involved in developing and 
drafting counter-terrorism laws often determines its overall impact on a Bill. 
1. The Challenge of Gathering Views on Legitimacy 
As discussed in Chapter 2, finding evidence of whether or not a committee is seen as more or 
less legitimate demands consideration of both objective sources of evidence (such as reference 
to the work of committees in public service guidelines or annual reports of regular submission 
makers)33 and the subjective views of the key participants themselves. For example, whether a 
committee is seen as more legitimate than others may depend upon whether the participant is 
an ‘insider’ (such as a member of the government or a public servant) or an ‘outside observer’ 
(such as a commentator) or perhaps an ordinary member of the public, with no particular 
knowledge or interest in the committee system. As a result, my research draws upon interviews 
conducted with past and present members of parliamentary committees and their staff, regular 
submission makers and a number of public servants, government officials and statutory bodies 
who are responsible for developing, drafting and reviewing counter-terrorism laws.34 My 
research deliberately targets this range of participants, rather than the public at large, as they 
are most likely to reveal the contextual information needed to supplement the other 
documentary material presented in this part, such as insights into whether past committee 
                                                 
 
32 See discussion in Chapter 2, Section E(3). 
33 This evidence is considered in further detail in Chapter 7. 
34 For further information about the interviews conducted for this research see Appendix A. 
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scrutiny has been taken into account when developing, drafting or debating a proposed new 
law.  
This approach is designed to infuse my research with the real-life experiences of those directly 
involved in the committee system; however, it also makes it impossible to completely avoid 
the risks inherent in undertaking interviews with a selective and relatively small sample of key 
participants.35 I am aware, for example, that some of my findings could be affected by factors 
such as the interviewee’s seniority and experience, their geographical location, and their 
political allegiance. In addition, my analysis includes case studies relating to counter-terrorism, 
which may generate particularly strong responses in those asked to comment on the legitimacy 
of certain committees. However, it is important to note that indications of legitimacy derived 
from these interviews are not relied upon in this thesis to provide proof of a committee’s impact 
on a particular counter-terrorism law (which is instead tested by looking for evidence of 
legislative, public and hidden impact). Rather this material is used to provide a fuller picture 
of the context in which the particular committees operate, and to begin to understand what types 
of changes to the system would be accepted as realistic by those directly involved in its work. 
When used in this way, the subjective nature of the interview material adds colour to the 
documentary evidence used to determine impact without undermining the integrity of my 
research. 
2. A Spectrum of Legitimacy among Committees 
My research suggests that, when it comes to assessing legitimacy, a spectrum of committee 
experiences emerges. At one end are the SSCSB and the PJCIS, which are attributed high levels 
of legitimacy by almost all categories of participants, and particularly by those directly 
involved in the law-making process, such as proponents of Bills, public servants, parliamentary 
counsel and parliamentarians. At the other end is the PJCHR, a much newer committee clearly 
struggling to gain legitimacy in the eyes of a wide range of participants. A special place is held 
by the LCA Committees, whose legitimacy is sometimes questioned by the government of the 
day, but whose relatively broad and diverse range of participants consistently attribute at least 
                                                 
 
35 Discussed further in Appendix A. 
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moderate levels of legitimacy across a wide range of functions. This spectrum is summarised 
in Table 4.6, and discussed further below. 
3. Tensions Between the Deliberative and Authoritative Attributes of Committees 
Looking for evidence of legitimacy within the committee system also illustrates the important 
tension between the deliberative and authoritative attributes of parliamentary committees. The 
deliberative attributes of the system (discussed in further detail in Chapter 6) are those that 
facilitate meaningful forums for the public and a diverse range of parliamentarians to engage 
in and contribute to the law-making process.36 These attributes are most commonly observed 
with respect to the inquiry-based committees, who regularly hold public hearings and have 
politically diverse and relatively dynamic committee membership. The authoritative attributes 
of the committee system are those features of individual committees, including membership, 
processes and relationships with the executive, that command respect among key decision 
makers in the system. This authority can manifest in terms of legislative impact (such as 
amendments being made to implement committee recommendations) or behind-the-scenes 
influence (such as public servants developing legislation in line with the standards set by 
scrutiny committees). As discussed further below, both of these attributes – deliberative and 
authoritative – can generate legitimacy for a particular committee, and sometimes pull against 
each other to reduce or dilute the respect or political authority a committee demands. Of central 
interest to this thesis is how these tensions play out when committees work together as a system, 
and what changes could be made to minimise the tension between these attributes, and improve 
the rights-enhancing impact of the committee system on federal laws. This discussion, which 
takes place in Part III, is informed by the views of key participants on the legitimacy attributed 
to particular committees set out in Table 4.6 and considered further below. 
  
                                                 
 
36 As noted above, the hallmarks of deliberative decision making processes are: diverse sources of information, 
inclusivity, cooperation, open-mindedness, and opportunity for reflection.  For further discussion see Ron Levy 
and Grahame Orr, The Law of Deliberative Democracy (Routledge, 2016) 4, 22-23. 
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Of all the committees studied, the SSCSB appears to generate the most legitimacy (or command 
the most political authority) among the key participants interviewed, due to its well accepted 
‘technical scrutiny’ character, and the fact that its scrutiny criteria resonates strongly with those 
involved in the development of legislation.37 This is also evident from the extent to which the 
SSCSB’s scrutiny criteria are closely reflected in formal guidance materials prepared by 
government departments.38 Interviews with parliamentarians suggest that other parliamentary 
committees also attribute strong value and legitimacy to the SSCSB and its reports. For 
example, former Senator Crossin said that when she was Chair of the LCA Legislation 
Committee she would: 
always cross-reference the work of the SSCSB, as a first step when getting across the issues. 
We would draw upon the work of the SSCSB and the other committees whenever we could. 
The secretariat staff would always be right across the SSCSB report.39 
These comments were supported by secretariat staff of other committees, such as former 
Secretary of the LCA Committees Sophie Dunstone, who explained that there are now formal 
processes in place to help ensure parliamentary committee secretariat staff are aware of the 
findings and reports of the SSCSB.40 
Submission makers also spoke of the value of the SSCSB reports, particularly in the context of 
their submissions to other parliamentary committees. For example, a legal submission maker 
said: ‘I refer to them quite a lot. If they’ve raised concerns or made recommendations about 
something then we tend to note them in our submissions because that often bolsters the 
arguments we’re making.’41 
                                                 
 
37 For example, OPC officers underscored the importance of the SSCSB’s scrutiny criteria when drafting Bills: 
‘We will draft the provision, but the instructor will have to justify why it deviates from the [SSCSB] criteria or 
the Guidelines to the Parliament and to the parliamentary committees’: Interview with Peter Quiggin, First 
Parliamentary Counsel, Office of Parliamentary Counsel (Adelaide, 3 August 2016). See also Interview with 
Meredith Leigh and Naomi Carde, Office of Parliamentary Counsel (Canberra, 24 May 2016). 
38 This is explored in detail in Chapter 7. 
39 Interview with Patricia Crossin, former Chair and Deputy Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs, former Australian Labor Party Senator for Northern Territory (telephone, 10 August 
2016).  
40 Interview with Sophie Dunstone, former Secretary of the LCA Committee (Canberra, 23 May 2016).  
41 Interview with Legal Submission Maker (Canberra, 24 May 2016). 
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The SSCSB’s Alert Digest system is held in particular regard by many key participants, and 
‘operates as an “early warning” system, which alerts others to the possible need for further 
examination of provisions of concern from a scrutiny perspective’.42  
The high regard with which the SSCSB is held by its key participants, and in particular, the 
infusion of the SSCSB’s scrutiny criteria within the parliamentary and public service culture, 
gives it particular strengths when it comes to contributing to Australia’s parliamentary model 
of rights protection, but also limits its capacity to influence the content of federal laws. In this 
way, the views on the SSCSB in Table 4.6 neatly illustrate the tension described above. For 
many participants interviewed, the SSCSB is highly respected because it sits outside of the 
political process, and provides an opportunity for parliamentarians to undertake a non-partisan 
analysis of a Bill.43 These same qualities make the SSCSB less diverse in membership and less 
deliberative in process. In other words, it is because the SSCSB distances itself from the 
political qualities of the Australian Parliament that it commands the most authority for many 
participants interviewed, but, as Chapter 5 documents, this same attribute also works to limit 
its capacity to have a direct legislative impact on the case study Acts. 
(b) PJCIS 
This tension between the deliberative and authoritative roles of committees is also illustrated 
by the range of views expressed by key participants with respect to the PJCIS in Table 4.6. 
Many key participants attributed strong legitimacy (or political authority) to the PJCIS because 
of its strong legislative impact, major-party membership and bipartisan approach to developing 
recommendations.44 However, as discussed below, these same attributes also led others to 
question the committee’s capacity to provide a meaningful deliberative forum for rights 
protection.  
                                                 
 
42 SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the future direction and role of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee 
2011 (2012) [4.26]. 
43 See, eg, Interview with Andrew Bartlett, former Australian Democrats Senator for Queensland (telephone, 4 
August 2016); Interview with Meredith Leigh and Naomi Carde, Office of Parliamentary Counsel (Canberra, 24 
May 2016); Interview with Official A, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
44 This was also noted in Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2017 Independent Intelligence Review (2017) 
118–19, 121–3. 
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This tension is illustrated by the views of ‘insiders’ interviewed, such as public servants and 
committee members, who describe the PJCIS as being held in ‘high regard’ among the 
executive, in part due to the seniority of its membership and also due to the fact that it is ‘a 
bipartisan committee that makes recommendations that then the government largely 
supports’.45 Former PJCIS member Senator Robert Ray described PJCIS members as 
‘genuinely prepared to put the national interest first and work through the issues’.46 He said 
that this ‘was different to other committees, where I, like many others, acted in a very partisan 
way’47 and he described the PJCIS as ‘looking for solutions’ and developing compromises ‘so 
as to ensure that the recommendation it wanted to make was able to get through’.48 The PJCIS’s 
regular use of closed hearings to gather security-sensitive information from agencies,49 and the 
committee’s practice of utilising secondees from departments or agencies to provide technical 
assistance to the PJCIS secretariat staff,50 were also cited as examples of measures to foster 
positive working relationships with key agencies. For example, an Attorney-General’s 
Department (AGD) official described the secondee arrangement with the PJCIS as follows:  
the Committee, through the secretariat, seeks [secondee] assistance and quite logically so, 
because in a very short space of time it’s able to get across a very technical area of law. So the 
[Attorney-General’s Department] might provide a staff member to assist [the committee] to 
get across the complexities of a Bill, and answer some simple inquiries so that the committee 
doesn’t have to ask everything on notice.51 
                                                 
 
45 Interview with Cameron Gifford, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
46 Interview with Robert Ray, former Australian Labor Party Senator for Victoria (telephone, 23 November 2016). 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 See Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) sch 1, pt 3 Procedure. 
50 PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Annual Report 2014–2015 (2015) 3. Mr Gifford explained the process of 
selecting and using secondees as follows: ‘The PJCIS has got to the stage where it’s called on departments and 
agencies where there’s a particularly large inquiry and particularly where there’s not necessarily a long lead time 
with the inquiry, to ask for secondments. So we have certainly supported that over the last couple of years in terms 
of making sure that we are providing resources, either coordinating throughout department to make sure the 
agencies provide somebody, or providing a departmental representative as well, and they then provide a research 
assistant role. [They provide] nothing but factually based information to the committee’s questions so that the 
committee is really well placed to understand the proposals that are being taken forward.’ Interview with Cameron 
Gifford, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
51 Interview with Official B, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 30 May 2016). 
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The requirement for PJCIS secretariat staff to have security clearance, and their high level of 
experience and expertise, was also cited as enhancing the committee’s legitimacy, particularly 
among the public service and the law enforcement and intelligence community. As AGD 
National Security Branch officer Mr Cameron Gifford said: 
The people at the secretariat who support the PJCIS have been there for a number of years. … 
[They] also need a security clearance, so that means that [the secretariat staff] have been 
through that process and been in that position for some time. That’s not necessarily the same 
for the human rights committee, and I understand that there’s been a little bit more turnover 
in terms of the secretariat support for it.52 
These ‘insider’ views can be contrasted with the more critical perspectives offered by other, 
‘outsider’ participants, who express scepticism of the PJCIS’s close and trusted working 
relationship with government and question its legitimacy as a rights-protecting forum.53 As a 
former senior member of an oversight body said: 
I have some concerns that the PJCIS could be captured by the agencies, and I am really 
concerned by the use of secondees to the secretariat. I have seen examples of the same person 
who has worked on the legislation for the agencies then on the secretariat for the committee. 
This presents a big risk for the impartiality of the committee. I have also seen committee 
members who are so uncritical of the submissions of agencies. This pro-agency bias is 
concerning.54 
The capacity to hold private hearings, which is available to all parliamentary committees but 
is used frequently by the PJCIS, also gave rise to some questions about the PJCIS’s legitimacy 
for some interviewees. For example, a former senior member of an oversight body said: 
                                                 
 
52 Interview with Cameron Gifford, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
53 See, eg, Interview with a former senior member of an oversight body (telephone, 8 November 2016); Interview 
with Robert Ray, former Australian Labor Party Senator for Victoria (telephone, 23 November 2016); Interview 
with Lydia Shelly, Muslim Legal Network (telephone, 2 June 2016); Interview with Bill Rowlings, Civil Liberties 
Australia (Canberra, 24 May 2016). Former LCA Committee Secretary Sophie Dunstone also expressed some 
reservations about the use of departmental or agency secondees to assist parliamentary committee secretariat staff: 
‘I guess from my professional perspective I have reservations about things like having a departmental person 
seconded here … Senators and committees have a high degree of trust in us, … we take privilege and those types 
of things really seriously. Conversations and advice and decision making made within the committee and between 
the committee and the secretariat is not disclosed, so that always makes me a bit nervous I have to say.’ Sophie 
Dunstone, former Secretary of the LCA Committees (Canberra, 23 May 2016).  
54 Interview with a former senior member of an oversight body (telephone, 8 November 2016). 
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A lot of … information gathering is done in closed sessions, and some of it has to be done in 
this way, but it really does detract from the purpose of parliamentary scrutiny, which is about 
public accountability. It doesn’t allow others to question the evidence of the agencies. There 
is no one in those hearings able to contest the agencies’ claims, except the IGIS. This is a big 
contrast to other parliamentary committees, where evidence of departments and agencies is 
robustly tested by a range of other experts and submission makers. So the role of the IGIS is 
really important to give the PJCIS a different view.55 
These different views illustrate the tension between the effectiveness of the PJCIS when it 
comes to legislative impact (which, as Chapter 5 discusses, appears to be generally rights-
enhancing), and its capacity to generate respect among non-government submission makers as 
a meaningful deliberative forum for rights protection. In other words, the discussion above 
suggests that for some key participants the PJCIS is a high-impact, authoritative committee, 
while for others it risks being held captive by the executive and its agencies. While this tension 
is unlikely to be completely resolved, my research suggests that it can be minimised to improve 
the rights-protecting potential of the committee system. As discussed further in Part III, I argue 
for changes to the system of committees to preserve the attributes of the PJCIS that give rise to 
its strong legislative impact, whilst at the same time encouraging other committees to help fulfil 
the deliberative role sought by ‘outsider’ participants in the system.  
(c) LCA Committees 
As discussed further in Part III, the LCA Committees provide the counterpoint to the SSCSB 
when it comes to the tension between the deliberative and authoritative roles of parliamentary 
committees. The information in Table 4.6 suggests that the LCA Committees are valued as 
deliberative forums, but do not always attract high levels of legitimacy, particularly among key 
participants who actively seek to influence the executive government. This is because the 
diverse membership of the LCA Committees (which include members from major and minor 
political parties as well as substitute and participating members), coupled with the broad range 
of issues they inquire into, can be seen by some as diluting their influence in terms of legislative 
impact. As the interview material reveals, there appears to be some hesitation among key 
participants when it comes to the capacity of the LCA Committees to influence legislation, 




alongside general praise for the committees’ deliberative function. For example, Civil Liberties 
Australia said that ‘the Senate Legal and Con Committee is the most important committee from 
our perspective’.56 This is also reflected in the LCA Committees’ strong performance when it 
comes to rates and diversity of participating in their public inquiries into counter-terrorism 
Bills, and by the discussion in Chapter 6 relating to public impact, which explains that the LCA 
Committees are often referenced and praised by post-enactment review bodies57 and in 
parliamentary debates.58 However, not all interviewees consider the LCA Committees to be 
preferable forums over other committees to make submissions on counter-terrorism laws. For 
example, a legal submission maker said: 
In my experience when we’ve put up submissions to the Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs committee, it’s not a particularly effective committee in so far as a lot of 
recommendations made to it by a range of organisations they tend not to be accepted. Whereas 
the Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security it has a reputation of trying to 
achieve bipartisan results. I think that forces members to really negotiate and sit down and 
discuss the issues of relevance and so that seems to be a committee that’s more open to 
submissions being made from other organisations and possibly accepting some of those 
recommendations.59 
This comment demonstrates the important relationship between legitimacy (or political 
authority) and legislative impact, which can be particularly relevant for sophisticated 
submission makers looking to ‘forum shop’ to ensure that their submissions have the best 
chance of being reflected in committee recommendations that result in legislative change.60  
                                                 
 
56 Interview with Bill Rowlings, Civil Liberties Australia (Canberra, 24 May 2016). 
57 For example references to the LCA Committees were included in the following reports that considered the case 
study Acts: Australian Law Reform Commission, Fighting Words: A Review of Sedition Laws in Australia, Report 
No 104 (2006); Security Legislation Review Committee, Commonwealth, Report of the Security Legislation 
Review Committee (2006); Hon Mark John Clarke, Report of the Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef 
(2008) (Clarke Report). 
58 See Table 6.3 in Chapter 6. 
59 Interview with Legal Submission Maker (Canberra, 24 May 2016). 
60 As will be discussed further below, since the election of the 44th Parliament in 2013, the PJCIS inquiries into 
proposed counter-terrorism Bills have completely displaced inquiries into the same Bills by the LCA Committees, 
and the PJCIS has enjoyed a 100 per cent strike rate when it comes to translating its recommendations for 
legislative change into enacted amendments.  
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Other submission makers cited the LCA Committees’ heavy and broad-ranging workload as a 
barrier to having a consistently strong impact on counter-terrorism laws. For example, some 
public servants interviewed explained that it was much harder to elucidate a clear set of 
principles, or to anticipate what concerns the LCA Committees may raise, due to the 
committees’ broad mandate61 and politically diverse and changeable membership.62 
Despite these mixed views, members and former members described the LCA Committees as 
particularly valuable spaces for backbench parliamentarians to have an influence on 
government policy. For example, former LCA Legislation Committee Chair and ALP Senator 
Patricia Crossin said that the committee allows you to have: 
access to good quality submissions – particularly from the 25 or so ‘usual suspects’ in the legal 
area … and you can help show up significant flaws in the legislation that the Minister’s office 
or the department has overlooked, or due to sloppy drafting of [Explanatory Memoranda] etc 
– these types of issues almost always resulted in legislative amendments to remedy the issue.63 
Former Senator Crossin also spoke of the opportunity to help shape policy or the content of 
legislation through her role as LCA Committee Chair, observing that, even in the context of 
counter-terrorism Bills that had strong bipartisan support, the committee was able to draw 
Ministerial attention to rights concerns and push for legislative change.64  
Taken together, these views illustrate the other side of the tension between deliberative and 
authoritative roles described with respect to the SSCSB. In other words, the LCA Committees 
are valued and respected among key participants due to their ability to attract a large number 
and diverse range of submission makers, and due to their politically diverse membership. 
However, for those looking to influence government legislation, these same features can 
present risks and dilute the political authority of the LCA Committees. As discussed in Part III, 
this has implications for the LCA Committees’ future capacity to contribute to the 
                                                 
 
61 Interview with Official A, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
62 See, eg, Interview with Official B, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 30 May 2016); Interview with 
Cameron Gifford, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
63 Interview with Patricia Crossin, former Chair and Deputy Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal 




parliamentary model of rights protection. I argue that the challenge for those seeking to 
improve the parliamentary model of rights protection at the federal level is to encourage the 
LCA Committees to continue to provide a meaningful deliberative forum for public inquiry 
into proposed counter-terrorism laws without duplicating the work of other, high-impact 
inquiry-based committees such as the PJCIS. 
(d) PJCHR 
As Table 4.6 suggests, the PJCHR has struggled to attract strong levels of legitimacy from the 
majority of key participants. Chief among the reasons for this is the relative youth of the 
committee, the contested nature of the PJCHR’s role and purpose, and a number of structural 
and procedural issues that lead to its reports not being seen as timely or useful.  
(i) The Contested Role and Purpose of the PJCHR 
Many people interviewed expressed concern about the confusion that surrounds the ‘proper’ 
role and purpose of the PJCHR, and considered this a threat to the committee’s legitimacy.65 
As an interviewee explained: 
[T]he Act says that the job of the committee is to assess legislation for its compatibility, against 
human rights standards, and to report to both Houses of Parliament. And that’s the end of the 
matter really if you want to take the Act as providing that answer to that question, so that is an 
educative role. It’s not a role to … prevent the passage of legislation that is incompatible with 
our human rights obligations. But … if you look at the circumstances in which it was 
introduced, there’s often a little bit of confusion. … [S]o when you look at what was said in 
the second reading speech, for example, then the purpose of the committee, … is to ensure 
that human rights considerations are taken into account, not just at this end point, but all the 
way through the process. And then there are elements of the design of the approach that 
support that.66 
Other key participants were not prepared to accept that ‘technical scrutiny’ was the only 
legitimate purpose of the PJCHR, and envisaged a more proactive, deliberative role for the 
                                                 
 
65 See, eg, Interview with B (Canberra, 23 May 2016); Interview with Simon Rice, former Legal Advisor to the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (Sydney, 24 May 2016); Interview with Dean Smith, Liberal 
Senator for Western Australia, former Chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (telephone, 
22 September 2016). 
66 Interview with B (Canberra, 23 May 2016).  
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committee, where non-government organisations were actively invited to provide evidence to 
the committee on the rights compatibility of a Bill, in addition to information being provided 
by government. For example, PJCHR Legal Advisor Dr Aruna Sathanpally explained: 
If you think that human rights involve political and policy issues then you need evidence, not 
just technical advice on the law, to help reach conclusions. If the only evidence is from the 
department, this does not put the committee in the best position to reach conclusions in certain 
cases. [The PJCHR] could do the job much better if supported by civil society.67 
The first legal advisor to the PJCHR, Professor Andrew Byrnes, also envisaged proactive 
engagement by the committee with submission makers and advocacy groups. However, Byrnes 
also considered the PJCHR to offer particularly strong opportunities to bring human rights 
considerations to the attention of law and policy makers at the pre-introduction phase, and to 
‘have a washback effect or to bring about cultural and bureaucratic change’.68 Campbell and 
Morris made similar observations in their 2015 review of the PJCHR, where they saw the 
committee as having a primary role in providing the: 
right sort of opportunities for the executive and parliamentary branches of government to 
become better informed about, and more focussed on, the human rights issues which arise in 
the course of preparation and enactment of new legislation.69 
For others, it was not just the contested role and purpose of the PJCHR, but also the contested 
nature of its human rights mandate, that posed a threat to the committee’s legitimacy.70 As an 
interviewee explained: 
                                                 
 
67 Interview with Aruna Sathanpally, Legal Advisor, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (telephone, 
23 June 2016). 
68 Andrew Byrnes, ‘Human Rights Under the Microscope: Reflections on Parliamentary Scrutiny’ (Speech 
delivered at Law Society of South Australia Continuing Professional Development Program, Adelaide, 11 
December 2014) <http://www.ahrcentre.org/sites/ahrcentre.org/files/mdocs/Byrnes%20--%20%20PJCHR%20-
%20handout%20for%20Adelaide%20talk%20December%202014%20revised.pdf>  
69 Tom Campbell and Stephen Morris, ‘Human rights for democracies: a provisional assessment of the Australian 
Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011’ (2015) 34(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 7, 8. 
70 For example, current INSLM, the Hon Roger Gyles QC, said: ‘I think the Human Rights Committee is useful 
and it draws attention to the issue and for people who are not international lawyers, like me, it does educate the 
people involved. It’s difficult area though, … because you are dealing with something that is not domestic law, 
it’s international law, and not everyone accepts that in the same way’: Interview with Roger Gyles QC, 
Independent Monitor of National Security Legislation (telephone, 6 December 2016). 
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Human rights is … a subject matter that is very polarising. It has the appearance of being ethics 
laden, morality laden, so that's a difficult thing to pursue totally as a technical matter. … Often 
there’s going to be room for legitimate differences in view, but it can be hard to keep those 
away from essential policy preferences. So you know, people choose an outcome based on 
their policy preference in that space, and then give differences in views. So I think it’s the 
nature of human rights itself that [is] so polarising and so, the idea of the committee report 
saying this legislation is incompatible with the right to ‘X’ is something that is very difficult 
for committee members to come to terms with.71 
As a number of former PJCHR members have reflected, not all members of the committee or 
the broader Parliament have a background in international law and some have a deep scepticism 
of human rights.72 For some of these rights sceptics, the PJCHR can be seen as a potentially 
confrontational committee, pushing a particular international human rights law agenda that has 
at times been rejected by the government of the day. As former Chair of the PJCHR Senator 
Smith said: 
I made a very, very conscious decision that I would uphold the scrutiny function of the 
committee even at the risk of pitting myself against the government. The government was 
quite willing to publicly surrender its human rights obligations to pursue laws and policies in 
the public interest and that is absolutely within their rights to do so. What is needed [from the 
committee’s point of view] is a strong and rigorous defence of that choice with reference to 
the human rights standards and the particular policy. The merits of the policy should be 
debated in the [inquiry-based] committees. That is the place for compromises to be made.73 
For others, it is the way the PJCHR has approached its human rights analysis that poses a risk 
to its legitimacy. For example, former INSLM Bret Walker SC praised the work of the PJCHR, 
but suggested that a more proactive approach could be adopted to identifying and outlining the 
                                                 
 
71 Interview with B (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
72 Interview with Penny Wright, former member of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, former 
Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, former 
Australian Greens Senator for South Australia (Adelaide, 11 August 2016); Interview with Dean Smith, Liberal 
Senator for Western Australia, former Chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (telephone, 
22 September 2016). For further discussion see George Williams, ‘Scrutiny of Primary Legislation Principles and 
Challenges: Where are We Now and Where are We Headed?’ Australia-New Zealand Scrutiny of Legislation 
Conference, Parliament House, Perth, 12 July 2016. 
73 Interview with Dean Smith, Liberal Senator for Western Australia, former Chair of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (telephone, 22 September 2016). 
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rights-protecting impact a proposed new counter-terrorism law may have, as well as its 
negative or rights-infringing consequences.74  
Some submission makers interviewed praised the intention behind the establishment of the 
PJCHR, but were cynical of the extent to which it could have any impact on the shape or content 
of laws such as counter-terrorism laws. For example, Civil Liberties Australia said: 
The Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights has done as good a job as it can do. Basically, 
it’s like in the old days of cricket they used to have a long stop behind the wicket keeper. 
That’s what that committee is. It’s a long stop. It’s not in the main game, it’s too late to be 
helping the action, etc.75 
For others, the impact of the PJCHR will only truly be felt once it has been in operation for a 
longer period of time.76 For example, former Chair of the PJCHR Senator Smith said: 
The PJCHR needs time to entrench its principles particularly with respect to the House 
members. This requires more work for the House members to gain an understanding of the 
scrutiny mechanisms generally and then to understand the particularly human rights standards. 
It will take time to entrench that scrutiny function.77 
                                                 
 
74 For example, former INSLM, Mr Bret Walker SC explained: ‘I think the Human Rights Committee could 
perhaps more routinely … start with the rights of what I might call the people who just want to be left alone, and 
get on with their lives in freedom and peace ... And if you do that, I think a lot of other things fall into place more 
naturally’: Interview with Bret Walker SC, former Independent Monitor of National Security Legislation (Sydney, 
30 May 2016). 
75 Interview with Bill Rowlings, Civil Liberties Australia (Canberra, 24 May 2016). 
76 This view was shared by an interviewee who explained: ‘[The] Regulations and Ordinances Committee and 
Scrutiny of Bills Committee are part of the furniture …. As new members come in quite often they get put on 
scrutiny committees early in the piece. A big part of our role is to essentially encourage them to approach it as a 
technical inquiry, as a parliamentarian, rather than as a party member. Both of the scrutiny committees had 
existential issues when they were first established, and that was really to be expected. It took time to get that status 
as being part of the furniture. Now, the Human Rights Committee is a new committee and it doesn’t have that 
status yet’: Interview with B (Canberra, 23 May 2016). As Senator Don Farrell said: ‘My instinctive feel would 
be simply a question of time [before PJCHR scrutiny criteria are more entrenched in parliamentary culture]. The 
Scrutiny of Bills Committee has much more entrenched processes whereas the Human Rights Committee is new 
and in time they’ll develop their own procedures’: Interview with Don Farrell, Australian Labor Party Senator for 
South Australia (Adelaide, 15 November 2016). 
77 Interview with Dean Smith, Liberal Senator for Western Australia, former Chair of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (telephone, 22 September 2016). 
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(ii) Structural and Procedural Risks to PJCHR’s Legitimacy 
Structural and procedural features, such as staffing, the handling of dissent and timing of 
tabling of reports, have also been identified as risks to the PJCHR’s political authority and 
capacity to influence government legislation.78 For example, while the first years of the 
PJCHR’s operation were characterised by consensus-style reporting,79 in later years dissenting 
reports were included in the rights analysis of the PJCHR. The deteriorating consensus style of 
reporting undertaken by the PJCHR has been cited by Williams and Burton as contributing to 
the PJCHR’s lack of overall impact on the content and debate of proposed new laws.80 
Reflecting on the emerging dissent within the PJCHR, former PJCHR member Penny Wright 
said: 
I think it was a really laudable aim to have a consensus report because, in a sense, this isn’t 
about whether members of the committee think what is being proposed is a good idea or a bad 
idea. The question of what is required for compliance with human rights law is actually pretty 
settled in most cases. So it was often very clear. It wasn’t a maybe; it was a yes or a no. But, 
in my later time on the committee, we were rarely able to get the committee to acknowledge 
that. 
I feel that, in some ways, the dissent within the committee came about because some latter 
members of the committee had not worked hard enough to educate themselves about the nature 
of human rights law. 
So, the concern I have is that, where the report routinely contains majority and minority views, 
it undermines the effectiveness of the report and people can then pick and choose what side 
they are on, depending on their policy objectives. The outcome is more politicised than 
                                                 
 
78 The timing of the tabling of PJCHR reports is discussed in Chapter 6, Section A. 
79 This early consensus-style report was praised by many as a sign of a bipartisan commitment to meaningful 
rights scrutiny by committee members. For example, the first legal advisor to the PJCHR, Professor Andrew 
Byrnes, observed: ‘The PJCHR has thus been an exemplar of the tension between the nonpartisan and principled 
process of scrutiny by MPs and Senators in their role as Parliamentarians, and their duties and the pressures on 
them as members of political parties’: Andrew Byrnes, ‘Human Rights Under the Microscope: Reflections on 
Parliamentary Scrutiny’, above n 68.  
80 See, eg, George Williams and Lisa Burton, ‘Australia’s Parliamentary Scrutiny Act: An Exclusive 
Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Jane Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), 
Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart Publishing, 2015) 257. 
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principled. It becomes almost irrelevant what the actual human rights law is. That is my main 
concern.81 
However, others considered dissent to be part of the PJCHR’s natural development, having 
regard to the accepted practice of dissenting reports being regularly issued by other committees 
in the system, such as the LCA Committees. For example, former PJCHR Legal Advisor 
Professor Rice expressed the view that a dissenting view is of no concern provided it is well 
reasoned, with reference to the human rights standards that form part of the PJCHR’s 
mandate.82 However, in his time on the committee Professor Rice said he: 
didn’t see a single dissent in the reports which was reasoned. The dissents are nakedly 
unsubstantiated. They simply, after a long, long explanation about how one part of the 
committee gets to a conclusion, the other part of the committee says, ‘and we say this’.83 
(iii) Clarifying the Role and Rights Contribution of the PJCHR  
Taken together, these comments highlight the need to clarify whether the legislative review 
role84 of PJCHR should be one of ‘technical scrutiny’ or a more deliberative inquiry function. 
My research suggests that this is important not just for structural and procedural matters, such 
as the timing and format of the PJCHR’s reports, but also for the PJCHR’s overall legitimacy 
and political authority. 
As explored further in Part III, if these roles remain blurred or confused, the PJCHR runs the 
risk of being rendered ineffectual and uninfluential. Unlike the other committees discussed 
above, when it comes to Bills scrutiny, the PJCHR will be neither deliberative nor authoritative, 
                                                 
 
81 Interview with Penny Wright, former member of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, former 
Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, former 
Australian Greens Senator for South Australia (Adelaide, 11 August 2016). 
82 Interview with Simon Rice, former Legal Advisor to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(Sydney, 24 May 2016). 
83 Ibid. 
84 My focus on is the PJCHR’s Bills scrutiny role; however, I acknowledge that, like the SSCSB, the PJCHR also 
has the power to hold public inquiries. As noted in Chapter 3, this inquiry-based function has been used relatively 
infrequently but in 2017 the PJCHR held a public inquiry into pt IIA of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) 
that attracted large numbers of submissions and included multiple public hearings. See, eg, PJCHR, Parliament 
of Australia, Freedom of Speech in Australia: Inquiry into Part IIA of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) 
and related procedures under the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (2017). As discussed 
further in Part III, I argue that investing in the PJCHR’s technical scrutiny role is the best way to maximise its 
rights-protecting capacity when working together with other committees in the system. 
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and thus struggle to attract legitimacy among key participants. If, on the other hand, the role of 
the PJCHR is clear and its strengths and weaknesses complemented by other committees in the 
system, it has strong potential to contribute in a meaningful way to Australia’s parliamentary 
model of rights protection. As discussed further below, I argue that the PJCHR’s role should 
be clarified in favour of its technical scrutiny function, at least with respect to its legislative 
review function. As explored in detail in Part III, such a ‘technical scrutiny’ would building 
upon the existing features of the committee that are most well respected by key participants in 
the system, and would encourage the PJCHR to more closely emulate the work practices of the 
SSCSB when it comes to the timeliness and format of its Bills scrutiny reports. While this 
approach may be disappointing to some rights advocates, particularly those who had hoped the 
Australian PJCHR would one day more closely resemble its UK counterpart, my research 
strongly warns against making more radical structural change to a committee that is already at 
risk of being sidelined or ignored. Instead, my recommendations reflect a more cautious, 
consolidating approach that recognises that some of the most significant rights-enhancing 
impacts of the committee system occur ‘behind the scenes’ and depend upon members of the 
executive being able to accurately predict and proactively respond to the future parliamentary 
scrutiny of the laws they initiate. 
C Summary of Findings on Legitimacy 
This chapter has begun to illustrate the important tension between the deliberative and 
authoritative roles of parliamentary committees that runs through each of the committees 
studied in my research. It demonstrates that high rates of participation from a diverse range of 
parliamentarians and submission makers can generate respect among key participants, but may 
also come at the risk of political authority. It also demonstrates that the relationship between a 
particular committee and the executive can both generate legitimacy (through legislative 
influence) and give rise to scepticism (through concerns about lack of independence and 
transparency), depending on the perspective of key participants in the system. This chapter also 
demonstrates that committees with more tightly controlled membership, entrenched scrutiny 
criteria and less public engagement can be highly influential for those working behind the 
scenes on the development of legislation. This tension is explored further in Chapter 5, which 
considers the legislative impact each of the four committees had on the case study Acts. It also 
sets the scene for the discussion in Part III, where I argue that this tension can be minimised 
when parliamentary committees work together as a system, and the individual strengths and 
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weaknesses of a particular committee can be complemented by other committees in the system. 
CHAPTER 5: LEGISLATIVE IMPACT 
A Why Look for Legislative Impact? 
This chapter sets out evidence of the legislative impact the parliamentary committees had on 
the case study Acts. As discussed in Chapter 2, evidence of legislative impact – such as whether 
a successful legislative amendment has been made in response to a specific committee 
recommendation – can provide an objective source of evidence that points to a committee’s 
overall influence. The nature of the legislative amendment can also provide a strong source of 
evidence about the committee’s contribution to Australia’s parliamentary model of rights 
protection, particularly if it is rights-enhancing (improves the compatibility of the Bill with 
international human rights standards, or constitutional or common law rights) or rights-
remedying (such as removing any rights-abrogating features).  
As noted in Chapter 4, there is also a reciprocal relationship between a committee’s legislative 
impact and its legitimacy, particularly when the Bill in question relates to a key policy platform 
for the government. As discussed above, often the political authority attributed to a committee 
is based on its capacity to influence legislative outcomes; however, if the relationship between 
the committee and the executive is seen as too close, the committee may lose respect from key 
participants, particularly non-government submission makers and non-government 
parliamentarians. Other committees, such as the SSCSB, achieve legislative impact through 
less direct means, generating strong levels of legitimacy among those most active at the pre-
introduction stage, but less visible during parliamentary debates. 
As noted in Chapter 1, I have been generally surprised by the extent to which the committees 
studied were able to generate legislative change to the case study Acts.1 Governments generally 
resist making changes to legislation that they have already publicly committed to and 
introduced into Parliament. When they do accept a committee’s calls for changes to be made, 
and introduce and pass amendments, it is a strong sign that they consider the committee to be 
a valued and legitimate component of the parliamentary process – even if there are also political 
                                                 
 
1 For a summary of these legislative changes see Appendix D. 
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incentives to make the change, such as the need to negotiate a hostile Senate. This chapter 
demonstrates that, in a number of cases, Australian governments of different political 
persuasions accept and implement the legislative recommendations made by parliamentary 
committees, even when they have made a strong and public commitment to the counter-
terrorism Bill at the time of introduction.2 In addition, this chapter shows that a large proportion 
of the legislative changes made following committee recommendations were rights-enhancing 
in nature (even if they did not fully remedy the rights-abrogating features of the Bill). Further, 
the evidence in this chapter suggests that, when Bills are subject to scrutiny or review by 
multiple parliamentary committees, the nature of the legislative impact is more significant and 
more likely to be rights-enhancing. For this reason, the evidence in this chapter is critical to the 
overall themes of my research that focus on the role the parliamentary committee system plays 
in Australia’s model of rights protection.  
However, my research also heeds the warnings of those scholars referred to in Chapter 2 when 
it comes to relying on evidence of legislative impact as an indicator of a committee’s overall 
influence or role in the parliamentary system. I acknowledge, for example, the need for caution 
when identifying the causal relationship between the work of the committee and the legislative 
change, and when understanding the significance of the legislative change made. A myriad of 
factors, including potent political factors, could influence the decision of an individual 
parliamentarian to introduce or support a legislative amendment. This may be particularly 
pronounced in the context of an issue such as counter-terrorism, which provokes strong views 
and attracts media coverage, providing a platform for political ambitions of all types to play 
out.3 Then there are factors associated with the make-up of the Senate, and the need for the 
government to secure support for the passage of its legislative agenda from independents, 
                                                 
 
2 These themse are also explored in Laura Grenfell and Sarah Moulds, ‘The Role of Committees in Rights 
Protection in Federal and State Parliaments in Australia’ (2018) 41(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 
(Advance). 
3 As noted in Chapter 2, a number of scholars have sought to avoid these issues by selecting a broad spectrum of 
thematic areas for their evaluations of parliamentary committees including: Carolyn Evans and Simon Evans, 
‘Evaluating the Human Rights Performance of Legislatures’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 546; Meghan 
Benton and Meg Russell, ‘Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight Committees: The Select Committees 
in the British House of Commons’ (2013) 66 Parliamentary Affairs 772; George Williams and Daniel Reynolds, 
‘The Operation and Impact of Australia’s Parliamentary Scrutiny Regime for Human Rights’ (2016) 41(2) 
Monash University Law Review 469. 
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minor parties or the opposition.4 I do not ignore these issues, but seek to factor them in by 
adopting the following approach: 
 explicitly acknowledging the institutional and political context in which a particular 
case study Bill was introduced, scrutinised, amended and passed;5 
 looking for clear documentary evidence that the legislative change can be directly 
attributed to the work of a parliamentary committee, for example by reference to a 
committee’s recommendation in the supplementary Explanatory Memorandum 
accompanying the proposed legislative amendments; 
 distinguishing between substantive and inconsequential or minor legislative 
amendments; and 
 testing these findings against the views of a range of key participants in the committee 
system6 and the other forms of impact a parliamentary committee can have on the law-
making process, described in my research as ‘public’ and ‘hidden’ forms of impact.7  
This allows legislative impact to remain a powerful indicator of the overall influence of the 
committees studied on the content of the case study Acts, without ignoring the equally powerful 
evidence set out in Chapters 4, 6 and 7. 
To begin the analysis of legislative impact, Table 5.1 set outs the ‘strike rate’ of the inquiry-
based committees (LCA Committees and PJCIS) in terms of translating their recommendations 
into successful legislative amendments. These committees are the focus of this table as their 
recommendations are frequently articulated in terms of specific amendments to a Bill, which 
allows a crude but important calculation of how many recommendations are translated into 
legislative amendments. The ‘technical’ scrutiny committees (SSCSB and the PJCHR) are not 
included in Table 5.1 as their recommendations rarely refer explicitly to legislative 
amendments, and are instead more commonly couched in terms of matters for the Senate or the 
                                                 
 
4 Geoffrey Lindell, ‘How (and Whether?) to Evaluate Parliamentary Committees – From a Lawyer’s Perspective’ 
(2005) August About the House 55. 
5 This is primarily addressed in Chapter 3 but is also considered in this chapter. 
6 For example, see the references to a range of key participants’ views on legitimacy set out in Chapter 4. 
7 See Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Parliament to consider.8 However, the work of the SSCSB and the PJCHR is included in the 
following analysis of the overall scrutiny experience for each case study Bill. This allows 
findings to be made about the legislative impact of each committee on a case study Bill, and 
also demonstrates the overall legislative impact of multi-committee scrutiny.  
  
                                                 
 
8 See also discussion in Chapter 3. 
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Table 5.1 Overview of Legislative Impact 
Bill  No of 
successful 
amendment
s made to 
Bill 





Amendment (Allegiance to 
Australia) Bill 2015 
9  27 PJCIS recommendations, 25 reflected in 
legislative amendments (2 changes to the 
Explanatory Memorandum (EM)) 
PJCIS 100% 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) 
Bill 2014 




Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014 




(Interception and Access) 
Amendment (Data Retention) 
Bill 2015 
51  39 PJCIS recommendations reflected in 
legislative amendments. 
PJCIS 100% 
National Security Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2010 
Nil 4 LCA Committee recommendations, 3 non-
legislative (2 not adopted), 1 legislative (and 
not adopted).  
LCA Committees 
0%  
Independent National Security 
Legislation Monitor Bill 2010 
9  12 Senate Finance and Public Administration 
Committee (SFPAC) recommendations, 8 
reflected in legislative amendments (3 non-
legislative).  
SFPAC 100% 
Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 
2005 
74  51 LCA Committee recommendations, 24 
were fully implemented by amendments, 13 




National Security Information 






13 LCA Committee recommendations made. 3 
accepted and reflected in substantive changes 
to the re-introduced Bill, 1 partially 
implemented and 9 not adopted. 
LCA Committees 
30% 
Anti-terrorism Bill 2004 8  8 LCA Committee recommendations, 5 
reflected in amendments, 1 further amendment 
supported by Senate but not passed by House.  
LCA Committees 
65% 
ASIO Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2003  
11  11 amendments made reflecting the previous 
LCA Committee and PJC on ASIO, DSD and 
ASIS recommendations with respect to the 
2002 Bill. 
LCA Committees 
and PJ ASIO 100% 
Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 
2002  
63 15 PJC on ASIO, DSD and ASIS 
recommendations, 12 reflected in 
amendments, 2 partially reflected and 1 not 
adopted. 27 LCA Committee 
recommendations, 13 reflected in 
amendments, 8 rejected, 5 rejected but 
alternative model proposed, 1 non-legislative 




Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 
2002 (No 2) and Other Bills 
10  7 LCA Committee recommendations, 4 





B Evidence of Legislative Impact  
Table 5.1 above provides a broad-brush snapshot of the success rates of the inquiry-based 
committees in turning their recommendations into legislative outcomes and conveys the 
strikingly high success rate of the PJCIS, particularly since 2014. It also demonstrates a 
consistently high success rate (60 per cent or over in almost all cases) experienced by the LCA 
Committees. Although further research is required to confirm whether this experience is typical 
of all Bills subject to committee review, these results suggest that both the PJCIS and the LCA 
Committees are having a relatively strong legislative influence on the case study Acts. This 
tentative conclusion is considered further below. 
To assist in the presentation of material in this chapter, in the next section I analyse three 
‘phases’ of committee scrutiny of the case study Acts. These three phases help navigate the 
five tranches of counter-terrorism law making discussed in Chapter 3: 
 Phase 1 was a period where parliamentary committees’ scrutiny of proposed counter-
terrorism Bills took place at a fast and furious pace, in a climate where it was still 
politically viable (at least from the perspective of some members of the opposition and 
minor parties) to challenge the necessity of certain proposed counter-terrorism 
measures. During this phase, both the LCA Committees and the PJC on ASIO, DSD 
and ASIS (which later became the PJCIS) had a modest to moderately strong legislative 
impact. This phase corresponds to the first three ‘tranches’ of counter-terrorism law 
making set out in Chapter 3, all of which occurred under the Howard Government 
between 2001 and 2007. 
 Phase 2 was a period of relatively robust post-enactment review of the case study Acts 
(both by parliamentary committees and independent bodies) following the election of 
the Rudd Government, and continued through the Gillard Government. During this 
phase, the legislative impact of committee scrutiny on proposed new counter-terrorism 
measures depended heavily on the relationship between the committees’ 
recommendations and the findings of other independent review bodies with respect to 
pre-existing counter-terrorism laws. This phase corresponds with the ‘Time for Review’ 
period and ‘tranche 4’ of counter-terrorism law making discussed in Chapter 3 and 
spans the period 2007–13. 
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 Phase 3 saw the emergence of the PJCIS as a committee with strong legislative impact, 
which coincided with the establishment of the PJCHR, and the effective ‘sidelining’ of 
the LCA Committees as a forum for reviewing counter-terrorism legislation. Phase 3 
coincides with tranche 5 of counter-terrorism law making described in Chapter 3 and 
covers the period from the election of the Abbott Government until the end of 2015. 
In the background of each of these phases is the scrutiny work being undertaken by SSCSB 
and (since 2012) the PJCHR. As will be discussed below, both of these committees had a 
discernible legislative impact, but it was less direct than either the PJCIS or the LCA 
Committees at the height of their respective influence. 
The following analysis of these three phases allows for a set of preliminary findings to be made 
about the overall legislative impact of the parliamentary committee system on the case study 
Acts. These preliminary findings can then be considered alongside the other components of the 
assessment framework applied in my research, the public and hidden impacts. 
C Three ‘Phases’ of Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Case Study Bills 
Phase 1: Fast and Furious Scrutiny 
Phase 1 covers the period from 2001 until 2007, when the Howard Government was in power. 
Six of the case study Acts were introduced and passed during this period:  
 SLAT Acts (CSA 1); 
 ASIO Bill 2002 (CSA 2); 
 ASIO Act 2003 (CSA 3); 
 Anti-Terrorism Act 2004 (Cth) (CSA 4); 
 National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) (CSA 5); and 
 Control Orders Act (CSA 6). 
I describe this phase as ‘fast and furious scrutiny’ due to: (a) the speed at which these new 
provisions were introduced and scrutinised by parliamentary committees, and (b) the political 
climate that existed at the time, wherein it was still political viable for non-government 
parliamentarians and some government backbenchers to directly question the need for the 
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introduction of new counter-terrorism laws, having regard to existing criminal laws, and law 
enforcement and intelligence powers.  
In this context, the LCA Committees, with their broad membership and strong capacity to 
conduct wide-ranging and popular public inquiries, were influential when it came to turning 
recommendations into legislative change. This can be seen with respect to the SLAT Acts, the 
Anti-Terrorism Act 2004 (Cth) and the Control Orders Act, but also the ASIO Bill 2002 and 
ASIO Act 2003 which received an unprecedented level of parliamentary scrutiny and 
underwent significant change from introduction to enactment. The more specialist PJC on 
ASIO, DSD and ASIS also featured prominently in the scrutiny of the ASIO Bill 2002. The 
SSCSB’s constant role in reviewing the laws introduced in this phase is less visible; however, 
as the examples below demonstrate, the issues raised by the SSCSB regularly featured strongly 
in the reports and recommendations of other parliamentary committees and were sometimes 
reflected in successful amendments to the Bill. 
(a) The SLAT Acts (CSA 1) 
As noted in Chapter 3, the SLAT Bills9 marked the beginning of the Howard Government’s 
legislative response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.10 After 
quickly passing through the House, the SLAT Bills were referred to the LCA Legislation 
Committee for inquiry and report.11 Despite having only five weeks to conduct its inquiry, the 
LCA Legislation Committee received 431 submissions and held public hearings in Sydney, 
Melbourne and Canberra. A majority report was issued, supported by members from both 
major political parties.12 The report contained seven majority recommendations for 
amendments to the Bill, including that: 
                                                 
 
9 The SLAT Bills package included the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Bill 2002 (Cth), the Criminal 
Code Amendment (Suppression of Terrorist Bombings) Bill 2002 (Cth), the Border Security Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2002 (Cth), the Telecommunications Interception Legislation Amendment Bill 2002 (Cth), and 
the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth). 
10 See Chapter 3, Section D(1). See also SC Res 1373, UN SCOR, 4385th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1373 (28 September 
2001); Nathan Hancock, ‘Terrorism and the Law in Australia: Supporting Materials’ (Research Paper No 13, 
Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2002) 25–7.  
11 The SLAT Bills were first introduced into Parliament on 13 March 2002, and on 20 March 2002, after passing 
through the House of Representatives, were referred to the LCA Legislation Committee for inquiry and report by 
3 May 2002.  
12 LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Security Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 2] and Related Matters (2002) 32. Dissenting comments were provided by the 
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 a defence to the offence of treason be provided relating to the provision of humanitarian 
aid;13  
 the definition of ‘terrorist act’ be amended to require the action or threat of action to be 
undertaken with the intention to influence government by undue intimidation or undue 
coercion, or to unduly intimidate the public or a section of the public;14  
 absolute liability be removed as an element of the proposed terrorist act offences, and 
be replaced with requirement that the person knew or was reckless as to the required 
element in the proposed new offences;15  
 the proposed proscription of terrorist organisations regime be amended to ensure, 
among other things, that the regime ‘does not vest a broad and effectively unreviewable 
discretion in a member of the executive’ and that it provides for ‘adequate judicial 
review of the grounds for declarations of proscription’;16  
 the Attorney-General review the current law on access to stored communications of 
delayed messages services with a view to introducing a warrant regime;17  
 the proposed financing of terrorism offences be amended to include an element of 
intent;18 and  
 changes be made to the proposed asset-freezing provisions.19 
Four of these recommendations were reflected in successful amendments to the Bills that were 
directly attributed to the work of the LCA Legislation Committee and that were rights-
enhancing in nature. As a result, the SLAT Bill was amended to: 
                                                 
 
Australian Democrats. See ‘Additional Comments and Points of Dissent, by Senator Brian Greig on behalf of the 
Australian Democrats’ in LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Security 
Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 2] and Related Matters (8 May 2002) 81–7. 
13 Ibid Recommendation 1. 
14 Ibid Recommendation 2. 
15 Ibid Recommendation 3. 
16 Ibid Recommendation 4. 
17 Ibid Recommendation 5. 
18 Ibid Recommendation 6. 
19 Ibid Recommendation 7. 
154 
 tighten the proposed definition of ‘terrorist act’ to be inserted in the Criminal Code;20  
 remove absolute liability and the reverse onus in respect of fault from the terrorism 
offences;21 
 create a defence to the offence of treason relating to the provision of humanitarian aid;22 
and 
 make changes to the proscription regime, including requiring proscription to occur via 
regulation thereby enabling parliamentary review.23  
Amendments were also made to the Bills to require the SLAT Acts to be reviewed by the PJC 
on ASIO, ASIS and DSD (later to become PJCIS) in three years.24 The SLAT Bills were also 
scrutinised by the SSCSB, and some legislative amendments, such as those that removed the 
absolute liability features of the proposed new offences and improved oversight of the terrorist 
organisation proscription regime, reflected key concerns raised by that committee.25 
These important legislative changes to the SLAT Bills package are particularly noteworthy 
having regard to both the short time frames for conducing such a large and complex scrutiny 
task and the political context for the reforms, coming soon after the 11 September 2001 attacks 
and after the Howard Government successfully won the 2001 election with a ‘tough on terror’ 
mandate.  
                                                 
 
20 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 2] and 
Related Bills (Cth), Items 5 and 8. These items respond to the LCA Legislation Committee’s Recommendation 2. 
21 Ibid Items 11, 13, 14. These items respond to the LCA Legislation Committee’s Recommendation 3. 
22 Ibid Item 4. This item responds to the LCA Legislation Committee’s Recommendation 1, for example by 
inserting ‘forms an intent’ into the treason offence. 
23 Ibid Items 12, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19. These items respond to the LCA Legislation Committee’s Recommendation 
4. The new proscription provisions would involve the making of a regulation proscribing an organisation, when 
the Minister is ‘satisfied on reasonable grounds’ that the organisation is either engaged in, planning, preparing, 
assisting or fostering a terrorist act or is listed in a UNSC resolution. Such a regulation would be tabled in 
Parliament and subject to disallowance.  
24 Ibid Items 1 and 20. This was discussed in the LCA Committee’s report, but did not form one of the LCA 
Committee’s formal recommendations.  
25 SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Alert Digest No 3 of 2002 (20 March 2002) 49–52; SSCSB, Parliament of 
Australia, Report No 4 of 2002 (2002). Key issues of concern included: incorporating absolute liability into 
proposed new terrorist organisation offences; the proposed new proscription of terrorist organisation powers and 
related offences; and access to judicial review under Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth).  
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(b) ASIO Bill 2002 and ASIO Act 2003 (CSA 2 and 3) 
The ASIO Bill 2002 was the second major counter-terrorism reform package introduced by the 
Howard Government. This Bill is a particularly interesting case study as it was considered by 
four separate parliamentary committees and underwent significant legislative change from 
introduction to enactment. 
As noted in Chapter 3, the ASIO Bill 2002 proposed to introduce a new questioning and 
detention warrant regime (Q&D regime) wherein ASIO officers would be empowered to apply 
for a warrant to detain, search and/or question persons before a prescribed authority.26 The 
proposed Q&D regime included the power to detain a person (without charge or being 
suspected of committing an offence) for up to 48 hours, with successive warrants available. 
The detention could be incommunicado and the person subject to the warrant would have no 
rights to decline to give information or produce a document. Like the SLAT Bills, the ASIO 
Bill 2002 was referred to the LCA Legislation Committee;27 however, it was also referred to 
the PJC on ASIO, ASIS and DSD for report, with the same tight five-week time frame.28 
The PJC on ASIO, ASIS and DSD received over 150 written submissions in response to its 
inquiry and held public hearings in Canberra, Sydney and Melbourne.29 The majority of the 
submissions called for the Bill to be abandoned or recommended key provisions be removed,30 
and much of the PJC ASIO, ASIS and DSD’s oral hearings were devoted to exploring 
alternative policy options and additional safeguards for witnesses. A consensus report was 
                                                 
 
26 The regime is summarised in PJC on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Parliament of Australia, An Advisory Report on 
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (2002) 3–5. 
27 For inquiry and report by 3 May 2002. 
28 As it transpired, an extension of time was eventually granted to both committees, with the PJC ASIO reporting 
on the ASIO Bill on 5 June 2002 and the LCA Legislation Committee tabling its report on 18 June 2002. 
29 Evidence was taken at public hearings in Canberra (30 April 2002), Sydney (1 May 2002) and Melbourne (2 
May 2002). See PJC on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Parliament of Australia, An Advisory Report on the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (2002) 1. 
30 Ibid. 
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issued31 that included strongly worded concerns about aspects of the Bill32 and 15 
recommendations for amendments, including that the Bill be amended to: 
 ensure that persons detained under a Q&D warrant have access to legal representation, 
and be protected against self-incrimination;33 
 require all warrants to be issued by a Federal Magistrate and, in those cases where 
detention will exceed 96 hours, by a Federal Court Judge;34 
 prescribe a maximum period of detention of seven days, at the expiry of which a person 
will need to be charged or released;35 
 provide that a person must have the right to judicial review after 24 hours of detention 
and every time a subsequent warrant is sought;36  
 remove the power to detain a person under 18 under a questioning and detention 
warrant;37 and  
 include a three-year sunset clause for the questioning and detention regime.38 
Of the 15 recommendations made by the PJC on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, 14 were accepted in 
part or in full, and government amendments were moved in the House to implement the 
legislative changes recommended by the committee.39 As discussed below, these amendments 
                                                 
 
31 This report focused on matters including: the status of the prescribed authority responsible for issuing the Q&D 
warrants; access to legal representation for those subject to the proposed warrants; the maximum duration of the 
detention period permissible under the proposed warrants; the need for protocols governing the detention of 
persons subject to a proposed warrant; the application of the Bill to persons under 18; how to deal with the 
privilege against of self-incrimination; whether the issue of a warrant should be subject to judicial review; and 
oversight and accountability measures. For an overview of the key issues see ibid 10. 
32 For example, the PJC ASIO observed that ‘The ASIO Terrorism Bill is the most controversial piece of 
legislation ever reviewed by the Committee’: ibid 1.  
33 Ibid Recommendation 6. A particular framework was recommended involving a panel of senior lawyers 
recommended by the Law Council of Australia who could represent persons being held in detention.  
34 Ibid Recommendation 1. 
35 Ibid Recommendation 3. 
36 Ibid Recommendation 15. 
37 Ibid Recommendation 10. 
38 Ibid Recommendation 12. 
39 These amendments were attributed to the work of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD 
in the Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum. See Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth), which explained that the government 
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successfully passed through the House, but the ASIO Bill 2002 was blocked by members of 
the opposition and the minor parties in the Senate, who pushed hard for further changes to be 
made to the Bill, including amendments to preclude the application of the regime to children 
and the inclusion of a sunset clause.40 
The legislative changes attributed to the PJC on ASIO, ASIS and DSD were substantive and 
rights-enhancing in character, even if they failed to remedy the most pressing of the human 
rights concerns with the Bill. As former committee member ALP Senator Robert Ray observed: 
The ASIO 2002 Bills were the perfect example of the [PJC on ASIO, ASIS and DSD] issuing 
a consensus report recommending changes to a whole raft of provisions that were absolutely 
over the top and draconian ….  
At this time, rights issues were very much in the minds of the committee. 
The more intrusive powers, the more protections are required. In the first form of the 
legislation, there certainly wasn’t anywhere enough of these.41 
The LCA Legislation Committee’s concurrent inquiry into the ASIO Bill 2002 was far less 
comprehensive and reflected an early deference by the LCA Legislation Committee to the more 
specialist PJC on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, which has intensified in more recent parliamentary 
inquiries into counter-terrorism law.42 The LCA Legislation Committee did not hold any public 
                                                 
 
amendments to the Bill will clarify: that a person who has previously been a Judge of a federal or state superior 
court may act as either an issuing authority, a prescribed authority or both (Items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13 and 16); the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security may be present at the questioning, taking into custody or detention 
of a person under a warrant (Items 19 and 20); that a person subject to a warrant will have access to an interpreter 
(Item 18); and that the Bill does not affect the law relating to legal professional privilege (Item 27). The 
government did not fully accept the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD’s recommendations 
relating to complete access to legal representation during detention, questioning and detention of children, and a 
proposed three-year sunset clause; however, amendments were introduced that went some way towards meeting 
some of the committee’s concerns about the first two issues: see Explanatory Memorandum, Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth), Items 23–4.  
40 See, eg, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 September 2002 (Robert 
McClelland) 6696; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 17 October 2002 (Kerry Nettle) 5385. 
41 Interview with Robert Ray, former Australian Labor Party Senator for Victoria (telephone, 23 November 2016). 
42 This is clear from the opening paragraphs of the LCA Committee’s report: ‘The reference of the same Bill 
simultaneously to both Committees placed this Committee in a somewhat difficult position. On one hand, the 
Committee has an obligation to report to the Senate on the matter. On the other hand, the Committee recognises 
the inherent difficulties involved in two Committees investigating the same matter or one Committee commenting 
on another Committee’s current work. The Committee recognises that the two Committees have different roles. 
In matters concerning security operations, particularly relating to the security and intelligence organisations such 
as ASIO, inquiries are most appropriately undertaken by the PJC. On legal and constitutional matters contained 
in legislation, consideration of which is this Committee’s role, the Committee has noted the attention given to 
158 
hearings or make any specific recommendations in its report on the Bill. Instead, it focused on 
the constitutional concerns raised with respect to the ASIO Bill 2002 by submission makers to 
both the PJC on ASIO, ASIS and DSD inquiry and the earlier LCA Committee inquiry into the 
SLAT Bills.43 Having considered further advice from the AGD on these issues,44 the majority 
of the LCA Legislation Committee concluded that, if adopted, the recommendations of the PJC 
ASIO would largely address all of the constitutional concerns raised by submission makers 
with respect to the Bill.45 
The SSCSB also scrutinised the ASIO Bill 2002, first through its Alert Digest46 and later in its 
report on the Bill.47 In the Alert Digest, the SSCSB raised a number of concerns and questioned 
the necessity of the proposed new warrant regime, and whether it was appropriate that police 
powers should be extended to organisations concerned with the collection of intelligence.48 
Ensuring due process rights for those subject to the proposed new warrants was a central issue 
for the SSCSB, which observed that: 
The protection of the community from terrorism is obviously a vital concern. However a 
community that fails to accord its citizens due process, and to protect their rights, even in 
                                                 
 
those issues by the PJC. The Committee took a conscious decision that it would not adjudicate on the PJC.s report. 
However, the Committee has a number of additional observations that it wishes to make.’ LCA Legislation 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (2002) 1. 
43 The two key constitutional issues of interest to the LCA Committee were (1) ‘the constitutionality of the 
Executive authorising the detention of a person who is not a suspect’; and (2) ‘whether the issuing by magistrates 
of warrants for questioning of an individual is an exercise of executive power that is incompatible with their role’. 
Ibid 2. 
44 Ibid 2–3. 
45 In reaching this conclusion, the majority of the LCA Committee underscored the extraordinary nature of the 
powers proposed in the ASIO Bill 2002, but remained of the view that, if the recommendations of the PJC ASIO, 
ASIS and DSD were accepted, the Bill should pass. Ibid 4–5. A dissenting report was provided by Australian 
Democrats who opposed the Bill and described it as eroding key legal rights, undermining civil liberties and 
‘deeply flawed’. Ibid 9–11. A further dissenting report was provided by Labor Senator Barney Cooney and 
Australian Greens Senator Bob Brown, who observed that the Bill ‘marks a sharp fall in the quality of our civil 
life and of our democratic system’. Ibid 11–12. 
46 SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Alert Digest No 4 of 2002 (15 May 2002). 
47 SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Report No 12 of 2002 (2002). 
48 SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Alert Digest No 4 of 2002 (15 May 2002). 
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extreme circumstances, runs the risk of becoming a community different in nature from that 
which currently exists.49  
On 24 September 2002, the Attorney-General provided a written response to the questions 
raised by the SSCSB in its Alert Digest,50 referring repeatedly to the government amendments 
moved in response to the PJC on ASIO, ASIS and DSD which, he asserted, alleviated the 
SSCSB’s concerns.51 In its final report on the ASIO Bill 2002, the SSCSB concluded that ‘the 
provisions, even after amendment, may continue to be seen to trespass unduly on personal 
rights and liberties’ and found that the ‘Senate must therefore decide whether such breaches 
are acceptable when weighed against the policy objectives of the bill’.52  
As noted above, while nearly all of the recommendations made by the PJC on ASIO, ASIS and 
DSD were reflected in government amendments to the ASIO Bill 2002 that passed the House, 
the amended Bill was not agreed to in the Senate. Instead, the Senate referred the ASIO Bill 
2002 and related matters to the LCA References Committee for inquiry.53 This time, led by a 
non-government majority, the LCA References Committee conducted an extensive public 
inquiry into the ASIO Bill 2002 that attracted over 400 written submissions and involved public 
hearings in Canberra, Melbourne and Sydney.54 
Almost all of the submissions received by the LCA References Committee objected to parts or 
all of the Bill.55 Like the SSCSB, the LCA References Committee queried whether it was 
                                                 
 
49 SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Report No 12 of 2002 (2002) 415, quoting from SSCSB, Parliament of 
Australia, Alert Digest No 4 of 2002 (15 May 2002). 
50 On 13 August 2002, the Attorney-General wrote to the Acting Chair of the SSCSB to notify the committee of 
his intention to respond to the issues raised in the Alert Digest once the government’s response to the reports of 
the other parliamentary committees that had inquired into the Bill was finalised. See SSCSB, Parliament of 
Australia, Report No 12 of 2002 (2002) 415. 
51 See, eg, ibid 418. 
52 Ibid. 
53 LCA References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 and related matters (2002) ix. The terms of reference 
for the inquiry included consideration of the Labor Opposition’s alternative model for questioning, wherein the 
Australian Federal Police rather than ASIO would have powers to coercively question, and the Australian Greens’ 
reference to the human rights implications of the Bill and any proposed alternatives.  
54 Ibid xx. 
55 The proposed detention provisions provoked the most critical comment, in particular the idea that a person who 
is not suspected of having committed an offence being detained incommunicado for questioning and held without 
charge for up to a week, which was seen as incompatible with ‘the rights and freedoms enjoyed in this country’. 
Ibid xix. 
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appropriate to invest an intelligence agency with coercive questioning and detention powers.56 
However the majority of the LCA References Committee supported the passage of the Q&D 
regime, albeit with some significant changes.57 The committee made 27 recommendations for 
amendments to the ASIO Bill 2002, some of which included additional comments or provisos 
expressed by government members.58 Among the key recommendations were that:  
 changes be made to the way questioning and detention warrants are issued;59  
 clear limits be set on the maximum time period for questioning;60  
 a person subject to a warrant be given confidential access to lawyer of choice,61 an 
interpreter,62 and the IGIS during questioning;63  
 procedures and protocols for detention under the proposed warrants be enshrined in 
regulation;64  
 the proposed new regime be subject to a three-year sunset clause;65 and  
 the Bill not apply to children.66 
                                                 
 
56 See, eg, ibid 11–22. The LCA References Committee also considered: constitutional concerns raised with 
respect of the Bill (23–32); the ability for ASIO to detain people without charge for extended periods and deny 
them access to family members or legal representatives (71–90); the impact of the Bill on children, and the PJC 
on ASIO ASIS and DSD recommendation that the Bill not apply to people under 18 (129–36); the range of 
safeguards, protocols and oversight mechanisms recommended by the PJC on ASIO ASIS and DSD in its earlier 
report on the Bill (109–29); and possible alternative models of questioning people thought to have relevant 
information about terrorist activity or threats (91–109). 
57 This was a significant conclusion for the majority of the committee to reach, particularly in light of the fact that 
the non-government members of the LCA References Committee enjoyed a majority and in the context of senior 
Labor Opposition figures strongly calling for an alternative, AFP-based questioning approach.  
58 LCA References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 and related matters (2002) Recommendations 8 and 
9. 
59 Ibid Recommendations 1–3. 
60 Ibid Recommendations 4–6. 
61 Ibid Recommendations 9, 11–14.  
62 Ibid Recommendations 17–18. 
63 Ibid Recommendation 20. 
64 Ibid Recommendations 22–3. 
65 Ibid Recommendation 26. 
66 Ibid Recommendation 27. 
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The majority of the committee concluded that these recommendations provided ‘a basis for 
improving and progressing the legislation, while keeping its provisions within acceptable 
bounds and respecting the rights and freedoms that are fundamental to the Australian 
community’.67 A different view was adopted by the Australian Democrats68 and Australian 
Greens69 who concluded that, even with the changes proposed by the majority, the Bill was a 
‘disproportionate, badly targeted and possibly unconstitutional response’ to the threat of 
terrorism in Australia.70 
Following the tabling of the LCA References Committee report, the government introduced a 
range of amendments, implementing a number but not all of the LCA Committee’s 
recommendations.71 Recommendations relating to the issuing authority for warrants were 
accepted, as were those relating to access to interpreters and the IGIS for those subject to a 
warrant.72 The government amendments also sought to address concerns about lack of access 
to legal representation for those subject to a warrant, but did not fully implement the 
committee’s recommendations on this issue.73 Nor did the government amendments restrict the 
                                                 
 
67 Ibid xxi. 
68 Ibid 153–4. 
69 Ibid 161–2. 
70 Ibid 161. 
71 For example, the government accepted the following LCA References Committee recommendations: 
Recommendations 1–3 (relating to issuing of warrants) via Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth), Items 2–8, 13, 15 and 16; 
Recommendation 10 (relating to legal professional privilege) via Item 27; Recommendation 16 (relating to the 
right of persons subject to a questioning warrant to be informed of functions of all persons present) via Item 14; 
Recommendations 17–18 (relating to the right to request an interpreter) via Items 17, 18, 25; Recommendation 
20 (relating to the right to access IGIS) via Items 19–20; Recommendation 21 (relating to conduct of searches) 
via Items 1, 22; Recommendations 22–23 (relating to procedures for detention) via Items 9–12; Recommendation 
24 (relating to ASIO disciplinary procedures) via Item 26; and Recommendation 25 (relating to annual reporting 
requirements) via Item 28. It did not accept: Recommendations 4–6 (relating to the prescription of a maximum 
time period for questioning); Recommendations 7–8 (relating to limits on consecutive questioning warrants); 
Recommendation 15 (relating to the reverse onus of proof); Recommendation 26 (relating to a sunset clause of 
three years); and Recommendation 27 (that the Bill not apply to anyone under 18 years). In addition, the 
government did not accept the LCA Committee’s Recommendations 9, 11–14 relating to confidential access to 
lawyer of choice, however an alternative model to provide access to legal representation was proposed.  
72 See LCA References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 and related matters (2002) Recommendations 1–3 
(relating to issuing of warrants), Recommendations 17–18 (relating to the right to request an interpreter) and 
Recommendation 20 (relating to the right to access IGIS). 
73 The government introduced an amendment to create a new proposed s 34AA. This responded in part to 
Recommendation 6 in the committee’s report on the Bill relating to access to legal representation by persons who 
are the subject of a warrant. See Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth), Item 24. Cf LCA References Committee, 
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proposed warrant regime to adults or introduce a three-year sunset clause. If this is where the 
legislative story ended, one would have to conclude that the LCA References Committee had 
only a modest legislative impact on the shape of the ASIO Bill 2002. However, the legislative 
story continued for some time, with the Bill debated deep into the night by both the House and 
the Senate during the final couple of sitting days in December 2002.74 Chief among the issues 
debated during this period were whether a sunset clause should be included in the Bill and 
whether the regime should be restricted to adults, as recommended by both the LCA References 
Committee and the PJC on ASIO, ASIS and DSD. The need to ensure full, confidential access 
to legal representation and protect the common law privileges of self-incrimination and use 
immunity also featured strongly, particularly in the amendments moved by Opposition 
members. The Bill was not passed. 
When Parliament resumed the next year, the ASIO Bill 2002 was re-introduced as the ASIO 
Bill 2003, which incorporated many of the features recommended by the committees discussed 
above.75 For example, it included limits on the maximum time period for questioning under a 
warrant,76 a process for a person subject to a warrant to access a lawyer of their choice (albeit 
a lawyer with a security clearance),77 and a restriction to ensure that the questioning and 
detention regime only applies to people who are 14 years and older, and special regime for 
those between 14 and 18.78 A three-year sunset clause for the proposed new regime was also 
included in the enacted Bill. 
                                                 
 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 and related matters (2002) Recommendations 9, 11–14. 
74 On 12 December 2002 the Bill was the subject of an all-night sitting of Parliament. This was the last time for 
debate before the next sitting of Parliament on 4 February 2003.  
75 Interestingly, by this time, there was much broader agreement among major parties in the Parliament about the 
need for ASIO, rather than the AFP, to be able to exercise the proposed questioning and detention powers. The 
debate on the reintroduced Bill centred much more closely on the adequacy of the proposed safeguards in the Bill. 
For further discussion see Chapter 6. 
76 See ASIO Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2003 Items 34C and 34D, implementing LCA References Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 and related matters (2002) Recommendations 4–6.  
77 See ASIO Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2003 Item 34A, adopting the same alternative model as that proposed 
in the government amendments to the 2002 Bill. 
78 See ASIO Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2003 Item 34NA, partially adopting LCA References Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 and related matters (2002) Recommendation 27.  
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The ASIO Bill 2002 and ASIO Act 2003 experience highlights how different components of 
the parliamentary committee system can work together to maximise the overall legislative 
impact of their scrutiny. Given the political dynamic of this period, and particularly the 
composition of the Senate, the legislative impact of parliamentary scrutiny on the shape of the 
enacted ASIO Act 2003 should not be overstated. Indeed, it may have been this political 
dynamic that provided the opportunity for the committees studied to exert particularly strong 
legislative influence on the content of the Bills. In any case, given the explicit 
acknowledgement of the work of the various parliamentary committees in multiple 
Supplementary Explanatory Memoranda and Hansard speeches79 accompanying both 
government and opposition amendments, it is possible to conclude that parliamentary scrutiny 
of the ASIO Bills had an important rights-enhancing, but not rights-remedying, legislative 
impact. 
(c) Anti-Terrorism Act 2004 (CSA 4) 
The Anti-Terrorism Bill 2004 was introduced in May 2004, during the height of the public 
debate around the cases of David Hicks,80 Mahmoud Habib81 and the treatment of detainees by 
the US at Guantanamo Bay,82 and six months prior to the 2004 federal election, after which the 
Howard Government had a majority in the Senate.83 One of the key purposes of the Anti-
                                                 
 
79 For an overview of the Hansard references to parliamentary committee work see Chapter 6. 
80 On 9 December 2001 Australian David Hicks was captured by the United States military, having been found 
among Taliban forces in Afghanistan. By January 2002, Hicks had been transferred to US military prison at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This marked the beginning of over a decade-long legal and diplomatic battle involving 
Australia, the US, the UK and Hicks’ legal team. See Nigel Brew, Roy Jordan and Sue Harris-Rimmer, 
‘Australians in Guantanamo Bay: A Chronology of the Detention of Mamdouh Habib and David Hicks’ 
(Chronologies Online, Parliamentary Library, Commonwealth, 2007); Joshua L Dratel, ‘Navigating the New 
Military Commissions: The Case of David Hicks’ (2006) 10 New York City Law Review 385; Lucas Bastin and 
Brian Tamberlin, ‘David Hicks in the Australian Court: Past and Future Legal Issues’ (2008) 82(11) Australian 
Law Journal 774. 
81 Mr Habib was an Egyptian and Australian citizen who was held for more than three years by the United States 
as an enemy combatant, and sent by extraordinary rendition from Pakistan to Egypt after his arrest. He was finally 
released without charges in January 2005. For further background see Brew, Jordan and Harris-Rimmer, above n 
80; Cynthia Banham, ‘The Power of Human Rights Rituals: Torture and the Australian Context’ (2016) 22(1) 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 67.  
82 For further background see Brew, Jordan and Harris-Rimmer, above n 80. 
83 The Bill was also introduced in the shadow of the Madrid bombings, the Abu Ghraib scandal, the ul-Haque case 
and some of the first terrorism charges being laid in Australia. See, eg, R v Ul-Haque [2007] NSWSC 1251; Ross 
Ray, ‘Policing in the Shadow of Australia’s Anti-terror Laws’ (2007) 366 Lawyers Weekly 20; Nicola Horsburgh 
and Fernando M Manas, ‘Strengths and Weaknesses of Grassroots Jihadist Networks: the Madrid Bombings’ 
(2008) 31(1) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 17; Richard Neville, ‘The Fever that Swept the West’ (2009) 8(2) 
Diplomat 14; Katherine Gallagher, ‘Universal Jurisdiction in Practice: Efforts to Hold Donald Rumsfeld and Other 
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Terrorism Bill 2004 was to extend existing Crimes Act 1915 (Cth) powers to enable AFP 
officers to detain people without charge for the purpose of investigating possible terrorist 
related activity (known as the Part IC changes).84 The Bill also extended the existing proceeds 
of crime regime to ensure that it applied to proceeds derived from literary works.  
The Bill was referred to the LCA Legislation Committee for inquiry and report, as well as being 
considered by the SSCSB.85 After holding a 12-day inquiry, involving only a relatively small 
number of submissions and one public hearing,86 the LCA Legislation Committee issued a 
report containing eight recommendations focused on: 
 improving judicial oversight of the use of the proposed new Part IC powers;87 
 ensuring clear criteria for proscription of organisations for foreign incursion laws;88 
 tightening proposed proceeds of crime laws relating to literary proceeds and ensuring 
no retrospective operation;89 and 
 opposing recognition of military commissions in proceeds of crime laws.90 
The government accepted the first two of these sets of recommendations and introduced 
amendments to that effect.91 The government amendments also addressed the issue of 
retrospectivity92 but otherwise rejected the remaining LCA Committee’s recommendations.  
                                                 
 
High-level United States Officials Accountable for Torture’ (2009) 7(5) Journal of International Criminal Justice 
1087; Martin Fraser, Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Melissa Martin and Diane Sivasubramaniam, ‘Protecting Human 
Rights in Australian Investigative Interviews: the Role of Recording and Interview Duration Limits’ (2014) 20(2) 
Australian Journal of Human Rights 107; Sarah Sorial, ‘The Use and Abuse of Power and Why We Need a Bill 
of Rights: the ASIO (Terrorism) Amendment Act 2003 (Cth) and the Case of R v Ul-Haque’ (2008) 34(2) Monash 
University Law Review 400. 
84 Explanatory Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism Bill 2004 (Cth), General Outline. 
85 LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Anti-Terrorism Bill 2004 (2004); Senate 
SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Alert Digest No 6 of 2004 (12 May 2004). 
86 The LCA Legislation Committee received 28 submissions: LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Inquiry into the Anti-Terrorism Bill 2004 (2004) Appendix 1. 
87 Ibid 11–20, Recommendation 1. 
88 Ibid 23–32, Recommendations 2–4. 
89 Ibid 41–53, Recommendations 6–7. 
90 Ibid 48, Recommendation 8. 
91 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism Bill 2004 (Cth) Amendments (4), (5), (6), (7) and 
(8) implement LCA Committee Recommendations 1–4. 
92 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism Bill 2004 (Cth) Amendment 1. 
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The SSCSB report on the Bill focused exclusively on the Part IC changes that would permit 
law enforcement authorities to detain a person without charge, and without judicial oversight.93 
While not directly attributed to the SSCSB, some of the successful government amendments 
improved the judicial oversight of the use of the Part IC provisions in line with the issues 
considered by the SSCSB.94 
On this basis, is it possible to conclude that the formal parliamentary scrutiny of the Anti-
Terrorism Bill 2004 had a rights-enhancing legislative impact on the Bill, in so far as it led to 
the introduction of additional safeguards and more precise, proscriptive criteria on the use of 
executive power. However, the central pillars of the reforms remained intact, including a new 
detention without charge regime, and more expansive proceeds of crime provisions.95  
(d) National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 (Cth) 
As noted in Chapter 3, 2004 also saw the introduction of a regime designed to protect classified 
national security information from being disclosed in federal criminal court proceedings,96 
loosely based on a similar regime implemented in the UK.97 The regime proposed in the 
National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 sought to preclude the public, 
and the defendant, from accessing information that was relevant and sometimes critical to the 
prosecution case, where revealing that information could be considered prejudicial to national 
                                                 
 
93 SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Alert Digest No 6 of 2004 (21 June 2004) 5. 
94 See, eg, Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism Bill 2004 (Cth) Amendments (4), (5), (6). 
95 Two additional amendments were made to the Bill following the issue of the LCA Legislation Committee report 
that detract from established criminal law principles and common law rights. These amendments remove the 
presumption against bail for people charged with terrorism offences and provide for minimum non-parole periods 
for persons convicted of, and sentenced to imprisonment for, terrorism offences. Supplementary Explanatory 
Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism Bill 2004 (Cth) Item 1B and Item 1C. 
96 This Bill concerns ‘federal criminal proceedings’, which are defined in s 8 of the National Security Information 
(Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 as ‘a criminal proceeding in any court exercising federal jurisdiction, where the 
offence or any of the offences concerned are against a law of the Commonwealth’. 
97 For further information about the UK approach see House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee, 
Parliament of the United Kingdom, Constitutional Affairs – Seventh Report (2005). 
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security.98 It also proposed to introduce a system of security clearances for defence lawyers 
engaged in terrorism-related trials.99 
Once passed by the House, the Bill was referred to the LCA Legislation Committee for inquiry 
and report.100 During the inquiry, which attracted almost exclusively legal bodies and only 
modest numbers of submissions, the Attorney-General’s Department and the Director of Public 
Prosecutions argued strongly in favour of changes, providing examples of the gaps in the pre-
existing law in this area.101 However, other submission makers queried the need for changes in 
light of other laws that they argued already provided for protection of sensitive information.102 
The LCA Legislation Committee’s report focused heavily on legal process rights, reflecting 
the predominantly legal character its key submission makers.103 Legal organisations were 
particularly concerned about the proposed system of security clearances for lawyers, and the 
implications for the independence of the legal profession, particularly if security clearances 
                                                 
 
98 National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 (Cth) clauses 22–29. See also LCA Legislation 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 
2004 and the National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2004 
(12004) [2.23]–[2.42]. See also Jacob Varghese ‘National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004’ 
(Bills Digest No 25 2004–2005, 9 August 2004) 4. 
99 National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 cl 34. 
100 The National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 (Cth) was introduced in Parliament on 27 
May 2004. On 12 June 2004 it was referred to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, which 
reported on 19 August 2004. LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the National 
Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 and the National Security Information (Criminal 
Proceedings) (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2004 (2004). 
101 Although a legal mechanism already existed to preclude the publication of information prejudicial to national 
security in court proceedings, known as ‘public interest immunity’, the government argued that this was a ‘blunt’ 
instrument to deal with national security information relevant to terrorist offending as, once evidence is excluded 
on public interest grounds, it cannot be used in any form to prove the guilt of the defendant. This became an 
obstacle in the case of R v Lappas and Dowling [2001] ACTSC 115, which the Attorney-General cited as a 
precipitant for the National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 (Cth). See Varghese, above n 
988, 4. 
102 See, eg, Law Council of Australia, Submission No 8 to LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Provisions of the National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 and the National Security 
Information (Criminal Proceedings) (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2004 (2004) [3.5]–[3.8]. 
103 For example, the report considered the implications of the Bill for the right to a fair and public trial, including 
the right to be tried in your own presence, to know the evidence supporting the conviction, and to prepare a defence 
including the right to call and question witnesses. LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Provisions of the National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 and the National Security 
Information (Criminal Proceedings) (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2004 (2004) ch 3. 
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were denied or delayed by the Attorney-General.104 The LCA Legislation Committee made 13 
recommendations including that: 
 the court105 retains its discretion to determine whether proceedings are open or 
closed;106 
 the court be required to provide a written statement outlining the reasons for holding 
proceedings in-camera;107  
 defendants and their legal representatives can only be excluded from hearings in limited 
specified circumstances;108  
 the court be required, when making an order to exclude a witness from the proceedings, 
to be satisfied that the exclusion of the witness would not impair the ability of the 
defendant to make his or her defence;109 and 
 the court be required, when making an order for non-disclosure, to be satisfied that the 
redacted documentation to be adduced as evidence would provide the defendant with 
substantially the same ability to make his or her defence as would disclosure of the 
source document.110 
The SSCSB also considered the Bill in a very short report focused on the weight to be attributed 
by the court exercising federal jurisdiction to the rights of the accused when considering 
                                                 
 
104 See, eg, Law Council of Australia, Submission No 8; Criminal Bar Association, Submission No 16; Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Submission No 14 to LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Provisions of the National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 and the National 
Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2004 (2004) [3.99]–[3.120]. 
105 In the National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 (Cth) and related committee inquiry 
reports, ‘court’ refers to ‘court exercising federal jurisdiction, where the offence or any of the offences concerned 
are against a law of the Commonwealth’: see National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Act 2004 
(Cth) s 8. 
106 LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the National Security Information 
(Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 and the National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) (Consequential 
Amendments) Bill 2004 (2004) Recommendation 1. 
107 Ibid Recommendation 2. 
108 Ibid Recommendation 6. 
109 Ibid Recommendation 8. 
110 Ibid Recommendation 7. 
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whether to exclude national security information from the defendant.111 The SSCSB also noted 
the lack of a requirement for the Attorney-General to provide reasons when issuing an 
evidential certificate under the Bill.112 
Parliament was prorogued before the government issued its formal response to the LCA 
Legislation Committee’s report. However, shortly after the Howard Government was re-
elected, a new Bill was introduced that included a number of features recommended by the 
LCA Committee,113 including: a narrower definition of ‘national security’;114 a requirement to 
provide reasons for holding a hearing in camera;115 power for the court to make decisions about 
how national security information could be used prior to trial;116 and the preservation of the 
court’s discretion to make decisions about the admissibility of evidence.117 The new Bill also 
allowed the court to stay proceedings if the defendant could not be assured a fair trial, provided 
that a security-cleared lawyer could not be excluded from closed hearings, and ensured that 
defendants have the opportunity to make submissions before evidence or witnesses are 
excluded.118 The new Bill also provided that ‘substantial adverse effect’ on the conduct of the 
defence must be a factor considered by the court in deciding to exclude evidence or witnesses 
or withdraw a statement or facts.119 
                                                 
 
111 SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Alert Digest No 11 of 2004 (11 October 2004) 29, 30. 
112 Ibid 31. 
113 These features were acknowledged as being included in response to the LCA Committee’s recommendations 
in the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the re-introduced Bill (which was re-introduced on 17 November 
2004). See Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 
2004 (Cth), ‘General Outline’. See also Varghese, above n 98, 4. 
114 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 
(Cth), Items 1–3. 
115 National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 (Cth) (reintroduced 17 November 2004) cl 
32. 
116 Ibid cls 21–3.  
117 Ibid cl 31(7) (and deletion of previous sub-cl 29(6)). 
118 Ibid cl 29. This clause provides that security-cleared counsel cannot be excluded from closed hearings and 
defendants must have the opportunity to make submissions before evidence or witnesses are excluded. Cl 19 
provides that courts retain the power to stay proceedings. 
119 Ibid cl 31(7). 
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These rights-enhancing features of the new Bill attributable to the work of the LCA Committee 
are particularly noteworthy coming after the Howard Government had been re-elected with an 
increased majority and with the prospect of a Senate majority in coming months.  
(e) The Control Orders Act (CSA 6) 
As noted in Chapter 3, the Control Orders Bill constituted one of the most significant legislative 
contributions to the counter-terrorism framework in Australia. Among other reforms, it 
introduced preventative detention orders, control orders and updated sedition offences into the 
federal criminal law.120 The Bill was also exceptional in terms of the speed at which it moved 
through Parliament, enacted just 41 days after introduction,121 despite attracting strong public 
attention and receiving second reading speeches by over 50 parliamentarians.122  
When the Control Orders Bill was introduced into the House, it was referred immediately to 
the LCA Legislation Committee for inquiry and report.123 After only 25 days, and having 
received nearly 300 submissions and hearing from 21 witnesses, the LCA Legislation 
Committee issued its report. The report contained 51 recommendations for change,124 17 of 
which related to the proposed preventative detention order regime, and sought to address the 
key concerns of submission makers.125 Recommendations made by the LCA Committee to 
                                                 
 
120 For further background on the Control Orders Bill see Sue Harris-Rimmer et al, Bills Digest Anti-Terrorism 
Bill (No 2), No 64 of 2005, 18 November 2005; Greg Carne, ‘Prevent, Detain, Control and Order? Legislative 
process and executive outcomes in enacting the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth)’ (2007) 10(1) Flinders 
Journal of Law Reform 17; Paul Fairall and Wendy Lacey, ‘Preventative Detention and Control Orders Under 
Federal Law: the Case for a Bill of Rights’ (2007) 31(3) Melbourne University Law Review 1072; Murray 
McInnis, ‘Anti-terrorism Legislation: Issues for the Courts’ (2006) 51 Australian Institute of Administrative Law 
Forum 1; Bret Walker, Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Annual Report (2011). For more 
recent commentary on the rights impact on the preventative detention order regime see Svetlana Tyulkina and 
George Williams, ‘Combating Terrorism in Australia through Preventative Detention Orders’ in Tullich, T, 
Anaian-Welsh R, Bronitt S and Murray S (eds) Regulating Preventative Justice: Principle, Policy and Paradox 
(Routledge, 2017) 136. 
121 The Control Orders Bill was introduced on 3 November 2005 and received Royal Assent on 14 December 
2005. 
122 Details of timing for parliamentary scrutiny and number of second reading speeches are provided in Chapter 
6, Section B (timing) and Section C (parliamentary speeches). 
123 LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (2005) 
[1.1]. 
124 Ibid Recommendations [1.3]–[1.5]. 
125 These concerns related to: the adequacy of the procedural safeguards within the proposed preventative 
detention order application and confirmation regime; access to the courts, including the right to judicial review; 
the conditions of detention and standards of treatment, including conditions governing detention of minors; the 
broad discretion to prohibit contact with the outside world, including contact between minors and their parents; 
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address these matters translated into over 30 successful amendments to the preventative 
detention order regime in the Bill that were directly attributed to the work of the committee in 
the Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum126 and in the second reading speech of Senator 
Brandis, then representing the Attorney-General in the Senate.127 The amendments included 
changes to how the preventative detention order regime would apply to children, including 
making express provision for children subject to a control order to have contact with their 
parents or other support persons.128 The committee also made a number of recommendations 
for changes to the proposed control order regime, relating to the need to ensure access to natural 
justice and procedural fairness.129 These recommendations also translated into successful 
government amendments that were attributed to the work of the LCA Committee and improved 
the procedural fairness of the control order regime, for example by requiring that the person 
subject to the interim order be provided with notice of an application for confirmation, and 
relevant information supporting that application.130  
The LCA Committee also recommended that Schedule 7 (which contained proposed new 
sedition offences) be removed in its entirety and be subject to detailed consideration by the 
ALRC.131 As an alternative, the majority recommended that significant changes be made to the 
proposed sedition-related offences.132 While Schedule 7 was not removed from the Bill, the 
proposed sedition offences were amended to clarify the burden of proof and expand the 
proposed ‘good faith defence’ in the manner set out by the LCA Committee.133 The government 
                                                 
 
and the restrictions imposed on detainees’ lawyers and their discussions with their client. Ibid ch 3 (key issues 
summarised at [3.22]). 
126 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (Cth), sch 4, Items 25–64. 
127 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 2005, 18 (George Brandis). 
128 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (Cth), Item 47. 
129 LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (2005) 
ch 4. See also Recommendations 19–26. 
130 Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 cl 104.12A(2) and related amendments. Supplementary Explanatory 
Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (Cth), Item 13.  
131 LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (2005) 
Recommendations 27 and 28, see also ch 5 ‘Sedition and Advocacy’. 
132 Ibid Recommendation 9, see also ch 5 ‘Sedition and Advocacy’. 




also adopted the LCA Committee’s recommendation to refer the sedition offences to the ALRC 
for inquiry.134 
Overall, in response to the LCA Committee’s report, the government introduced 74 
amendments to the Bill, the great majority of which could be described as ‘rights-enhancing’. 
However, many of the LCA Committee recommendations were not implemented, or not 
implemented in full by the government,135 although some of these recommendations were 
reflected in unsuccessful opposition amendments, such as setting out a process for independent 
review of the preventative detention order regime or introducing a five-year sunset clause.136  
The SSCSB also reported on the Control Orders Bill,137 focusing on the provisions of the Bill 
that sought to exclude judicial review,138 the retrospective operation of certain key provisions, 
and the abrogation of common law privileges.139 In its usual style, the SSCSB left these matters 
to the Senate as a whole to consider. While none of the government amendments to the Bill 
were directly attributed to the work of the SSCSB, the issues raised by the SSCSB featured 
prominently in the report of the LCA Committee,140 which in turn led to a number of successful 
government amendments and had the effect of at least partially alleviating some of the concerns 
                                                 
 
134 ALRC, Fighting Words: A review of sedition laws in Australia, Report No 104 (2006). On 1 March 2006, the 
government issued formal Terms of Reference for an ALRC inquiry, which included consideration of whether the 
new offences in sch 7 of the Control Orders Bill ‘effectively address the problem of urging the use of force or 
violence’. 
135 For example, the following recommendations were not implemented in full: LCA Legislation Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (2005) Recommendation 25: ‘The 
committee recommends that the Bill be amended by inserting an express requirement for a public and independent 
5 year review of the operation of Division 104, adopting the same mechanism and similar terms to that provided 
by s 4 of the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth), which established the Sheller 
Committee.’ Recommendation 27: ‘The committee recommends that Schedule 7 be removed from the Bill in its 
entirety.’ Recommendation 39: ‘The committee recommends that the Bill be amended by inserting an express 
requirement for a public and independent five year review of the operation of Schedule 5.’ 
136 See, eg, Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005, Schedule of the amendments moved by Senator Ludwig on behalf 
of the Opposition in Committee of the whole 
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Famend%2Fr2
469_amend_1b897e88-a64d-49c2-ae2c-40e66788818a%22>. 
137 SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Alert Digest No 13 of 2005 (9 November 2005) 8. 
138 For example, the committee focused on the provisions of the Bill that excluded the Attorney-General’s decision 
to consent to a police officer requesting a CO or PDO from the scope of the ADJR Act. Ibid 8, 13. 
139 For example, the SSCSB discussed the Bill’s impact on the common law privileges of self-incrimination and 
legal professional privilege in the context of proposed provisions requiring the production of documents. Ibid 8, 
14–16. 
140 See, eg, LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 
2005 (2005) 13–14, 24–7, 48, 143. See also Recommendations 2, 4, 7, 8, 13, 14. 
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raised by the SSCSB.141 Interestingly, the PJCIS (as it was by now known) did not receive a 
reference to inquire into the Control Orders Bill, signalling that, at least at this time, the LCA 
Committee remained the ‘forum of choice’ for large-scale public inquiries into proposed new 
counter-terrorism laws. 
Taken together, the Bills in this first phase demonstrate that, even where there is bipartisan 
support for strong legislative responses to new threats to Australia’s national security, 
parliamentary committees can have a rights-enhancing impact on the content of the laws 
passed. As discussed further in Chapter 6, this can occur even when the Bills are rushed through 
Parliament, and is greatly enhanced when more than one committee is involved in scrutinising 
or reviewing a proposed law. While the case study Acts enacted during this phase continue to 
raise serious rights concerns and have been cited by some scholars as evidence of the 
weaknesses of the parliamentary model of rights protection,142 the rights implications of these 
laws would have been significantly worse had parliamentary committees not been able to effect 
significant legislative change. As the next phase reveals, the rights-enhancing impact of 
parliamentary committees can also have a longer-term effect, helping to shape the development 
of new provisions and providing the basis for further independent review of Australia’s 
counter-terrorism framework. 
Phase 2: Consolidating Reform of Counter-Terrorism Laws  
The second ‘phase’ of parliamentary scrutiny of counter-terrorism law was a period covering 
2008–2012, commencing with the defeat of the Howard Government and the election of the 
Rudd Government. As noted in Chapter 3, this period saw review and reform of pre-existing 
counter-terrorism laws and the introduction of new oversight mechanisms to help ‘strike the 
right balance’ between national security and individual rights and freedoms. This phase also 
saw the establishment of the PJCHR in response to the findings of the National Consultation. 
                                                 
 
141 See Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (Cth). 
142 See, eg, Greg Carne, ‘Re-Orientating Human Rights Meanings and Understandings? Reviving and Revisiting 
Australian Human Rights Exceptionalism through a Liberal Democratic Rights Agenda’ (2015) 17 Flinders Law 
Review Journal 1; George Williams, ‘A Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws’ (2011) 35(3) Melbourne 
University Law Review 1136; Andrew Lynch, ‘Legislating with Urgency – The Enactment of the Anti-Terrorism 
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S and Murray S (eds) Regulating Preventative Justice: Principle, Policy and Paradox (Routledge, 2017) 136; 
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This period also coincided with a number of specific cases that drew public attention to the 
scope of the new powers given to intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and the risks 
associated with the use of those powers, including the case of Dr Mohamed Haneef.143 
Two Bills illustrate this phase of the legislative impact: the National Security Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2010 and the INSLM Bill 2010. Together these Bills constitute the most 
significant legislative activity in the area of counter-terrorism by the Rudd and Gillard 
Governments, and reflect many years of independent review of Australia’s counter-terrorism 
framework introduced since 2001. These Bills are also different in character to the phase 1 
Bills discussed above, as they were introduced in an effort to consolidate the existing counter-
terrorism framework, rather than in response to an emerging threat to national security. As the 
below discussion reveals, although neither of these Bills were referred to the PJCIS following 
their introduction, the past work of the PJCIS featured strongly in their development. In this 
way, this phase marks the beginning of the rise of the PJCIS as a committee with significant 
influence on the shape of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws.  
(a) The INSLM Act (CSA 7) 
As noted in Chapter 3, the INSLM Bill had its origins in past reviews of counter-terrorism 
legislation, including reviews conducted by the PJCIS in 2006 and 2007,144 the Sheller 
Committee145 and the Haneef Inquiry.146 It also represented the culmination of previous efforts 
by Liberal backbenchers Humphries and Troeth to introduce similar legislation in 2008.147 The 
PJCIS articulated the need for an independent monitor of counter-terrorism law in its 2006 
report as follows: 
The terrorism law regime is, essentially, a preventive model, which differs in many respects 
from our earlier legal traditions. Bearing in mind the significance of these changes and the 
                                                 
 
143 Mark John Clarke, Report of the Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef (2008) (Haneef Report). 
144 PJCIS, Inquiry into the Terrorist Organisation Listing Provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (2007) 52; 
PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Review of Security and Counter Terrorism Legislation (2006) 21–2. See, eg, 
Explanatory Memorandum, National Security Legislation Monitor Bill 2009 (Cth) notes on cl 3. 
145 Security Legislation Review Committee, Report of the Security Legislation Review Committee (2006) 6 
(Sheller Committee Report). 
146 Clarke, above n 143, 255–6. 
147 Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Laws Bill 2008 [No 2]. 
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importance of terrorism policy into the future, we have recommended the appointment of an 
Independent Reviewer to provide comprehensive and ongoing oversight. The Independent 
Reviewer, if adopted, will provide valuable reporting to the Parliament and help to maintain 
public confidence in Australia’s specialist terrorism laws.148 
The purpose of the INSLM Bill was to establish the statutory position of the National Security 
Legislation Monitor to review: 
the operation, effectiveness and implications of the counter-terrorism and national security 
legislation and report his or her comments, findings and recommendations to the Prime 
Minister. In addition, the Monitor must consider whether Australia’s counter-terrorism and 
national security legislation contains appropriate safeguards for protecting individual rights, 
and whether the legislation remains necessary.149 
Although previous incarnations of the Bill had been considered by the LCA Legislation 
Committee,150 the 2010 INSLM Bill was reviewed by the Senate Finance and Public 
Administration Committee (SFPAC).151 The SFPAC conducted a relatively small public 
inquiry and drew heavily from past scrutiny reports including the LCA Committee’s inquiry 
into the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Laws Bill 2008 (No 2) (Cth)152 and other inquiries 
into counter-terrorism laws that recommended the establishment of an INSLM. The SFPCA 
issued a consensus report that contained 12 recommendations for amendment but otherwise 
supported the Bill. These recommendations included: a name change (adding ‘independent’ to 
                                                 
 
148 PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Review of Security and Counter Terrorism Legislation (2006) vii. 
149 SFPAC, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into National Security Legislation Monitor Bill 2009 (2009) [1.5]. 
150 For example, in October 2008, the LCA Legislation Committee reported on its inquiry into the Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Laws Bill 2008 (No 2). See LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Laws Bill 2008 [No 2] (2008). 
151 SFPAC, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into National Security Legislation Monitor Bill 2009 (2009). Senate, 
Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 25 (15 July 2014) provides for the appointment of a legislative and 
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152 LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Laws Bill 2008 [No 
2] (2008). 
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the Monitor’s title),153 power for the INSLM to conduct its own inquiries,154 power for the 
PJCIS to refer matters to the INSLM for inquiry and report,155 and providing the INSLM with 
an explicit mandate to assess whether the counter-terrorism laws were consistent with 
Australia’s international human rights obligations.156 The government implemented all of these 
recommendations as amendments to the Bill.157 In addition, the key features of the INSLM Bill 
were drawn from provisions already considered by the LCA Committee in its inquiries into the 
previous incarnations of the Bill.158 Thus, it is possible to conclude that, in this case, the 
parliamentary committee system had a substantial legislative impact on the enacted law. As 
ALP Senator Ludwig observed during the second reading debate on the INSLM Bill: 
In many respects, the bill we are considering today reflects the considerable work of both the 
joint and the Senate committees in drawing attention to and developing proposals to fix a gap 
in the security legislation identified by both committees, as well as independent reviews of 
counterterrorism legislation since 2001. I recognise the work of my Senate and House 
colleagues from all parties on this important issue. To a great extent the bill is the fruit of a 
properly functioning parliament working at its best.159 
As will be discussed further below, the work of the INSLM has had a significant and 
predominantly rights-enhancing impact on the shape of subsequent changes to Australia’s 
counter-terrorism laws, despite the Abbott Government’s attempts to abolish the office, delays 
in appointing or re-appointing an INSLM, and delays in government responses to successive 
                                                 
 
153 SFPAC, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into National Security Legislation Monitor Bill 2009 (2009) 
Recommendation 2. 
154 Ibid Recommendation 5. 
155 Ibid Recommendation 6. 
156 Ibid Recommendation 10. See also Recommendations 9 and 11. Additional comments were provided by the 
Liberal Senators who queried the location of the Monitor within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
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also made a number of additional suggestions for amendments: see National Security Legislation Monitor Bill 
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the Bill and in the Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the amendments. See Supplementary 
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158 LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Laws Bill 2008 [No 
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159 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 3 February 2010, 209 (Joseph Ludwig, Special Minister for 
State). 
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INSLM reports. The value of the INSLM was also emphasised in interviews conducted for this 
thesis. For example, Law Council of Australia Criminal Law Committee member Mr Phillip 
Boulten SC said: 
The Monitor’s work is really important. … The Monitor acts over and above politics. Both of 
[the appointed Monitors] have been very diligent and effective in the way in which they 
conduct their inquiries. They engaged with the Law Council and other contributing bodies in 
a very thorough and open-minded way. Their reports go past immediate use value. In many 
respects, they’re the real conscience of both the PJCIS and the Parliament on these issues.160 
(b) National Security Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) (CSA 8) 
The National Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 (Cth) is another example of a Bill 
introduced in response to a series of independent reviews of Australia’s counter-terrorism 
provisions introduced since 2002.161 As noted in Chapter 3, the National Security Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2010 (Cth) was preceded by a discussion paper162 circulated by the Attorney-
General’s Department in August 2009.163 Some, but not all, of the proposals contained in the 
discussion paper were included in the Bill. The changes proposed in the Bill included 
amendments to the treason and sedition offences, changes to the ‘dead time’ provisions in Part 
IC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth),164 changes to the operation of the National Security 
Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth)165 and expanded oversight 
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165 Ibid sch 8. 
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powers for the IGIS.166 The discussion paper and the Bill formed part of an attempt by the Rudd 
Government to ensure that Australia’s counter-terrorism laws strike: 
a balance between the Government’s responsibility to protect Australia, its people and its 
interests, and instilling confidence in the community that the national security and counter-
terrorism laws will be exercised in an accountable way, protecting key civil liberties and the 
rule of law.167 
Following its introduction, the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 (Cth) was 
referred to the LCA Legislation Committee for inquiry and report.168 The committee received 
23 submissions, largely from legal organisations, law reform bodies, government departments 
and law enforcement agencies and held a public hearing in Melbourne. A number of submission 
makers expressed concern that the issues they raised in submissions in response to the 
discussion paper were not addressed in the Bill.169 These included concerns about the proposed 
new ‘urging violence’ offences,170 the pre-charge detention provisions in Part IC of the Crimes 
Act 1915 (Cth),171 and the system of security-cleared lawyers under the National Security 
Information (Civil and Criminal Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth).172 Some submission makers also 
expressed concern that the Bill did not make substantive changes to the existing control orders 
and preventative detention order regimes, and proposed only relatively minor changes to the 
proscription regime and terrorist organisation offences.173  
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The majority of the LCA Legislation Committee recommended four amendments, including 
that the government reissue the Explanatory Memorandum to clarify the reasons for 
introducing the proposed new ‘urging violence’ offences and remove the element of ‘good 
faith’ from the proposed defence to the new offences.174 It also recommended that the ALRC 
conduct a public inquiry into the pre-charge detention regime in Part IC of the Crimes Act 1915 
(Cth)175 and amend the regime to limit the amount of time that a person can be held in detention 
to a maximum of three days.176 The Liberal Senators of the LCA Legislation Committee did 
not agree with this last recommendation, preferring evidence given by law enforcement officers 
that a maximum of seven days pre-charge detention was more appropriate.177 A dissenting 
report was provided by the Australian Greens, who argued that the legislation should not 
proceed until reviewed by the newly created position of INSLM.178 
The SSCSB also considered the Bill,179 focusing its attention on the commencement of the new 
treason-related offences.180 The SSCSB expressed concern about the proposed reversal of proof 
to apply to these new offences where the conduct is undertaken for the purposes of 
humanitarian assistance.181 
The original Bill lapsed with the proroguing of Parliament on 28 September 2010 without any 
amendments being introduced. An identical Bill was then reintroduced, with only minor 
changes to the Explanatory Memorandum, and without any substantive changes to address the 
LCA Legislation Committee’s recommendations. At first blush, this would suggest that formal 
parliamentary scrutiny of the Bill had no discernible legislative impact at all. However, this 
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180 SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Report 7 of 2010 (2010) 267, 268–70. 
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would obscure the strong influence of the previous recommendations made by the PJCIS in its 
2007 and 2006 inquiries, which featured strongly in both the discussion paper and in the 
Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Bill. In fact, many of the key features of the Bill 
reflected the government’s attempt to implement the outstanding recommendations of the 
PJCIS and were attributed as such in both the Explanatory Memorandum and in the second 
reading speeches on the Bill. For example the following rights-enhancing features of the Bill 
were attributed to previous recommendations made by the PJCIS: 
 changes to clarify the content and narrow the scope of the treason offences;182 
 changes to the time frames relating to the proscription of terrorist organisations, to 
provide improved opportunities for organisations subject to proscription orders to 
challenge their proscription;183 
 changes to ensure parliamentary oversight over the proscription process by continuing 
to require the PJCIS to review regulations that prescribe terrorist organisations;184 and 
 changes to the listing process for the proscription of terrorist organisations relating to 
UN instruments, to narrow the scope of ‘automatic’ listing provisions.185 
Taken together, the two Bills in this phase of scrutiny provide examples of the legislative 
impact of the system of parliamentary committees, demonstrating that, even when a particular 
committee struggles to have its recommendations translated into legislative change, the 
cumulative effect of past committee inquiries and reports can be significant and rights-
enhancing. This phase also points to the cumulative rights-enhancing effect of multiple stages 
of rights review, whether from parliamentary committees or other independent review bodies, 
which increasingly features the PJCIS as a key player. As discussed below, this theme 
continued in phase 3. 
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Phase 3: The Rise of the PJCIS and the Introduction of the PJCHR 
Phase 3 of parliamentary scrutiny of counter-terrorism law commenced at the election of the 
Abbott Government in 2013 and continued up until the end of 2015, taking in ‘tranche 5’ of 
the counter-terrorism law-making experience described in Chapter 3 and incorporating the 
following case study Acts: 
 Data Retention Act (CSA 9); 
 Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2014 (Cth) (CSA 10);  
 Foreign Fighters Act (CSA 11); 
 Citizenship Act (CSA 12). 
In this phase it is possible to see two distinct trends occurring. The first is the complete 
sidelining of the LCA Committees as a forum for inquiring into proposed changes to counter-
terrorism laws. The second is the 100 per cent ‘strike rate’ of the PJCIS in translating its 
recommendations for legislative change into successful amendments.186 This dramatic rise in 
legislative impact attributable to the PJCIS occurred against the backdrop of the newly 
operational INSLM and the now functioning PJCHR, and generates important insights for the 
discussion in Part III of my research. 
(a) The Data Retention Act (CSA 10) 
The Data Retention Bill provides a useful case study to examine the longer-term legislative 
impact of the PJCIS, and the role of the LCA Committees in providing a forum for extensive 
public debate on bold new legislative reforms. The Bill, which was introduced by the Abbott 
Government, had its origins in a proposal first floated by the Gillard Government in a 
discussion paper developed by the then Attorney-General the Hon Nicola Roxon MP in May 
2012.187 The Roxon discussion paper was referred to the PJCIS for inquiry and report, in what 
                                                 
 
186 This is clear from the Explanatory Memoranda and second reading speeches accompanying each of the Bills 
discussed below, and also from the PJCIS’s annual reports. PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Annual Report of 
Committee Activities 2014–2015 (2015) 3. The PJCIS’s 2014–2015 annual report suggests that, across the four 
counter-terrorism Bills reviewed in this period, it made 109 recommendations for change, all of which were 
accepted by the government, and resulted in 63 successful amendments to the relevant Bills. 
187 The package of reforms included ‘telecommunications interception reform, telecommunications sector security 
reform and Australian intelligence community reform’, and drew upon findings and recommendations made in 
181 
became known as the Inquiry into the Potential Reforms of Australian’s National Security 
Legislation.188 The inquiry lasted for just over a year and attracted 236 written submissions. 
Five public hearings were held in Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra.189 The PJCIS tabled its 
report in June 2013 making 43 recommendations,190 three directly related to data retention.191 
One of these recommendations suggested that, if such a regime was to be pursued, draft 
legislation should be developed and released for public consultation, and should include a range 
of specific features.192 Another said that, if a mandatory data retention regime was pursued, the 
PJCIS should have a clear oversight role and review the regime within three years.193 These 
became critical considerations in the PJCIS’s subsequent inquiry into the Data Retention Bill.  
Some months after the PJCIS had issued its report, and following the election of the Abbott 
Government in 2013, the newly constituted Senate asked the non-government majority LCA 
References Committee to undertake a ‘comprehensive revision of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth)’.194 The LCA References Committee was asked to 
have particular regard to recent recommendations made by the ALRC, and the 
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191 Ibid Recommendations 5, 42 and 43. 
192 Ibid Recommendation 42. These features included that any mandatory data retention regime should apply only 
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and that the regime should include a robust, mandatory data breach notification scheme, and oversight of agencies’ 
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193 Ibid Recommendation 43. 
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recommendations of the PJCIS inquiry described above.195 The LCA References Committee 
received 46 submissions and held six public hearings.196 The inquiry was lengthy, with a final 
report not issued until 23 March 2015. During that time, the LCA References Committee 
received substantial comment on the issue of mandatory data retention and by the later stages 
of the committee’s inquiry the government had announced that it would be introducing the 
Data Retention Bill.197  
The LCA References Committee Chair, Australian Greens Senator Scott Ludlam, and the other 
committee members could not reach agreement on the key issues raised during the inquiry. As 
a result, the final report includes a lengthy Chair’s report, containing six recommendations, 
including that the Data Retention Bill be withdrawn.198 The government Senators opposed the 
Chair’s report and instead recommended that the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 (Cth) be amended to provide a single attribute-based warrant scheme to apply 
to telecommunications content and that the Data Retention Bill be passed by the Senate.199  
Meanwhile, on 21 November 2014, the Data Retention Bill was referred to the PJCIS for 
inquiry and report.200 Attorney-General Brandis also provided the PJCIS with a draft data set 
outlining the specific types of telecommunications data that service providers would be 
required to retain.201 The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Bill included numerous 
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references to the 2013 PJCIS inquiry and described some provisions of the Bill as 
implementing the relevant PJCIS recommendations.202  
In response to its Data Retention Bill inquiry, the PJCIS received 204 submissions and held 
three public hearings over December and January 2015.203 The PJCIS’s consensus report was 
tabled on 27 February 2015 (almost a month before the tabling of the LCA References 
Committee’s report). It looked carefully at the matters set out in the PJCIS’s 2013 report and 
noted the failure of the government to provide the PJCIS with draft legislation to consider prior 
to introducing the Bill into Parliament.204 The PJCIS’s report also referred extensively to the 
work of other parliamentary committees and independent reviews, including the LCA 
References Committee, the SSCSB and the PJCHR.205 Consideration was also given to the 
relevant human rights standards, particular the right to privacy protected by Article 17 of the 
ICCPR,206 and to the way these issues were dealt with by the government in the SoC 
accompanying the Bill. Particularly strong concerns were raised by media groups about the 
impact of the regime on journalists and their sources, and on their ability to report on matters 
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relevant to national security or government activity that may be in the public interest.207 The 
PJCIS made 39 recommendations for amendments to the Bill, including that:  
 the relevant data set be defined in primary legislation;208  
 the Bill make it clear that service providers are not required to collect and retain 
customer passwords, PINs, web-browsing histories or other destination information;  
 data retained be de-identified or destroyed after two years;209 
 the Bill include detailed reporting and oversight regimes, including detailed reporting 
requirements to the PJCIS;210 and  
 that a separate parliamentary inquiry be instigated into the impact of the proposed 
provisions on journalists and their sources.211 
On 3 March 2015 the government announced that it would accept all of the PJCIS’s 
recommendations212 and moved quickly to introduce amendments.213 The government also 
agreed to commence a separate PJCIS inquiry into the impact of the regime on journalists.214 
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Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 (Cth), General Outline [1]–[7]. 
214 On 4 March 2015, Attorney-General Brandis asked the PJCIS to inquire into and report on the question of 
‘how to deal with the authorisation of a disclosure or use of telecommunications data for the purpose of 
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Following pressure from the ALP Opposition and media groups, the government introduced 
amendments to establish a ‘journalist information warrant’, designed to protect the 
confidentiality of journalists’ sources.215 As discussed further in Chapter 6, frequent reference 
was made to the PJCIS’s recommendations during the second reading debates on the Bill and 
further unsuccessful amendments were introduced in the Senate by the minor parties and 
independents, building on the issues raised by submission makers to both the LCA References 
Committee and the PJCIS.216  
The Data Retention Bill was also considered by the PJCHR217 in a report tabled well in advance 
of either the PJCIS or LCA References Committee reports. The PJCHR’s report focused on the 
potential for the Bill to unjustifiably interfere with the right to privacy protected by Article 17 
of the ICCPR.218 In a relatively unusual step, the PJCHR issued a consensus recommendation 
that the Bill be amended to: 
provide that access to retained data be granted only on the basis of a warrant approved by a 
court or independent administrative tribunal, taking into account the necessity of access for 
the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime and defined objective grounds as set out 
[earlier in the report].219 
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219 Ibid 18. 
186 
The PJCHR also recommended that the Bill be amended to define the types of data that are to 
be retained,220 and to limit the range of agencies with access to retained data.221 The PJCHR 
also sought further information from the Attorney-General as to ‘whether the two year retention 
period is necessary and proportionate in pursuit of a legitimate objective’222 and recommended 
that consideration be given to amending the proposed scheme to ensure that individuals were 
notified when their data has been accessed.223 While the PJCHR did not receive a positive 
response to its recommendations for amendment from the government, many of its concerns 
were noted in the reports of both the LCA References Committee and the PJCIS, and many of 
its recommendations were reflected in the PJCIS’s recommendations.224 
The Data Retention Bill was also scrutinised by the SSCSB.225 In its Alert Digest, the SSCSB 
expressed concerns about the extent to which the Bill interfered with the right to privacy, and 
the way the Bill left many key matters, including the meaning of ‘data’, to delegated 
legislation.226 In its final report on the Bill, issued after the government had agreed to 
implement the PJCIS recommendations, the SSCSB reiterated its strong concerns about the use 
of delegated legislation and instruments to prescribe the type of data to be retained under the 
scheme and to list the types of agencies that would have access to such data.227  
Taken together, the Data Retention Bill experience provides another example of the cumulative 
legislative impact of multi-committee review. In this case, the PJCIS had a strong, direct 
legislative impact, with all of its recommendations implemented though successful government 
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amendments. In addition, the PJCIS’s 2013 report provided the framework for much of the 
public and parliamentary debate on the Data Retention Bill when introduced. The work of the 
LCA References Committee, the PJCHR and the SSCSB is also evident in the submissions to 
the PJCIS and in the PJCIS’s report on the Bill. Further, many of the recommendations made 
by the PJCHR and issues raised by the SSCSB were reflected in legislative amendments 
introduced in response to the PJCIS report.228 These committee reports may have also 
influenced opposition and minor party parliamentarians to pressure the government to 
introduce the ‘journalist information warrant’ regime. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the Data Retention Bill related to a subject matter that was 
intrinsically interesting to media organisations and journalists, which no doubt influenced the 
significant public attention the Bill received. However, the very large number of submissions 
to the committee inquiries, and the diversity of the organisations and individuals providing 
evidence, suggests that parliamentary committees provided a practical forum for 
parliamentarians and sophisticated submission makers to develop concrete ways of 
ameliorating some of the rights-abrogating features of the proposed legislation. In these types 
of scenarios, where public support for rights-enhancing change is strong, government 
backbenchers, opposition members and minor parties may be particularly strident in their push 
for reform, even with respect to Bills that had originally received bipartisan support. As 
discussed further in Chapter 6, this can be a sign of the important role parliamentary committees 
play in fostering deliberative democracy at the federal level.  
(b) The Foreign Fighters Act 2014 (CSA 11) 
As noted in Chapter 3, the Abbott Government introduced the Foreign Fighters Bill in response 
to the ‘serious and ongoing terrorist threat’ posed to Australia by the return of ‘foreign fighters’ 
(those Australians who have participated in foreign conflicts or undertaken training with 
extremist groups overseas).229 The Bill amended 22 separate Acts.230 Its key provisions 
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included: the establishment of a new offence of entering a ‘declared area’ in which a terrorist 
organisation is engaging in hostile activity;231 a new offence of ‘advocating terrorism’;232 
amendments to the terrorist organisation training offences;233 the introduction of a delayed 
notification search warrant regime;234 and a ten-year extension of the control order and 
preventative detention order regimes, and the questioning and detention regime.235 
Despite moving rapidly through Parliament,236 four separate parliamentary committees 
scrutinised the Foreign Fighters Bill, but not the LCA Committees. This decision, adopted by 
the government members of the LCA Committees (and opposed by the non-government 
members) was made on the basis that the PJCIS was already inquiring into the Bill.237 
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The PJCIS’s three-week inquiry into the Bill attracted over 50 submissions, involved three days 
of hearings, and resulted in an extensive consensus report.238 In its report, the PJCIS referred 
extensively to past independent reviews and parliamentary committee reports, including the 
2012 and 2013 INSLM annual reports239 and the 2012 COAG review of the control order and 
preventative detention order regimes and stop and search powers.240 The PJCIS accepted the 
evidence provided from government agencies on the need for the new offences and powers 
proposed in the Bill. However, it also acknowledged the rights-intrusive nature of the proposed 
new measures, and warned of the need to ensure that the proposed provisions were 
accompanied by strong safeguards and oversight mechanisms.241 This is reflected in the 
PJCIS’s 36 recommendations, which included: 
 improving the safeguards in the preventative detention order regime to include the 
requirement for the Ombudsman to be notified of certain events;242 
 introducing a new sunset clause (24 months after the next election) for the questioning 
and detention regime, the control order and preventative detention order regime and the 
stop, search and seizure powers relating to terrorism offences 243 
 increasing the PJCIS’s oversight powers to include the counter-terrorism activities of 
the AFP;244 
 limiting the definition of ‘hostile activity’ in the proposed new offences to conduct 
which would be considered to be a ‘serious offence’ if undertaken within Australia;245 
 ensuring that declarations of declared areas for the purposes of the new offences can 
only be made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and only if a ‘terrorist organisation is 
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239 Ibid 10, 63, 77, 79. 
240 Ibid 46, 52, 63. 
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engaging in a hostile activity’ in that area. These declarations must be in the form of 
disallowable instruments and subject to disallowance by Parliament;246 
 requiring the PJCIS to conduct a review of each ‘declared area’ declaration made, 
within the disallowance period for each declaration;247 and  
 subjecting the proposed new declared area offences to a sunset clause two years after 
the next election.248 
The government agreed to implement all of these recommendations249 and introduced 
amendments to this effect, directly referencing the work of the PJCIS in second reading 
speeches and in supplementary Explanatory Memoranda.250 The government amendments 
were passed, as well as amendments proposed by the opposition in the Senate, which inserted 
a ‘legitimate purpose’ exception into the new declared areas offence regime.251 The opposition 
also moved successful amendments to clarify that the ‘advocating terrorism’ offence does not 
apply to ‘a person who engages in good faith in public discussion of any genuine academic, 
artistic, scientific, political or religious matter’.252 
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249 George Brandis, Attorney-General, ‘Government Response to the Committee’s Report on the Foreign Fighters 
Bill’ (Media Release, 22 October 2014).  
250 See Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 
2014 (Cth); Supplementary Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (Cth). 
251 Under this amendment, the declared area offence provision does not apply if the person enters or remains in 
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252 Unsuccessful amendments were also moved by the Australian Greens and independent Senator David 
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notification search warrant regime. See, eg, Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 
2014 (Cth), Amendments to be moved by Senator Wright, on behalf of the Australian Greens, in committee of the 
whole; Amendments to be moved by Senator Leyonhjelm, on behalf of the Liberal Democratic Party, in committee 
of the whole. 
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The SSCSB also considered the Bill, initially in a special Alert Digest tabled out of session253 
and later in two separate, longer reports.254 These latter reports were tabled just as the Bill was 
reaching the second reading stage in the Senate, and just prior to passage of the amended Bill 
in the House.255 In its Alert Digest and subsequent reports, the SSCSB referred to the relevant 
findings and recommendations of the INSLM and requested further information on why the 
government sought to depart in some respects from the INSLM’s recommendations.256 A key 
consideration for the SSCSB was whether persons subject to the proposed new executive 
powers in the Bill (such as passport or visa cancellation powers) had access to judicial review 
and the rules of natural justice.257 In his response to the SSCSB’s Alert Digest, the Attorney-
General undertook to include further information in the revised Explanatory Memorandum.258 
The Attorney-General also noted the government’s acceptance of the full range of PJCIS 
recommendations, which he asserted addressed many of the SSCSB’s concerns.259 Some 
issues, particularly those relating to access to judicial review following passport or visa 
cancellation decisions and those features of the Bill that diluted pre-existing safeguards for the 
control orders or preventative detention orders regime, continued to raise concerns for the 
SSCSB, which ultimately left these issues to the Senate as a whole to consider.260  
The PJCHR also considered the Bill261 but tabled its report after the conclusion of the second 
reading debate on the Bill in the Senate, and just two days before the amended Bill passed 
through the House. The PJCHR expressed strong frustration at the time frame it was given to 
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scrutinise this complex legislation and provide rights analysis on the pre-existing control order 
regime, which had been introduced prior to the establishment of the PJCHR and therefore had 
not previously be subject to detailed consideration by the committee.262 The PJCHR made a 
series of requests for further information about the rights compatibility of the control orders 
regime, and to substantiate claims in the SoC that the proposed new measures were a necessary 
and proportionate response to the threat posed by foreign fighters to Australian national 
security.263 The PJCHR also made a number of consensus findings of incompatibility with a 
number of human rights and recommended legislative amendments. For example, it found that: 
 the control order regime and the preventative detention order regime is likely to be 
incompatible with Article 9 and 14 of the ICCPR;264 
 the proposed delayed notification search warrant regime should be amended to require 
an applicant to demonstrate that it is not possible to obtain the evidence in another 
way;265 
 the declared area offence provision is likely to be incompatible with the right to a fair 
trial and the presumption of innocence, unnecessarily restricts freedom of movement, 
and is likely to be incompatible with the right to equality and non-discrimination;266 
and 
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 the advocating terrorism offence provision, as currently drafted, is likely to be 
incompatible with the right to freedom of opinion and expression.267 
Unlike the SSCSB, the PJCHR did not receive a response to its requests for further information 
or advice from the Attorney-General. As a result, the Bill was passed with amendments on 30 
October 2014 that did not directly address the full range of rights concerns later raised by the 
PJCHR. 
When taken together, the parliamentary scrutiny of this Bill had an important rights-enhancing 
legislative impact, despite the very tight time frame for undertaking inquiries and the 
complexity and range of new measures proposed. However, as discussed further in Chapter 6, 
the Foreign Fighters Bill is also an example of how the work of the PJCHR can be frustrated 
by the very short times between the introduction of a Bill and the second reading debate. 
Despite making findings of rights incompatibility and specific recommendations for 
amendment, the PJCHR’s efforts to influence the content of the Bill were stifled as a result of 
its report being tabled after the conclusion of the second reading debate on the Bill in the 
Senate. This meant that Senators did not have access to the views of PJCHR prior to voting on 
the Bill, and members of the House received the PJCHR report just days before the amended 
Bill was passed. In addition, submissions makers to the PJCIS inquiry did not have access to 
the PJCHR’s analysis of the Bill, and were therefore unable to integrate the PJCHR’s concerns 
into their advocacy. 
(c) Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2014 (Cth) (CSA 10) 
Just a month after introducing the Foreign Fighters Bill, and before that Bill had passed, the 
government introduced the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014. This 
Bill expanded the grounds upon which a control order can be requested and issued, reduced the 
information required to be provided to the Attorney-General when seeking an interim control 
                                                 
 
267 Ibid 50–2. The PJCHR also made recommendations relating to the use of foreign evidence to clarify that 
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order, and extended the time before material must be provided to the Attorney-General where 
a request for an urgent interim control order has been made.268 
The Bill was referred to the PJCIS (but not the LCA Committees)269 for a short inquiry270 that 
attracted 17 written submissions and involved one public hearing.271 Many submissions drew 
attention to the INSLM’s 2012 recommendation that control orders were ‘not effective, not 
appropriate and not necessary’ and that the regime should be repealed.272 Some submissions 
also noted that the Bill’s proposal to expand the control order regime was being pursued despite 
the majority of the COAG Review Committee having recommended strengthening safeguards 
in the existing control order regime.273 In its report, the PJCIS referred to the work of the 
INSLM and the committee’s own consideration of the control order regime as part of its inquiry 
into the Foreign Fighters Bill.274 The report also noted that some of the safeguards proposed 
by COAG were not reflected in the Bill, such as the introduction of a system of ‘Special 
Advocates’ who would be able to access classified information and act on behalf of individuals. 
Some committee members supported the introduction of such a regime to accompany the 
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changes proposed by the Bill.275 The PJCIS also noted that the extended delay in appointing 
the INSLM left a gap in accountability and oversight of the control order regime276 and 
recommended that the position be filled as a matter of urgency. Other recommendations 
included that: 
 the meaning of a number of key terms be clarified;277  
 when seeking the Attorney-General’s consent to request an interim control order, the 
AFP must provide the Attorney-General with a statement of facts relating to why the 
order should be made, and any known facts as to why it should not be made;278  
 requests to obtain the Attorney-General’s consent to apply for an interim order should 
be dealt with within eight hours;279 and 
 the pre-existing safeguards relating to specifying and reviewing the conditions imposed 
as part of a control order should be re-instated.280 
The government agreed to accept, or ‘accept in principle’, all of the PJCIS’s 
recommendations281 and introduced a number of successful government amendments to the 
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Bill, and a supplementary Explanatory Memorandum attributing the legislative changes to the 
work of the PJCIS.282  
On the same day, the PJCHR tabled its report on the Bill283 containing strong criticisms of the 
SoC,284 and noting that a far more detailed assessment of the control order regime’s compliance 
with human rights should have been provided. The PJCHR also expressed the view that the 
proposed changes should not go ahead until an INSLM was appointed285 and sought further 
information on these and other matters from the Attorney-General. However, no response was 
provided until 11 February 2015, well after the passage of Bill.286 
The SSCSB also considered the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 
2014,287 referring to its detailed comments on the control order regime contained in its 
extensive reports on the Foreign Fighters Bill.288 Like the PJCHR, the SSCSB also expressed 
concern that the provisions proposed in this Bill would expand the scope of the regime while 
also removing key safeguards.289 The SSCSB requested further information on why the Bill 
departed from past findings made by the PJCIS, and failed to address the concerns raised by 
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the INSLM.290 However, these requests for information were not answered prior to the passage 
of the Bill.291 
The scrutiny experience of this Bill demonstrates a convergence of rights concerns being 
expressed by three different committees, but reveals that only one committee (the PJCIS) was 
able to translate these concerns into legislative change. The technical scrutiny committees were 
sidelined in this case by the lack of timely responses from the proponent Minister to their 
requests for information, which meant that their concluded views on the Bill were not available 
to parliamentarians at the vital second reading stage. Nor were they available to submission 
makers to the PJCIS. These issues will be discussed further in Part III, where a range of 
strategies are suggested to address the reporting practices of the SSCSB and the PJCHR and to 
encourage more collaboration between the technical scrutiny and inquiry-based committees. 
(d) The Citizenship Act (CSA 12) 
The final Act in this phase of scrutiny, the Citizenship Bill, was introduced in June 2015 in the 
context of escalating global and local concerns about the threat posed by ‘foreign fighters’ and 
‘home-grown terrorists’.292 It included a range of new measures designed to remove the 
Australian citizenship of anyone who travels overseas to participate in or support terrorist 
activity.293 The Bill was referred to the PJCIS for inquiry and report,294 and an attempt by the 
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Australian Greens to have the Citizenship Bill referred to the LCA Legislation Committee was 
defeated.295 The Bill was also considered by the SSCSB and the PJCHR.296  
The PJCIS received 43 submissions and seven supplementary submissions to its inquiry,297 and 
held three public hearings in addition to receiving private briefings.298 This culminated in an 
extensive report containing 26 recommendations for amendment, subject to which the PJCIS 
recommended that the Bill be passed. All of these recommendations were accepted and 
reflected in successful government amendments.299 In a number of instances, these changes 
could be described as rights-enhancing. For example, the amendments: 
 make it clear that before a dual national can have their citizenship ‘renounced’ by doing 
something terrorist-related overseas, they must at least have intended to engage in the 
particular prescribed conduct (rather than been reckless or negligent);300  
 narrow the range of conduct that can trigger the renunciation provisions, from the 
previously low-level ‘damage to Commonwealth property’ to a tighter list of conduct 
with a closer connection to an actual terrorist act;301  
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 require the Minister for Immigration to notify the person who has ‘renounced’ their 
citizenship that he or she is no longer an Australian, and set out the person’s rights of 
review;302 and  
 make it clear that the laws cannot be applied to children under 14.303  
The PJCHR also considered the Citizenship Bill in a lengthy and detailed report.304 In its report, 
the PJCHR criticised many aspects of the SoC, in particular its failure to provide reasoning or 
evidence that the measures were reasonable to address a ‘pressing or substantial concern’.305 
The PJCHR also questioned the proportionality of having the citizenship revocation provisions 
trigged by offences that included damaging Commonwealth property and other relatively minor 
offences,306 and expressed concerns with respect to:  
 the lack of clarity around how decisions will be made by the Minister or officials to 
revoke a person’s citizenship;307 and 
 whether depriving a person of citizenship, and therefore potentially exposing them to 
deportation, is compatible with Australia’s non-refoulement obligations.308 
The PJCHR requested further information from the Attorney-General and Minister for 
Immigration on these and other matters, but did not wait for a response before tabling its report 
on 11 August 2015. This proved prudent, as further advice from the Minister for Immigration 
was not received until 11 January 2016.309  
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The SSCSB also considered the Citizenship Bill in its Alert Digest tabled prior to the 
resumption of second reading debate on the Bill,310 and raised a number of strongly worded 
concerns.311 For example, it said that: ‘serious issues of fairness arise given that a person may 
lose their citizenship on the basis of criminal conduct without any of the protections associated 
with a criminal trial’.312 The SSCSB also found the ‘automatic’ nature of the cessation of 
citizenship provisions to be highly problematic,313 and sought further explanations about why 
these provisions were considered necessary from the Minister of Immigration.314 Like the 
PJCHR, the SSCSB did not receive a response to its requests for further information until 
several months after the enactment of the Citizenship Bill;315 however, the SSCSB’s concerns 
were noted by the PJCIS in its report and by a number of submission makers to the PJCIS 
inquiry.316 
Parliamentary scrutiny of the Citizenship Bill is another strong example of the cumulative and 
rights-enhancing legislative impact of multi-committee scrutiny of a Bill. In this case, the 
legislative impact of the PJCIS was clearly more direct, but was underpinned by the analysis 
provided by the SSCSB and its robust exchange of correspondence with the executive. 
Similarly, while the PJCHR may not have had a direct legislative impact, it was successful in 
alerting Parliament to the issues to consider when passing laws of this nature due to its decision 
to table its report prior to the commencement of the second reading debate, despite not 
receiving a response from the Minister.317 As discussed further in Part III, early reporting by 
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the PJCHR on rights-engaging Bills (even in the absence of a response from the proponent 
Minister) is one of the key recommendations of my research.  
D Summary of Findings on Legislative Impact 
The analysis above suggests that parliamentary committees had a significant rights-enhancing 
legislative impact on the case study Acts, despite strong bipartisan support for ‘tough on terror’ 
policies and even in the context of short reporting time frames and lack of timely responses to 
requests for information from proponents of a Bill. The strength of this legislative impact varied 
from committee to committee. For example, the PJCIS was a particularly strong performer, 
enjoying a high ‘strike rate’ (particularly since 2013) when it came to translating 
recommendations into legislative change, but also when it came to the rights-enhancing 
significance of the amendments it generated. The LCA Committees were particularly active in 
the first phase of scrutiny described above, generating popular and influential public inquiries 
that had important, rights-enhancing legislative outcomes, even if the LCA Committee 
recommendations were not implemented as consistently as those of the PJCIS in the post-2013 
period. The fact that the LCA Committees have been effectively sidelined as forums to review 
counter-terrorism law since 2013 illustrates the dynamic nature of the committee system, and 
is an important sign that a committee’s legislative impact can shift significantly over time. 
The evidence set out above also makes it clear that it was not just the inquiry-based committees 
that had a legislative influence on the case study Acts; the technical scrutiny committees also 
played an important, if less direct, role. In particular, the work of the technical scrutiny 
committees armed the inquiry-based committees and their submission makers with the 
information and analysis they needed to substantiate and justify the legislative changes they 
recommended. This is explored further in the next chapter. 
Perhaps most significantly, the above analysis demonstrates that it is when multiple committees 
work together to scrutinise and review a Bill that the most significant legislative impact is felt. 
This is evident in both the early cases of the Control Order Bill and ASIO Bill 2002, which 
were considered by the SSCSB, PJC ASIO and the LCA Committees, and also in the post-2013 
                                                 
 
of the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 (2015) ch 8, and Recommendation 
20.  
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Bills which were considered by the PJCIS, SSCSB and the PJCHR. As discussed further in 
Part III, this suggests that, by working together, the committees can address the tensions in 
legitimacy and participation discussed in Chapter 4 – with the technical scrutiny committees 
providing legitimate and clear analytical frameworks for submission makers to draw upon and 
the inquiry-based committees providing participatory forums to develop specific 
recommendations for reform. This has important implications for the types of changes I 
recommend in Part III. For example, it encourages an approach that enhances the value and 
utility of the reports and publications issued by the SSCSB and the PJCHR from the perspective 
of the inquiry-based committees and their submission makers. It also suggests a need to 
preserve the features of the PJCIS that help account for its consistently strong legislative impact 
on the case study Acts, including its strong relationships with the executive and its agencies. 
As will be discussed further in the next chapter, this approach is supported by the findings 
made with respect to the public and hidden impacts of the parliamentary committees studied. 
It is also important to underscore again that, in the vast majority of cases, the legislative impact 
that is occurring as a result of parliamentary committee scrutiny is rights-enhancing, even if 
the amendments made regularly fail to completely remedy the concerning features of the 
proposed new counter-terrorism measure.318 As discussed in Chapter 1, this may give rise to 
scepticism by some scholars about the overall strength of the committee system as a component 
of Australia’s parliamentary model of rights protection. However, as explored further in Part 
III, the significance of the amendments attributable to parliamentary committee work should 
not be underestimated, even if they are far from perfect from a rights advocate’s perspective.  
In addition, the type of successful rights-enhancing legislative changes attributable to 
parliamentary scrutiny suggest that a particular type of rights-scrutiny culture may be emerging 
at the federal level that could be valuable for those seeking to improve (or even replace) 
Australia’s current model of rights protection. For example, from the case study Acts above, 
the most common rights-enhancing amendments that can be directly attributable to committees 
included: clarifying and narrowing the scope of new investigative powers or offences; 
introducing stronger safeguards or protections for common law privileges and procedural 
fairness; requiring ongoing independent or parliamentary oversight or review; limiting the 
                                                 
 
318 A summary of these changes is provided at Appendix D. 
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discretion to be applied by members of the executive; and/or limiting the effect of new 
measures or offences on children.319 Provisions that sought to give Ministers or law 
enforcement or intelligence officers powers to interfere with rights of speech, association, 
privacy, citizenship or procedural fairness also appeared to attract significant attention from 
the committees, and generated legislative amendments that sought to dilute or limit this 
interference. These commonly emerging rights and scrutiny principles are explored further in 
the next chapter and in Part III of the thesis, where it is noted that further research is needed to 
determine whether this finding could have broader application beyond the case study adopted 
in my research. 
 
                                                 
 
319 See also Appendix D. 
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CHAPTER 6: PUBLIC IMPACT 
A Why Look for Public Impact? 
This chapter sets out evidence of the public impact of the four parliamentary committees 
studied on the 12 case study Acts. As noted in Chapter 2, in this thesis, ‘public impact’ means 
evidence that the parliamentary committee influenced or was considered in public or 
parliamentary debate on the case study Act or during a post-enactment review of the Act. 
Evidence of public impact includes reference to the findings or recommendations of a 
committee in Hansard, media reports or academic commentary, or in reports of post-enactment 
oversight bodies or review mechanisms.  
Public impact is distinct from legislative impact (considered in Chapter 5) because it looks for 
influence beyond amendments to a clause of a Bill; however, there is necessarily a clear 
relationship between the two. A committee with a strong, direct legislative impact will 
invariably feature in the parliamentary debate on a proposed law, for example when proponents 
of the law refer to the recommendations of the committee when introducing amendments. In 
addition, members of committees with strong legislative impact may frequently refer to their 
involvement in the committee when debating the proposed law in Parliament and in public. 
However, evidence of public impact does not merely reflect strong legislative impact. Looking 
for evidence of public impact can also identify the long-term influence of parliamentary 
scrutiny on the content of the law, recognising that sometimes it can take years for the full 
impact of the work of parliamentary committees to become apparent.1 
Examining public impact is particularly important for understanding how committees 
contribute to the parliamentary model of rights protection in Australia. As discussed in Chapter 
3, parliamentary committees can help establish a ‘culture of rights scrutiny’ by providing a 
forum for members to share their views on a proposed law, including pointing out what they 
                                                 
 
1 As AHRC Policy Director Darren Dick said, speaking of the PJCHR and its long-term impact on the Northern 
Territory Intervention legislation: ‘I think it’s clear that if you judge [the impact of the PJCHR] at that initial point 
at when that legislation came in, and ask whether committee processes were sufficient at the time, your answer is 
no, but if you look at it seven years later, you see the way things changed, then it’s very clear that [the committee 
processes] had a very significant impact’. Interview with Darren Dick, Australian Human Rights Commission 
(Sydney, 31 May 2016). 
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consider to be the rights implications of the proposed law. This can help identify any 
unintended or unjustified rights implications arising from a proposed law, and generate new, 
less rights-intrusive, legislative or policy options. Parliamentary committees can also help 
parliamentarians to weigh competing arguments or different policy options,2 either through the 
public process conducted by the inquiry-based committees, or through the consideration of 
written analysis provided by the technical scrutiny committees. This weighing process becomes 
particularly relevant when considering the enactment of counter-terrorism laws which, as 
Dalla-Pozza explains, are regularly accompanied by the claim that counter-terrorism laws must 
strike an appropriate ‘balance’3 between safeguarding Australia’s national security and 
preserving individual rights and liberties.4 This bipartisan commitment to ‘striking the right 
balance’ when enacting counter-terrorism laws is evident from Dalla-Pozza’s earlier study5 and 
my research,6 even if the enacted outcomes leave some commentators sceptical of the efficacy 
of this process.7  
One way to test whether the Parliament has engaged in this weighing process in a meaningful 
way is to look at the role parliamentary committees play in the development of a particular law. 
This is because a committee inquiry, or an independent analysis of the key features of a Bill, 
can demonstrate the capacity of Parliament to gather and disperse information, or bring new 
                                                 
 
2 John Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia: The Changing Place of Parliament (CUP, 1998) 25; Dominique 
Dalla-Pozza, ‘Refining the Australian Counter-terrorism Framework: How Deliberative Has Parliament Been?’ 
(2016) 27(4) Public Law Review 271, 274 
3 As will be explored further below, the bipartisan parliamentary focus on ‘striking the right balance’ when 
enacting counter-terrorism laws comes through strongly in the language used in Hansard when debating the case 
study Acts.  
4 Dalla-Pozza, ‘Refining the Australian Counter-terrorism Framework’, above n 19, 272–4. 
5 Ibid. See also Dominique Dalla-Pozza, ‘Promoting deliberative debate? The submissions and oral evidence 
provided to Australian parliamentary committees in the creation of counter-terrorism laws’ (2008) 23(1) 
Australasian Parliamentary Review 39. 
6 This is discussed further below, including by reference to Table 6.2. See also the following Hansard debates on 
the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 (Cth): Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Representatives, 24 November 2015, 13558 (Warren Entsch); Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Representatives, 23 November 2015, 13326 (Lisa Chesters); Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Representatives, 12 November 2015, 13117–18, 9504. (Michael Danby). 
7 See, eg, George Williams, ‘A Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws’ (2011) 35(3) Melbourne University Law 
Review 1136; Andrew Lynch, ‘Legislating with urgency – the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 1) 2005’ 
(2006) 30(3) Melbourne University Law Review 747; Shawn Rajanayagam, ‘Does Parliament Do Enough? 
Evaluating Statements of Compatibility under the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act’ (2015) 38(3) 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 1046. 
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voices into the public debate.8 It can also provide insights into the nature of the parliamentary 
debate that occurred on the proposed law, including the time allocated for debate, whether 
alternative policy options were considered, and whether the impact of the law on individual 
rights was discussed.  
This chapter argues that the public impact parliamentary committees had on the case study Acts 
was significant and generally rights-enhancing. This was particularly the case when multiple 
committees worked together to scrutinise proposed provisions and offered less rights-intrusive 
policy alternatives for governments to consider. This chapter also suggests that there may be 
an emerging commonality when it comes to the types of rights the parliamentary committees 
in this study focus on when scrutinising the case study Acts, and those discussed in 
parliamentary and public debates on the case study Acts. As explored further in Part III, this in 
turn reveals something useful about the rights-scrutiny culture that may be developing at the 
federal level. 
B Time for Parliamentary Scrutiny and Debate 
If the work of parliamentary committees is going to have any impact on the content of a 
proposed law there must be adequate time for parliamentary scrutiny to take place.9 The 
counter-terrorism law-making experience outlined in Chapter 3 suggests that this may not 
always be the case, as some of the case study Bills were ‘rushed’ through Parliament with little, 
if any, time for calm, considered parliamentary debate.10  
As noted in Chapter 5, where the second reading debate on a Bill concludes prior to the tabling 
of a committee’s report, the opportunity for that committee to have an immediate impact on 
                                                 
 
8 See, eg, Malcolm Shaw, ‘Parliamentary Committees: A Global Perspective’ (1998) 4(1) Journal of Legislative 
Studies 225; Gareth Griffith, ‘Parliament and Accountability: The Role of Parliamentary Oversight Committees’ 
(Briefing Paper No 12/05, Parliamentary Library Research Service, New South Wales, 2005). 
9 See, eg, John Uhr, ‘Parliamentary Measures: Evaluating Parliament’s Policy Role’ in Ian Marsh (ed), Governing 
in the 1990s: An agenda for the decade (CEDA/Longman, 1993) 347; Malcolm Aldons, ‘Problems with 
Parliamentary Committee Evaluation: Light at the End of the Tunnel?’ (2003) 18(1) Australasian Parliamentary 
Review 79. 
10 See, eg, Lynch, above n 7; George Williams and Edwina MacDonald, ‘Combating Terrorism: Australia’s 
Criminal Code since September 11, 2001’ (2007) 16 Griffith Law Review 27; George Williams, Nicola McGarrity 
and Fergal Davis, ‘Mapping the Terrain’ in F Davis, N McGarrity and G Williams (eds), Surveillance, Counter-
Terrorism and Comparative Constitutionalism (Routledge, 2014) 3; Lisa Burton and George Williams, ‘What 
Future for Australia’s Control Order Regime’ (2013) 24 Public Law Review 182. 
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the enacted law or on the parliamentary debate can be severely limited.11 This is because 
parliamentarians are required to make a public statement about the merits of a proposed Bill 
without the benefit of the information generated from the committee’s inquiry, or the analysis 
contained in the committee’s scrutiny report. Short time periods between committee reporting 
and the commencement of second reading debates also add pressure to those responsible for 
drafting the Bill and any government amendments made in response to committee 
recommendations.12  
For some committees, the Senate Standing Orders provide some protection against the 
resumption of the second reading debate prior to the tabling of committee reports. For example, 
the Senate Standing Orders provide that a second reading debate cannot resume until the tabling 
of the reports of any relevant Senate committees.13 However, while designed to guard against 
uninformed debate, these orders can sometimes add to the time pressures experienced by 
Senate committees and their staff. As former LCA Committee Secretary Ms Dunstone 
explained: 
The Senate doesn’t bring on Bills for debate until committee reports are tabled, and so that’s 
partly where some of that time pressure on committee inquiries is borne out. Governments 
don’t want their legislative timetable delayed by committee inquiries and reporting. So often 
it will be the day that the committee’s report is tabled, or the very next day, that the Bill is 
listed for debate.14 
The same Standing Orders do not apply to the tabling of joint committee reports, meaning that 
the second reading debate on a Bill can commence prior to the tabling of a joint committee 
report. As noted in Chapter 5, this has led to occasions where the PJCHR has not had sufficient 
                                                 
 
11 For example, as noted in Chapter 5, the PJCHR’s report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment 
(Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 was tabled after the second reading debate on the Bill had concluded. See PJCHR, 
Fourteenth Report of 2014 (2014) 3. 
12 See, eg, Interview with Meredith Leigh and Naomi Carde, Office of Parliamentary Counsel (Canberra, 24 May 
2016); Interview with Official A, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016); Interview with 
Official B, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 30 May 2016); Interview with Cameron Gifford, Attorney-
General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
13 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 38 (24 August 1994); Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing 
Order 62 (14 October 1991). 
14 Interview with Sophie Dunstone, former Secretary of the LCA Committees (Canberra, 23 May 2016).  
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time to table its report on a case study Bill prior to the resumption of the second reading debate 
in either the Senate or the House.  
For Dalla-Pozza, providing adequate time for meaningful parliamentary scrutiny of proposed 
laws is integral to ‘striking the right balance’ between liberty and security when enacting 
counter-terrorism laws.15 Like many other scholars, Dalla-Pozza’s work suggests that a shorter 
time allocated for scrutiny results in poorer quality scrutiny.16 While the evidence presented in 
this chapter certainly confirms that a committee that is unable to table its report prior to the 
completion of the second reading debate on the Bill will struggle to have a strong impact on 
the content of the law, my research also presents a more complex picture of the relationship 
between the time allocated for scrutiny and the strength of the impact of the scrutiny on the 
Bill. My research suggests that other factors may be at play that have more influence on the 
overall impact of parliamentary committees on the case study Acts than time alone. These 
findings are discussed in further detail below, and are supported by Table 6.1, which 
summarises how much time was allocated to formal parliamentary scrutiny and parliamentary 
debate for each case study Act. This table also draws upon information from Chapter 4 to help 
identify whether tight periods have a correlation with lower levels of public or parliamentary 
participation.  
  
                                                 
 
15 See, eg, Dalla-Pozza, ‘Refining the Australian Counter-terrorism Framework’, above n 19. 
16 See, eg, ibid; Lynch, above n 7. 
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1 Period Between Introduction and Enactment  
Table 6.1 suggests that the shortest time between introduction and enactment occurred with the 
Foreign Fighters Bill (39 days), closely followed by the Control Orders Bill (41 days). As 
Dalla-Pozza notes, these Bills have experiences in common other than short time frames.17 In 
particular, both were introduced in response to a serious and imminent threat to national 
security.18 Both Bills also made significant changes to Australia’s criminal law framework, 
with important consequences for individual rights. However, there are also important 
differences between these Bills and their parliamentary scrutiny experiences. While both Bills 
proceeded through Parliament quickly, the Control Orders Bill was able to attract considerable 
public and parliamentary attention. For example, the LCA References Committee’s inquiry 
into the Control Orders Bill attracted 294 submissions and 52 second reading speeches.19 In 
addition, both the LCA Committee’s report and the SSCSB report on the Control Orders Bill 
were tabled in advance (although only just) of the resumption of the second reading debate.20 
Thus, at least when compared with the other Bills in my case study, the short time between 
introduction and enactment of the Control Order Bill did not appear to act as a serious 
impediment to robust parliamentary scrutiny of this Bill.21 This can be contrasted with the 
experience of the Foreign Fighters Bill, where neither the PJCHR nor the SSCSB were able to 
table their reports on the Bill prior to the resumption of the second reading debate and only 46 
submissions were made to the PJCIS inquiry. This suggest that, for the Foreign Fighters Bill, 
the short time between introduction and enactment may have had a negative impact on the 
scrutiny experience. However, it must also be noted that all of the PJCIS’s recommendations 
with respect to the Foreign Fighters Bill were introduced as successful government 
amendments, and many of these had important rights-enhancing consequences. As Chapter 5 
                                                 
 
17 Dalla-Pozza, ‘Refining the Australian Counter-terrorism Framework’ above n 2. 
18 As discussed in Chapter 3, Section D(1) and Chapter 5, Section C(1), for the Control Orders Bill, this was the 
threat posed by the London Bombing experience; in the case of the Foreign Fighters Bill, the threat concerned the 
return of Australians following participation in terrorist activities overseas. 
19 Dalla Pozza and Appleby note that this parliamentary debate amounted to 17 hours of parliamentary 
deliberation. See Dominique Dalla-Pozza, ‘Refining the Australian Counter-terrorism Framework’, above n 2, 
281; Gabrielle Appleby, ‘The 2014 Counter-Terrorism Reforms in Review’ (2015) 26 Public Law Review 4. 
20 As noted in Chapter 3, the Bill also required the states and territories to introduce similar laws and thus was 
proceeded by a COAG process which, through the actions of ACT Chief Minister Jon Stanhope, provided an 
opportunity for the media and the community to be made aware of the key features of the Bill.  
21 As discussed in Chapter 5, important legislative changes were made to the content of the Anti-terrorism Bill 
(No 2) 2005 that can described as rights-enhancing.  
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notes, the LCA Committee experienced less comprehensive success when it came to 
influencing legislative change of the Control Orders Bill. These contrasting experiences 
suggest that, while very short time frames can have an influence on the nature and quality of 
parliamentary scrutiny, they do not necessarily determine the strength of the public or 
legislative impact a committee can have. 
The longest periods shown in Table 6.1 also illustrate this point. Both the National Security 
Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 and the INSLM Bill were before Parliament for around 8–9 
months. In many ways, these longer periods are not surprising, as these Bills were not 
introduced in response to a particular terrorist threat, but rather to a series of reviews of 
Australia’s counter-terrorism framework. These Bills could also be described as less rights 
intrusive, and more rights protective, than many of the other case study Acts. However, what 
is interesting is the fact that the longer time frames provided for scrutiny of these Bills did not 
result in more submissions to committees, or in additional parliamentary debate. In fact, these 
Bills received lower than average numbers of submissions, relatively short periods of 
parliamentary debate and a relatively small number of legislative changes attributable to 
parliamentary scrutiny. As noted in Chapter 5 and discussed further below, for these Bills, it 
was the work of previous parliamentary committee inquiries into counter-terrorism laws that 
proved influential at the pre-legislative phase, rather than the more direct committee scrutiny 
of their provisions once the Bills had been introduced.  
This suggests that factors other than time periods may have an influence on the quality of 
scrutiny a proposed law receives, and on the rights-enhancing impact a parliamentary 
committee can have. One of these factors has already been identified as a central theme of my 
research, that is, the cumulative rights-enhancing effect of multiple committee scrutiny of a 
particular Bill. Another factor appears to be the extent to which a Bill attracts a range of 
sophisticated non-government actors to participate in the parliamentary committee process, 
which in turn increases the volume of public debate on a Bill, and provides important political 
incentives for parliamentarians to carefully ‘weigh’ competing public interests and policy 
options when making decisions about a Bill. These two factors are explored further below and 
set the foundations for a number of reform recommendations set out in Part III.  
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C Influence of Parliamentary Committees on the Public Debate on the Case Study 
Bills 
1 Parliamentary Debates  
One way to measure the impact of committees on parliamentary debate is to look for direct 
references to committee work in Hansard debates on the case study Acts. Care must be taken 
not to overstate the significance of a reference to a committee in parliamentary debates. It is 
not possible to identify with any precision what a parliamentarian was actually thinking when 
debating a Bill, or what made him or her vote in a certain way. The political reality may be that 
the parliamentarian was simply reciting a series of dot points circulated by the proponent 
Minister or Shadow Minister without any independent reflection on the merits of the Bill. 
Alternatively, a parliamentarian might refer to the work of a committee that they are a member 
of simply to bolster their own reputation. However, the words deliberately chosen for 
parliamentary speeches do provide some indication of the type of issues parliamentarians want 
the public to understand as important in their deliberation on a particular Bill. For these reasons, 
evidence derived from Hansard debates on the case study Acts provides a useful basis on which 
to begin to measure public impact in my research. 
Table 6.2 provides an overview of the frequency with which the four parliamentary committees 
studied were referred to during parliamentary debates on the case study Acts. It shows that 
around three quarters of second reading speeches made on the case study Acts referred to 
scrutiny undertaken by at least one of the four parliamentary committees studied. 
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Table 6.2: References to Parliamentary Committee Scrutiny  
 Bill  References to parliamentary committee scrutiny 
TOTAL 262 of 334 speeches (78%) 
Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 
2015 
36 of 41 speeches (90%)  
36 references to PJCIS, 1 reference to LCA Committees 
(Greens); 1 reference to PJCHR (Greens) 
Australian Citizenship Amendment 
(Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 
40 of 68 speeches (60%)  
40 references to PJCIS, 1 reference to PJCHR (Greens); 1 
reference to SSCSB 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 
19 of 31 speeches (60%)  
19 references to PJCIS, 3 references to PJCHR, 2 references 
to LCA Committees being excluded (Greens) 
Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014 
12 of 15 speeches (80%)  
12 references to PJCIS, 3 references to PJCHR  
National Security Legislation Amendment 
Bill 2010 
15 of 19 speeches (78%) 
5 references to LCA Committees, 11 references to past 
inquiries being addressed by this Bill, all of which included 
reference to PJCIS 
Independent National Security 
Legislation Monitor Bill 2010 
17 of 21 speeches (80%) 
7 references to Senate Finance and PA Committee, 10 
references to work of past committees 
Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 24 of 52 speeches (46%)  
24 substantive references to LCA Committees 
National Security Information (Criminal 
Proceedings) Bill 2004 (Cth) 
5 of 5 speeches (100%) 
5 substantive references to LCA Committees 
Anti-terrorism Bill 2004 7 of 13 speeches (53%)  
7 substantive references to LCA Committees 
Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 
25 of 36 speeches (75%)  
25 substantive references to PJC ASIO, 11 substantive 
references to LCA Committees, 3 references to Scrutiny of 
Bills 
Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2003 
14 of 23 speeches (66%)  
14 references to past parliamentary inquiries into the 2002 
Bill 
Security Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill  (No 2) 2002 and Other 
Bills 
17 of 27 speeches (62%)  
17 references to LCA Committees 
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It is clear from Table 6.2 that committees featured prominently in parliamentary debates on the 
case study Acts. It is also clear that the PJCIS and the LCA Committees received far more 
references than the PJCHR or the SSCSB, with the PJCIS featuring particularly strongly in the 
debates since 2013. While opposition and minor parties referred more frequently to 
parliamentary committees than government members with respect to some Bills22 it is not 
uncommon for government members to make substantive references to the work of 
parliamentary committees in their second reading speeches.23 
Of interest is the fact that the debate on the two Bills which attracted the highest number of 
second reading speeches – the Citizenship Bill and the Control Order Bill – contained fewer 
direct references to the work of parliamentary committees than those Bills that moved through 
Parliament with much less debate. As will be explored further below, this may be because these 
Bills invoked strong rights discussions within the broader community, which may have 
provided incentives for parliamentarians to refer directly to submission makers to the inquiry 
committees, rather than relying on the reports of the inquiry-based committees themselves. The 
same trend is apparent with respect to the debates on the ASIO Bill 2002, the ASIO Bill 2003 
and the SLAT Bills, which also contained fewer direct references to parliamentary committees. 
This can be contrasted with the two Bills that attracted the least number of submissions to 
committee inquiries and lower numbers of second reading speeches: the National Security 
Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 (Cth) and the National Security Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2010. For these Bills, there was a common deference to the work of 
parliamentary committees as evidence that the ‘weighing process’ described above had 
occurred. At both ends of this spectrum, the public impact of parliamentary committees (and 
in particular the inquiry-based committees) was strong. The inquiry-based committees 
provided the forum for rights concerns about the Bills to be raised, and parliamentarians were 
keen to emphasise the importance of the committees undertaking this role (either by deferring 
to the committee’s report, or quoting directly from the committee’s submission makers) when 
justifying their position on a particular Bill. 
                                                 
 
22 For example, the Hansard debates on the Control Orders Bill. 
23 For example, the Hansard debates on the Citizenship Bill. 
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2 Signs of an Emerging Rights-Scrutiny Culture within the Federal Parliament 
An analysis of the parliamentary debates on the case study Acts reveals useful insights into the 
way the Parliament discusses rights and suggests that a particular rights-scrutiny culture may 
be emerging that has an important relationship with the mandates of the technical scrutiny 
committees considered in this thesis. This argument is supported by three compelling 
observations from the second reading debates on the case study Acts. The first is the propensity 
for second reading speeches on the case study Acts to include discussions of the need to 
‘balance’ competing rights related to the protection of the community from the threat of 
terrorism, and the individual rights of those affected by the proposed law. For example, of the 
334 second reading speeches made on the case study Acts, my analysis suggests that around 
70 per cent included some discussion of ‘rights’ and the need to consider these rights in light 
of competing public interests.24  
The second compelling observation is the apparent preference for discussing rights with 
reference to the broad language featuring in the SSCSB’s mandate (such as ‘individual rights 
and liberties’ and ‘limits on executive power’) as opposed to referring directly to international 
human rights law (such as ‘Article 14 of the ICCPR’).25 Interestingly, there was no dramatic 
increase in references to international human rights concepts following the establishment of 
the PJCHR, suggesting that, outside of a handful of human rights ‘champions’,26 the work of 
the PJCHR was not able to generate a strong response from parliamentarians in the context of 
debating the case study Acts.27 
The third compelling observation is the repeated reference to the same types of rights scrutiny 
principles across the second reading speeches for the 12 case study Acts. These rights and 
scrutiny principles closely reflect the type of rights analysis found in reports of the committees 
considered in Chapter 5, and are listed in Appendix E. They include, for example, the principle 
that: 
                                                 
 
24 Chapter 1, Section A(3) describes what is included in the term ‘rights’ for the purposes of my research. 
25 232 general rights references (69%); 101 references to international human rights (30%). 
26 These ‘champions’ are discussed further in Chapter 8. 
27 This is consistent with the findings of George Williams and Daniel Reynolds, ‘The Operation and Impact of 
Australia’s Parliamentary Scrutiny Regime for Human Rights’ (2016) 41(2) Monash University Law Review 469. 
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 The proposed provisions and Explanatory Memorandum should be clearly drafted so 
the meaning and policy aim is clear to Parliament.28 
 The expansion of executive power must come with procedural fairness guarantees, 
including access to legal representation, preservation of common law privileges and 
access to judicial review.29 
 New criminal offences should have clearly defined physical and mental elements, 
allocate the burden of proof to the prosecution, ensure access to legal representation, 
and not apply retrospectively.30 
 Any restriction of free speech should be accompanied by exceptions to promote robust 
debate on matters of public interest.31 
Taken together, these observations suggest that a particular rights-scrutiny culture may be 
emerging at the federal level that warrants further documentation and investigation.  
Many observers may be sceptical of the value of this emerging rights-scrutiny culture, noting 
for example that common references to ‘balancing’ in parliamentary debates are not reliable 
evidence that meaningful deliberation has taken place or that less rights-intrusive means of 
achieving the same policy end have been considered.32 In some instances, they argue, it is just 
part of the standard political rhetoric used by both major parties to ‘soften’ or ‘hide’ the rights-
                                                 
 
28 See, eg, LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the National Security Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2010 and Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Bill 2010 (2010) 
Recommendations 1 and 2. 
29 See, eg, LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Security Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 2] and Related Matters (2002) Recommendation 4; LCA Legislation Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (2005) ch 3 (key issues summarised at 
[3.22]); SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Alert Digest relating to the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment 
(Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (2014). 
30 See, eg, Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005, Schedule of the amendments made by the Senate, Items 68–72; 
SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Alert Digest No 13 of 2005 (9 November 2005) 8, 14–16; SSCSB, Parliament of 
Australia, Alert Digest relating to the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 
(2014). 
31 See, eg, SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Alert Digest No 7 of 2015 (12 August 2015) 3, 10; LCA Legislation 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (2005) Recommendations 
27 and 28, see also ch 5 ‘Sedition and Advocacy’; LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry 
into the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 and Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law 
Enforcement Bill 2010 (2010). 
32 See, eg, George Williams, ‘Losing Our Balance in Fortress Australia’ Australian Financial Review, 23 
September 2005; Jude McCulloch, ‘Human Rights and Terror Laws’ (2015) 128 Precedent 26, 28. 
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intrusive nature of the laws they are enacting.33 However, my research points to an interesting 
relationship between the repeated reference to ‘balancing’ and the nature of the parliamentary 
committee scrutiny of the Bill.34 The more popular the committee inquiry leading up to the 
second reading debate, the more confident parliamentarians appear to be in asserting that the 
‘right balance has been struck’. There is also a strong relationship between (a) those Bills that 
attract a large number of submission makers to parliamentary inquiries and (b) those Bills that 
attract the most significant references to rights concepts in parliamentary debates. This suggest 
that, when the Parliament talks about the work of its committees, it is more likely to discuss 
‘rights’ and is more explicit about the need to strike the right ‘balance’ when enacting counter-
terrorism laws. Further, as established in Chapter 5, where multi-committee scrutiny occurs, 
there is also a strong chance that it will result in meaningful rights-enhancing legislative 
change. This suggests that some form of meaningful rights scrutiny took place, at least with 
respect to the case study Acts, that could be improved and built upon. 
Others may consider that I am presenting an overly optimistic view of the rights-scrutiny 
culture in the federal Parliament, particularly since the election of the Abbott government.35 
For example, for Carne, the Brandis-led shift away from international human rights discourse 
towards the language of individual freedoms points to ‘a renewed and deliberate distinctiveness 
and differentiation in Australian human rights policy and practice’36 that has ‘proven grossly 
                                                 
 
33 This view was also supported by some of the interview material. For example, the Council for Civil Liberties 
said that often the lack of a clear analytical framework being applied when parliamentarians speak of ‘balance’ 
leaves submission makers and the public more broadly cynical about their commitment to genuinely looking for 
ways to avoid disproportionate interferences with individuals’ rights: Interview with Bill Rowlings, Civil Liberties 
Australia (Canberra, 24 May 2016). See also Interview with Bret Walker SC, former Inspector General of 
Intelligence and Security (Sydney, 30 May 2016); Interview with Nicholas Cowdery, former Human Rights 
Advisor to the Law Council of Australia (Sydney, 30 May 2016). 
34 For an example of the challenges associated with legal 'balancing' of rights from the perspective of the courts, 
including consideration of the use of the proportionality approach when considering the implied freedom of 
political communication, see Shipra Chordia, ‘The problem of balancing: structured proportionality and tiered 
scrutiny’, Harvard Law School Visiting Scholar Colloquium Series, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, 30 
November 2016. 
35 See, eg, Carolien van Ham and Louise Chappell, ‘Democracy and human rights: a tripartite conceptual 
framework’ (2017) 23(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 143, 166–7; Greg Carne, ‘Re-Orientating Human 
Rights Meanings and Understandings? Reviving and Revisiting Australian Human Rights Exceptionalism 
Through a Liberal Democratic Rights Agenda’ (2015) 17(1) Flinders Law Journal 61. 
36 Carne, above n 35, 65. 
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ineffectual in offering substantive review and critique of far reaching 2014 terrorism law 
reform provisions’.37  
Before conducting this research, I shared Carne’s concerns that the ‘liberal democratic rights 
agenda’ promoted by Attorney-General Brandis would dilute rights scrutiny at the federal level 
and impact negatively on the human rights literacy of the Parliament. However, as discussed 
further in Part III, my research challenges Carne’s assumptions on a number of fronts. First, 
my research demonstrates that the counter-terrorism laws debated and enacted during 2013–14 
attracted a rights discourse that moved beyond the ‘liberal democratic rights agenda’, both 
within the Parliament and within the broader media commentary on the laws. This discourse 
included, for example, reliance on specific human rights analysis undertaken by the PJCHR by 
influential submission makers to other parliamentary committees, as well as a focus by the 
PJCIS and SSCSB on issues such as appropriate parliamentary oversight of the use of executive 
power and the impact of the law on religious or ethnic minorities.38 Secondly, my research 
demonstrates that short time periods for parliamentary review are not necessarily fatal when it 
comes to improving the rights compatibility of proposed counter-terrorism laws, particularly 
when inquiry-based committees are still able to conduct extensive public hearings, and 
submission makers and parliamentarians have access to scrutiny committee reports.39 Finally, 
my research demonstrates that during 2013–14, the PJCIS had a 100 per cent ‘strike rate’ in 
terms of translating its recommendations into legislative amendments, and the vast majority of 
these amendments were rights-enhancing in nature (even if they did not remedy the full range 
of rights concerns with the Bills).  
Thus, while rights advocates may be correct to hold concerns about the scope of the ‘liberal 
democratic rights agenda’ promoted by the Abbott Government, my research suggests that this 
‘agenda’ has not prevented the development of a particular rights-scrutiny culture at the federal 
level that could, if documented and investigated further, be useful for identifying what type of 
reforms will be most successful at improving rights protection in Australia.  
                                                 
 
37 Ibid 67. 
38 For further information see Appendix E. 
39 As noted above, in the case of the Foreign Fighters Bill, my research found that parliamentary scrutiny of the 
Bill was undermined by the failure of the PJCHR to table its report on the Bill prior to the commencement of the 
second reading debate on the Bill.  
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In addition, understanding this emerging rights-scrutiny culture could help to distinguish 
between what Orr and Levy describe as the difference between ‘conceptual balancing’ (which 
often takes the form of trading off values or interests against others) and ‘deliberative 
accommodation’ (which often involves searching for a common ground between different 
values or interests).40 For these authors, deliberative accommodation methodologies are 
preferable to conceptual balancing approaches as they encourage a broader range of views to 
be heard, involve mutual learning and persuasion and depend on inclusiveness, rather than 
‘trade offs’ between rights holders.41  My research suggests that, when working together as a 
system, parliamentary committees may be beginning to show signs of ‘deliberative 
accommodation’, at least in the context of reviewing the case study Acts. As discussed further 
in Part III, understanding this emerging rights-scrutiny culture could also help contextualise 
what Stephenson has described as the ‘institutional disagreements’ that occur on rights issues 
within the federal jurisdiction, which could in turn help to identify options for improving 
Australia’s parliamentary model of rights protection.42  
D Media Commentary  
The final snapshot of public impact being considered in this chapter is media commentary on 
the case study Bills. Table 6.3 lists references to the work of committees in media commentary 
on the case study Acts, found through searches of an Australian media database.43 While this 
is by no means a comprehensive catalogue of the public commentary on counter-terrorism law 
                                                 
 
40 Ron Levy and Grahame Orr, The Law of Deliberative Democracy (Routledge, 2016) 76-80. 
41 Ibid, 80, 197. While Orr and Levy’s work focuses on what they call ‘second order’ issues in deliberative 
democracy, such as the role the judiciary and lawyers play in the design and operation of the electoral system, 
their analysis of how deliberative democratic values can improve the quality of public decision making holds 
lessons for the work of parliamentary committees, see 197-200. 
42 Scott Stephenson, From Dialogue to Disagreement in Comparative Rights Constitutionalism (Federation Press, 
2016) 8. 
43 The database used for this purpose was the Australia/New Zealand Reference Centre accessed through the 
University of Adelaide Library. This database is supported by EBSCO Host and provides access to Australian and 
New Zealand newspapers, magazines, and radio and television transcripts. Searches were also undertaken on 
‘Google’ with the ‘News’ tab ‘Australia only’ selected. The time period set for these searches was 2001–16. Media 
articles referring to the case study Acts during this time period are set out in Appendix C. 
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making in Australia,44 it provides a glimpse into the extent to which parliamentary committee 
work featured in the broader public debate on the Bills. 
  
                                                 
 
44 For example, Table 6.3 does not show the very large volume of media and academic commentary that refers in 
general terms to Australia’s response to terrorism, or that documents or discusses particular local and international 
terrorist events or threats. Even a cursory examination of this volume of material reveals that articles or reports 
referring to parliamentary scrutiny of proposed new counter-terrorism measures comprise a small minority. This 
must be kept in mind when evaluating the public impact of the parliamentary committee system on the public 
debate on these laws. 
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Table 6.3 Public Commentary on the Case Study Bills and the Role of Parliamentary 
Scrutiny (References Provided in Appendix C) 
 Media 
articles  
Reference to parliamentary 
scrutiny 
Reference to rights issues 
Security Legislation 
Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 
(No 2) and Other 




Yes, references to LCA 
Committees, also criticism of 
legislative process 
Yes, focus on procedural 
rights, freedom of association, 
freedom of speech 
ASIO Legislation 
Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 
and 2003 




Yes, extensive references to 
LCA Committees’ and PJC 
ASIO Committee’s inquiries, 
including quotations from 
submission makers and 
recommendations. 
Yes, extensive discussion of 
rights and civil liberties 
including specific references 
to right to free speech, rights 









Proceedings) Bill 2004 
11 Yes, references to LCA 
Committees  
Yes, strong focus on 
procedural rights, eg right to 
access legal representation, 
open justice  
Anti-Terrorism Bill 
(No 2) 2005 
Over 200 NB 
including after 
enactment 
Yes, references to work of 
LCA Committees 
Yes, extensive discussion of 
rights issues, including 
reference to international 
human rights law 
National Security 
Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2010 




Yes, references to past 
reviews including by PJCIS, 
LCA Committees but more 
commonly to Haneef Inquiry 
Yes, in general terms and with 
reference to the Haneef case. 
Independent National 
Security Legislation 
Monitor Bill 2010 
10 Yes, references to SCFPA but 
also PJCIS and Sheller 
Committee 
Yes, with particular reference 





Fighters) Bill 2014 
33 Yes, references to PJCIS and 
‘Senate Committees’ 
examining the Bill. NB also 
reference to INSLM and IGIS 
Yes, particular reference to 
procedural fairness and fair 




Amendment Bill (No 
1) 2014 




(Data Retention) Bill 
2014 
Over 250 Yes, some references to both 
PJCIS and LCA Committees 
Yes, particularly strong and 





Australia) Bill 2015 
126 Yes, frequent references to 
work of PJCIS and INSLM 
Yes, including specific 
references to procedural 
fairness, legal right to access 
citizenship, indefinite 
detention, freedom of speech, 
right to equality 
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Table 6.3 largely confirms the trends described above with respect to the parliamentary debates 
on the case study Acts. For example, the Control Orders Bill, the Data Retention Bill and the 
Citizenship Bill all received high levels of media attention, and public commentary on these 
Bills included regular references to rights issues, as well as references to parliamentary scrutiny 
processes.45 These Bills also attracted large numbers of submission makers to committee 
inquiries and, in the case of the Control Orders Bill and the Data Retention Bill, were 
scrutinised by at least three separate committees. This suggests that there is a causal 
relationship between the rights-engaging nature of the content of the Bill, the number of 
submissions a committee inquiry attracts, and the rate of media attention a Bill receives. The 
interviews I conducted for my research also suggest that often it is the referral of a Bill to a 
committee for inquiry that provides important trigger points for public advocacy by 
sophisticated submission makers.46 This can include direct media engagement by these bodies 
in order to highlight the rights issues arising from the Bill.47 
                                                 
 
45 For media coverage of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 see, eg, on control orders, citizenship and data 
retention Justice John Von Doussa, ‘Human Rights Chief Says Anti-terrorism Laws Could Make Courts Unfair’, 
Canberra Times, 15 October 2005; Elizabeth Evatt, ‘Heavyweights Unite in Call for More debate’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 25 October 2005, 1; International Commission of Jurists Australia, ‘ICJ Australia Denounces 
New Counter-Terrorism Laws’ (Media Release, 17 October 2005); Law Society of New South Wales, 
‘Government Abuses Power Over Anti-Terrorist Laws’ (Media Release, 14 October 2005). For media coverage 
of the Data Retention Bill see, eg, Emma Griffiths, ‘Data Retention: Access to Journalists’ Records to be Tougher 
Under Deal Between Government and Labor Party’, ABC News (online), 19 March 2015 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-19/access-journalists-records-tougher-data-retention-deal/6331904>; 
Katie Miller, ‘Why the Data Retention Legislation Should be Withdrawn’, Australian Financial Review (online), 
2 March 2015 <http://www.afr.com/technology/web/why-the-data-retention-legislation-should-be-withdrawn-
20150227-13qufg#ixzz4kdXl5wER>; Allie Coyne, ‘Govt toAadopt All Changes to Data Retention Bill’, IT News 
(Australia, online), 3 March 2015 <https://www.itnews.com.au/news/govt-to-adopt-all-changes-to-data-
retention-bill-401177>. For media coverage of the Citizenship Bill see, eg, Emma Griffiths, ‘Bill Shorten Gives 
Qualified Backing to Stripping Terrorists of Citizenship’, ABC News (online), 4 June 2015 
<ttp://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-04/shorten-indicates-labor-will-support-citizenship-changes/6521600>; 
Sangeetha Pillai, ‘Committee Recommendations Improve Citizenship Bill, but Fundamental Flaws Remain’, The 
Conversation (online), 7 September 2015 <http://theconversation.com/committee-recommendations-improve-
citizenship-bill-but-fundamental-flaws-remain-45720>; Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘Commission 
Responds to Citizenship Bill’ (Media Release, 7 September 2015). For further examples see Appendix C. 
46 See, eg, Interview with Kris Klugman and Bill Rowlings, Civil Liberties Australia (Canberra, 24 May 2016); 
Interview with Simon Henderson, Law Council of Australia (Canberra, 23 May 2016); Interview with Nicola 
McGarrity, Gilbert & Tobin Centre for Public Law (Sydney, 31 May 2016). 
47 See, eg, David Wroe, ‘Law Council Blasts New Citizenship Terrorism Laws as Much Too Broad’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online), 26 June 2015 <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/law-council-
blasts-new-citizenship-terrorism-laws-as-much-too-broad-20150626-ghyqqx.html>; Civil Liberties Australia, 
‘Need for Proposed Anti-terror Laws Still Unexplained’ (Media Release, 28 September 2005); Sangeetha Pillai, 
‘Bill Targets Foreign Fighters Before departure and After Return’, The Conversation (online), 24 September 2014 
<http://theconversation.com/bill-targets-foreign-fighters-before-departure-and-after-return-30095> (at the time 
of publication Sangeetha Pillai was a PhD researcher in citizenship and constitutional law at the Gilbert + Tobin 
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A similar experience can be observed with respect to the SLAT Bills and the ASIO Bills, as 
well as the Foreign Fighters Bill, which all generated significant media attention.48 In the case 
of the SLAT and ASIO Bills, the media commentary included strident criticism of the proposed 
new measures containing references to human rights principles, rule of law principles and 
comparative examples.49 The speed at which these laws were ‘pushed through’ Parliament was 
also frequently noted, although the work of the LCA Committees was praised and submissions 
to those committees frequently quoted.50 This again suggests that the conduct of public 
inquiries by parliamentary committees, particularly those involving large numbers of 
sophisticated non-government submission makers, helps to generate strong media interest in 
the Bill. 
This relatively strong media interest may also help explain the rights-enhancing nature of the 
legislative amendments made to the Bills noted above that can be attributed to the work of 
parliamentary committees. This is supported by interviews conducted for this thesis, which 
suggest that public statements by reputable submission makers about the rights concerns arising 
from a proposed Bill can provide useful ‘cover’ for backbenchers or non-government members 
to push for their respective parties to give effect to rights-enhancing committee 
recommendations by way of legislative amendment.51 
Despite these persuasive examples, it is clear that there is not always a causal relationship 
between the rights-engaging nature of the Bill, the popularity of the committee inquiry and the 
level of media attention generated. For example, the Anti-Terrorism Bill 2004 attracted very 
                                                 
 
Centre of Public Law at UNSW; Law Council of Australia, ‘Law Council’s Outrage at One Week Review for 
Anti -Terror Laws’ (Media release, 14 October 2005). For further examples see Appendix C. 
48 ‘ASIO Law Fears’, The Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 21 February 2002, 8; ‘Will the Terrorism Bill Allow 
Government Terrorism’, The Age (Melbourne), 17 April 2002, 12; Shaya Laughlin, ‘Australia’s New Foreign 
Fighter Laws Scared Son’, The Gold Coast Bulletin (Brisbane), 7 February 2015, 5. For further examples see 
Appendix C. 
49 See, eg, ‘Other Threats to Freedom’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 28 November 2002, 12; Brendan 
Nicholson, ‘Protect Our Values, Georgio Urges’, The Sunday Age (Melbourne), 29 September 2002, 6. For further 
examples see Appendix C. 
50 See, eg, ‘Flaws in Terror Laws Exposed’, The Courier Mail (Brisbane), 11 May 2002, 22; Linda Kirk, ‘Balance 
Terror Fight and Liberties’, The Advertiser (Adelaide), 23 December 2002, 18. For further examples see Appendix 
C. 
51 See, eg, Interview with Patricia Crossin, former Chair and Deputy Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs, former Australian Labor Party Senator for Northern Territory (telephone, 10 
August 2016).  
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little media attention when introduced, despite introducing rights-intrusive new powers 
including the so called ‘dead time’ provisions in Part IC of the Crimes Ac 1915 (Cth), which 
permitted the police to detain a person (potentially incommunicado) who may have relevant 
information about terrorist activities for extensive periods without charge. These provisions 
appeared to ‘slide under the radar’ at the time the Bill was introduced, only to attract much 
more significant media and academic attention in subsequent years (sparked by the Haneef case 
and the subsequent inquiry).52 This suggests that rights-engaging provisions may not always 
attract media and submission maker attention at the time of introduction. Something more may 
be needed (such as the opportunity to observe the laws in action) before media attention will 
occur. 
Another interesting example is the National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 
2004. Despite only attracting a relatively modest number of submissions and second reading 
speeches in Parliament, this Bill managed to attract stronger than expected media attention.53 
This could be explained by the concerted ‘campaign’ against the Bill developed and prosecuted 
by legal organisations and journalists, both of whom had direct interests in drawing attention 
to the provisions of the Bill that would restrict their professional roles in terrorist-related trials. 
In the case of the legal organisations, it was the proposal to ‘security clear’ lawyers that 
generated particular concern, as well as the ‘closed court’ provisions that aimed to protect 
national security information from disclosure in criminal trials.54 This example underscores the 
                                                 
 
52 See, eg, ‘The Haneef Affair: From Arrest to Inquiry’, ABC News (online), 2 July 2010 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-10-15/the-haneef-affair-from-arrest-to-inquiry/542576>; Chris Hammer, 
‘Haneef Case Weak, FOI Papers Show’, The Age (online), 16 May 2008, 
<http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/haneef-case-weak-foi-papers-
how/2008/05/15/1210765057432.html>; George Williams, ‘Time to Change Terrorism Laws’, The Sydney 
Morning Herarld (online), 24 February 2009 <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/time-to-change-terrorism-
laws-20090223-8fr1.html>. For further examples see Appendix C. 
53 See, eg, Cynthia Banham and Nick O’Malley, ‘Rights at Risk in Security Crackdown’, The Sydney Morning 
Herald (Sydney), 6 September 2005, 2; Patrick Walters, ‘Press Lobby Wins Reforms to National Security Crime 
Bill’, The Australian (National), 12 September 2004, 17; Brendan Nicholson, ‘Government Eases Secrecy of 
Terrorist Trial Evidence’, The Age (Melbourne), 12 March 2004, 4. For further examples see Appendix C. 
54 See, eg, Law Council of Australia, Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, National Security 
Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 and the National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) 
(Consequential amendments) Bill 2004 (2 July 2004); Law Council of Australia, Submission to Australian Law 
Reform Commission, Inquiry into Protecting Classified and Security Sensitive Information (12 September 2003); 
Law Council of Australia, Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, Shadow Report to 
Australia’s Common Core Document (29 August 2008).  
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role that sophisticated submission makers play in generating media attention on proposed laws, 
which is frequently triggered by the referral of the Bill to an inquiry-based committee. 
With these findings in mind, it is unsurprising that the inquiry-based committees dominate 
media references to committees in Table 6.3, as these are the committees that provide the forum 
for submission makers to publicly articulate their concerns about a proposed law. Inquiry-based 
committees also provide a forum for parliamentarians to directly question the proponents of a 
Bill, often adding an element of drama to the public hearing experience that is of interest to the 
media. The technical scrutiny committees are very rarely referred to in media commentary on 
the Bills; however, this does not mean that their analysis is completely absent from the public 
discourse. Table 6.3 suggests that public commentary on the case study Bills almost invariably 
included references to rights, and in particular the need to ‘balance’ competing rights or public 
interests or to ensure oversight and safeguards to protect rights. In many instances, broad 
reference was made to international human rights law principles or the principles applied by 
the SSCSB. This could suggest that the scrutiny criteria being applied by the technical scrutiny 
committees resonated to some degree within the public commentary on the Bills. However, it 
may also be explained by the fact that sophisticated submission makers regularly focus on 
rights issues, and the public commentary simply reflects their concerns. In either case, as 
Chapters 4 and 5 suggest, the provision of rights-related analysis of a Bill by the SSCSB and 
the PJCHR appears to assist submission makers to justify and articulate their concerns about a 
proposed law, which in turn appears to inform the rights-related discussions that occur within 
the inquiry-based committees and in the public commentary on the law. These different 
strengths and weaknesses between the inquiry-based and technical scrutiny committees are 
considered in detail in Chapter 8, and help inform the recommendations made in Part III of my 
research. 
E Influence of Formal Parliamentary Scrutiny on Post-Enactment Review of the 
Case Study Bills 
The final area of public impact considered in this chapter is the role parliamentary committees 
play in post-enactment review of the case study Acts. Looking for this form of public impact 
helps to identify whether parliamentary committees are having a longer-term impact on the 
content of the case study Acts. For example, the LCA Legislation Committee’s 
recommendations with respect to the Control Orders Bill relating to the proposed new sedition 
226 
offences featured prominently in the ALRC’s report Fighting Words: A Review of Sedition 
Laws in Australia,55 and then later in parliamentary debate on the National Security Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2010, which implemented a number of the ALRC’s recommended reforms.56  
Another example is the 2006 Sheller Review,57 which drew upon the work of the LCA 
Legislation Committee and the PJC on ASIO, ASIS and DSD in their inquiries into the SLAT 
Bills, the ASIO Bills and the Control Orders Bill. For example, in line with the 
recommendations made by these committees, the Sheller Review recommended that the 
process for proscribing a terrorist organisation be made more transparent by providing persons 
affected with notification and the right to be heard in opposition.58 It also recommended that 
the term ‘threat of action’ be removed from the definition of ‘terrorist act’,59 the advocating 
terrorism offence be narrowed,60 the offence of ‘associating with terrorist organisations’ be 
repealed,61 and consideration be given to the establishment of a Special Advocate and/or Public 
Interest Monitor. The Rudd Government later referred to the recommendations made by the 
Sheller Committee as the basis for a number of the provisions contained in the National 
Security Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Cth). 
The work of parliamentary committees also featured in the 2008 Haneef Report,62 with Mr 
Clarke echoing concerns raised about the relevant provisions of Part IC of the Crimes Act 1915 
                                                 
 
55 ALRC, Fighting Words: A review of sedition laws in Australia, Report No 104 (2006). As noted in Chapter 5, 
the key recommendations of the ALRC included that the term ‘sedition’ be removed from federal criminal law 
(Recommendations 1, 2 and 3) and that changes be made to the advocating terrorism and sedition offences 
introduced by the Control Orders Bill to ensure that there is a ‘bright line distinction’ between offending conduct 
and freedom of expression (Recommendation 9).  
56 LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (2005). 
The LCA Committee’s report on the Control Orders Bill also featured prominently in the following inquiries into 
counter-terrorism laws: Security Legislation Review Committee, Report of the Security Legislation Review 
Committee (2006) 6; COAG, Review of Counter Terrorism Legislation (2012); Bret Walker, Independent National 
Security Legislation Monitor: Annual Report 2011 (2011); PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Review of Security and 
Counter Terrorism Legislation (2006). 
57 Security Legislation Review Committee, Report of the Security Legislation Review Committee (2006) 6. 
58 Ibid Recommendation 3. 
59 Ibid Recommendation 7. 
60 Ibid Recommendation 9. 
61 Ibid Recommendation 15. 
62 Mark John Clarke, Report of the Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef, Volume One (2008). 
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(Cth) by the LCA Legislation Committee in its inquiry into the Anti-Terrorism Bill 2004.63 
The Haneef Report also recommended that consideration be given to the appointment of an 
Independent Reviewer of counter-terrorism laws.64 As discussed above, the government gave 
legislative effect to some of these recommendations in the National Security Legislation 
Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) and the INSLM Act 2010 (Cth). 
The 2012 COAG Review of Counter Terrorism Legislation65 also referred to past 
parliamentary committee scrutiny of the control order and preventative detention order 
regimes.66 The COAG Committee recommended 47 changes to a range of counter-terrorism 
provisions subject to the review, many of which reflected the recommendations previously 
made by parliamentary committees.67 Although the government only supported a handful of 
the COAG Committee recommendations, the recommendation for the introduction of a 
nationwide system of ‘Special Advocates’68 to participate in control order proceedings later 
found its way into the PJCIS’s report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill 
(No 1) 2014.69  
The above examples demonstrate that the scrutiny work undertaken by the four parliamentary 
committees studied had an influence on post-enactment reviews of counter-terrorism laws, 
which in turn were at least moderately effective at making rights-enhancing changes to the 
content of the case study Acts. This supports the finding made earlier in this chapter that 
parliamentary committees appear to play an important supportive role in the broader public 
                                                 
 
63 Ibid 242–3. 
64 Ibid Recommendation 4. 
65 COAG, Review of Counter Terrorism Legislation (2012). The legislation covered by the COAG Review 
included divs 101, 102, 104 and 105 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 6 of the Crimes (Foreign Incursions 
and Recruitment) Act 1978 (Cth) and ss 3C, 3D and Division 3A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) as well as a range 
of corresponding state and territory laws. 
66 Ibid. Eg 33 references were made to the work of the PJCIS, with much less frequent reference being made to 
the LCA Committees. Other independent post-enactment reviews were also discussed, including the Sheller 
Review.  
67 Ibid. For example, the COAG Committee recommended changes to clarify and narrow the scope of the 
definition of ‘advocates’ in the advocating terrorism offence in s 102.1(1A) of the Criminal Code 
(Recommendation 13). The LCA Committee (Recommendation 31) made a similar recommendation in its report 
on the Control Orders Bill. The COAG Committee also recommended the removal of strict liability elements in 
the terrorist organisation offences (Recommendation 18), similar to recommendations made by the LCA 
Committee in its report on the SLAT Bills (Recommendations 3 and 4). 
68 Ibid Recommendations 13. 
69 Ibid Recommendations 19–24.  
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debate on how to ‘strike the right balance’ when it comes to counter-terrorism laws. As noted 
above, the contribution each committee makes to the public debate on the case study Acts may 
not always be immediately apparent and depends on their particular strengths and 
characteristics. As discussed further below, I argue that capitalising on these different strengths 
of individual committees within the system, and encouraging multi-committee collaboration, 
is the key to improving the rights-protecting capacity of the parliamentary committee system. 
F Summary of Findings on Public Impact 
By looking at the influence of parliamentary committees on parliamentary debates, media 
commentary and post-enactment review it is possible to get a glimpse of the broader impact of 
the committee system on the case study Acts. The above analysis shows that, when the 
committee system provided genuine opportunities for public hearings to be conducted into the 
case study Acts, the public impact was considerable, particularly when sophisticated 
submission makers who had the capacity to generate media attention participated. This in turn 
provided strong incentives for parliamentarians to engage with rights issues and discuss 
committee inquiries when debating the relevant Bill. This is apparent in the LCA Committees’ 
and PJCIS’s inquiries into the most controversial case study Acts, such as the ASIO Bills, the 
Control Order Bill and the Citizenship Bill, but also in the context of less controversial Bills, 
such as the National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004.  
The above analysis also demonstrates that the public impact of committee work can occur many 
years after enactment, as evident in the reports and recommendations of the post-enactment 
review bodies discussed above. This suggests that committee recommendations for legislative 
amendment that were rejected or ‘slipped under the radar’ at the time of initial scrutiny can be 
revived by post-enactment review, providing the committee system with a second chance to 
influence the shape and operation of these laws.  
This chapter also considered whether the time allocated for parliamentary scrutiny of the case 
study Acts determined the quality of scrutiny undertaken. The results suggest that, while tabling 
committee reports prior to the conclusion of the second reading debate on a Bill is critical if a 
committee is to have an immediate influence on the content of the Bill, short time frames for 
scrutiny do not necessarily negate the potential for rights-enhancing legislative and public 
impacts. In particular, the examples discussed above suggest that large public inquiries can 
take place in short periods, which can in turn generate robust parliamentary debate and strong 
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media attention, and give rise to rights-enhancing legislative change. While this type of ‘fast 
and furious’ scrutiny could be particularly problematic for less well-resourced submission 
makers,70 it suggests that timing might not be everything when it comes to rights scrutiny of 
proposed laws.  
Finally, this chapter identifies that, when it comes to debating proposed counter-terrorism Bills 
in the Parliament and the media, there is a positive relationship between the work of the four 
parliamentary committees studied and the consideration of a particular range of rights and other 
scrutiny principles. While it may be too early to tell whether this collection of rights and 
scrutiny principles resonates across other subject areas, I argue that the development of this 
rights-scrutiny culture is a relevant factor to consider when identifying options to improve 
Australia’s parliamentary model of rights protection.  
. 
                                                 
 
70 See, eg, discussion in Chapter 4 about the challenges faced by less experienced organisations seeking to 
participate in parliamentary committee inquiries. See also Interview with Lydia Shelly, Muslim Legal Network 
(telephone, 2 June 2016). 
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CHAPTER 7: HIDDEN IMPACT  
A Why Look for Hidden or Behind-the-Scenes Impact of Parliamentary 
Committees? 
Chapter 7 of this thesis sets out evidence of the hidden or behind-the-scenes impact of the four 
parliamentary committees on the case study Acts. As noted in Chapter 2, ‘hidden impact’ 
means the role a parliamentary committee, or the system of committees, plays in the pre-
introduction development of a Bill. This type of impact is described as ‘hidden’ as it often 
occurs prior to a Bill being introduced into Parliament and concerns the activities of public 
servants and parliamentary counsel, outside of the public gaze.  
Evidence of hidden impact can take the form of publicly available materials published by the 
government and its departments to guide policy development and ensure consistency in 
legislative drafting. This provides an insight into the extent to which public servants are 
required or encouraged to have regard to the work of parliamentary committees when 
undertaking their work. However, documentary evidence alone is unlikely to provide a clear 
sense of whether public servants are actually having regard to the work of parliamentary 
committees. This requires a more subjective analysis. In my research this was achieved by 
interviewing key participants in the law-making process.1  
Looking for hidden impact is particularly relevant when considering the parliamentary 
committee system’s contribution to rights protection in Australia. This is because, for many 
commentators, the best opportunity to effect rights-enhancing change within an exclusively 
parliamentary model of rights protection is at the pre-introduction stage.2 As noted in Chapter 
1, once a Bill has been introduced into Parliament, the proponent Minister has made a public 
                                                 
 
1 As noted in Chapter 2, as part of this research, I interviewed public servants who were directly responsible for 
developing or drafting the case study Bills, including those from the AGD, Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection (DIBP), AFP and OPC. I also conducted interviews with current and past parliamentarians and 
parliamentary staff. Although not statistically representative, these interviews provide a useful insight into the 
role parliamentary committees play in the development of proposed laws from the perspective of a broad range 
of players in the legislative development and drafting process. Further information about the interviews is set out 
in Appendix A. 
2 See, eg, Janet Hiebert, ‘Parliamentary Engagement with the Charter’ (2012) 58 Supreme Court Law Review 87. 
See also discussion in Chapter 1. 
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political commitment to its policy objectives that can be very hard to shift even in the face of 
compelling arguments about the Bill’s negative rights consequences.3 Conversely, a proposed 
Bill can be adjusted to lessen the potential rights impact or to improve rights protection at the 
pre-introduction stage with far less political risk for the proponent. Pursuant to this approach, 
the people best able to achieve this rights-enhancing change are those working behind the 
scenes such as public servants or parliamentary counsel, rather than those involved in the post-
introduction public debate on the Bill, who are necessarily curtailed by the political realities of 
the day. This behind-the-scenes rights-enhancing change is sometimes described as a ‘culture 
of rights compliance’ and is seen by some as a key component of successful rights protection.4 
The hidden impact of the parliamentary committees also has important implications for the 
tension described in Chapter 4 relating to the legitimacy attributed to different types of 
parliamentary committees. For example, my research finds that an inquiry-based parliamentary 
committee that attracts a high rate of participation will be in the minds of those responsible for 
developing and implementing legislation, and prudent proponents of Bills will adopt strategies 
to anticipate or avoid public criticism by such committees. In this way, the inquiry-based 
committees may have a strong ‘hidden impact’ on the development of laws. My research also 
shows that the ‘technical scrutiny’ committees, and in particular the SSCSB, may also generate 
a strong hidden impact – not because of their capacity to generate public interest, but rather 
because the scrutiny criteria the SSCSB applies is entrenched in the practices of public servants 
and parliamentary counsel. In other words, the SSCSB commands political authority among 
this category of key participants precisely because it is seen to be removed from the political 
discourse on the Bill.  
Understanding these different forms of ‘hidden impact’ helps uncover new opportunities to 
improve the rights-protecting capacity of the committee system, in addition to exposing some 
                                                 
 
3 See, eg, Janet Hiebert, ‘Legislative Rights Review: Addressing the Gap between Ideals and Constraints’ in 
Murray Hunt et al (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart Publishing 
2015) 39, 52; David Monk, ‘A Framework for Evaluating the Performance of Committees in Westminster 
Parliaments’ (2010) 16 Journal of Legislative Studies 1, 7; David Feldman, ‘Democracy, Law and Human Rights: 
Politics as Challenge and Opportunity’ in Murray Hunt et al (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing 
the Democratic Deficit (Hart Publishing 2015) 95, 108. 
4 See, eg, Julie Debeljak, ‘Does Australia Need a Bill of Rights?’ in Paula Gerber and Melissa Castan (eds), 
Contemporary Perspectives on Human Rights in Australia (Lawbook Co, 2013) 37, 59; Simon Evans and Carolyn 
Evans, ‘Australian Parliaments and the Protection of Human Rights’ (Paper presented in the Department of the 
Senate Occasional Lecture Series, Parliament House, Canberra, 8 December 2006). 
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of the system’s key challenges and weaknesses. In particular, as discussed further in Part III, 
the findings in this chapter warn against reforms that radically alter the features of the 
committee system that currently resonate strongly with those responsible for developing and 
drafting proposed laws. For this reason, I argue that, instead of relying on one particular 
committee, such as the PJCHR, to generate a culture of rights compliance among law makers 
at the federal level, it may be more useful to consider how the system of parliamentary 
committees could be adjusted or changed to encourage rights considerations at the pre-
introduction stage.  
B Documentary Evidence 
As noted above, the behind-the-scenes impact of parliamentary committees is evident from 
explicit references to parliamentary committees or their scrutiny criteria in guidance and other 
materials prepared for those public servants directly engaged in developing and drafting 
proposed laws. For example, the Legislation Handbook5 provides a summary of the legislative 
process, beginning from submitting a legislative proposal for consideration and ending with 
passage through Parliament, and is an authoritative source of guidance for public servants. The 
Legislation Handbook also contains a number of explicit references to the work of 
parliamentary committees and the scrutiny criteria they apply. For example, it explicitly refers 
to parliamentary committees when describing the consultation required when developing 
legislation6 and when highlighting specific matters for consideration, such as whether the 
proposed Bill includes changes to criminal law principles7 or departures from Australia’s 
international human rights obligations.8 The sections of the Legislation Handbook relating to 
the preparation of Explanatory Memoranda and SoCs also include references to parliamentary 
committees,9 as do the sections describing a Bill’s journey through Parliament. For example, 
                                                 
 
5 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Legislation Handbook (February 2017) 
<https://www.dpmc.gov.au/resource-centre/government/legislation-handbook>. 
6 Ibid 1. 
7 Ibid 29. 
8 Ibid 31. 
9 Ibid 43–4. For example, the Legislation Handbook provides that officers involved in preparing Explanatory 
Memoranda should be aware of the SSBSC’s scrutiny mandate and ensure that ‘(a) the policy and legislative 
background are explained so that the reason and intent of a bill/provision or amendments are clear; and (b) 
examples of the intended effect of a clause or the problem it is intended to overcome are provided wherever 
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the Legislation Handbook warns that, if a Bill is referred to a committee, ‘departments will 
need to be available to provide background briefing and factual information to the minister or 
the committee. This could include advice on any possible amendments to the bill and to 
progress preparation of amendments when required.’10  
The SSCSB and the PJCHR feature particularly prominently in the Legislation Handbook, and 
the scrutiny criteria applied by the SSCSB, and to a lesser extent the PJCHR, are often pointed 
to as a useful checklist for public servants when developing proposed legislation.11 For 
example, during the 2012 inquiry into the future direction of the SSCSB, the then Clerk of the 
Senate observed: 
[T]he committee’s most effective work has been in influencing approaches to, and standards 
in, the drafting of legislation and the provision of supporting documentation (such as, 
explanatory memoranda). Although some of the committee’s work in this area might be 
characterised as formulaic, there is a risk that, if the committee stepped away from this work, 
it would not take long for drafting standards to reflect the absence of a watch dog.12  
The strong influence of the SSCSB on the development and drafting of legislation is also 
evident from the Drafting Directions published on the Office of Parliamentary Counsel’s 
(OPC’s) website. These Drafting Directions are used regularly by the OPC to assist 
departmental staff to prepare clear drafting instructions for proposed laws. A handful of these 
directions are particularly relevant for those providing instructions with respect to counter-
terrorism laws, and each of these Drafting Directions explicitly refer to the work of the SSCSB 
and occasionally the PJCHR, and/or discuss key components of the scrutiny criteria applied by 
                                                 
 
possible’ among other matters. The handbook also summarises some common issues of concern arising from the 
PJCHR’s consideration of SOCs. 
10 Ibid 65, 72, 77. For example, the Legislation Handbook explains that parliamentary committees ‘may hold 
public or private hearings to take evidence and seek information from ministers and their departments’ and that 
‘departments will need to be available to provide background briefing and factual information to the minister or 
the committee’. It also provides that, ‘if a bill has been referred to a committee, it will not be programmed for 
Senate debate util the committee has reported’. The handbook also describes what is likely to be the Minister’s 
response to a parliamentary committee’s concerns or requests for information. For example, it explains that a 
Minister may respond to the PJCHR by ‘(a) proposing government amendments to legislation; or (b) writing to 
the Committee explaining why the bill is in the form it is’. It also describes the SSCSB Alert Digest process and 
the need for departments to be available to assist the Minister in responding to SSCSB requests for information.  
11 SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the future direction and role of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee 
(2012) [2.30]. 
12 Ibid [2.31]. 
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these committees.13 In many cases, these directions are intended to operate as a prompt for the 
instructing departmental officer either to obtain specific legal advice about the particular 
provision that engages the scrutiny criteria, or to consider alternative policy options that would 
avoid engaging the criteria in such a way. For example: 
 Drafting Direction 3.1 includes a requirement to consider whether the proposed Bill 
may infringe upon or engage the implied freedom of political communication.14 This 
encourages careful consideration of both constitutional compliance, but also rights 
principles including freedom of speech. 
 Drafting Direction 3.5 encourages instructors to have regard to the Guide to Framing 
Commonwealth Offences, Infringement Notices and Enforcement Powers (the Guide to 
Commonwealth Offences) when proposing legislation that includes criminal offences.15 
This encourages consideration of the range of rights issues previously considered by 
the SSCSB, such as burden and onus of proof, extended liability offences, coercive 
powers, and clear drafting of the elements of a criminal offence.16  
 Direction 4.2 sets out the circumstances in which the OPC will refer a draft Bill to a 
department other than the instructing department for advice or comment. These include 
the requirement that a draft Bill be referred to the Office for International Law (OIL) if 
it proposes to, or may, engage or infringe Australia’s international obligations, 
                                                 
 
13 Office of Parliamentary Counsel, Commonwealth Government, Drafting Direction No 3.1 (January 2017); 
Office of Parliamentary Counsel, Commonwealth Government, Drafting Direction No 3.5 (31 February 2013); 
Office of Parliamentary Counsel, Commonwealth Government, Drafting Direction No 3.9 (June 2013); Office of 
Parliamentary Counsel, Commonwealth Government, Drafting Direction No 4.2 (August 2016); Office of 
Parliamentary Counsel, Commonwealth Government, Drafting Direction No 4.5 (2 February 2015).  
14 Office of Parliamentary Counsel, Commonwealth Government, Drafting Direction No 3.1 (January 2017) 6–7. 
15 Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Government, Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, 
Infringement Notices and Enforcement Powers (September 2001) 
<https://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Pages/GuidetoFramingCommonwealthOffencesInfringementNoticesandE
nforcementPowers.aspx>.. While the direction notes that the Guide to Commonwealth Offences is not binding, it 
encourages the proponent department to refer the relevant provisions to the AGD Criminal Justice Division if the 
Bill contains novel or complex issues or departs significantly from ‘fundamental criminal law principles’. Office 
of Parliamentary Counsel, Commonwealth Government, Drafting Direction No 3.5 (31 February 2013). 
16 Office of Parliamentary Counsel, Commonwealth Government, Drafting Direction No 3.5 (31 February 2013) 
5.  
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including the human rights obligations contained in the treaties that comprise the 
PJCHR mandate.17  
The above examples, which are emulated in other public servant guidance materials, suggest 
that the technical scrutiny committees have an important behind-the-scenes impact on the key 
actors in the development of legislation.18 The Drafting Directions also demonstrate the 
‘gatekeeper’ role played by the OPC when it comes to ensuring that instructing departments 
seek specialist advice if they intend to pursue policy options that infringe upon the scrutiny 
criteria applied by these committees. As discussed below, this gatekeeper role is further 
confirmed by interviews conducted with OPC staff and public servants. 
C Interview Material 
Interviews conducted with those involved in the development of the case study Acts confirm 
that parliamentary committees can have a rights-enhancing impact on the content of proposed 
laws and contribute to the ‘culture of rights compliance’ within the federal public service. 
However, the interviews also help elucidate the limits of parliamentary committees as a form 
of pre-introduction rights protection. In particular, the interviews highlight that, at key stages 
of the policy development process, the rights-enhancing impact of committees may hinge on 
the value attributed to parliamentary scrutiny by the proponent Minister or his or her Cabinet 
colleagues.  
This section of Chapter 7 summarises what the interviews reveal about the pre-introduction 
impact of parliamentary committees.. These interviews also help illustrate the tension between 
the deliberative and authoritative roles of parliamentary committees discussed above. The 
interviews suggest, for example, that the inquiry-based, deliberative committees with strong 
legislative and public impact, such as the PJCIS, are at the forefront of the minds of those 
involved in the development of the case study Bills. The interviews also confirm that the 
technical scrutiny committees, and in particular the SSCSB, command authority and respect 
among those tasked with drafting proposed new laws. As discussed further in Chapter 8, this 
                                                 
 
17 Office of Parliamentary Counsel, Commonwealth Government, Drafting Direction No 4.2 (August 2016). 
18 See, eg, Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Government, Guide to Framing Commonwealth 
Offences, Infringement Notices and Enforcement Powers (September 2001). 
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again highlights the benefit of considering the different strengths and weaknesses of particular 
committees in the system when developing reform options to improve rights protection at the 
federal level. This is discussed in further detail below and in Part III. 
1 The ‘Technical Scrutiny’ Committees 
Interviews with senior officers from the OPC confirm the influential role of the SSCSB when 
it comes to drafting proposed laws and liaising with instructing departments.19 In addition, the 
fact that many of the SSCSB’s common concerns are articulated in the Guide to 
Commonwealth Offences makes reference to the work of the SSCSB a particularly efficient 
way for OPC staff to alert instructing departments to potential concerns about proposed 
counter-terrorism legislation.20 The OPC officers also explained that the SSCSB criteria reflect 
‘best practice’ standards when it comes to the development of policy and legislation,21 and 
provide a strong indication of how key terms within a proposed Bill may be later interpreted 
by the courts: 
Well I think at the end of the day, a lot of the principles that are looked at by Senate Scrutiny 
of Bills Committee are around the principles of legality, … and so that sort of infiltrates all 
aspects of public life when you are talking about legislating for what citizens can and can’t 
do. … 
And those things are at the forefront of our minds when we are drafting for example. So if you 
want to interfere with fundamental rights, you need to be express and clear about that, and if 
                                                 
 
19 For example, First Parliamentary Counsel Mr Quiggin explained that the OPC has a database of SSCSB reports 
that assist parliamentary counsel to keep on top of relevant issues with respect to Bills that they may be drafting. 
Interview with Peter Quiggin, First Parliamentary Counsel, Office of Parliamentary Counsel (Adelaide, 3 August 
2016). 
20 Interview with Meredith Leigh and Naomi Carde, Office of Parliamentary Counsel (Canberra, 24 May 2016). 
The officers said: ‘A lot of the concerns that the Scrutiny of Bills Committee might coincide with what might be 
in Commonwealth legal policy in relation to a particular matter, for example in the Guide to Framing Criminal 
Offences’. Department officers responsible for developing new criminal offences also indicated that the 
integration of the SSCSB’s criteria into the Guide to Commonwealth Offences is significant. For example, an 
AGD official said: ‘[T]hose principles do shape the way you think about constructing offences, … I would say as 
a public servant that some of those principles speak to me in terms of what is fair and reasonable as well as being 
things that formally a committee will be looking for. It will certainly influence the way I would write Explanatory 
Memoranda, absolutely.’ Interview with Official A, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
21 The OPC officers explained the type of assistance they are able to provide to instructors when it comes to 
anticipating formal parliamentary scrutiny, emphasising the need to draw a clear line between providing examples 
of best practice (which is appropriate) and providing policy advice (which is not parliamentary counsel’s role): 
Interview with Meredith Leigh and Naomi Carde, Office of Parliamentary Counsel (Canberra, 24 May 2016). 
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you are not, you run the risk of the court reading down what you are trying to do. And we do 
have those discussions with instructors.22 
The OPC officers also confirmed that the technical scrutiny committees, rather than the 
inquiry-based committees, have the strongest influence on their work.23 This confirms the 
findings in Chapter 4 relating to the particular strengths the SSCSB holds among this category 
of key participants arising from its deliberate refusal to engage in policy matters when 
scrutinising a Bill. Like the SSCSB, the OPC also refuses to provide advice on policy matters, 
and sees its role as providing ‘technical’ advice.24 
According to the interview material, the SSCSB’s ‘clear’ and ‘consistently applied’ scrutiny 
criteria also gives it a distinct advantage over the newer and broader-mandated PJCHR when 
it comes to ease of integration into drafting and policy development practice.25 For example, 
an AGD official explained: 
The principles [applied by the SSCSB] are very specific … it’s very clear what choice is the 
better one to make. And then if you feel in the circumstances there are a series of reasons why 
you need to make the choice that could contravene or raise concerns with a principle, you 
should have a set of reasons and be able to clearly articulate what they are and how you’ve 
weighed it up.26 
In a similar vein, former PJCHR Legal Advisor Professor Simon Rice observed: 
One of the advantages that the [SSCSB and the SSCRO] have is they’re scrutinising against a 
limited, well defined and well understood range of criteria, that by and large conservative 
politicians will accept as indicators of good government. So there is nothing political really in 
what they are doing. … 
                                                 
 
22 Interview with Meredith Leigh and Naomi Carde, Office of Parliamentary Counsel (Canberra, 24 May 2016). 
23 Ibid. The officers said: ‘I think the two committees, the Scrutiny of Bills and the SSCRO, we really focus on. 
PJCHR we focus on at a broad level, and the remaining committees are relevant when they directly comment on 
the Bill.’ 
24 Ibid. 
25 Interview with Maureen Weeks, Deputy Clerk of the Senate (Canberra, 23 May 2016); Interview with A 
(Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
26 Interview with Official A, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
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So when the [SSCSB] says there’s a problem here with the right of review, that’s probably the 
nearest they get to a policy contest. … [B]y and large, what they are doing is helping the 
government shape their legislation in a good governance kind of way.27 
For public servants who are directly engaged in policy and legislation development, the well-
entrenched nature of the SSCSB’s scrutiny criteria contrasts with the more nebulous mandate 
of the PJCHR, which has proved challenging for some public servants to integrate into their 
policy practice. For example, the interview material highlights the distinct lack of familiarity 
with international human rights law concepts among public servants responsible for developing 
legislation prior to the introduction of the PJCHR, particularly among those outside of the 
AGD.28 Even after the introduction of the PJCHR and the requirement to prepare SoCs for 
every Bill, many public servants have yet to familiarise themselves with these concepts.29 This 
has resulted in a significant divergence in the levels of engagement with human rights issues 
across the public service and in the quality of SOCs prepared.30 This was also reflected in the 
interview material; for example, one interviewee said: 
[E]ven fairly recently, anecdotally you hear that departments are getting correspondence from 
the Human Rights Committee and they just don’t understand what it is. They certainly know 
what they’re getting when they get a scrutiny of Bills letter, but even as recently as in the last 
                                                 
 
27 Interview with Simon Rice, former Legal Advisor to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(Sydney, 24 May 2016). 
28 See, eg, Interview with Simon Rice, former Legal Advisor to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights (Sydney, 24 May 2016); Interview with Simon Henderson, Law Council of Australia (Canberra, 23 May 
2016); Interview with Nicola McGarrity, Gilbert & Tobin Centre for Public Law (Sydney, 31 May 2016); 
Interview with Cameron Gifford, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
29 For an overview of the impact of the reforms on the public service see Greg Manning, ‘The Human Rights 
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act’ (speech delivered at APS Human Rights Network, Canberra, 2 December 2015). 
At the time of the introduction of the requirement to prepare SoCs, funding was provided across the public service 
to support public servants from across departments to fulfil this requirement. The AGD delivered training on SoCs 
to over 600 policy and legislation officers across the public service. However in the 2014 Federal Budget funding 
for the Commonwealth Human Rights Education Program was cut by the Abbott Government, and many of the 
initiatives outlined in the Australian Human Rights Framework were no longer actively pursued. As a result, not 
all public servants have had access to specific human rights training. For further information see Australian 
Government, Budget measures: Budget Paper No 2: 2010–11: Attorney-General’s Portfolio (2010) 94; Attorney-
General’s Department, Annual Report 2012 (2013) ch 4 About the Department; Australian Government, Budget 
measures: Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements 2014–15: Attorney-General’s Portfolio (2014) 29; 
Australian Lawyers Alliance, ‘Budget Overview: Cuts to Justice and Human Rights’ (Media Release, 15 May 
2014) <https://www.lawyersalliance.com.au/opinion/budget-overview-cuts-to-justice-and-human-rights>. 
30 PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, Annual Report 2012–13 (2013) 10–12. 
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couple of years, [there have been] stories about departments still struggling to work out what 
is this all about.31 
This point was also expressed by former PJCHR Legal Advisor Professor Simon Rice, who 
pointed to the important leadership role played by the proponent Minister when it comes to 
ensuring human rights compliance is taken seriously at the pre-introduction phase. Professor 
Rice said: 
If the Minister says to the department ‘give me a human rights compatible piece of legislation’ 
they will. If a Minister doesn’t care or bother, then you need a department to come up with it. 
And sometimes the Minister won’t care and sometimes they’ll say ‘what’s this crap?’ So I 
actually think the message coming down [is very important]. It’s the Minister who has to table 
[the statement]. It’s the Minister who has to give the speech. It’s the Minister who gets the 
correspondence from the committee. If they don’t care, why should the departments bother?32 
Despite these significant challenges, and broad variations in knowledge and experience across 
departments, those working directly to improve the quality of SoCs share some optimism about 
the potential for this mechanism to have a meaningful impact on the development of counter-
terrorism laws. For example, some policy officers who were responsible for preparing SoCs 
for the case study Acts suggest that, at least within their divisions, a range of formal and 
informal processes are in place to help ensure that high-quality SoCs are produced. This 
includes: formal and ‘on the job’ training on the preparation of SoCs;33 the practice of obtaining 
advice early from OIL on the content of department-drafted SoCs;34 genuine engagement with 
the PJCHR on the quality of SoCs; and an informal ‘lessons learnt’ process.35 This appears to 
be translating into a greater human rights awareness at least among some senior AGD officers, 
and those responsible for developing counter-terrorism laws. As AGD National Security 
Branch officer Mr Gifford said: 
                                                 
 
31 Interview with B (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
32 Interview with Simon Rice, former Legal Advisor to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(Sydney, 24 May 2016). 
33 Interview with Cameron Gifford, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
34 Eg, Interview with Official B, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 30 May 2016). 
35 Interview with Cameron Gifford, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
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My earlier [policy roles] would probably have had less of a sharper focus on human rights and 
international obligations and that’s probably to some extent the result of the creation of the 
human rights compatibility statements, but also, you can now see that the committees 
themselves are having those considerations in a sharper focus than they used to have as well.36  
In its 2013–14 annual report, the PJCHR also reported that ‘[t]he quality of statements of 
compatibility continued to improve’37 and that, in many cases, SoCs ‘provided sufficient 
information on proposed measures limiting human rights for the committee to conclude its 
examination without requesting further information from the legislation proponent’.38 
However, the PJCHR also observed that: 
[A] significant number of bills and legislative instruments during the reporting period failed 
to provide sufficient information or supporting evidence to justify potential limitations of 
human rights. … In particular, the committee noted that proponents of legislation often 
claimed that measures engaging human rights were ‘reasonable, necessary and proportionate’ 
without providing any supporting analysis or empirical evidence. … 
In a number of cases, the committee noted that additional information provided by the 
legislation proponent addressed the committee’s concerns, but should have been included in 
the statement of compatibility for the bill or instrument in the first instance.39 
The material above suggests that the requirement to issue SoCs is beginning to have a rights-
enhancing impact on the development of legislation, although there remain significant concerns 
about the veracity of this process when policy is ‘Minister driven’ and SoCs are ‘retro-fitted’ 
to already finalised legislation. The interviews also suggest that, taking into account the low 
base of human-rights literacy among the public service prior to the introduction of the PJCHR, 
there now appear to be some foundations (at least within the AGD) upon which to improve the 
capacity of the public service to engage with rights in a meaningful way.  
The implications of these findings for improving the rights-protecting capacity of the 
parliamentary committee system are discussed further in Part III, where recommendations are 
                                                 
 
36 Ibid. 
37 PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, Annual Report 2013–14 (3 May 2016) [3.30]. 
38 Ibid [3.31]. 
39 Ibid [3.32]–[3.34]. 
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made to build upon the particular strengths of the SSCSB when it comes to influencing the pre-
introduction development of legislation. Changes are also proposed to the processes of the 
PJCHR to capitalise on its modest but improving capacity to guide legislative drafters and 
policy makers. 
2 The ‘Inquiry-Based’ Committees  
The interviews I conducted for this research, combined with the material discussed in Chapter 
6, suggest that the inquiry-based committees, such as the PJCIS and LCA Committees, can also 
have a pre-introduction impact on the development of proposed counter-terrorism laws. This 
most commonly takes two forms: as an impetus for the legislative proposal itself or as part of 
the risk assessment process that policy officers undertake in anticipation of future 
parliamentary scrutiny. Those responsible for developing proposed counter-terrorism laws 
confirmed that, while often the impetus for these laws is operational or Minister driven,40 past 
parliamentary committee recommendations regularly feature as a source of particular 
provisions.41 For example, AGD National Security Branch officer Mr Gifford said:  
[F]or instance, if we’re taking something forward like we did with the Foreign Fighters Act, 
that was very much a theme about how to address that particular challenge and we did draw 
together a range of recommendations that had been around for quite some time to address that 
issue. So it’s not necessarily that you’re always developing new laws in relation to a policy 
gap, but sometimes there’s something that’s already sitting in the background where you go, 
actually this is the right response, for this particular challenge, at this particular time.42 
The AGD officers interviewed also emphasised the important role policy staff play in ensuring 
the legislative response to an identified operational need is balanced, and has regard to any 
relevant previous parliamentary reviews or inquiries. For example, some officers interviewed 
                                                 
 
40 Interview with Cameron Gifford, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). See also, Interview 
with Official B, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 30 May 2016).  
41 For example, an AGD official said: ‘Sometimes it might be something more in the nature of a review whether 
that’s a department-initiated review or a government-initiated review or a statutory review, so there’s quite a 
number of reviews that have been pre-programmed into legislation, so when powers have been enacted, it’s been 
said that they’d be reviewed at a later time.’ Interview with Official B, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 
30 May 2016). 
42 Interview with Cameron Gifford, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
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explained that often the policy officer works as a ‘translator’43 between the operational staff 
(such as police or intelligence officers) and the Parliament. In this role, the policy officer is 
regularly engaged in seeking detailed information from operational staff about why they need 
a particular power or new offence provision. The policy officer may also be involved in 
developing safeguards that limit the use of the new power or scope of the new offence, in order 
to develop a legislative proposal that is more likely to withstand public and parliamentary 
scrutiny.44 For example, an AGD official explained that past parliamentary inquiries and 
recommendations influence: 
the conversations that we in this department might have with agencies about well, what’s the 
operational justification, how far do we need to go, we need to have some accountability here. 
[We often say] ‘Yes we know that in practice you are above board and behave appropriately 
but the public and senate committees will be looking for more than just your word that you do 
things properly, some mechanisms for assuring the, for assurance about that’. So it definitely 
shapes the conversations in developing those provisions.45 
Those working on policy development of counter-terrorism laws also said that the anticipation 
of future inquiry-based parliamentary scrutiny can sharpen their focus on developing a strong 
evidence base for the policy goals of the law and help identify the safeguards or oversight 
mechanisms that might be needed to guard against unfair or unjustified intrusion on the rights 
of particular groups in the community. For example, Tony Alderman, Manager of Government 
and Communications, AFP, said: 
In the AFP’s view, parliamentary committees and their processes are very useful and very 
valuable. They provide an opportunity for the AFP to outline a case for necessity, provide an 
operational context, clarifying the extensive existing oversight mechanisms applying to the 
                                                 
 
43 Mr Alderman said: ‘The [AFP] Policy Unit operates as a translator for operational need into policy or legislative 
outcomes. The Policy Unit works as a team with the operational staff of the AFP to develop and deliver policy 
and legislative outcomes.’ Interview with Tony Alderman, Australian Federal Police (telephone, 6 June 2016). 
44 For example, AGD Official A noted: ‘[I]n many cases, … I think that [it is] knowledge of scrutiny to come, 
which influences the behaviour of government and public servants at an earlier stage in the process.’ Interview 
with Official A, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
45 Ibid. 
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AFP, and demonstrate the range of transparency and accountability measures and point to any 
safeguards.46 
For these policy officers, their approach was less about avoiding questions from a committee 
inquiry, and more about the need to ensure that, when developing legislation in response to 
operational need, consideration is given to the types of issues parliamentary committees are 
likely to focus on in any future scrutiny of the proposed Bill. As Mr Gifford said: 
It’s not so much what’s going to come through the PJCIS, we always try and put forward a 
piece of legislation which is the most balanced legislation as well as meeting the operational 
need, but also, only engaging rights to the extent that it is absolutely necessary.47 
The interviews also suggest that there is a practice of reflection on past parliamentary 
committee inquiries when AGD officers are engaged in the early stages of development of a 
Bill that proposes changes to existing counter-terrorism laws. As an AGD official explained: 
It would be remiss of us not to consider previous committee observations. And that’s even 
where the composition of a committee has changed, because it is part of a process through 
which previous amendments have been considered. Even if that committee has changed, even 
if the government has changed, it’s illustrative of the views and questions we might get. So 
even if it doesn’t affect the policy direction, it certainly affects how we consider the issues and 
present that advice to government and then how we might engage with our stakeholders.48 
Similarly, Mr Alderman explained that the AFP policy team will ‘regularly look to see what 
parliamentary committees have said in the past’ and consider whether the AFP should explain 
the need for the reform to the public.49 Mr Alderman explained that ‘[o]ften the AFP can 
provide a clear public statement of why the reform is needed, how it would benefit from the 
passage of the law, what the risks are in terms of not passing the law’.50 
The interview material also suggests that AGD officers take seriously the process of appearing 
as a witness at a parliamentary inquiry into a Bill and this usually involves the policy 
                                                 
 
46 Interview with Tony Alderman, Australian Federal Police (telephone, 6 June 2016). 
47 Interview with Cameron Gifford, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
48 Interview with Official B, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 30 May 2016). 
49 Interview with Tony Alderman, Australian Federal Police (telephone, 6 June 2016). 
50 Ibid. 
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development team as well as support from senior operational officers.51 For counter-terrorism 
Bills, Mr Gifford said that the AGD tend to present a ‘portfolio appearance’ including AFP, 
and ASIO depending on the nature of the reforms.52 Mr Gifford also said: 
We appear then as a witness, and it can take a few hours, it can take a lot longer. More often 
than not these days we end up going back once or twice. Particularly with the PJCIS, they’re 
pretty keen for us to … make sure that we’ve examined all the issues that are raised either by 
the submissions or in oral evidence, where we can come back and provide some additional 
information in relation to that. Sometimes that means actually coming back a second time to 
appear as a witness again.53 
Once a committee has made recommendations for changes with respect to a Bill, the 
responsible department, as well as any government agencies affected, will be required to reflect 
on the implications of the proposed change and advise the proponent Minister. Drafting 
instructions will then be provided to the OPC if the Minister intends to implement changes 
recommended by parliamentary committees by way of amendment to the Bill. This process can 
be assisted by prior anticipation of scrutiny by OPC staff and their instructors, particularly in 
the context of ‘controversial Bills’ such as those relating to national security, where committee 
consideration of the detailed provisions of a Bill regularly result in rights-enhancing (rather 
than rights-limiting) change. As Mr Gifford explained: 
There’s usually not huge surprises and that is mostly because we’ve hopefully done a very 
good job in terms of actually looking at the issues being raised before the committee, so we’re 
aware of the likely direction the committee potentially may go. It’s still very challenging in 
terms of the time frames that are attached to these things. So you know, the PJCIS inquiry into 
[the Foreign Fighters Bill], I think happened over the course of a month, which for such a large 
reform exercise that was quite challenging. It becomes very challenging in terms of the speed 
at which you need to think and respond to the issues as they are raised, but also the speed at 
which you’re able to implement them. So again, when you get to the government amendment 
                                                 
 
51 Interview with Official B, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 30 May 2016). 
52 Interview with Cameron Gifford, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
53 Ibid. Mr Gifford also noted that it is common for the department to provide further supplementary submissions 
to the inquiry-based committees. These submissions regularly respond in detail to the issues raised by other 
submission makers or witnesses. 
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stage, … parliamentary counsel do the most tremendous job of being able to turn those 
[recommendations] into provisions very very quickly.54 
This suggests that the inquiry-based committees provide an important behind-the-scenes 
opportunity for senior public servants to provide direct advice to proponent Ministers on the 
risks and benefits of adopting particular legislative provisions in light of past or present 
committee recommendations. This can provide an ‘extra’ opportunity for such officers to draw 
attention to those features of the original Bill that have unjustified impacts on rights, or that 
fail to ‘strike the right balance’ between operational need and rights protection.  
D Summary of Findings on Hidden Impact 
This chapter has presented evidence of the hidden impact parliamentary committees can have 
on the development of proposed laws. For example, the documentary evidence suggests that 
the work of the SSCSB, and to a lesser extent the PJCHR, features regularly in the materials 
relied upon by public servants responsible for developing and drafting counter-terrorism 
legislation. Some of these documents, in particular the Legislation Handbook, Drafting 
Directions and Guide to Commonwealth Offences, translate the abstract principles 
underpinning the SSCSB and PJCHR mandates into practical checklists to be applied during 
particular stages of the legislation development process. In this way, these documents may help 
create a ‘culture of rights compliance’ within the public service. Over time, they also give rise 
to the shared view that the scrutiny criteria applied by the SSCSB (and to a lesser extent the 
PJCHR) reflect ‘best practice’ when it comes to developing laws. The interview material also 
suggests that the requirement to introduce all Bills with SoCs has, at the very least, required 
policy officers to turn their minds to the human rights implications of the legislation they are 
developing, even if the quality of engagement with human rights concepts varies significantly 
across departments and ministerial portfolios. The interview material further suggests that the 
prospect of a public inquiry can sharpen policy officers’ focus on the right implications of 
proposed new provisions and encourage them to develop safeguards or other rights-protecting 
mechanisms when seeking to translate operational need into legislative form. 
                                                 
 
54 Interview with Cameron Gifford, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
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While these findings are compelling, it is important to note that, despite the significant hidden 
impact of the parliamentary committees studied, I do not argue that committee scrutiny 
provides a sufficient form of rights protection when it comes to counter-terrorism laws. As 
discussed earlier, I recognise that the content of the enacted case study Acts departs in 
significant ways from human rights standards.55 The interview material also reveals that the 
rights-enhancing hidden impact of parliamentary committees remains vulnerable to a number 
of dynamic factors. These include: 
 the degree of respect with which the proponent Minister holds the particular 
parliamentary committee (where this is very low, public servants are unlikely to 
prioritise the preparation of robust policy advice to anticipate or address the 
committee’s concerns); 
 the degree to which the policy officers are able to present alternative policy and 
legislative options to the Minister for consideration (where a Bill is led exclusively from 
the Minister’s office, the scope for public servants to reflect upon or anticipate 
parliamentary scrutiny is likely to be very narrow); and 
 the expertise and experience of the policy officers and parliamentary counsel involved 
in the development and drafting of the Bill (where awareness of the scrutiny criteria 
applied by the SSCSB and the PJCHR is very low, the capacity to reflect upon or 
anticipate parliamentary scrutiny is also low). 
As discussed in Part III, these factors point to significant limitations when it comes to 
parliamentary committees and the generation of a sufficiently strong rights-scrutiny culture at 
the federal level. However, despite these important considerations, the material set out in 
Chapter 7 supports the general theme of my research: that the rights-enhancing nature of the 
parliamentary committee system is most strongly felt when committees work together to 
influence the development and content of a proposed law. In particular, the above material 
                                                 
 
55 For examples of articles documenting the rights-infringing content of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws see 
George Williams, ‘The Legal Assault on Australian Democracy: the Annual Blackburn Lecture’ (2015) 18 Ethos 
236; George Williams, ‘A Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws’ (2011) 35(3) Melbourne University Law 
Review 1136; Gabrielle Appleby, ‘The 2014 Counter-terrorism Reforms in Review’ (2015) 26(1) Public Law 
Review 4; Andrew Lynch and Nicola McGarrity, ‘Counter-terrorism Laws: How Neutral Laws Create Fear and 
Anxiety in Australia’s Muslim Communities’ (2008) 33(4) Alternative Law Journal 225.  
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demonstrates that the complementary strengths of the committees within the system enhance 
the overall quality of the scrutiny a Bill receives, both before and after introduction. For 
example, this chapter shows that the technical scrutiny committees, such as the SSCSB, are 
well placed to have their clearly prescribed mandates integrated into practical guidance for 
public servants, but cannot expect to hold the same place in the minds of a public servant who 
is anticipating having to appear as a witness before a public inquiry. Similarly, while the 
inquiry-based committees are able to generate future policy options with clarity and specificity, 
they are less able to articulate a particular set of scrutiny criteria that they will apply 
consistently over time and that can be used in drafting or policy practice manuals.  
For these reasons, the recommendations I propose in Part III are designed to encourage 
particular committees to build upon their individual strengths, and to improve opportunities for 
committees to work together when scrutinising rights-engaging legislation. They are designed 
to minimise the tensions between the deliberative and authoritative roles of parliamentary 
committees, for example by encouraging the technical scrutiny committees to develop 
practical, accessible guidance for public servants and by supporting technical-based 
committees to provide meaningful, deliberative forums for proposed new laws to be reviewed 
and discussed. In this way, the changes I propose are designed to place the full range of 
parliamentary committees in the minds of those responsible for developing, drafting and 
introducing proposed new laws, and to maximise the opportunities for rights-enhancing 
alternatives to legislative provisions to be developed and enacted. These changes are discussed 
further in the next part of this thesis. 
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PART III: IMPROVING THE RIGHTS-
PROTECTING CAPACITY OF THE 
PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE SYSTEM  
In the first two parts of this thesis, I explored the place parliamentary committees hold in the 
Australian model of rights protection and evaluated the impact of four prominent committees 
on the development, debate and enactment of 12 case study Acts. In this final part of the thesis, 
I analyse the material presented in Part II to identify the particular strengths and weaknesses of 
each of the committees studied and explore options for minimising or resolving the tension 
between the deliberative and authoritative roles of parliamentary committees. This analysis 
supports the central argument in my thesis, namely that only by considering parliamentary 
committees working together as a system can realistic proposals for substantive improvement 
of Australia’s parliamentary model of rights protection be developed. This part concludes by 
reflecting on the discussion in Chapter 1 regarding the conventional scepticism about the 
parliamentary model of rights protection, and offers new perspectives on how to improve this 
system of rights protection.  
Part III comprises four short chapters that draw upon the material presented earlier in this thesis. 
Chapter 8 discusses the complementary strengths of individual committees within the system, 
and the benefits of building upon these strengths to enhance the quality of interactions with 
other committees in the system. Chapter 9 sets out reforms to the system of committees as a 
whole, designed to encourage the type of collaboration between committees that my research 
suggests will improve rights protection. Chapter 10 sets out complementary reforms to the 
individual committees studied to support the system-wide changes recommended in Chapter 9. 
Finally, Chapter 11 revisits the arguments outlined in Chapter 1 relating to Australia’s 
parliamentary model of rights protection in light of the findings of my research.  
In this part of the thesis, I explain how making changes to the processes or powers of individual 
committees can improve their capacity to have a rights-enhancing impact on proposed laws. 
However, I also argue that focusing exclusively on individual committees, without 
understanding how they work with other committees as part of a broader system, may 
overestimate the rights-protecting role of individual committees and miss important system-
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wide opportunities for practical and sustainable reform. The evidence collected in Part II 
shows, for example, that parliamentary committees had the most significant rights-enhancing 
impact on the case study Acts when multiple committees worked together to scrutinise a law. 
This suggests that improving opportunities for collaboration between committees would 
improve the rights-enhancing capacity of the system as a whole. The evidence in Part II also 
shows that those committees that are able to maintain high levels of legitimacy in the eyes of 
a range of participants have a stronger rights-enhancing impact on the development of the law. 
This suggests that there is a need to ensure that any reforms to individual committees work to 
strengthen (rather than disrupt) their legitimacy across the committee system.  
In this way, my recommendations depart in important respects from those made by other 
commentators who have focused on improving the rights-enhancing capacity, effectiveness or 
efficiency of particular committees.1 For example, the recommendations in this thesis seek to 
strengthen the technical scrutiny committees’ capacity to produce timely and high-quality 
reports that can be relied upon by submission makers to inquiry-based committees, rather than 
trying to turn these scrutiny committees into more active inquiry-based forums.2 My 
recommendations also seek to expand the capacity for multiple inquiry-based committees to 
hold public hearings into the same Bill, rather than trying to ‘streamline’ the number of 
committee hearings being undertaken.3 The recommendations I make also seek to emulate 
features of high-impact committees (such as the PJCIS) within the context of other committees 
                                                 
 
1 For examples of committee-specific studies see George Williams and Lisa Burton, ‘Australia’s Parliamentary 
Scrutiny Act: An Exclusive Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Jane Hooper and 
Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart Publishing, 2015) 
257; George Williams and Daniel Reynolds, ‘The Operation and Impact of Australia’s Parliamentary Scrutiny 
Regime for Human Rights’ (2016) 41(2) Monash University Law Review 469; Catherine Rodgers, ‘A Comparative 
Analysis of Rights Scrutiny of Bills in New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom: Is New Zealand Lagging 
Behind its Peers?’ (2012) 1 Australasian Parliamentary Review 4; Stephen Argument, ‘Of Parliament, Pigs and 
Lipstick (Slight Return): A Defence of the Work of Legislative Scrutiny Committees in Human Rights Protection’ 
(Paper presented at the Australian Institute for Admistrative Law Forum, Canberra, 21–22 July 2011). 
2 For example, in their studies on the PJCHR, Williams and Burton and Williams and Reynolds have 
recommended a more robust public engagement role for the PJCHR. Williams and Reynolds, above n 1; George 
Williams and Lisa Burton, ‘Australia’s Exclusive Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection’ (2013) 34(1) Statute 
Law Review 58. A more active public inquiry role was also canvassed by some submission makers to the SSCSB, 
Parliament of Australia, The future direction and role of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee (2012) [4.22]. 
3 As discussed in Chapter 9, some commentators and key participants in the committee system hold concerns 
regarding the increase in the number of committee inquiries being undertaken and have called for a ‘streamlining’ 
of references to committees. See, eg, Phillip Thompson, ‘Department of the Senate Dealing with Too Many 
Inquiries’, The Canberra Times (Canberra), 7 February 2016 <http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/public-
service/department-of-the-senate-dealing-with-too-many-inquiries-20160207-gmo4pj.html>.  
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that may not yet be achieving these results.4 My recommendations also recognise that the 
hidden impact of parliamentary committees is a particularly fertile ground for improving rights 
protection.5 In addition, the changes recommended in this thesis focus almost exclusively on 
non-legislative changes that can be pursued by committee Chairs, parliamentary staff and 
public servants.6 These changes are also less dependent on strong leadership from the executive 
than those previously recommended by other scholars,7 although support at the Ministerial 
level is encouraged and anticipated.  
For these reasons, some rights advocates could view my recommendations as unambitious. 
This is a view I shared prior to undertaking the research compiled in Part II. However, as 
discussed further below, the evidence of the important rights-enhancing impact of the 
parliamentary committee system on the case study Acts has demonstrated the value in building 
upon (rather than seeking to replace) the practices, functions and powers of the existing 
parliamentary committee system. As Chapter 11 explains, this demands a more subtle, 
pragmatic approach than that often recommended by rights advocates who are sceptical of the 
parliamentary model of rights protection.  
  
                                                 
 
4 As noted in Chapter 4, some submission makers interviewed expressed concern about the secondee arrangements 
employed by the PJCIS. See, eg, Interview with Kris Klugman and Bill Rowlings, Civil Liberties Australia 
(Canberra, 24 May 2016). 
5 Meg Russell and Meghan Benton, ‘Assessing the Policy Impact of Parliament: Methodological Challenges and 
Possible Future Approaches’ (Paper presented at the PSA Legislative Studies Specialist Group Conference, 
London, United Kingdom, 24 June 2009) 20. 
6 This is in line with Uhr’s approach to improving the effectiveness of parliamentary committees: see, eg, John 
Uhr, Keeping Government Honest: Preconditions of Parliamentary Effectiveness, Parl Paper No 29 (1995) 53.  
7 See, eg, Shawn Rajanayagam, ‘Does Parliament Do Enough? Evaluating Statements of Compatibility under the 
Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act’ (2015) 38(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1046; 
Janet Hiebert, ‘Legislative Rights Review: Addressing the Gap Between Ideals and Constraints’ in Murray Hunt, 
Hayley Jane Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit 
(Hart Publishing, 2015) 39. 
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CHAPTER 8: BUILDING UPON THE COMPLEMENTARY STRENGTHS OF INDIVIDUAL 
COMMITTEES IN THE SYSTEM 
Parts I and II of this thesis set out the defining characteristics of the four parliamentary 
committees studied, and provided insights into how key participants in the law-making process 
view each of the four committees. This in turn uncovered the particular strengths and 
weaknesses of the individual committees studied and the different rights-enhancing impact the 
committees had on the case study Acts. For example, the material in Part II suggests that the 
LCA Committees provide a meaningful deliberative forum by holding popular and diverse 
public hearings but are not always able to translate their recommendations into legislative 
change. In contrast, the SSCSB has a strong behind-the-scenes impact as a result of its scrutiny 
principles being integrated into public service practice, but is rarely directly cited in 
parliamentary or public debates. As discussed below, understanding the implications of these 
strengths and weaknesses of the system of committees is central to identifying opportunities to 
improve rights protection at the federal level. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the LCA Committees and the PJCIS are ‘inquiry-based’ committees 
due to their common practice of calling for submissions and holding public hearings. The 
PJCHR and the SSCSB can be described as ‘technical scrutiny’ committees, as both are 
required to scrutinise all Bills against a set of prescribed criteria, and both rarely hold public 
hearings as part of this Bills scrutiny function.8 It is hardly surprising that there is a considerable 
difference between the type of impact an inquiry-based committee has compared with that of 
a technical scrutiny committee. As outlined in Chapter 3, these categories of committees have 
distinct goals, functions, processes and powers, some of which are prescribed by legislation or 
in the Standing Orders. They are not designed to emulate each other. They contribute different 
things to the parliamentary committee system. What is interesting for this thesis is that, despite 
their organic evolution, each category of committee complements the strengths of the other 
when it comes to scrutinising the case-study Acts. Indeed, the evidence presented in Part II 
suggests that the highest overall impact on a Bill occurs when these different categories of 
                                                 
 
8 As noted in Chapter 3, this categorisation of the PJCHR as a ‘technical scrutiny’ committee has been contested 
by some commentators. See, eg, Williams and Reynolds, above n 1. See also Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Representatives, 30 September 2010, 271–2 (Robert McClelland). 
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committees interact in ways that complement each other’s strengths. The following analysis 
aims to explain why this is the case. 
A Inquiry-Based Committees Can Provide a Meaningful Deliberative Forum 
As noted above, the practice of calling for submissions and holding public inquiries allows the 
PJCIS and the LCA Committees to provide a deliberative forum for scrutinising the content of 
a Bill or policy proposal. Requiring senior public servants or senior police or intelligence 
officers to appear before a potentially hostile group of parliamentarians can also be a potent 
way for the inquiry-based committees to hold the government to account. Unlike the relatively 
passive experience of exchanging formal correspondence with the scrutiny committees, when 
participating in a public inquiry into a Bill, public servants have to personally attend a 
committee meeting and justify on the public record the particular policy and legislative choice 
they have made.  
The public inquiry function of the PJCIS and LCA Committees also strengthens these 
committees’ capacity to build legitimacy among a wider range of key participants. In particular, 
establishing relationships with sophisticated submission makers (described in Chapter 4 as the 
‘usual suspects’) can help attract and retain diverse committee membership and legitimacy 
within the Parliament and the community. Sophisticated submission makers also attract media 
attention, which can in turn have an impact on the nature of parliamentary debate on the Bill.9 
In addition, as explained in Chapters 3 and 5, the recommendations made by the inquiry-based 
committee are specific and directive, often proposing precise amendments to key provisions of 
the Bill or its Explanatory Memorandum.  
The specificity of the recommendations made by the inquiry-based committees, coupled with 
the legitimacy and public impact they are able to generate, contribute to their comparatively 
strong legislative impact.10 This gives these committees important strengths that should be 
preserved and enhanced when evaluating options to improve the overall rights-enhancing 
capacity of the parliamentary committee system. For these reasons, the recommendations made 
                                                 
 
9 See the discussion in Chapter 6, Section D that documents references to committee work in the media. See also 
Appendix C. 
10 The particularly strong legislative impact of the PJCIS is discussed further below. 
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in Chapter 10 include a focus on increasing the deliberative capacity of the PJCIS and LCA 
Committees, as well as increasing the quality of the collaboration between committees in the 
system. 
B Technical Scrutiny Committees Provide Vital Resources for Those Engaged in 
the Public Inquiry Process 
My research suggests that the capacity of the inquiry-based committees to influence strongly 
the shape of the case study Acts also depended, at least in part, on the work of the technical 
scrutiny committees. The technical scrutiny committees enhance the legislative and public 
impact of the inquiry-based committees in three key ways. First, they provide submission 
makers with reliable information about the purpose and policy objectives of the Bill, and the 
key features of the Bill that are likely to raise rights concerns. In the case of the SSCSB, this is 
likely to be in the form of an Alert Digest (more recently described as an ‘Initial Scrutiny 
Report’).11 The use of Alert Digests means that the SSCSB is able to release information that 
summarises its preliminary concerns with the Bill quickly and in an accessible form, often prior 
to the close of submissions to the inquiry-based committees and usually before the 
commencement of second reading debate on the Bill. This means that, even when the SSCSB’s 
final report on the Bill is delayed because of difficulties associated with obtaining a response 
from the proponent Minister, submission makers and parliamentarians are at least armed with 
the SSCSB’s preliminary views before they are required to articulate their public position on 
the merits of the Bill.12 
                                                 
 
11 As noted in Chapter 3, in 2017, the SSCSB began publishing its scrutiny comments on recently introduced Bills 
(including responses received on matters previously considered by the committee) in one report, the Scrutiny 
Digest. However, the Scrutiny Digest continues to be divided into initial reports on the Bill (previously called 
‘Alert Digests’, now called ‘Initial Scrutiny’) and concluded reports on the Bill (previously called ‘Reports’ now 
called ‘Commentary on Ministerial Responses’). See, eg, SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Scrutiny Digest No 7 
of 2017 (21 June 2017).  
12 This is supported by the interview material. For example, an interviewee said that it is critical to ensure that at 
least the Alert Digest, and ideally the committee’s final report, is tabled prior to the resumption of second reading 
debates on the Bill: ‘the committee certainly sees that its work, the effectiveness of its work is massively reduced 
if it’s not available for debate, to inform … that process. Having said that, if legislation has gone through, the 
committee still expects a response because it wants its complete view on the record.’ Interview with A (Canberra, 
23 May 2016). 
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The reports of the PJCHR can also assist submission makers to inquiry-based committees, but 
of course this is dependent on submission makers having access to these reports prior to the 
deadline for receipt of submissions. As the material in Chapter 6 indicates, the tabling of 
PJCHR reports can sometimes be significantly delayed, and in this circumstance, submission 
makers and parliamentarians are without the benefit of the PJCHR’s views at the point at which 
they are required to make public decisions on the merits of the Bill.13 For this reason, as 
discussed in Chapter 10, I recommend strategies to increase the PJCHR’s capacity to publish 
its views on the rights compatibility of a Bill at an earlier stage in the legislative process. 
A second related way the technical scrutiny committees enhance the impact of the inquiry-
based committees is by providing a consistent analytical framework to evaluate competing 
public interests or individual rights. In other words, the technical scrutiny committees can help 
the inquiry-based committees (and their submission makers) to unpack the idea of ‘striking the 
right balance’ between protecting national security and preserving individual rights.14 As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the work of the technical scrutiny committees is also evident – albeit 
in a less direct way – in the recommendations made by the inquiry-based committees, which 
regularly align with some of the key concerns or issues raised by the technical scrutiny 
committees.15 
The third, and perhaps most significant, way the technical scrutiny committees enhance the 
impact of the inquiry-based committees relates to their strong influence on the pre-introduction 
                                                 
 
13 For example, former Chair of the LCA Legislation Committee former ALP Senator Patricia Crossin said that 
while the LCA Committee would endeavour to look at the reports of the PJCHR as part of its work: ‘timing was 
often a problem, particularly when the government was pushing for committee reports to happen quickly. Because 
that committee [PJCHR] only met when Parliament was sitting it sometimes didn’t have the chance to consider 
the Bill and issue its report when we needed to use it.’ Interview with Patricia Crossin, former Chair and Deputy 
Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, former Australian Labor Party 
Senator for Northern Territory (telephone, 10 August 2016). 
14 See, eg, 31; Shipra Chordia, Sangeetha Pillai and George Williams, Submission No 17 to submissions to the 
PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Provisions of the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance 
to Australia) Bill 2015 (2015), 2–3; NSW Society of Labor Lawyers, Submission No 25 to submissions to the 
PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into n the Provisions of the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance 
to Australia) Bill 2015 (2015), 5; Australian Bar Association, Submission No 43, to submissions to the PJCIS, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Provisions of the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to 
Australia) Bill 2015 (2015)  2. 
15 See, eg, LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Security Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 2] and Related Matters (2002) 8–9. See also PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Advisory 
Report on the Provisions of the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 (2015) ch 
8, where the findings of the PJCHR were referred to on six occasions, including extensive quotations from the 
PJCHR’s report.  
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stage of legislative development. This is outlined in Chapter 7, where the SSCSB was seen to 
have a particularly strong behind-the-scenes impact. For example, the interview material 
suggests that the consideration of the SSCSB’s scrutiny criteria at the legislative proposal or 
Bill drafting stage effectively works to triage some of the rights concerning aspects of the Bill 
well before it enters the formal parliamentary committee system. 
Care must be taken not to overstate the contribution the technical scrutiny committees make to 
the inquiry-based committees. Other factors, including committee membership and 
relationships with government agencies, play a significant role. However, the evidence in Part 
II suggests that the inquiry-based committees and their submission makers regularly rely upon 
the work of the technical scrutiny committees to inform the content and structure of their 
submissions and reports. It also suggests that the work of the inquiry-based committees would 
be substantially more complex without the behind-the-scenes impact of the SSCSB, and to a 
lesser extent the PJCHR. The converse is also true. The technical scrutiny committees would 
clearly struggle to have a substantive impact on the shape of proposed laws without the inquiry-
based committees, and the media interest and parliamentary attention that comes from holding 
a public inquiry into a Bill. This suggests that both categories of committees are needed in the 
parliamentary committee system, and the different strengths of these committees should be 
preserved and enhanced if the rights-enhancing capacity of the system is to be improved. This 
finding, derived from the symbiotic relationship that exists between individual committees, 
pulls against the changes recommended by other scholars who have focused their attention on 
individual committees.16 It also informs the recommendations set out below and discussed 
further in Chapters 9 and 10. 
C Summary of Key Findings in Chapter 8 
In summary, this chapter draws together the findings made in Part II and the contextual 
information provided in Part I to identify the particular strengths and weaknesses of the four 
                                                 
 
16 For example, Williams and Burton advocate changes to the PJCHR that would see the committee more actively 
engage with submission makers as part of its Bills scrutiny work, including by calling for submissions and holding 
public inquiries. Similarly, some submission makers to the Future Directions of the SSCSB inquiry called for the 
SSCSB to take a more active inquiry role as part of its Bills scrutiny process. See, eg, Williams and Burton, 
‘Australia's Parliamentary Scrutiny Act: An Exclusive Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection’, above n 1; 
Williams and Reynolds, above n 1. See also SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the future direction and 
role of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee (2012).  
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individual committees studied. In so doing, this chapter illustrates the tension between the 
authoritative and deliberative roles of parliamentary committees, and points to ways to 
minimise or resolve this tension when committees work together to contribute collaboratively 
to the scrutiny of proposed laws. In this way, this chapter sets the scene for the 
recommendations that follow in Chapter 10 that aim to capitalise on the particular strengths of 
individual committees, for example by enhancing the quality of the deliberative forum offered 
by the LCA Committees and improving the accessibility of the technical scrutiny provided by 
the SSCSB. This chapter also lays the foundation for the recommendations in the next chapter, 
which are designed to maximise the opportunities for different committees to work 
collaboratively and efficiently when reviewing or inquiring into rights-engaging laws. 
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CHAPTER 9: REFORM OPTIONS FOR THE SYSTEM OF COMMITTEES 
The analysis above highlights the particular strengths and weaknesses of each of the four 
committees studied and shows that when individual committees work together they can have a 
significant rights-enhancing impact on the development and content of Australia’s counter-
terrorism laws.1 This suggests that the rights-enhancing capacity of the committee system could 
be improved by increasing meaningful collaboration between committees, while preserving 
and enhancing the particular strengths of the individual committees in the system. With this in 
mind, the next two chapters set out a range of integrated recommendations, starting with 
system-wide changes designed to promote more timely and higher quality collaboration 
between different committees in the system. This is followed by committee-specific 
recommendations in Chapter 10, which are designed to promote the strengths of each of the 
committees studied, whilst also increasing their capacity to engage efficiently with other 
committees in the system.  
Conscious of the need to make my recommendations accessible to key participants in the 
committee system, my recommendations focus on practical changes and are presented in table 
format. The system-wide recommendations are set out in Table 9.1 and are organised around 
the need to encourage multi-committee scrutiny of rights-engaging Bills,2 increase committee 
resources, ensure timely tabling of reports,3 improve communication between committees and 
key participants,4 and improve our understanding of parliamentary committees’ contribution to 
the emerging rights-scrutiny culture within the Australian Parliament.5 
  
                                                 
 
1 A summary of the rights-enhancing impacts identified in Part II is set out in Appendix D. 
2 See Chapter 5, Section D. 
3 The resource challenges facing committees, and the consequences of failing to table reports prior to the close of 
the second reading debate on a Bill are discussed in Chapter 6, Section B. 
4 The benefits of improved communication between key participants are outlined in Chapter 4 and underscored 
by the evidence of ‘hidden impact’, set out in Chapter 7. 
5 This ‘common rights-scrutiny culture’ is identified in Chapter 6, Section C, and discussed further in Chapter 8 
and below. 
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Table 9.1 Reform Options for the System of Committees 




and key participants 
Improve communication between inquiry-based committees 
and the media (including through adopting the committee-




 Improve communication between committees and regular 
submission makers (including through adopting the 





 Improve communication between individual committees 
(including through adopting the committee-specific 




 Ensure all committees prepare timely annual reports that 
document the full range of impact (legislative, public and 
hidden) the committee has on the development of new laws. 
Parliamentary offices, 
committee Chairs  
 Improve communication between committees and those 
responsible for developing and drafting legislative 
proposals. This could involve committee secretariat staff 
liaising with public servants to develop subject-specific 
Guidance Notes and Drafting Directions. It could also 
include committee Chairs providing feedback on high-
quality SoCs and EMs, or publicly praising helpful 
responses to committee requests for information from 





 Undertake specific training to assist in the facilitation of 
respectful, deliberative public hearings. For example, 
specific training could be provided to inquiry-based 
committee Chairs and members to develop strategies to 
promote a culture of respect and support for a diverse range 
of witnesses and processes to update and expand ‘invited 




 Require government responses to all Legislation Committee 
reports before the conclusion of second reading debate on 
the Bill, and to all Reference Committee reports within six 
months of tabling. 
Parliament 
Increase committee 
resources and address 
high workloads to 
ensure timely tabling 
of reports 
Provide additional funding for to the Senate Office and 
House of Representatives Office to apply to the general 
staffing pool that services parliamentary committees. The 
amount of additional funding should be determined 
following a work analysis to determine the nature and level 
of secretariat support necessary for future demands on the 
committee system.  
Parliament 
 Encourage the use of responsive staffing practices, such as 
shared secretariats and flexible staffing pools, which enable 
parliamentary staff to move between committees in response 
to changing workloads. 
Committee Chairs 
 Encourage the appointment of high-quality, politically 
independent, part-time specialist advisors to support 
parliamentary committees over a fixed period, or for 
particularly complex or lengthy inquiries. 
Committee Chairs 
 Encourage the use of departmental or agency secondee 
arrangements to support parliamentary committees over a 
Committee Chairs 
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fixed period, or for particularly complex or lengthy inquiries 
(accompanied by the transparency arrangements 
recommended for the PJCIS in Table 10.2). 
Encourage multi-
committee scrutiny of 
rights-engaging Bills 
Facilitate and coordinate Bill references to multiple inquiry-
based committees (in addition to the technical scrutiny 
committees), particularly when the Bill attracts broad public 
interest or gives rise to rights concerns. This includes 
utilising existing forums for committee Chairs to meet and 
help coordinate multi-committee inquiries into the same Bill 
and amending the Standing Orders to make it clear that, 
when examining Bills or draft Bills, all committees should 
take into account any past or concurrent reports on the Bill 
published by any other relevant committee.  




Ministers and senior 
public servants, 
Parliament 
 Encourage proponent Ministers and relevant departments to 
refer draft Bills and discussion papers to inquiry-based 
committees for report prior to formally introducing the Bill 
into Parliament. This could be facilitated by adopting the 
‘Blue Paper’ strategy recommended by Civil Liberties 
Australia in 2016. 
Relevant Ministers 
and senior public 
servants 
 Support parliamentarians in their involvement in 
parliamentary committees, including through improving 
training programs for parliamentarians’ staff, and profiling 
high-quality contributions from individual committee 
members. 
Parliamentary offices 
 Promote parliamentary committees as part of the policy and 
legislative development process amongst the broader public 
service, including by pointing out the efficiency gains to be 
made by anticipating and addressing parliamentary scrutiny 
issues at the pre-introduction stage. This should be 
supported by training for all policy officers in the scrutiny 
criteria applied by the technical scrutiny committees. 
Parliamentary offices, 
senior public servants 
 Amend the Standing Orders for both Houses to make it clear 
that, as a general rule, the second reading debate on a Bill 
should not proceed unless all relevant committee reports on 








within the Parliament 
Invest in research to track the rights language used in 
parliamentary debates and parliamentary committee reports 
across a wide range of subject areas to evaluate the level of 






 Encourage individual committees to more clearly and 
specifically document the impact they have on the 
development and debate of proposed new laws, particularly 





 Facilitate workshops and forums to discuss, document and 
debate the contribution of parliamentary committees to 
rights protection in Australia, for example by adopting a 
similar format to the public forum conducted to celebrate the 







A Improving Communication Between Committees and Key Participants 
The recommendations in Table 9.1 include a sustained focus on improving communication 
amongst the key participants in the parliamentary committee system. This reflects the theme 
emerging from Part II that a strong rights-enhancing legislative impact is dependent upon 
individual committees working together, which in turn demands effective communication 
among key participants in the system. Part II further suggests that effective communication can 
be particularly critical for improving the hidden impact of the technical scrutiny committees, 
and for improving the public impact of inquiry-based committees. For example, effective 
communication between the technical scrutiny committees and public servants can help 
entrench the criteria that committees apply when they scrutinise policy development and 
drafting practices. Similarly, effective communication between the inquiry-based committees 
and sophisticated submission makers can ensure high-quality submissions and oral testimony 
is received by the committee, even in the face of tight time frames. 
The material in Chapters 4 and 7 also underscores the integral role the committee Chair plays 
in facilitating meaningful deliberative forums for scrutiny to take place, and establishing the 
‘culture’ of the committee, including how decision-making processes will work in practice. 
The interview material further suggests that targeted support may be needed to ensure that less 
experienced committee Chairs are well placed to undertake this role, particularly Chairs of 
inquiry-based committees.6 For this reason, I recommend that training be provided to inquiry-
based committee Chairs and members to develop strategies to promote a committee culture 
where a diverse range of submission makers are encouraged and supported to participate in the 
inquiry process. These strategies include updating and expanding invited submission maker 
lists to ensure individuals and groups beyond the ‘usual suspects’ are actively encouraged to 
participate. 
Improving communication between committee members and submission makers not only 
contributes to the system’s capacity to provide a deliberative forum, but can also act as a 
conduit for improved media coverage of the work of committees. As Chapter 6 explained, the 
key to generating strong media coverage is to attract and retain sophisticated submission 
                                                 
 
6 See Interview with Sophie Dunstone, former Secretary of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
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makers who proactively utilise the committee process as a key plank of a broader media 
strategy. Once these sophisticated submission makers regard the committee as a ‘forum of 
choice’, they are likely to orient their public advocacy around the committee, which in turn 
increases executive attention on the committee’s work. This also avoids what Larkin has 
described as the ‘perpetual problem’ of attracting media attention for positive committee work,7 
particularly when coupled with other recommendations set out in Table 9.1, such as the 
requirement for the relevant Ministers to respond to legislation committee reports before the 
conclusion of the second reading debate on the relevant Bill, and to respond to reference 
committee reports within six months of the date of tabling of the report.8 
B Increasing Committee Resources and Adopting Strategies to Address High 
Workloads and Ensure Timely Tabling of Reports 
In line with past reviews of the federal committee system,9 my recommendations include the 
provision of additional financial resources for committees and their staff. This is integral to the 
successful implementation of the other recommendations made in this thesis and would 
constitute an important investment in the rights-protecting capacity of the parliamentary 
committee system. For example, additional secretariat staff for technical scrutiny committees 
would facilitate further collaboration between these committees and the inquiry-based 
committees and assist in the development of targeted, technical scrutiny resources for public 
servants and drafters to use when developing new laws. Similarly, funding for additional 
specialist advisors for the inquiry-based committees, such as human rights experts or 
                                                 
 
7 See House of Representatives Standing Committee on Procedure, Parliament of Australia, Building a modern 
committee system: An inquiry into the effectiveness of the House committee system (2010) Dr P Larkin, Transcript 
of evidence, 22 October 2009, 6. 
8 This recommendation is consistent with that made in the 2010 ‘Agreement for a Better Parliament’ made between 
the Australian Labor Party and the independent members (Mr Tony Windsor and Mr Rob Oakeshott) on 7 
September 2010, in particular para 10.6. For more information on this agreement see Parliament of Australia, 
‘The Hung Parliament: procedural changes in the House of Representatives’ (Parliamentary Research Papers 
2013–2014 Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2013) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/
HungParliament#_ftn6>.  
9 See, eg, House of Representatives Standing Committee on Procedure, Building a modern committee system, 
above n 7, Recommendation 2. 
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constitutional law experts, would assist in the identification of practical policy options to 
replace rights-abrogating provisions.  
Despite its impressive contribution to the law-making function of the Australian Parliament, 
the committee system has experienced a decline in overall funding for several consecutive 
years.10 Concerns about inadequate funding in the face of rapidly expanding workloads have 
been voiced in the recent annual reports of the Department of the Senate,11 and by many of the 
parliamentarians interviewed for this thesis, who also cited the burden of committee work on 
the resources of their own offices.12 The need for further support for committee members, in 
particular committee Chairs, was also acknowledged in the 2010 House Committee Review.13 
While successive governments have been slow to respond to the call for extra funding for the 
parliamentary committee system, the committees themselves have begun to adopt innovative 
and effective strategies to ensure parliamentary committee staff are responsive to changes in 
workloads across system, and to maximise administrative efficiencies and resource allocation. 
For example, the Office of the Senate has co-located the secretariats of the SSCSB, the PJCHR 
and the SSCRO to form a single Legislative Scrutiny Unit,14 and the PJCIS has utilised part-
time specialist advisors and secondee arrangements to enhance the quality and range of 
resources available to parliamentary committees. Some committees have also begun to invest 
in efficient communication technologies and innovative new practices for holding public 
hearings. As set out in Table 9.1, I recommend the continuation of these types of strategies, 
both at the Senate and House level, in addition to the provision of extra funding to the 
committee system. 
                                                 
 
10 Anthony Bergin and Russell Trood, ‘Creative Tension: Parliament and National Security’ (Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, August 2015). See also Department of the House of Representatives, Parliament of Australia, 
Annual Report 2013–14 (2014); Department of the Senate, Parliament of Australia, Annual Report 2013–14 
(2014).  
11 See, eg, Department of the Senate, Parliament of Australia, Annual Report 2014–15 (2015) Clerks Review, 4. 
Department of the Senate, Parliament of Australia, Annual Report 2015–16 (2016) Clerks Review, 3–6. 
12 See, eg, Interview with Andrew Bartlett, former Australian Democrats Senator for Queensland (telephone, 4 
August 2016).  
13 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Procedure, Building a modern committee system, above n 7, 
[2.47]. 
14 See Interview with B (Canberra, 23 May 2016). See also Australian Parliament, ‘Commonwealth Legislative 
Scrutiny Unit’ <https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Legislative_Scrutiny_Unit>. 
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In addition to access to adequate resources, my research demonstrates that it is critical that 
parliamentary committees engaged in Bills scrutiny are in a position to table their reports (or 
at least their preliminary reports) prior to the resumption of the second reading debate on the 
Bill. On this basis, I recommend amending the existing Standing Orders for both Houses15 to 
make it clear that, as a general rule, the second reading debate on a Bill should not proceed 
unless all relevant committee reports have been tabled. The material in Chapter 7 suggests this 
is already the accepted practice when it comes to the tabling of Senate committee reports on 
Bills that were referred to the committees via the Selection of Bills Committee, but does not 
always apply when it comes to the tabling of joint committee reports.16 
In making this recommendation, I recognise that Standing Orders can always be changed or 
suspended by the majority of the relevant House of Parliament, and this is particularly likely 
when the legislation being considered is considered urgent or relates to national security. 
Nevertheless, such an order would provide a strong statement of general practice. It would help 
establish the expectation among parliamentarians that they should have access to the analysis 
prepared by parliamentary committees prior to reaching their conclusions on the merits of the 
Bill.17 
C Encouraging Multi-committee Scrutiny of Rights-Engaging Bills 
Once armed with adequate resources and the procedural options to promote timely tabling of 
reports, the committees studied in this research would be well placed to respond to the demands 
of multi-committee scrutiny of rights-engaging Bills, such as that which occurred with respect 
to a number of the case study Acts. My research suggests that the greater the number of 
committees that scrutinised a particular case study Act, the greater the rights-enhancing results, 
particularly when a combination of inquiry-based and technical scrutiny committees was 
                                                 
 
15 See, eg, Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 25A; House of Representatives, Parliament of 
Australia, Standing Order 222. 
16 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Legislation Handbook (2017) 65, 72, 77. See also Interview 
with Maureen Weeks, Deputy Clerk of the Senate (Canberra, 23 May 2016); Interview with A (Canberra, 23 May 
2016). 
17 Former Australian Democrats Senator Andrew Bartlett said that this could be further supported by raising the 
threshold for changing the Standing Orders to a ‘super majority’ (such as 75% or more rather than 50% of 
members). Interview with Andrew Bartlett, former Australian Democrats Senator for Queensland (telephone, 4 
August 2016). 
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involved.18 As Chapter 7 documents, scrutiny by multiple committees also appears to provide 
more opportunities for those involved in legislative development and drafting to draw upon the 
scrutiny principles applied by the technical scrutiny committees, and to reflect upon the 
outcome of past committee inquiries. As a result, this thesis recommends reforms that would 
encourage and facilitate scrutiny by multiple committees of the same Bill – particularly for 
those Bills that engage a large number of rights, or that have significant rights implications.19  
The evidence in Part II also demonstrates that facilitating parliamentary committee scrutiny of 
proposed legislation at the draft Bill or discussion paper stage can have important rights-
enhancing results.20 For this reason, I recommend strategies to encourage proponent Ministers 
and departments to utilise relevant inquiry-based committees when developing significant, 
rights-engaging legislative proposals. These strategies received specific support from a number 
of submission makers that regularly engage with counter-terrorism Bills and who are looking 
for further opportunities to engage at the policy development stage. For example, Civil 
Liberties Australia has made its own recommendation to facilitate what it considers to be more 
effective public scrutiny of counter-terrorism policy, centred on the idea of a National Security 
Blue Paper, akin to a Defence ‘White Paper’.21 As Civil Liberties Australia explains, the ‘Blue 
Paper’ approach would allow for parliamentary committee scrutiny of national security 
legislation at the pre-introduction stage, with the potential to improve the deliberative quality 
of law making in this area.22 A number of scholars have also recommended engaging 
parliamentary committees more regularly in the scrutiny of proposed Bills, including Marsh 
and Halligan, who argue that ‘joint committees constitute a prime setting for routine review of 
                                                 
 
18 For example, see discussion of SLAT Bills, ASIO Bill 2002 and Control Orders Bill in Chapter 5, Section C. 
19 This recommendation is consistent with that made in the 2010 ‘Agreement for a Better Parliament’ made 
between the Australian Labor Party and the independent members (Mr Tony Windsor and Mr Rob Oakeshott) on 
7 September 2010, particularly para 10.5. The proposals in the agreement, together with some proposals from the 
Greens and Mr Wilkie, formed the basis of the procedural changes in the House of Representatives in the 43rd 
Parliament. Most of these changes were implemented via amendments to the Standing Orders on 29 September 
2010 (the second sitting day of the 43rd Parliament) and on 19 and 20 October 2010. For more information on 
this agreement see Parliament of Australia, ‘The Hung Parliament’, above n 8.  
20 See, eg, discussion of the Data Retention Bill, the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 (Cth) 
and the INLSM in Chapter 5, Section C. 
21 For further information see Civil Liberties Australia, ‘Blue Paper for Police and Spooks’, CLArion No 1511 
(online), 1 November 2015 <http://www.cla.asn.au/clarion/1511CLArion(1col).pdf>.  
22 Interview with Bill Rowlings, Civil Liberties Australia (Canberra, 24 May 2016). 
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strategic issues’ and ‘provide a forum where official, novel, sectional and deviant or marginal 
opinions can be voiced’.23 
When recommending changes that foresee more committee scrutiny of rights-engaging laws 
and policies, I acknowledge the need to address concerns expressed by some key participants 
who consider the committee system to be already overstretched.24 Some have observed, for 
example, that large numbers of committee inquiries leads to ‘exhaustion from submitters’, 
fatigue among industry and community bodies and ‘exhaustion from the secretariats who are 
run off their feet trying to write reports’.25 These concerns are shared by former Clerk of the 
Senate Rosemary Laing who told journalists that workload pressures for committee secretariat 
staff have become worse as the number of independent and minor party Senators have 
increased.26 The interview material also points to difficulties associated with ensuring a quorum 
of committee members are present for key committee meetings and public hearings, 
particularly when individual parliamentarians may be involved in multiple committees at the 
same time.27 
These concerns are addressed by my recommendations in two ways. First, as discussed above, 
I recommend a range of strategies to increase the resources available to committee secretariats, 
committee members and submission makers to support the system to respond effectively and 
efficiently to increases in workload. Secondly, I recommend the formalisation of a range of 
strategies already employed on an ad hoc basis to improve the process of making referrals to 
committees and to encourage effective collaboration between committees working on the same 
                                                 
 
23 Ian Marsh, ‘Australia’s Representation Gap: A Role for Parliamentary Committees?’ (Speech delivered at the 
Department of the Senate Occasional Lecture Series, Parliament House, Canberra, 26 November 2004). See also 
John Halligan, ‘Parliamentary Committee Roles in Facilitating Public Policy at the Commonwealth Level’ (2008) 
23(2) Australasian Parliamentary Review 135, 153; Interview with Patricia Crossin, former Chair and Deputy 
Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, former Australian Labor Party 
Senator for Northern Territory (telephone, 10 August 2016). 
24 See, eg, Bruce Childs, The Truth About Parliamentary Committees, Parl Paper No 18 (1992) 
25 Patricia Crossin, Christine Milne and Gary Humphries, ‘The Future of Senate Committees: Challenges and 
Opportunities’ in Commonwealth, Senate Committees and Government Accountability, Parl Paper No 54 (2010) 
134. 
26 Phillip Thompson, ‘Department of the Senate Dealing with Too Many Inquiries’, The Canberra Times (online), 
28 February 2016 <http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/public-service/department-of-the-senate-dealing-
with-too-many-inquiries-20160207-gmo4pj.html>. 
27 Interview with Dean Smith, Liberal Senator for Western Australia, former Chair of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (telephone, 22 September 2016). 
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Bill. For example, like ALP Senator Patricia Crossin28 and former Australian Greens Senator 
Christine Milne,29 I recommend utilising existing forums for committee Chairs to meet and 
help coordinate multi-committee inquiries into the same Bill. I further recommend that this 
practice be supported by changes to the Standing Orders to make it clear that, when examining 
Bills or draft Bills, all committees should take into account any past or concurrent reports on 
the Bill published by any other relevant committee.30 Senate Standing Order 40, which governs 
meetings with House committees, could also be amended to facilitate more flexible 
opportunities for Senate committees to discuss inquiries with their House and joint committee 
counterparts.31 These changes would help target the ‘submission-maker fatigue’ described 
above by providing transparent options for individual committees to draw upon submissions 
made to other committees, or by facilitating shared committee hearings, where members from 
two committees would be permitted to attend the same public hearing and question witnesses.  
In additional to these strategies, I support efforts to review the number of individual committees 
across both Houses of Parliament with a view to rationalising this number if it is shown to be 
unworkably large. When taken together, these strategies have the potential to capitalise on the 
rights-enhancing impact and other benefits that flow from multi-committee scrutiny of rights-
engaging laws, whilst at the same time guarding against adding unnecessarily to the heavy 
workload experienced by committee members and secretariat staff. 
                                                 
 
28 Milne, Crossin and Humphries, above n 25, 138–9. 
29 Ibid 134. Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 25(10) (15 July 2014) provides that ‘The chairs of 
the committees, together with the chairs of any select committees appointed by the Senate, shall constitute the 
Chairs’ Committee, which may meet with the Deputy President in the chair, and may consider and report to the 
Senate on any matter relating to the operations of the committees.’ 
30 This could be based on existing Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 25(2A) (15 July 2014). 
31 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 40 (24 August 1994) currently provides: ‘(1) A committee may 
not confer or sit with a committee of the House of Representatives except by order of the Senate. (2) When such 
an order has been made, it shall be communicated by message to the House of Representatives with a request that 
leave be given to the committee of that House to confer or sit with the committee of the Senate. (3) A committee 
permitted or directed to confer with a committee of the House of Representatives may confer by writing or orally. 
(4) Proceedings of a conference or joint sitting of a committee of the Senate and a committee of the House of 
Representatives shall be reported to the Senate by its committee.’ A similar recommendation was previously made 
with respect to the Standing Orders of the House of Representatives. See House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Procedure, Building a modern committee system, above n 7. 
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D Documenting and Acknowledging the Contribution Parliamentary Committees 
Make to a Common Rights-Scrutiny Culture within the Australian Parliament 
As part of my evaluation of the role of parliamentary committees in the parliamentary model 
of rights protection, my research has uncovered evidence of an emerging rights-scrutiny culture 
at the federal level. It suggests that the federal Parliament may already be in the process of 
developing its own set of rights and scrutiny principles that can be built upon and enhanced 
when seeking to improve the existing parliamentary model of rights protection.32  
The evidence presented in Chapters 5 and 6 describes the rights and scrutiny principles that 
were most commonly discussed when Parliament debated the case study Acts, suggesting that 
it may be possible to identify a common set of rights and scrutiny principles that a wide range 
of parliamentarians, public servants and submission makers consider to be important when 
evaluating the merits of a proposed law. These principles are summarised at Appendix E and 
include: 
 The expansion of executive power must come with procedural fairness guarantees, 
including access to legal representation, preservation of common law privileges and 
access to judicial review.33 
 Parliament should have access to information about how government departments and 
agencies are using their powers.34 
 If the law is designed to respond to an extraordinary set of circumstances, Parliament 
should be required to revisit the law to determine whether it is still needed.35 
                                                 
 
32 See discussion in Chapter 8.  
33 See, eg, LCA Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Security Legislation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 2] and Related Matters (2002) Recommendation 4; LCA Legislation Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (2005) ch 3 (key issues summarised at 
[3.22]); SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Alert Digest relating to the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment 
(Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (2014). 
34 See, eg, PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Review of Security and Counter Terrorism Legislation (2006) vii; LCA 
Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Laws Bill 2008 [No 2] 
(2008); PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Advisory Report on the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) 
Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 (2015) Recommendation 10. 
35 See, eg, PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Advisory Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment 
(Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (2014) Recommendation 13; PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, Thirteenth Report of 
2014 (2014); Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Parliament of Australia, An Advisory 
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 New criminal offences should have clearly defined physical and mental elements, 
allocate the burden of proof to the prosecution, ensure access to legal representation, 
and not apply retrospectively.36 
These rights and scrutiny principles feature prominently in the work of parliamentary 
committees, have a particularly strong connection to the scrutiny criteria applied by the SSCSB, 
and align closely with the features and functions of the Australian Parliament37 and the 
common law ‘bill of rights’ as well as established constitutional doctrines.38 For example, many 
of the principles listed in Appendix E, such as the need to ensure parliamentary oversight of 
executive powers and the use of sunset clauses for extraordinary laws, are drawn directly from 
Parliament’s constitutional role in holding the executive government to account, and reflect the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.39 The principles also reflect the doctrine of separation 
of powers reflected in Chapter 3 of the Constitution, such as those concerning access to 
meaningful judicial review of executive action, and limitations on the use of executive power.40  
Taken together, this material suggests that there is a positive relationship between the features 
and functions of the Parliament discussed in Chapter 3 and the emerging rights-scrutiny culture 
discussed in Chapter 6. This may seem like an obvious conclusion to draw; however, it is 
important to keep these findings in mind when developing and evaluating options for 
improving the parliamentary model of rights protection in Australia. This is because, when 
                                                 
 
Report on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (2002) 
Recommendation 12. 
36 See, eg, Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005, Schedule of the amendments made by the Senate, Items 68–72; 
SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Alert Digest No 13 of 2005 (9 November 2005) 8, 14–16; SSCSB, Parliament of 
Australia, Alert Digest relating to the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 
(13 October 2014). 
37 These features include the doctrine of responsible government and the separation of powers, which are discussed 
in Chapter 3.  
38 The ‘common law Bill of Rights’ is discussed briefly in Chapter 1. It includes common law privileges such as 
legal professional privilege, which has been the subject of a number of committee-led legislative amendments to 
the case study Acts. See, eg, Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth), Item 27. 
39 For example, by focusing on increasing parliamentary oversight of elective powers and mandating 
parliamentary review of proposed provisions, for example through the use of sunset clauses. See further discussion 
in Chapters 6 and 8 and Appendices D and E. 
40 For commentary on the relationship between Chapter III of the constitution and the use and review of executive 
power see, eg, Anthony Gray, Criminal due process and Chapter III of the Australian Constitution (Federation 
Press, 2016); Elizabeth Price Foley, ‘Judicial Engagement, Written Constitutions, and the Value of Preservation: 
the Case of Individual Rights’ (2012) 19(4) George Mason Law Review 909.  
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viewed optimistically, this emerging rights-scrutiny culture may provide fertile ground on 
which to establish a more concrete statement of Australian rights that resonate across political 
lines and can be readily incorporated into parliamentary discourse. Such an approach aligns 
with the 2006 (pre-PJCHR) recommendations made by Evans and Evans,41 who saw benefits 
in developing a ‘home-grown’ set of rights at the federal level rather than adopting a human 
rights Act approach,42 and with the ‘democratic bill of rights’ model advocated by Campbell 
and discussed further below. The recommendations made following the National Consultation 
also supported the development of an ‘Australian statement of human rights’, as an alternative 
to replicating the provisions of the international human rights conventions when enacting a 
federal human rights Act or other legal statement of rights.43 As noted above and discussed 
further below, building upon this emerging rights-scrutiny culture may also hold advantages 
over other approaches to articulating and promoting a lists of rights, as it feeds into rather than 
disturbs the existing institutional framework for resolving rights disagreements that exists at 
the federal level. 
The significance of this emerging rights-scrutiny culture for future evaluations of Australia’s 
parliamentary model of rights protection is discussed in Chapter 11. However, it must also be 
emphasised that the rights-scrutiny principles listed in Appendix E were derived from the 
experience of four committees considering 12 counter-terrorism Acts and may not illuminate 
the true nature of the rights-scrutiny culture within the federal Parliament. As noted in Chapter 
1, the counter-terrorism case study concerns a highly dynamic area of law making that is 
responsive to unpredictable international and domestic events, and formal parliamentary 
scrutiny of other areas of law by other committees may generate different results. Because of 
this, I recommend further research to document the rights-scrutiny culture across a range of 
different subject areas, and across the full range of parliamentary committees. In line with the 
key findings of my research, I recommend that, when conducting this further research, scholars 
                                                 
 
41 Carolyn Evans and Simon Evans, ‘Evaluating the Human Rights Performance of Legislatures’ (2006) 6 Human 
Rights Law Review 545; Carolyn Evans and Simon Evans, Australian Parliaments and the Protection of Human 
Rights, Parl Paper No 47 (2007). 
42 Carolyn Evans and Simon Evans, Australian Parliaments and the Protection of Human Rights, Parl Paper No 
47 (2007). 
43 National Human Rights Consultation, National Human Rights Consultation: Report (2009) Recommendation 
5, xxx–xxxi. 
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focus on the contribution of the system of committees working together, rather than evaluating 
individual committees within the system.  
E Summary of System-Wide Reforms 
In summary, the changes to the system of parliamentary committees I recommend aim to make 
modest adjustments to the way individual committees work together to maximise the 
opportunities for committees to have a rights-enhancing influence on proposed federal laws. 
My recommendations do this by boosting the funding and human resources available to 
committee secretariats to support meaningful deliberation on rights-engaging Bills, and to 
facilitate expert technical analysis on a timely basis. My recommendations also encourage 
committees to embrace new ways of communicating with each other and their key participants, 
including submission makers and public servants. This includes the provision of resources and 
information that is accessible and useful for those tasked with providing government with 
policy guidance on rights-engaging laws and drawing public attention to rights-abrogating 
provisions. When taken together, and supported by the committee-specific recommendations 
set out in Chapter 10, these changes respond to the findings in Part II about the rights-enhancing 
impact parliamentary committees had on the case study Acts, and also recognise the place 
parliamentary committees hold in the broader parliamentary system, as considered in Part I. 
The next chapter completes this picture by setting out the committee-specific changes 
recommended in this research.  
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CHAPTER 10: REFORM OPTIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL COMMITTEES 
The recommendations set out in Chapter 9 focus on improving the capacity of the system of 
parliamentary committees to contribute to rights protection in Australia, having regard to 
particular strengths and weaknesses of the four committees studied in this thesis. This chapter 
completes the picture by setting out the changes recommended for the four individual 
committees studied.  
These recommendations have been formulated on the basis of the evidence presented in Part II 
of this thesis, occasionally drawing from past recommendations made by other studies of 
particular parliamentary committees, but more commonly supported by the interview material 
obtained from those with direct experience working with the particular committees studied. 
They are presented in table format in Tables 10.1–10.4 and discussed in further detail below, 
with reference to the strengths and weaknesses of the four parliamentary committees studied. 
When integrated with the recommendations set out in Chapter 9, these changes present a new 
perspective on the role of parliamentary committees in Australia’s parliamentary model of 
rights protection, discussed further in Chapter 11. 
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Table 10.1: Reform Options for the LCA Committees 
Aim  Recommendation Implementation  
Enhance the 
deliberative quality 
of the inquiry 
process 
Formalise and actively build upon existing databases of potential 
submission makers so that direct invitations to be involved in 
committee work are distributed more consistently to a broader 
range of potentially interested parties. 
Committee Chair, 
secretariat staff 
 Formalise processes for selecting witnesses for public inquiries to 
guard against unconscious bias or preference for ‘usual suspects’. 
Committee Chair, 
secretariat staff 
 Invest in online materials and secretariat staff capacity to support 
submission makers and witnesses, particularly new witnesses, for 
example by: 
o utilising the LCA Committees’ existing website to provide: 
 examples of high quality submissions; 
 video content to convey the ‘typical’ witness 
experience; 
 lists of tips for what committee members find useful in 
submissions and oral hearings; and/or 
 a FAQ page for new submission makers and witnesses 
with links to more experienced organisations to help 
establish mentor relationships; 
o facilitating regular workshops for regular and new 
submission makers and witnesses; and 
o establishing a modest hardship fund to support non-
government witnesses travelling from regional or remote 




 Invest in reliable video communication technologies in capital 
cities and regional centres to facilitate remote access public 
hearings. This could be supported by the interim use of video 
conferencing facilities provided by ‘host’ organisations, such as 





draft Bills and 
discussion papers 
Liaise with proponent Ministers and the AGD to encourage the 




support the LCA 
Committees to 




Demonstrate the impact of LCA Committee inquiries by 
documenting and reporting on the government response to and 
legislative implementation of the committees’ recommendations, 
for example through annual report and more instantaneous 
platforms including social media and direct email through a 
subscription alert service. 
Committee Chair, 
secretariat staff 
 Proactively engage with regular submission makers, for example 
through a biannual workshop, to convey the importance of 




 When receiving a reference into a Bill that has also been referred 
to the PJCIS, require the Chairs and Secretaries of both 
committees to discuss options for appropriate collaboration, which 
could include: 
a. coordinating submission deadlines to ease pressure on 
submission makers; 
b. ‘sharing’ public submissions in an open and transparent 
way – for example by alerting all submission makers that 
their submissions will be considered by the other 
committee; 
Committee Chair 
(LCA and PJCIS), 
secretariat staff 
(LCA and PJCIS) 
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c. coordinating public hearings – which could include 
holding ‘joint hearings’ – to ensure a wide range of 
witnesses can be heard; and/or 
d. agreeing that only one committee will hold public 
hearings, but that both committees will have access to 
hearing transcripts and will table substantive reports. 
Address workload 
pressures  
Increase the overall staffing levels of the Senate Office to support 
the existing practice of allocating additional staff to the LCA 
Committees when dealing with multiple or complex references 
(see also recommendations in Chapter 9). 
Senate Office  
 Appoint a part-time specialist advisor to assist the LCA 
Committees, in a similar way as the Legal Advisor assists the 
SSCSB and PJCHR.  
Committee Chair, 
Senate Office  
 Liaise with government departments, particularly the AGD and 
DIPB, to facilitate transparent secondee relationships for 
particularly large or complex Bills inquiries or references. 
Committee Chair, 
secretariat, AGD, 
DIPB and related 
departments 
 Continue to utilise the LCA Committees’ existing subcommittee 









Encourage early and explicit consideration of PJCHR and SSCSB 




staff (LCA, PJCHR, 
SSCSB) 
 Liaise with SSCSB and PJCHR to develop and publish specific 
Guidance Notes on the rights issues commonly arising from the 
LCA Committees’ work.  
Committee Chairs, 
secretariat staff  
 Explicitly acknowledge reliance on PJCHR and SSCSB reports in 
PJCIS reports and encourage committee members to use these 




 Incorporate the PJCHR’s analytical approach into training and 
induction processes for secretariat staff and new committee 
members and secondees. 
Committee Chair, 
secretariat staff 
A LCA Committees 
As noted above, the LCA Committees’ strengths centre on their capacity to provide a 
meaningful deliberative forum by attracting a large number of diverse submission makers and 
witnesses to public inquiries, and by involving a diverse range of parliamentarians as 
members.1 The LCA Committees’ ability to engage a diverse range of Senators as members 
                                                 
 
1 This capacity to attract a wide range of diverse public participation in its processes has been cited by other key 
participants as a strong indicator of effectiveness. See, eg, Kerry Sibraa, ‘Session One: The Revolutionary 
Proposals of the 1970s’ (Keynote Address at Conference to mark the twentieth anniversary of Senate Legislative 
and General Purpose Standing Committees and Senate Estimates Committees, Canberra, 3 October 1990). See 
also John Halligan, ‘Parliamentary Committee Roles in Facilitating Public Policy’ (2008) 23(2) Australasian 
Parliamentary Review 135, 147–8; See also Interview with Patricia Crossin, former Chair and Deputy Chair of 
the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, former Australian Labor Party Senator for 
Northern Territory (telephone, 10 August 2016). 
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and as participating members is also an important strength.2 These strengths help the LCA 
Committees attract attention to the key rights issues arising from the Bills they scrutinise 
through their public inquiry function. The evidence in Chapter 6 also suggests that these 
committees can have a long-term impact on the shape of future legislative reforms by preparing 
reports that include alternative policy proposals that are subsequently adopted and reflected in 
new policy proposals or draft Bills.3  
In light of these strengths, I recommend changes that enhance the deliberative quality of the 
LCA Committees’ inquiries and increase the LCA Committees’ engagement with draft Bills 
and discussion papers. These changes reflect suggestions made in the course of interviews with 
past LCA Committees members, secretariat staff4 and key submission makers.5 They include 
formalising processes for selecting witnesses to inquiries to ensure a broad range of interested 
parties are consistently involved; improving feedback processes between submission makers 
and the committee’s secretariat staff; and encouraging the referral of draft Bills or discussion 
papers to the committees for consideration.  
My recommendations also call for improved reporting by the LCA Committees on government 
responses to their reports and legislative implementation of their key recommendations. This 
would allow key participants to have a stronger sense of the overall impact of the LCA 
Committees on proposed laws, and further support and encourage high-quality participation 
among parliamentarians, public servants and submission makers. Currently, outside of 
academic analysis such as this thesis, it is difficult to access this type of information, 
particularly for the LCA Committees, which do not publish their own annual reports. 
The evidence in Part II also highlights that in some areas the LCA Committees are struggling 
to have a consistently strong impact. In particular, since 2013, the LCA Committees have not 
                                                 
 
2 See, eg, Halligan, above n 1, 155. 
3 An example of this longer-term impact can be seen with respect to the National Security Legislation Amendment 
Act 2010 (Cth). See discussion in Chapter 6.  
4 See, eg, Interview with Sophie Dunstone, former Secretary of the LCA Committees (Canberra, 23 May 2016); 
Interview with Patricia Crossin, former Chair and Deputy Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, former Australian Labor Party Senator for Northern Territory (telephone, 10 August 2016).  
5 See, eg, Interview with Lydia Shelly, Muslim Legal Network (telephone, 2 June 2016); Interview with Kris 
Klugman and Bill Rowlings, Civil Liberties Australia (Canberra, 24 May 2016); Interview with a former senior 
member of an oversight body (telephone, 8 November 2016). 
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been engaged in any public inquiries relating to counter-terrorism Bills, with government 
members of the LCA Committee deferring consideration of these Bills to the PJCIS. Some may 
consider this a sensible approach, given the very high workload facing the LCA Committees 
and the general demands placed on committee members and secretariat staff to respond to the 
increasing number of references parliamentary committees receive.6 However, this thesis 
argues that, at least when it comes to rights-engaging Bills, the LCA Committees’ deference to 
the PJCIS is a worrying trend. This is because the evidence in Part II clearly shows that the 
most substantial, rights-enhancing impacts occur when multiple parliamentary committees 
consider a Bill. This was the case for the SLAT Bills, the ASIO Bills and the Control Order 
Bills, which were reviewed by at least two inquiry-based committees,7 in addition to the regular 
scrutiny conducted by the SSCSB and later the PJCHR. For this reason, I recommend that 
reforms be implemented to encourage the LCA Committees to continue to accept and act upon 
counter-terrorism related references and desist the recent practice of deferring inquiries into 
such Bills to the PJCIS.8  
In recognition of the need to address the demanding workload faced by less-specialised 
committees such as the LCA Committees,9 I also recommend the introduction of strategies to 
provide practical support for LCA Committees and their secretariat. For example, I recommend 
that the LCA Committees adopt the secondee approach utilised so effectively by the PJCIS and 
available to the LCA Committees under existing Standing Orders.10 As discussed in Chapter 
                                                 
 
6 See, eg, Interview with Dean Smith, Liberal Senator for Western Australia, former Chair of the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Human Rights (telephone, 22 September 2016); Greg Jennett, ‘Record Crossbench a 
Headache for Stressed Senate Budget, Workload’, ABC Online, 22 August 2016 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-22/jennett-senate-committee-inquiries/7765838>. 
7 These Bills are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
8 This recommendation is also supported by interviews conducted with a range of submission makers who 
preferred the experience of appearing before the LCA Committees to that of the PJCIS: Interview with Lydia 
Shelly, Muslim Legal Network (telephone, 2 June 2016); Interview with Kris Klugman and Bill Rowlings, Civil 
Liberties Australia (Canberra, 24 May 2016). It is also supported by the findings in Part II that the LCA 
Committees attract a more diverse range of participants and enjoy legitimacy according to a broader range of 
participants than the PJCIS. 
9 This high workload was noted in Part II. See also Sophie Dunstone, former Secretary of the Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Canberra, 23 May 2016); Interview with Patricia Crossin, former 
Chair and Deputy Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, former Australian 
Labor Party Senator for Northern Territory (telephone, 10 August 2016). 
10 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 25(17) (15 July 2014) provides that ‘A committee shall be 
provided with all necessary staff, facilities and resources and shall be empowered to appoint persons with 
specialist knowledge for the purposes of the committee, with the approval of the President.’ 
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4, the use of secondees can help build relationships of trust between a committee and the 
executive, which can in turn increase the likelihood of the committee’s recommendations being 
reflected in legislative amendments.11  
In addition to addressing workload issues, my recommendations above also seek to improve 
the LCA Committees’ capacity to collaborate with other committees, particularly those that are 
able to provide the LCA Committees and their submission makers with timely rights-specific 
analysis. For example, I recommend that the LCA Committees (or at least their secretariat staff) 
liaise with SSCSB and PJCHR to develop specific Guidance Notes on rights issues that 
commonly arise in their work, such as parliamentary oversight of the use of executive power 
to prescribe places or organisations, and the type of safeguards necessary to ensure those 
suspected of engagement in terrorist activity have access to procedural fairness and natural 
justice. This would help ensure that the materials published by the SSCSB and the PJCHR are 
well tailored to the work of inquiry-based committees and their submission makers, which 
would in turn increase the rights-enhancing capacity of the committee system12  
 
  
                                                 
 
11 Indeed, it appears that the LCA Committees have in the past made use of such arrangements in their work. 
Commonwealth, Senate Committees and Government Accountability, Parl Paper No 54 (2010). See in particular 
former Senator the Hon Nick Minchin, ‘Committees Under a Government-Controlled Senate: Lessons From 
2005–08’, exchange between Chair (Mr John Carter) and Clerk of the House Robyn McClelland. 
12 This is consistent with feedback from parliamentary counsel and public servants about the utility of well-
targeted guidance material prepared by the SSCSB, discussed in Chapter 7. 
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Table 10.2: Reform Options for the PJCIS 
Aim  Recommendation Implementation  
Enhance and 
document strong 
legislative impact  
Continue to document and report on government 
responses to and legislative implementation of Committee 
recommendations in Annual Reports and more immediate 




 Encourage committee members to explicitly refer to the 
work of the PJCIS and the contribution of submission 
makers and witnesses in parliamentary debates. 
Committee Chair, 
committee members  
 Continue to invest in additional resources for Secretariat 
Staff and committee members faced with significant 
increases in statutorily prescribed workloads. 
Senate Office 
 Maintain and strengthen the development of legal and 
counter-terrorism expertise within PJCIS, particularly for 
new members and new Secretariat staff, for example 
through training, liaison with international counter-parts 
and regular formal and informal meetings with OIL and 
relevant intelligence and law enforcement agencies. 
Committee Chair, 








Continue to utilise secondee arrangements, and expand to 
include a broader range of policy and operational experts, 
including human rights experts and constitutional law 
experts where appropriate. 
Committee Chair, 
secretariat staff, AGD 
 Improve the transparency of secondee arrangements by: 
o Publicly confirming that the secondee is not 
answerable to the proponent Minister at any time 
when seconded to the committee; 
o Acknowledging in each report and before each 
public hearing that the Committee is utilising the 
expertise of a secondee from X agency or 
Department; 
o Ensuring that the secondee has not been involved 
in the development of the legislative proposal or 
legislative proposal approval process, prior to 
being seconded to the committee;  
o Disclosing the secondee as the source of any 
information relied upon by the Committee when 
making findings or recommendations in its report; 
o Excluding the secondee from private meetings 
conducted by the Committee; and 
o Seeking feedback from non-government 
submission makers and witnesses about the use of 
secondees. 
Committee Chair, 
secretariat staff, committee 
members 
 Continue to enhance the PJCIS’s working relationships 
with oversight bodies by: 
o Coordinating statutory mandated reviews and 
reporting requirements where possible 
o Inviting the IGIS, INSLM, and Ombudsman to 
give evidence at public inquiries into Bills as a 
matter of course, and ensuring evidence is given as 
part of a public inquiry (even if a closed hearing is 
also required) 
o Requesting additional briefings from the IGIS, 
INSLM, or Ombudsman when seeking to give 
effect to or depart from the specific 
Committee Chair, 
secretariat staff, oversight 
bodies 
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recommendations for legislative change made by 
these oversight bodies. 
Encourage a 
diverse range of 
submission makers 
to public inquiries 
Formalise and actively build upon existing databases of 
potential submission makers so that invitations to be 
involved in committee work are distributed more 




 Formalise processes for selecting witnesses for public 
inquiries to guard against unconscious bias or preference 
for ‘usual suspects’. 
Committee Chair, 
secretariat staff 
 Invest in materials and Secretariat staff capacity to 
support submission makers and witnesses, particularly 
new witnesses, for example by adopting the strategies 








Encourage early and explicit consideration of PJCHR and 
SSCSB reports to help structure draft PJCIS Reports and 
isolate key rights issues. 
Committee Chairs (PJCIS, 
PJCHR, SSCSB), 
secretariat staff (PJCIS 
PJCHR, SSCSB) 
 Liaise with SSCSB and PJCHR to develop specific 
Guidance Notes on the rights issues commonly arising 
from the work of the PJCIS.  
Committee Chairs (PJCIS, 
PJCHR, SSCSB), 
secretariat staff (PJCIS 
PJCHR, SSCSB) 
 Explicitly acknowledge reliance on PJCHR and SSCSB 
reports in PJCIS reports and encourage committee 
members to use these reports as the basis for questions for 
witnesses at public hearings. 
Committee Chair, 
committee members 
 Incorporate the PJCHR’s analytical approach into training 
and induction processes for Secretariat staff and new 





Part II of this thesis highlighted the many comparative strengths of the PJCIS, including its 
particularly strong legislative impact on the case study Acts since 2013. It highlighted the 
PJCIS’s strong, positive working relationships with government departments, key law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies, sophisticated submission makers and oversight bodies. 
It also explained how the majority-party-controlled membership of the PJCIS can help facilitate 
the effective negotiation of recommended legislative reforms to address rights concerns. Part 
II also documented the PJCIS’s expanding statutory oversight and legislative review role, and 
explained why the PJCIS may have replaced the LCA Committees as a forum of choice for 
review of counter-terrorism Bills. Chapter 8 explained how these features combine to give the 
PJCIS a number of advantages when it comes to rights-enhancing impact. 
However, the evidence presented in Part II also suggests that the PJCIS may suffer from 
shortcomings and potential threats to its future legitimacy, often precisely because of the 
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unique character of its relationship with government and its agencies. The PJCIS’s secondee 
arrangements, for example, have attracted negative feedback from some submission makers 
and oversight bodies,13 despite contributing significantly to the committee’s strong legislative 
impact. For this reason, I recommend changes to improve the transparency of secondee 
arrangements, such as ensuring that the secondee has not been involved in the development of 
the legislative proposal or legislative proposal approval process14 and disclosing the secondee 
as the source of any information relied upon by the committee when making findings or 
recommendations in its report.  
Like the LCA Committees, the PJCIS also lacks a clear rights-scrutiny mandate,15 meaning 
that it is often reliant upon submission makers, and the work of the SSCSB and the PJCHR, for 
consistent and detailed rights-specific analysis. For this reason, a number of changes to the 
PJCIS’s processes and practices are recommended to encourage a more diverse range of 
participants to the PJCIS inquiries and to ensure that the PJCIS and its submission makers have 
timely access to high-quality human rights analysis from the technical scrutiny committees. 
For example, I recommend changes to promote liaison between the PJCIS and the technical 
scrutiny committees to ensure that Guidance Notes and scrutiny reports are well tailored to the 
needs of the PJCIS. These recommendations share features in common with those made by 
other commentators, including former PJCIS member, former Senator John Faulkner16 and the 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute.17 They also align with recommendations made by the 
Department of Prime Minster and Cabinet’s 2017 Independent Intelligence Review.18  
                                                 
 
13 See, eg, Interview with Kris Klugman and Bill Rowlings, Civil Liberties Australia (Canberra, 24 May 2016); 
Interview with a former senior member of an oversight body (telephone, 8 November 2016). 
14 See discussion in Chapter 4; see also Interview with a former senior member of an oversight body (telephone, 
8 November 2016). 
15 As discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, I do not see this as inappropriate and do not recommend that it be changed, 
rather it is a characteristic of the PJCIS to which my recommendations are attuned. 
16 John Faulkner, ‘Surveillance, Intelligence and Accountability: an Australia Story’ (Senate Occasional Paper, 
Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2014). Note that a number of Mr Faulkner’s recommendations 
have already been adopted, for example extending the PJCIS’s functions to include a role in the oversight of the 
counter-terrorism functions of the AFP. See, eg, Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) s 29(1)(bab). 
17 Russell Trood and Anthony Bergin, ‘Creative Tension: Parliament and National Security’ (Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, August 2015).  
18 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Independent Intelligence Review (2017) 8–9, 118–25, 
Recommendations 21 and 23. For example, this review recommended that the PJCIS be empowered to: review 
all proposed reforms to counter-terrorism and national security legislation and review all such expiring legislation 
(recommendation 23(b)); initiate its own inquiries into proposed or existing counter-terrorism and national 
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By adopting the changes set out in detail in Table 10.2, I argue that the tensions between the 
PJCIS’s authoritative and deliberative role discussed in Chapter 4 can be minimised, without 
compromising the PJCIS’s unique strengths, identified in Chapter 8. 
  
                                                 
 
security laws (recommendation 23(c); request briefings from the INSLM and ask the INSLM to provide the PJCIS 
with a report on matters referred by the PJCIS and to coordinate reports on national security legislation 
(recommendation 23(d)). 
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Table 10.3 Reform Options for the SSCSB 




Document and report on the extent to which SSCSB 
publications have been incorporated into formal guidance 
materials for public servants and parliamentary counsel, 
including in the Legislation Handbook, Drafting Directions 
and the Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences.  
Secretariat 
 Prioritise the development of targeted Guidance Notes, 
focusing on the most common rights-related concerns that 
arise in the SSCSB’s reports. This guidance material should 
be developed in close consultation with parliamentary counsel 
and instructing departments and be subject to public review.  
Committee Chair, 
secretariat 
 Proactively utilise the power in Senate Standing Order 
24(1)(b) to scrutinise exposure drafts of proposed legislation 
and provide specific rights-scrutiny advice to departments at 






other committees  
Liaise with the inquiry-based committees to identify what 
SSCSB publications are most useful to these committees when 
undertaking inquiries into rights-engaging Bills and prioritise 
the development of Guidance Notes that address any needs of 
the inquiry-based committees for reliable, ‘technical’ analysis 
of commonly arising rights or scrutiny concerns. 
Committee Chair, 
secretariat  
 Document and report on instances when the SSCSB has been 
quoted in an inquiry-based committee report. 
Secretariat 
 Continue to issue timely Alert Digests in short, accessible 
format. The tabling of Bill-specific Alert Digests should be 




 Compile a database of SSCSB’s findings and 
recommendations that allows the SSCSB’s Alert Digests and 
reports to be searched thematically or by key word to improve 
access to key elements of the SSCSB’s reports, and allow 
analysis of the SSCSB’s findings on particular rights issues 
over time. This could include a link from the Bill’s homepage 
to any relevant Alert Digest or report which comments on that 
Bill. 
Secretariat 
 Be explicit about the connection between the SSCSB scrutiny 
criteria and that of the PJCHR in all SSCSB publications.  
Committee Chair, 
secretariat 
 Liaise regularly with the Chair and secretariat staff of the 
PJCHR with a view to preparing joint (or at least 
complementary) Guidance Notes on areas of common 
concern, such as retrospectivity, access to judicial review and 
procedural guarantees.  
Committee Chair, 
secretariat 
 Utilise Senate Standing Order 24(7) to actively encourage 
public input into the development of Guidance Notes and 




ministerial responses  
‘Name and shame’ delayed responses from proponent 
Ministers to reasonable requests for information by the 
committee, for example by utilising recently amended 
Standing Order 24(1)(d)–(g) to publicise late responses to 
requests for information and to demand an explanation from 
the proponent Minister in Parliament. 
Committee Chair 
 Publish Alert Digests and reports during non-sitting periods in 
appropriate cases, for example by adopting a provision similar 
to Standing Order 38(7) that currently permits this approach 






As discussed in Chapter 8, the SSCSB’s strengths lie in its strong hidden impact on the case 
study Acts, and in the high levels of legitimacy it attracts across key participants in the 
parliamentary scrutiny system. As an interviewee said, the SSCSB is ‘part of the Senate 
furniture’.19  
These strengths are preserved and enhanced by the above recommendations, which aim to 
further enhance the role of the SSCSB in policy development and legislative drafting, including 
by developing new, rights-focused guidance material that provides clear legislative options for 
public servants seeking to avoid negative scrutiny by the SSCSB.20 For example, Guidance 
Notes could be prepared on topics including access to meaningful judicial review of executive 
decisions or the type of safeguards necessary to protect against undue interference with 
individual privacy by law enforcement or intelligence officers.21 I also recommend that the 
SSCSB take better advantage of its power in Senate Standing Order 24(1)(b) to scrutinise 
exposure drafts of proposed legislation. This would amplify the committee’s existing strong 
behind-the-scenes impact by providing specific rights-scrutiny advice to departments at the 
pre-introduction stage.  
The above recommendations are also focused on increasing the SSCSB’s opportunities to 
interact meaningfully with other parliamentary committees in the system. These 
recommendations echo those made above for the LCA Committees and the PJCIS, and 
encourage the SSCSB to work with these inquiry-based committees to identify what Guidance 
Notes are most useful when undertaking public inquiries into rights-engaging Bills. It is further 
recommended that the SSCSB keep a ‘running record’ of the instances when the SSCSB has 
                                                 
 
19 Interview with A (Canberra, 23 May 2016). See also Brian Halligan, ‘Session Four Senate Committees: Can 
they Halt the Decline of Parliament?’ (Keynote Address at Conference to mark the twentieth anniversary of Senate 
Legislative and General Purpose Standing Committees and Senate Estimates Committees, Canberra, 3 October 
1990); John Uhr, Keeping Government Honest: Preconditions of Parliamentary Effectiveness, Parl Paper No 29 
(1995) 51, 59–60; Chris Puplick, ‘Session One: The Revolutionary Proposals of the 1970s’ (Keynote Address at 
Conference to mark the twentieth anniversary of Senate Legislative and General Purpose Standing Committees 
and Senate Estimates Committees, Canberra, 3 October 1990). 
20 This is supported by evidence from public servants and parliamentary counsel about the utility of previous 
SSCSB guidance materials, and the documentary evidence showing how these notes were used in Drafting 
Directions and policy guidance materials for the AGD. These matters were discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
21 These issues arise regularly in SSCSB reports, but also in inquiry-based committee reports on counter-terrorism 
laws. For examples, see Chapters 3 and 5. 
283 
been quoted in an inquiry-based committee report,22 as means of highlighting the existing 
rights-enhancing contribution made by the SSCSB, and improving the relevance of the 
SSCSB’s publications. 
Despite its many strengths, the evidence in Part II demonstrates that the SSCSB’s engagement 
with non-government participants, and in particular with the broader community and the media, 
is limited compared to the other committees studied. Chapter 5 also documented the challenges 
the SSCSB faces when it comes to tabling its final reports prior to the resumption of the second 
reading debate on a Bill, particularly when responses from Ministers are delayed or inadequate. 
In light of these comparative ‘weaknesses’, it is tempting to recommend a raft of changes that 
reframe the ‘technical’ character of the SSCSB and bring it closer to that of the PJCIS or LCA 
Committees. However, as the earlier discussion in this chapter warns, making such changes to 
the SSCSB could jeopardise the precise features of the committee that give it its comparative 
strengths as a ‘non-political’, ‘technical’ committee. 
For this reason, my recommendations stop short of calling for the SSCSB to hold more public 
inquiries into Bills, or encouraging the committee to publicise its findings in media releases. 
Instead, my recommendations focus on increasing the SSCSB’s opportunities to interact 
meaningfully with other parliamentary committees, as well as identifying new opportunities 
for the SSCSB to improve its engagement with the broader community. For example, I 
recommend that the SSCSB actively seek public feedback on existing and proposed Guidance 
Notes or other statements that seek to flesh out aspects of its scrutiny criteria in more detail. 
This could be easily managed by the committee without disturbing its ‘technical’ character, for 
example by drawing upon its already strong relationships with the legal profession and public 
servants. It could also allow the SSCSB to engage with other community groups without 
holding public hearings or impinging on tight time frames for completing scrutiny reports.  
The publication of more targeted Guidance Notes would also provide a practical opportunity 
for the SSCSB to liaise with the PJCHR. For example, the two committees (which are already 
supported by a combined secretariat structure that also includes the Senate Standing Committee 
                                                 
 
22 Senate Standing Order 25.2A (15 July 2014) for legislative and general purpose committees includes a 
requirement to take into account any SSCSB or SCSRO reports. 
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on Regulations and Ordinances)23 could develop joint Guidance Notes on rights issues of 
common concern, such as those listed in Appendix E. Such joint Guidance Notes could 
explicitly identify how each particular committee approaches the rights issue, or evaluates the 
appropriateness of safeguards or limitations on rights, whilst at the same time demonstrating 
the commonality in analytical approaches between the two committees. This in turn would help 
improve the relevance of these materials for a wide range of key participants, particularly for 
public servants and parliamentary counsel who rely upon consistency and clarity when it comes 
to providing advice on the rights-compliance of legislative options for government.  
My recommendations also share features with those made by the 2012 SSCSB report on the 
future directions of the SSCSB.24 For example, both the future directions report and this thesis 
recommend that the committee: 
 consider and publish its scrutiny reports during non-sitting periods in appropriate cases;  
 notify the Senate of any instance of a Minister’s failure to respond to a request for 
information from the SSCSB (after a reasonable time and with notice to the Minister); 
 include a link from the Parliament’s homepage for a Bill to any relevant Alert Digest 
or report which comments on that Bill; and  
 establish an internal database to capture the committee’s comments on Bills from 2000 
onwards.25 
From the interview material obtained for this thesis, it appears that moves are already underway 
to implement some of these strategies in practice. For example, an interviewee said that the 
committee has been: 
producing a quarterly responsiveness table, which provides the opportunity to [identify] 
people for a lack of response. [The previous committee] put in a notice of motion for a 
                                                 
 
23 Discussed further below, see also Interview with B (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
24 SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the future direction and role of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee 
(2012).  
25 Ibid [7.16]–[7.22]. 
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temporary order where any senator could take note of a lack of response before debate. … [I]t 
will be up to the next committee whether it proceeds with that.26 
As noted in Chapter 3, since November 2017 this has been reflected in Standing Order 24 
which provides that the SSCSB shall ‘maintain on its website a list of bills in relation to which 
the committee has sought advice from the responsible minister and not yet received a 
response’.27 The amended Standing Order also provides that, where the SSCSB has not been 
able to complete a final report on the Bill because a ministerial response has not been received, 
then ‘any senator may ask the minister for an explanation of why the minister has not provided 
a response to the committee’.28 This can be followed by a motion without notice asking that 
the ‘Senate take note of the explanation’ or that the Senate note the Minister’s ‘failure to 
provide an explanation’.29 Similar strategies are also recommended with respect to the PJCHR 
and are discussed below. 
  
                                                 
 
26 Interviews with A and B (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
27 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 24(1)(d) (17 November 2017). 
28 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 24(1)(e) (17 November 2017). 
29 Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 24(1)(f)–(g) (17 November 2017). 
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Table 10.4: Reform Options for the PJCHR 
Aim  Recommendation Implementation  
Enhance relevance 
and accessibility of 
analysis  
Use reports to highlight rights-protecting as well as rights-
infringing qualities of proposed laws. 
Committee Chair, 
secretariat 
 Continue to explicitly acknowledge instances where international 
human rights law concepts overlap with or intersect with SSCSB 




 Build capacity within the committee’s membership to articulate 
and apply a consistent approach to ‘balancing’ rights and public 
interests. This could be assisted by the publication of more 
Guidance Notes (see below). 
Committee Chair, 
secretariat 
 Publicly acknowledge high-quality SoCs including through the 
Chair’s Tabling Statement, the annual report and by informal 




 Compile a database of PJCHR reports and SoCs that can be 
searched thematically and/or by ‘rights issue’. 
secretariat 
 Prioritise the development of rights-specific Guidance Notes that 
focus on rights issues commonly emerging from the committee’s 
work, and include specific examples of the types of safeguards 
necessary if the Parliament intends to permissibly limit a protected 
right. These Guidance Notes should be developed in close 
consultation with the SSCSB, OIL, other relevant departments and 
parliamentary counsel. Public input should also be sought, for 
example, by requesting comments on draft Guidance Notes. 
Committee Chair, 
secretariat 
 Liaise with parliamentary counsel to distil commonly applied 
human rights principles into a drafting check list that can be 
readily incorporated in Drafting Directions and the Legislation 
Handbook. 
Secretariat 
 Prepare and table regular annual reports that document the impact 







Adopt Alert Digest style reporting practices to ensure that the 
PJCHR’s initial views on human rights compatibility are available 
prior to the resumption of the second reading debate on a Bill. 
These Alert Digests could be drafted in a similar style and 
structure to the SSCSB’s Alert Digests, leaving the more detailed 
analysis and response from the proponent Minister to be discussed 
in the subsequent final report 
Committee Chair, 
secretariat 
 ‘Name and shame’ delayed responses from proponent Ministers to 
reasonable requests for information by the committee, for example 
by publicising late responses to requests for information and 
demanding an explanation from the proponent Minister in 





other committees  
Liaise regularly with the Chair and secretariat staff of the SSCSB 
with the view to preparing joint Guidance Notes on areas of 
common concern, such as retrospectivity, access to judicial 
review, and procedural fairness guarantees. 
Committee Chair, 
secretariat 
 Amend Senate Standing Order 25.2A to require inquiry-based 
committees to have regard to reports of the PJCHR as well as the 
SSCSB. 
Parliament 
 Liaise with the inquiry-based committees to identify what 
resources and reports prepared by the PJCHR are most useful to 
these committees when undertaking inquiries into rights-engaging 
Bills. Prioritise the development of Guidance Notes that address 
the needs of the inquiry-based committees for reliable, ‘technical’ 





As observed in Part II and Chapter 8, of all the committees studied in this thesis, the PJCHR 
struggled to demonstrate high impact on the case study Acts. The relatively short lifespan of 
the committee,30 coupled with its complex mandate, contribute to its comparatively lower 
status among key participants, and its relative lack of direct legislative and public impact. This 
is further exacerbated by the confusion that appears to exist about the true goal or purpose of 
the committee. As discussed in Chapter 3 and highlighted in the interview material included in 
Part II, for many key participants it is either not clear exactly what the PJCHR’s goal is, or 
whether the PJCHR is capable of living up to the high expectations held at the time of its 
establishment.31 Is it a technical scrutiny committee, or a committee designed to actively 
promote human rights compliance? Is the committee comfortable working largely on the 
papers, or should it facilitate human rights discussions among the broader Australian 
community? These are some of the persistent questions that have plagued the PJCHR’s early 
history. They lead, in turn, to more practical questions relating to timing of tabling of reports, 
how dissenting views should be dealt with, and the content and quality of SoCs. 
This thesis argues that, by focusing on the PJCHR’s emerging strengths, and its potential 
capacity to collaborate with other parliamentary committees in the system, it is possible to 
                                                 
 
30 The fact that the PJCHR has only been in operation since 2012 was noted in the following interviews: Interview 
with B (Canberra, 23 May 2016); Interview with Aruna Sathanpally, Legal Advisor, Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (telephone, 23 June 2016); Interview with Simon Rice, former Legal Advisor to the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (Sydney, 24 May 2016); Interview with Dean Smith, Liberal 
Senator for Western Australia, former Chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (telephone, 
22 September 2016). 
31 See, eg, George Williams and Lisa Burton, ‘Australia’s Parliamentary Scrutiny Act: An Exclusive 
Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection’ in Murray Hunt, Hayley Jane Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), 
Parliaments and Human Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart Publishing, 2015) 257; George Williams 
and Daniel Reynolds, ‘The Operation and Impact of Australia’s Parliamentary Scrutiny Regime for Human 
Rights’ (2016) 41(2) Monash University Law Review 469; Rosalind Dixon, ‘A New (Inter)national Human Rights 
Experiment for Australia’ (2012) 23(2) Public Law Review 75; Dan Meagher, ‘The Human Rights (Parliamentary 
Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) and the Courts’ (2014) 42 Federal Law Review 1; Shawn Rajanayagam, ‘Does 
Parliament Do Enough? Evaluating Statements of Compatibility under the Human Rights (Parliamentary 
Scrutiny) Act’ (2015) 38(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1046; James Stellios and Michael 
Palfrey, ‘A New Federal Scheme for the Protection of Human Rights’ (2012) 69 AIAL Forum 13; Edward Santow, 
‘The Act that Dares Not Speak its Name: the National Human Rights Consultation Report’s Parallel Roads to 
Human Rights Reform’ (2010) 33(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 8.  Alexander Williams and 
George Williams, ‘The British Bill of Rights Debate: Lessons from Australia’ (2016) Public Law 471; Daniel 
Reynolds and George Williams, A Charter of Rights for Australia (NewSouth Books, 4th ed 2017); George 
Williams, ‘Scrutiny of Primary Legislation Principles and Challenges: Where are We Now and Where are We 
Headed?’ Australia-New Zealand Scrutiny of Legislation Conference, Parliament House, Perth, 12 July 2016. 
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resolve at least some of the existential questions confronting the PJCHR, and to improve its 
rights-enhancing impact. 
As Part II documented, the PJCHR’s emerging strengths centre on the following practices and 
outputs: 
 the provision of high-quality and detailed rights analysis that often involves reference 
to comparative international sources, common law rights, High Court decisions and 
findings by other oversight bodies such as the AHRC and the INSLM. The evidence in 
Part II suggests that it is increasingly relied upon and referred to by other parliamentary 
committees and in submissions to inquiry-based committees; 
 the high degree of cross-over between the findings of the PJCHR on a narrow range of 
‘legal process’ related rights and the recommendations made by inquiry-based 
committees, which are regularly reflected in successful amendments to proposed laws; 
 the articulation and application of the ‘proportionality test’32 as a framework for 
balancing competing rights and interests arising from a particular law; and 
 a small but growing awareness of the value of the analysis provided by the PJCHR by 
a handful of parliamentarians, and among some government departments, particularly 
the AGD. 
These strengths suggest that the PJCHR is performing relatively well as a ‘technical scrutiny’ 
committee, at least for a committee of its age. These are also the features of the PJCHR that 
appear to attract the most legitimacy among the broadest range of key participants,33 suggesting 
that investing in the PJCHR’s technical scrutiny role may also help to improve the committee’s 
political authority. 
                                                 
 
32 For an overview of the ‘proportionality test’ as applied by the PJCHR see, eg, PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, 
Guidance Note 1: Drafting Statements of Compatibility (2014) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Human_Rights/Guidance_Notes_and_Reso
urces>. For further discussion see Michael Newton and Larry May, Proportionality in International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2014). Cf Shipra Chordia, ‘The problem of balancing: structured proportionality and tiered 
scrutiny’, Harvard Law School Visiting Scholar Colloquium Series, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, 30 
November 2016. 
33 For further discussion see Chapters 4 and 7. 
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One way to invest in the PJCHR’s technical scrutiny function is to ensure that the committee’s 
reports are targeted to those responsible for developing and drafting proposed legislation, For 
example, I recommend that the PJCHR allocate time and resources to the preparation of 
Guidance Notes that focus on commonly arising rights issues, and specifically identify 
examples of the types of safeguards that should be included in proposed provisions that seek 
to interfere with or limit a protected right. This would serve the dual purpose of (1) clearly 
acknowledging that it may be permissible for the executive to limit a right, provided certain 
criteria are met; and (2) providing clear, prospective guidance to policy makers and 
parliamentary counsel about the types of provisions and safeguards that would be considered 
rights compliant by the PJCHR. 
These types of more targeted Guidance Notes could be developed in active consultation with 
key submission makers, the SSCSB and the inquiry-based committees. Indeed, this type of 
successful public engagement occurred at the beginning of the PJCHR’s life, when the 
processes and practices of the committee were still being finalised.34 The PJCHR has also been 
proactive in providing its own submissions to the inquiry-based committees on occasion, and 
this practice could be further supported and encouraged as a way of adding value to the multi-
committee scrutiny process.35 
The utility of the reports prepared by the PJCHR could be further enhanced by making it easier 
to access and understand the PJCHR’s views on particular rights issues over time. While efforts 
are currently made in the PJCHR’s annual report to list those rights most commonly considered 
by the committee,36 it remains a slow and cumbersome task to distil the key principles applied 
by the committee on commonly considered rights such as the right to a fair trial. This could be 
addressed by compiling a database of PJCHR reports that could be searched thematically or by 
‘key word’ to enable submission makers, parliamentary committee staff, parliamentary counsel 
and others to quickly access what the PJCHR has said on a particular rights issue across a range 
of different Bills. This would in turn improve the likelihood that submission makers to inquiry-
                                                 
 
34 Interview with Penny Wright, former member of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, former 
Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, former 
Australian Greens Senator for South Australia (Adelaide, 11 August 2016). 
35 PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, Annual Report 2012–13 (2013) [1.34]–[1.35]. 
36 Ibid app 6. 
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based committees, and parliamentarians themselves, would draw upon the work of the PJCHR 
in their public advocacy on particular rights issues or Bills. 
My research suggests that the PJCHR could also improve its legitimacy among public servants 
and government parliamentarians by regularly and publicly acknowledging positive efforts by 
the executive to have regard to the rights implications of proposed laws at an early stage. This 
could include, for example, publishing examples of high-quality SoCs on the PJCHR website. 
It could also involve the PJCHR explicitly recognising that, very often, the policy driver behind 
proposed laws is at least in part rights promoting, even if the provisions of the proposed law 
are not rights compliant. Like the former INSLM Bret Walker SC, I recommend that these 
rights-promoting aims be consistently and explicitly acknowledged in PJCHR reports,37 before 
descending into a more critical analysis of the overall rights compliance of the Bill. 
Of course, these recommended changes depend upon key participants receiving the reports of 
the PJCHR in adequate time to make use of their contents before the passage of the particular 
Bill. To this end, this thesis draws upon recommendations made by other scholars designed to 
improve the timeliness of the tabling of PJCHR reports. For example, I support the 
recommendation made by Williams and Burton that a ‘guaranteed minimum time period’ be 
provided between the introduction of a Bill and the completion of the second reading debate 
on the Bill to ensure that the PJCHR can consider and report on any proposed Bill.38 This could 
be achieved by the adoption of a Standing Order, applicable in both Houses, that provides that, 
as a general rule, the second reading debate on a Bill should not resume until the reports of all 
relevant committees have been tabled.39  
However, in recognition that such a reform would demand strong executive leadership and 
majority parliamentary support across both Houses, I also recommend reforms that can be 
implemented by the PJCHR itself. Chief among these is the recommendation that the PJCHR 
                                                 
 
37 See, eg, Interview with Bret Walker SC, former Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (Sydney, 30 
May 2016). 
38 Williams and Reynolds, above n 31, 479. 
39 Ibid 502. See Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms – Encroachments by 
Commonwealth Laws, Report No 127 (Interim) (2015) 52. This recommendation is included in the system-wide 
recommendations set out in Chapter 9. 
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adopt the Alert Digest style40 reporting practices of the SSCSB to ensure its initial views on 
the human rights compatibility of a Bill are available prior to the resumption of the second 
reading debate. These Alert Digests could be drafted in a similar style and structure to the 
SSCSB’s Alert Digests (more recently known as Initial Scrutiny Reports), leaving the more 
detailed analysis and response from the proponent Minister to be discussed in subsequent final 
reports (more recently known as ‘Commentary on Ministerial Responses’). 
Recent experience suggests that the PJCHR is already experimenting with tabling multiple 
reports on particularly complex or rights-engaging Bills41 and issuing scrutiny reports which 
include consideration of ‘matters where a response is required’ as well as ‘concluded 
matters’.42 This appears to be supported by the recent practice of sharing secretariat staff 
between the SSCSB and the PJCHR. This type of initial scrutiny reporting allows the PJCHR’s 
preliminary views to be made available to Parliament prior to the completion of the second 
reading debate on the Bill, while their concluded views are presented some time later, following 
the receipt of a response from the relevant Minister. My recommendation to adopt a more 
consistent Alert Digest or Initial Scrutiny approach would formalise this process, without 
undermining the PJCHR’s commitment to engaging in a meaningful ‘dialogue’ with the 
executive about the rights compliance of proposed laws.43  
The interview material gathered for this thesis suggests that the use of Alert Digest and Bill-
specific reporting would also greatly improve the chances of the views of the PJCHR being 
considered by a wide range of key participants prior to decisions being made on the content 
                                                 
 
40 As noted in Chapter 3, since 2017, the SSCSB began publishing its scrutiny comments on recently introduced 
Bills (including responses received on matters previously considered by the committee) in one report, the Scrutiny 
Digest. However, the Scrutiny Digest continues to be divided into initial reports on the Bill (previously called 
‘Alert Digests’, now called ‘Initial Scrutiny’) and concluded reports on the Bill (previously called ‘Reports’ now 
called ‘Commentary on Ministerial Responses’). See, eg, SSCSB, Parliament of Australia, Scrutiny Digest No 7 
of 2017 (21 June 2017). Similar language could be adopted by the PJCHR. 
41 See, eg, PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, Twenty-Fifth Report of the 44th Parliament (2015) 23; PJCHR, 
Parliament of Australia, Thirty-Sixth Report of the 44th Parliament (2016) ch 2 ‘Concluded Matters’. See also 
PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, Seventh Report of 2016 (2016); PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, Eighth Report 
of 2016 (2016). 
42 See, eg, PJCHR, Parliament of Australia, Report No 6 of 2017 (2017). 
43 The commitment of committee Chairs, members and staff to the preservation of this dialogue – which hinges 
on the proponent Minister having the opportunity to provide further written information to the PJCHR –appears 
to have thwarted efforts to ensure speedy tabling of PJCHR reports in the past. See, eg, Interview with B 
(Canberra, 23 May 2016); Interview with Dean Smith, Liberal Senator for Western Australia, former Chair of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (telephone, 22 September 2016). 
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and merits of the Bill.44 Alert Digest style reports could be supported by the development of 
Guidance Notes on commonly occurring rights issues, as discussed above, and by the 
establishment of a searchable database of PJCHR comments, to enable public servants who are 
involved in the legislation development process to quickly and easily access past PJCHR 
comments on relevant provisions or rights issues. 
Alert Digest style reporting could also assist the PJCHR to ‘develop a procedure for 
progressing to a conclusion when a response [from a proponent minister] is not forthcoming’, 
as recommended by Williams and Reynolds,45 and help to diffuse the tensions surrounding the 
handling of dissent within the PJCHR. For example, it would enable the committee to express 
preliminary rights compatibility concerns in the form of questions, or ‘leaving matters to the 
Parliament as a whole to consider’, in the style of the SSCSB, rather than requiring PJCHR 
members to directly criticise an aspect of government policy on human rights grounds.  
Alert Digest style reporting by the PJCHR could also help the committee experiment with new 
ways to present dissenting views on rights compatibility in its reports. For example, the PJCHR 
could follow a practice of raising rights compatibility questions at the Alert Digest stage, along 
with information about how such questions are resolved under international human rights law. 
This would allow the rights issue to be brought to the early attention of the Parliament and 
could provide a useful analytical framework to inform the public debate on the rights question. 
If dissenting views are still held within the committee they could be set out at the final report 
stage in a similar style to the ‘dissenting comments’ or ‘additional comments’ frequently 
included in the LCA Committees’ reports.46  
Alert Digest style reporting would also provide a strong basis for the PJCHR to adopt the type 
of strategies currently being implemented by the SSCSB to address the lack of timely response 
by Ministers to requests for further information and demand that Ministers be held to account 
                                                 
 
44 See discussion in Chapter 7 and Interview with Penny Wright, former member of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, former Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
References Committee, former Australian Greens Senator for South Australia (Adelaide, 11 August 2016); 
Interview with Official A, Attorney-General’s Department (Canberra, 23 May 2016). 
45 Williams and Reynolds, above n 31, 479. 
46 This recommendation can be compared with that of Williams and Reynolds, who take the view that ‘The current 
approach of the PJCHR … allows dissent to be anonymous, unsubstantiated and unresolved’ and suggest that 
‘[a]n appropriate solution to this would be to amend the Act so that it requires the Committee to reach a majority 
view, while making provision for dissenting members to provide reasons, along with their names’. Ibid, 503. 
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for their failure to respond through a motion in Parliament. For example, like the SSCSB, the 
PJCHR could take steps to publicise instances of delayed responses from proponent Ministers 
to reasonable requests for information.47  
Should the recommendations above relating to Alert Digest style reporting be adopted by the 
PJCHR, similar procedural consequences could follow. For example, a Bill could be barred 
from the ‘non-controversial’ list if it receives criticism from the PJCHR in its initial scrutiny 
report on the Bill. While most Bills dealing with national security or counter-terrorism would 
automatically be categorised as ‘controversial’, this procedural change could provide an 
additional incentive for proponent Ministers to take the initial scrutiny findings of the PJCHR 
seriously and implement practices for responding to PJCHR requests for information in a 
timely way. 
Taken together, these recommendations are designed to improve the utility and effectiveness 
of the PJCHR as a ‘technical scrutiny’ body, rather than an inquiry-based committee, on the 
basis that this is the best way for the committee to improve its rights-enhancing impact within 
the broader committee system. While at first blush it may be tempting to recommend more 
radical reforms, the evidence gathered in Part II warns against this approach. For example, the 
evidence presented in Chapters 4 and 7 suggests encouraging the PJCHR to conduct more 
public hearings and more proactively publicise its findings of non-compliance could put the 
legitimacy of the PJCHR at risk. By more proactively entering the public debate on a Bill, the 
PJCHR could be more susceptible to perceptions of illegitimately engaging in policy 
evaluation, at greater risk of alienating parliamentarians and submission makers, and face 
larger challenges when it comes to dealing with dissent.48 The findings and conclusions of the 
                                                 
 
47 As noted above, on 17 November 2017 Standing Order 24 was amended to provide, where the SSCSB has not 
been able to complete a final report on the Bill because a ministerial response has not been received, then ‘any 
senator may ask the minister for an explanation of why the minister has not provided a response to the committee’. 
This can be followed by a motion without notice asking that the ‘Senate take note of the explanation’ or that the 
Senate note the minister’s ‘failure to provide an explanation’. Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Order 
24(1)(d)–(g) (17 November 2017). 
48 Indeed some of these criticisms were levelled at the PJCHR after the committee’s 2016–17 Inquiry into Freedom 
of Speech. See, eg, Rob Inglis, ‘Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights releases freedom of speech 
report, The Examiner (Hobart), 28 February 2017 <http://www.examiner.com.au/story/4498392/free-speech-
report-tabled/>; see also David Crowe, ‘Malcolm Turnbull Urged to Overhaul HRC as Review Splits on 18C’, 




PJCHR may also be harder to predict, putting at risk its emerging hidden impact among public 
servants and parliamentary counsel who rely upon consistency and clarity when it comes to 
articulating and applying human rights principles.  
My recommendations are also consistent with the views of a number of key participants 
interviewed, including former Chair of the PJCHR Senator Smith, who rejected the idea of 
increasing the deliberative role of the PJCHR when it comes to Bills scrutiny, on the basis that 
it would undermine the ‘technical’ scrutiny role of the committee and bring it into conflict with 
the Parliament’s role as the final adjudicator on rights issues. Senator Smith said: 
there should not be a deliberative role for committees with a scrutiny function. The scrutiny 
undertaken by the committee is expert based, prepared with the assistance of an expert legal 
advisor. The onus is on the government to demonstrate compliance with the human rights 
standards. The debate on balancing human rights and the public interests is up to Parliament.49 
By focusing on the PJCHR’s technical scrutiny role, my recommendations also acknowledge 
what Stephenson describes as Australia’s system of multi-stage rights review,50 and seek to 
maximise the PJCHR’s ability to contribute positively to resolving institutional disagreements 
on rights, rather than exacerbating those disagreements by investing the committee with a more 
proactive rights-adjudicating role. 
E Summary of Committee-Specific Reforms 
The recommendations discussed above descend into the practical detail necessary to ensure 
that the individual committees studied capitalise on their particular strengths as identified in 
Part II of my research. They aim to equip each committee with new tools and strategies to 
ensure that their already rights-enhancing work is seen and relied upon by key decision makers 
in the system. They also provide opportunities and incentives for individual committees to 
work collaboratively and include a strong focus on responding to the needs of public servants 
                                                 
 
49 Interview with Dean Smith, Liberal Senator for Western Australia, former Chair of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (telephone, 22 September 2016). 
50 Scott Stephenson, From Dialogue to Disagreement in Comparative Rights Constitutionalism (Federation Press, 
2016) 8. 
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and sophisticated submission makers, who are at the front line when it comes to influencing 
the content of rights-engaging laws and policies. 
My recommendations also resist the temptation to look to one particular committee to carry the 
lion’s share of rights-scrutiny work, or to create a ‘super committee’ with extensive powers 
and wide-ranging functions. Instead, the reforms I advocate listen to the views obtained from 
those working closely in the committee system and reflect on the features of Australia’s multi-
stage approach to rights review discussed in Part I of this research. For this reason, my 
recommendations allow each individual committee to continue to performance the role that 
attracts the most legitimacy in the eyes of key participants, whilst ensuring that other 
committees in the system have the capacity to perform some of the functions necessary for 
meaningful rights protection. In this way, the recommendations in this chapter reflect the 
broader theme of this research by encouraging investment in the way committees work together 
as a system. In this way, my work offers a new standpoint from which to view Australia’s 
parliamentary model of rights protection, discussed further in the final chapter below. 
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CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION 
This thesis has explored the role and function of parliamentary committees and how they 
contribute to rights protection at the federal level through the lens of 12 counter-terrorism case 
study Acts. Part II of this thesis collated evidence of three tiers of impact (legislative, public 
and hidden) attributable to the work of the four parliamentary committees, elucidating with 
new clarity the rights-enhancing role parliamentary committees can play. The material in Part 
II also highlighted that different parliamentary committees have different strengths and 
weaknesses and therefore have an impact on proposed laws in different ways. Part II revealed 
that it is when different committees work together to scrutinise a law that the biggest rights 
impact is felt. These findings provide the basis for the recommendations in the previous two 
chapters, which are designed to lay out a new, practical pathway for improving the contribution 
parliamentary committees can make to rights protection in Australia. 
In this concluding chapter, I reflect on the central theme of this thesis, and argue that 
understanding parliamentary committees working together as a system provides the most fertile 
opportunity to identify options to improve Australia’s parliamentary model of rights protection. 
I also argue that the findings made in Part II and the recommendations made in Part III are of 
particular relevance to rights advocates as they provide a persuasive counterpoint to those who 
have expressed scepticism about the capacity of the parliamentary committee system to deliver 
meaningful rights protection. In this way, my research brings a new perspective to the broader 
discussion on how rights should be protected in Australia, which is considered in further detail 
below. 
A Understanding Parliamentary Committees as a System is the Key to Improving 
their Rights-Protecting Capacity 
Many of the rights advocates discussed in Chapter 1, including Evans and Evans,1 Williams2 
                                                 
 
1 See, eg, Simon Evans and Carolyn Evans, ‘Australian Parliaments and the Protection of Human Rights’ (Paper 
presented in the Department of the Senate Occasional Lecture Series at Parliament House, Canberra, 8 December 
2006). 
2 See, eg, George Williams and Lisa Burton, ‘Australia’s Exclusive Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection’ 
(2013) 34 Statute Law Review 58. 
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and Charlesworth,3 have argued that the parliamentary model of rights protection operating at 
the federal level is fundamentally flawed and that significant structural change is needed to 
ensure meaningful and comprehensive protection of rights in Australia. They have pointed out, 
for example, that the rights of minorities can often be overlooked or overridden in a system 
that leaves open multiple opportunities for executive dominance and popularist policy making.4 
Some have cited rights-abrogating features of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws as examples 
of the failure of the parliamentary model of rights protection to guard against unjustified 
intrusion into individual rights.5 While initially hopeful that the establishment of the PJCHR 
would help to ‘fill the gaps’ in rights protection at the federal level, many have since lamented 
the inability of the PJCHR to have a strong rights-protecting impact on legislation.6 They have 
largely dismissed the capacity of the parliamentary committee system to offer meaningful 
rights protection, at least without the support of a greater oversight role for the courts. 
As noted in Chapter1, prior to commencing my research I shared the views expressed above; 
however, the substantial list of rights-enhancing changes attributable to the work of 
parliamentary committees uncovered in Part II persuaded me to reassess my previous 
scepticism.7 It also led me to engage in a different way with the arguments of those who had 
previously sought to evaluate the role of parliamentary committees in rights protection.8  
As I conducted my research, it became clear that previous analysis of the role of parliamentary 
committees in rights protection in Australia and elsewhere had been focused on individual 
                                                 
 
3 See, eg, Hilary Charlesworth, Writing in rights: Australia and the protection of human rights (UNSW Press, 
2002); Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Who Wins Under a Bill of Rights?’ (2006) 25 University of Queensland Law Journal 
39. 
4 Ibid; Williams and Burton, above n 2. 
5 See, eg, Greg Carne, ‘Re-Orientating Human Rights Meanings and Understandings? Reviving and Revisiting 
Australian Human Rights Exceptionalism Through a Liberal Democratic Rights Agenda’ (2015) 17 Flinders Law 
Journal 61. 
6 See, eg, Williams and Burton, above n 2. 
7 See discussion in Chapter 1, Sections C and D. See also discussion in Chapters 4–7 and Appendices E and D. 
8 See discussion in Chapter 1, Sections C and D. Some of the past evaluations of parliamentary committtees 
considered in detail include: Williams and Burton, above n 2; Evans and Evans, above n 1; Tom Campbell and 
Stephen Morris, ‘Human Rights for Democracies: a Provisional Assessment of the Australian Human Rights 
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011’ (2015) 34(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 7; Dominique Dalla-
Pozza, ‘The Conscience of Democracy? The Role of Australian Parliamentary Committees in Enacting Counter-
Terrorism Laws' (Paper presented at the Australasian Law and Society Conference, Wollongong, December 2006) 
<www.aspg.org.au/conferences/adelaide2007/Dalla-pozzo.pdf>. 
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committees achieving (or struggling to achieve) their prescribed scrutiny mandates. It had not 
included a sustained focus on how different committees in a parliamentary system work 
together, the impact such a system might have on the behind-the-scenes development of 
legislation, or how such a system of committees might work to generate its own dynamic rights-
scrutiny culture. Past analysis of the PJCHR, for example, concludes that it has had only 
minimal impact on the content or development of federal laws since 2012,9 but does not 
consider in detail the extent to which the work of the PJCHR has contributed to the impact 
other committees in the system are having on our laws and parliamentary processes. Similarly, 
past studies of other parliamentary committees in Australia have not included a focus on how 
the inquiry-based committees, such as the PJCIS, may be influencing the post-introduction 
development of federal laws.10 This leaves open the possibility that past analysis of Australia’s 
parliamentary model of rights protection has underestimated the contribution made by 
parliamentary committees working as a system, and the potential for this system to be 
improved.  
By focusing on how parliamentary committees work together, my research uncovers new 
opportunities for improving the rights-enhancing role of parliamentary committees that build 
upon the particular strengths and weaknesses of particular committees and encourage system-
level collaboration and coordination. My research suggests that relatively minor changes could 
be made to the practices and processes of individual committees, which would allow them to 
maximise their rights-enhancing contribution to the committee system, without changing their 
character or diluting the respect they enjoy in the eyes of key participants. For example, my 
recommendations strengthen the capacity of the inquiry-based committees to attract a broader 
and more diverse range of submission makers and introduce practical strategies to improve the 
experience for first-time inquiry witnesses. My recommendations also encourage the scrutiny 
committees to prioritise the development of the type of materials and publications that the other 
key participants in the committee system find most useful. 
My recommendations also seek to address a number of structural and resource-related 
shortcomings within the committee system that may present barriers to individual committees 
                                                 
 
9 See, eg, Williams and Burton, above n 2. 
10 See, eg, Evans and Evans, above n 1. 
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working more effectively with other committees in the system. For example, my 
recommendations encourage the expanded use of transparent secondee arrangements to support 
the high performing but under-resourced pool of secretariat staff that support parliamentary 
committees. I also recommend changes to the Standing Orders to set out clear expectations 
around response times to committee requests for information, and for the timely tabling of 
committee reports. Specific changes are also recommended to the tabling of PJCHR reports – 
centred around the adoption of Alert Digest style reporting – to give key participants greater 
opportunity to access and understand the PJCHR’s rights analysis prior to making decisions 
about the merits of a proposed Bill. These changes are designed to be implemented primarily 
by public servants, parliamentary committee staff and committee Chairs and are generally not 
dependent on legislative change. It is hoped, therefore, that they could be adopted swiftly, and 
their veracity quickly tested by monitoring whether the rights-enhancing impact of the 
individual committees studied – and the system more broadly – improves.  
My research also highlights the value in understanding and investing in the rights-scrutiny 
culture that currently exists among the system of committees at the federal level, rather than 
relying upon one particular committee to hold the executive to account for its compliance with 
human rights obligations. While this may initially sound like a ‘weak’ approach to rights 
protection or an uncritical endorsement of the status quo, my research suggests that investing 
in the existing committee system has a number of advantages over other more radical models 
of rights reform.  
These advantages derive from the fact that the parliamentary committee system emulates and 
reinforces the existing institutional culture of the Australian Parliament described in Chapter 
3, including the way institutions of government instinctively seek to resolve disagreements on 
rights. As Stephenson explains, this institutional culture can have a particularly powerful 
behind-the-scenes impact and is difficult to shift, even when structural reforms are 
implemented that seek to give explicit rights-protecting roles to other branches of 
government.11 Stephenson’s work suggests that building upon the parliamentary committee 
system as a way to improve rights protection at the federal level may be an easier cultural fit – 
and therefore more readily accepted and more likely to be sustainable – than adopting more 
                                                 
 
11 Scott Stephenson, From Dialogue to Disagreement in Comparative Rights Constitutionalism (Federation Press, 
2016) 8, 211. 
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radical structural change, such as the introduction of a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights, 
that would significantly alter the way federal institutions ‘disagree’ with each other on rights. 
This is supported by the contextual material presented in Chapter 3, which demonstrates that 
the non-rights-protecting roles parliamentary committees play (such as providing the 
opportunity for parliamentarians to build their public profile and influence policy development, 
make connections with sophisticated submission makers and generate media interest) 
encourage a broad range of parliamentarians to be involved in committee processes. This in 
turn provides a broad and powerful base of parliamentarians who can then potentially go on to 
utilise this committee system to protect and promote the rights they consider to be important 
and shared by the Australian community, such as those principles set out in Appendix E. 
Human rights advocates such as Carne may be correct to point out the shortcomings in any 
attempt to articulate a list of commonly acknowledged individual rights from a parliamentary 
setting, warning that such lists rarely cover the full range of internationally protected rights and 
risks ignoring rights of unpopular or politically isolated minorities.12 However, my research 
(particularly Chapter 5 documenting legislative impact) suggests that the emerging rights-
scrutiny culture within the federal Parliament may be more robust than first imagined, at least 
in the context of the case study Acts, and could be the key to improving the capacity of 
Australia’s parliamentary model of rights protection. For this reason, I recommend changes to 
the parliamentary committee system that seek to legitimise and acknowledge all meaningful 
efforts to undertake rights scrutiny, regardless of the language used or the scope of the rights 
criteria applied. The recommendations I propose seek to do this by supporting both the SSCSB 
and the PJCHR to continue to produce timely and accessible analysis of Bills using their own 
separate ‘rights criteria’, whilst at the same time looking for opportunities for the two 
committees to collaborate where appropriate. This approach aims to welcome rights advocates 
from all political persuasions by emphasising the shared and dynamic nature of the emerging 
rights-scrutiny culture at the federal level, rather than alienating those parliamentarians who 
may be reluctant to embrace international human rights law, either due to lack of knowledge 
or political positioning. This recommendation feeds into and is supported by my broader 
                                                 
 
12 Carne, above n 5; Charlesworth, Writing in rights, above n 4; Charlesworth, ‘Who Wins Under a Bill of 
Rights?’, above n 4.  For more recent discussion of some of these issues see George Williams, ‘Scrutiny of Primary 
Legislation Principles and Challenges: Where are We Now and Where are We Headed?’ Australia-New Zealand 
Scrutiny of Legislation Conference, Parliament House, Perth, 12 July 2016. 
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recommendation to undertake further research to test and document the emerging rights-
scrutiny culture identified in this case study in other areas of law. These considerations also 
inform the new perspective I now bring to bear on Australia’s model of rights protection and 
the ways it can be improved in the future. 
B New Perspectives on Australia’s Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection 
By focusing on parliamentary committees working together as a system, my research offers 
important new perspectives on the work of other rights advocates who have considered the role 
parliamentary committees play (or could play) in Australia’s parliamentary model of rights 
protection. For example, my findings help provide a broader context in which to assess the 
performance of the PJCHR, building upon the qualitative work undertaken by Campbell and 
Morris, and Williams, Reynolds and Burton, and offering alternative options for enhancing the 
PJCHR’s capacity to contribute to Australia’s parliamentary model of rights protection.13 
While my research confirms many of the findings of these scholars on the PJCHR’s limited 
legislative and public impact, I argue that the high-quality rights analysis provided by the 
PJCHR is making an important contribution to the rights-enhancing work of other committees 
and their submission makers. Moreover, I argue that this analysis is the source of the PJCHR’s 
current and future legitimacy among key participants, and that this more ‘technical scrutiny’ 
role should be the future focus of the committee. For this reason, I recommend strategies to 
maximise the quality, timeliness and accessibility of the rights-scrutiny analysis of proposed 
laws, but warn against changing the character of the committee to resemble that of the inquiry-
based committees. 
My findings also build upon and update the 2006 evaluation of rights protection in the 
Australian Parliament undertaken by Evans and Evans, by highlighting a broader spectrum of 
rights-enhancing impacts made by the parliamentary committee system during the period 
2001–15.14 The emergence of the PJCIS as a committee with a strong legislative impact, and 
the considerable behind-the-scenes influence of the SSCSB revealed in my research, challenge 
the conclusion reached by these scholars during their 2006 study that the rights protection 
                                                 
 
13 Williams and Reynolds, above n 6; Lisa Burton and George Williams, ‘What Future for Australia’s Control 
Order Regime?’ (2013) 24 Public Law Review 182; Campbell and Morris, above n 8.  
14 Evans and Evans, above n 1 
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offered by committees was severely limited in scope and ad hoc. My analysis of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the PJCHR, which was created after the Evans and Evans study, also 
provides a fresh perspective to test some of the recommendations made by these scholars to fill 
what they saw to be the gaps in rights protection within the parliamentary model. 
From a deliberative democracy perspective, my research substantiates past findings made by 
Dalla-Pozza, Uhr and Halligan and suggests that the inquiry-based committees considered in 
my research not only provide meaningful deliberative forums but also deliver rights-enhancing 
results.15 For example, I argue that the particular strengths of the LCA Committees, such as 
their diverse membership and capacity to attract a diverse range of submission makers,16 should 
be considered when evaluating the contribution committees can make to Australia’s 
parliamentary model of rights protection. I also recommend that such committees have a 
continuing role to play in scrutinising draft Bills and policy proposals, to improve the 
deliberative quality of law making at the pre-introduction phase. My research also suggests that 
the strong relationships the PJCIS has been able to forge with key law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies and national security experts, and the strong legislative impact that has 
followed, offer important new opportunities to improve the deliberative quality of law making 
at the federal level, potentially with rights-enhancing results. 
Like Marsh,17 Monk18 and Uhr,19 my research also supports the finding that parliamentary 
committees have much to offer in improving the quality of law making at the federal level, 
including at the pre-introduction stage. By documenting the influence of the SSCSB on the 
                                                 
 
15 See, eg, Dalla-Pozza, ‘The Conscience of Democracy’, above n 8; John Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in 
Australia: The Changing Place of Parliament (CUP, 1998) 219; Dominique Dalla-Pozza, ‘Refining the Australian 
Counter-terrorism Framework: How Deliberative Has Parliament Been?’ (2016) 27(4) Public Law Review 271, 
274; John Halligan, ‘Parliamentary Committee Roles in Facilitating Public Policy at the Commonwealth Level’ 
(2008) 23(2) Australasian Parliamentary Review 135. See also Ron Levy and Graeme Orr, The Law of 
Deliberative Democracy (Routledge, 2016). 
16 As former Secretary to the LCA Committee Sophie Dunstone said: ‘I really fundamentally believe that one of 
the real strengths of the, particularly the Senate committee system, is that you are facilitating a process that enables 
anyone from Jo Bloggs on the street through to some academic who’s an expert in the field to provide their view 
and for Senators to have access to that information.’ Interview with Sophie Dunstone, former Secretary of the 
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Canberra, 23 May 2016).  
17 Ian Marsh, ‘Australia’s Representation Gap: A Role for Parliamentary Committees?’ (Speech delivered at the 
Department of the Senate Occasional Lecture Series, Parliament House, Canberra, 26 November 2004). 
18 David Monk, ‘A Framework for Evaluating the Performance of Committees in Westminster Parliaments’ (2010) 
16 Journal of Legislative Studies 1. 
19 Uhr, above n 15, 219. 
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work of parliamentary counsel and policy makers, for example, it is possible to see how those 
responsible for drafting and developing federal laws pre-empt committee scrutiny with rights-
enacting results. As Byrnes,20 and Campbell and Morris predicted,21 this trend is also beginning 
to emerge with respect to the PJCHR, but could be considerably enhanced by adopting reforms 
to support the PJCHR’s ‘technical scrutiny’ role and looking for ways to support the PJCHR 
working more closely with other committees in the system. 
Finally, my research provides the basis for the further investigation of an emerging rights-
scrutiny culture within the federal Parliament, with important implications for future options 
for reforming or replacing Australia’s current model of rights protection. At its highest, this 
emerging rights-scrutiny culture could have the potential to deliver the type of outcomes 
Campbell was looking for in his 2006 proposal for the establishment of a ‘democratic Bill of 
Rights’ to be developed and applied exclusively by a parliamentary committee.22 For 
Campbell, there was a need to improve upon Australia’s pre-PJCHR model of parliamentary 
protection by investing a specific parliamentary committee with the power to generate a list of 
rights standards itself, and then scrutinise proposed laws for compliance with these rights 
standards.23 That is, in effect, what I have observed occurring organically among the four 
committees studied in my thesis. In other words, it is possible to compile a list of common 
rights and scrutiny principles from the work of the PJCHR, SSCSB, PJCIS and LCA 
Committees in the context of their scrutiny of counter-terrorism laws that appear to resonate 
across political lines and attract public interest and submission maker support. Moreover, my 
research suggests that, when the committees make recommendations to improve a law’s 
compliance with these rights-scrutiny principles, these recommendations are frequently 
reflected in legislative amendments. While further research is required to investigate whether 
this emerging rights-scrutiny culture applies in other contexts, it appears to have the type of 
democratically articulated and dynamic character that scholars such as Kinley, Campbell and 
                                                 
 
20 Andrew Byrnes, ‘Human Rights Under the Microscope: Reflections on Parliamentary Scrutiny’ (Speech 
delivered at Law Society of South Australia Continuing Professional Development Program, Adelaide, 11 
December 2014) <http://www.ahrcentre.org/sites/ahrcentre.org/files/mdocs/Byrnes%20-
-%20%20PJCHR%20-%20handout%20for%20Adelaide%20talk%20December%202014%20revised.pdf>. 
21 Campbell and Morris, above n 13. 
22 Tom Campbell, ‘Human Rights Strategies: An Australian Alternative’ in Tom Campbell et al (eds), Protecting 
Rights Without a Bill of Rights (Ashgate, 2006) 319, 333. 
23 Ibid 333–6. 
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Morris considered to be integral for developing a model of rights protection that transcended 
the criticisms levelled at statutory or constitutionally entrenched bills of rights.24  
Of course, my findings and recommendations depart in important respects from those of 
Campbell. Unlike Campbell, I do not recommend providing a constitutional backing for 
parliamentary committees, or a more proactive legislative development role for the PJCHR. 
However, like Campbell, my research suggests that parliamentary committees should play a 
central role in any future reforms to improve rights protection in Australia.  
In addition, my research suggests that understanding this emerging rights-scrutiny culture 
could help identify opportunities to move the Australian Parliament away from what Levy and 
Orr describe as ‘conceptual balancing’ approaches to determining rights disputes, and towards 
‘deliberative accommodation’ approaches, by highlighting the potential for parliamentary 
committees to encourage a broader range of views to be heard and evaluated in a meaningful 
way.25 
When exploring these issues, I emphasise again that my research finds that parliamentary 
committees have had an important rights-enhancing impact on Australia’s counter-terrorism 
laws, but have rarely been able to completely remedy all of the rights-abrogating features of 
these laws.26 These rights-abrogating features are so significant that, even if the changes 
recommended in this thesis were fully implemented, Australia’s counter-terrorism laws would 
still fail to comply with the full range of internationally recognised human rights and common 
law rights to which Australia subscribes. For this reason, I do not argue that improving the 
parliamentary committee system is enough when it comes to rights protection at the federal 
level. Rather I argue that understanding how the parliamentary committee system works and 
the overall impact it has on our laws is critical to improving the model of rights protection that 
                                                 
 
24 Campbell and Morris, above n 13; David Kinley, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Human Rights: a Duty Neglected’ 
in Philip Alston (ed), Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives (Oxford 
University Press, 1999); David Kinley and Christine Ernst, ‘Exile on Main Street: Australia’s Legislative Agenda 
for Human Rights’ (2012) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 58. 
25 Levy and Orr, above n 15, 76-80. 
26 For examples of articles documenting the rights-infringing content of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws see 
George Williams, ‘The Legal Assault on Australian Democracy: the Annual Blackburn Lecture’ (2015) 18 Ethos 
236; George Williams, ‘A Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws’ (2011) 35(3) Melbourne University Law 
Review 1136; Gabrielle Appleby, ‘The 2014 Counter-terrorism Reforms in Review’ (2015) 26(1) Public Law 
Review 4; Andrew Lynch and Nicola McGarrity, ‘Counter-terrorism Laws: How Neutral Laws Create Fear and 
Anxiety in Australia’s Muslim Communities’ (2008) 33(4) Alternative Law Journal 225. 
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is in place now, and should be carefully considered when thinking about introducing different 
models of rights protection in the future. By engaging with key participants in the system and 
gathering views on how laws should be scrutinised for rights compliance, my research may 
point to the most sustainable and pragmatic pathway towards the development of further 
legislative or judicial protections for commonly respected human rights.  
C Conclusion 
The goal of my research was to evaluate the role played by parliamentary committees in 
Australia’s parliamentary model of rights protection and identify practical options for reform. 
This goal was pursued against a background of scepticism amongst rights advocates about the 
capacity of the parliamentary committee system to make a meaningful contribution to rights 
protection and in the face of more than a decade of rights-abrogating counter-terrorism related 
legislative activity. The outcome of my research has been the articulation of a new perspective 
on the role played by parliamentary committees in rights protection in Australia, informed by 
a three-tiered analysis of their impact on 12 case study Acts, and in particular by insights 
obtained from key participants working closely within the committee system. 
As a rights advocate who previously shared the conventional view about the inability of the 
parliamentary model to provide robust rights protection in Australia, the findings made in this 
thesis have been surprising and encouraging. The material presented in Part II suggests that 
parliamentary committees are having a rights-enhancing impact on Australia’s counter-
terrorism laws, and that in some cases this impact is quite profound. In particular, my research 
suggests that, when individual parliamentary committees work together as a system, they can 
effect rights-enhancing change at the policy development level, right through to the content of 
enacted provisions. They can smooth off rough edges of proposed laws that seek to extend 
executive power at the expense of individual rights, introduce safeguards to ensure access to 
review of executive decisions, and significantly limit the scope of proposed new law-
enforcement and intelligence-gathering powers and new criminal offences. They can also work 
to focus the minds of public servants, parliamentary counsel and parliamentarians on the type 
of principles that should be observed when making laws that broaden the powers of the 
executive branch of government at the expense of individual rights, and offer analytical 
frameworks for balancing competing rights or interests. When the scrutiny approaches of these 
committees are well entrenched and respected, they can also lay the foundations for a rights-
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scrutiny culture to emerge within the Parliament, and provide meaningful deliberative forums 
for those directly affected by these laws to express their views and concerns. They can also 
empower backbenchers and non-government members to push for amendments to proposed or 
existing laws that reflect the documented concerns of the Australian community, or the 
considered views of independent oversight bodies. 
My research does not find that parliamentary committees alone are well placed to remedy 
unjustified or disproportionate intrusions into individual rights, or that they can singlehandedly 
sustain the type of rights culture that may be thought necessary for a country like Australia. 
Studies of the content of Australian laws, including counter-terrorism laws, consistently 
conclude that Australia trails behind its Western counter-parts when it comes to complying 
with international human rights standards, particularly when it comes to minority rights.27 
However, the findings made in this thesis suggest that rights advocates would be wise to re-
think their past scepticism about the rights-enhancing capacity of the existing parliamentary 
committee system when seeking to improve the current parliamentary model of rights 
protection, or when developing proposals for more radical structural reform. In particular, my 
research demonstrates that investment in the parliamentary committee system, as well as in 
individual parliamentary committees, would greatly enhance the overall rights-enhancing 
impact of the current model.  
My research finds that reflecting on the role and function of the broader Australian Parliament 
helps identify the best opportunities to invest in the parliamentary committee system’s rights-
enhancing capacity. For this reason, my recommendations are about making sure that the work 
of committees – which is already highly valued and respected – is readily available and 
accessible to those in a position to make decisions about the development and content of 
                                                 
 
27 For a comparative analysis of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws and their impact on human rights see, eg, K 
Roach (ed), Comparative Counter-Terrorism Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 650–88; George Williams, 
Fergal Davis and Nicola McGarrity (eds), Surveillance, Counter-Terrorism and Comparative Constitutionalism 
(Routledge, 2014); George Williams, ‘Executive Oversight of Intelligence Agencies in Australia’ in Z K Goldman 
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Principle, Policy and Paradox (Routledge, 2017) 136. 
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proposed laws. This means recognising the particular strengths and weaknesses of the different 
committees studied, while at the same time identifying ways to improve the quality of the 
interactions between different committees in the system. For example, my recommendations 
suggest that strengthening the behind-the-scenes impact of the technical scrutiny committees 
and promoting the deliberative opportunities provided by the inquiry-based committees could 
increase the rights-enhancing capacity of the system by ensuring that policy makers, legislative 
drafters and sophisticated submission makers have access to (1) the technical analysis they 
need to draw attention to the rights impact of a Bill and (2) a diverse range of views to generate 
less rights-abrogating policy alternatives at the public inquiry stage.28 My recommendations 
also clarify the goals and objectives of newer committees such as the PJCHR, and encourage 
the use of innovative techniques such as the use of specialist secondees to preserve the already 
high legislative impact of committees such as the PJCIS. 
While motivated by the findings of counter-terrorism case study, I recognise that further 
research is needed to confirm that the observations made in this study apply to other subject 
areas and to other individual committees. In particular, further research is required to determine 
whether the emerging rights-scrutiny culture I identify is applicable in other contexts. With 
these considerations in mind, the recommendations made in this thesis are not radical or 
profound, but rather pragmatic and incremental. They suggest investing in, rather than 
disrupting, the existing multi-stage rights review at the federal level. In developing these 
proposed changes, I have resisted my initial temptation to conclude that the rights-enhancing 
contribution of parliamentary committees is fatally flawed without significant structural 
change. I have been persuaded by the evidence collected during the case study, and in particular 
by the views and experiences of those interviewed. I am now of the view that the current 
parliamentary committee system has much to offer as a form of rights protection, because of, 
not in spite of, its central characteristics, which draw from the features and functions of the 
Parliament itself. For this reason, I look forward to future studies of how the system of 
parliamentary committees contributes to Australia’s current model of rights protection, and 
how this system can be utilised in any alternative models of rights protection being considered 
                                                 
 
28 This would in turn bring the parliametmary committee system closer to what Levy and Orr describe as the 
‘deliberative accomodation’ approach to resolving rights-related disputes, and enhance the qualtity of the multi-
stage rights review identified by Stephenson.  See Ron Levy and Grahame Orr, The Law of Deliberative 
Democracy (Routledge, 2016) 76-80; Scott Stephenson, From Dialogue to Disagreement in Comparative Rights 
Constitutionalism (Federation Press, 2016) 8, 211. 
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APPENDIX A:  QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN 
A Introduction  
Chapter 2 introduced the methodology employed in my research.  The qualitative analysis that 
features in Part II draws upon a series of semi-structured interviews, supported by documentary 
evidence, including Hansard debates, departmental guidance material, and parliamentary 
committee reports.  As part of the broader methodology, which draws upon the Dickson Poon 
School of Law’s Effectiveness Framework,1 the views of participants obtained through the 
interviews are tested and supported by examples from academic literature, newspaper reports, 
and records of public speeches and conferences.  As Chapter 2 explains, these views are also 
compared and contrasted with other ‘tiers’ of impact that rely predominately on documentary 
evidence.  This Appendix provides a more explanation of the specific methodology employed 
during the interview process.  
Forty interviews were conducted from May 2016 until December 2016.  A list of interview 
participants (some of which have requested not be listed by name but rather by a more general 
descriptor) is provided at Appendix B.  The interviewing process was preceded by obtaining 
the necessary ethical clearance from the University of Adelaide’s Human Research Ethics 
Committee.  My research was categorised as low risk. 
B Selection of Interview Participants 
The primary research group for the interviews was past or current members of the four 
parliamentary committees studied and those with direct experience in developing, drafting, 
scrutinising or debating Commonwealth of counter-terrorism laws.  This included: 
 Members or Chairs of Parliamentary Committees tasked with scrutinising or 
reviewing counter-terrorism laws (including the Senate Standing Committees on Legal 
                                                 
 
1 Known as the ‘Effective Parliamentary Oversight of Human Rights Project’. See Philippa Webb and Kirsten 
Roberts, ‘Effective Parliamentary Oversight of Human Rights: A Framework for Designing and Determining 
Effectiveness’ (Paper presented at the Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London, University of 
London, June 2014) <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-institute/projects/government/assets/Human-Rights-
Policy-DocumentV5.pdf>, Executive Summary. 
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and Constitutional Affairs, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security and predecessor committees, the Senate Standing Committee on the Scrutiny 
of Bills, and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights); 
 Secretariat staff of parliamentary committees tasked with scrutinising or reviewing 
counter-terrorism laws; 
 Witnesses and submission makers to committees tasked with scrutinising or reviewing 
counter-terrorism laws; 
 Parliamentary counsel involved with either (a) drafting of counter-terrorism laws or 
(b) reflecting on the outcomes of parliamentary scrutiny for training or advising 
purposes; 
 Commonwealth public servants involved with either (a) development or review of 
counter-terrorism laws or policy and/or (b) reflecting on the outcomes of 
parliamentary scrutiny; 
 Commonwealth public servants involved with training of other public servants in areas 
relating human rights, counter-terrorism law or policy, or parliamentary scrutiny; 
 Independent review bodies or experts tasked with reviewing counter-terrorism laws; 
and 
 Journalists or commentators who have covered the development, debate, enactment 
and review of counter-terrorism laws. 
In order to identify the ‘hidden impacts’ of parliamentary scrutiny on Australia's counter 
terrorism laws (in line with the methodology outlined in Chapter 2), first priority was given to 
interview participants with direct experience in either:  
 the development or review of counter-terrorism laws or policy and/or (for example 
parliamentarians who gave speeches on counter-terrorism laws in Parliament, public 
servants involved in preparing briefings for Ministers or cabinet or drafting Statements 
of Compatibility or Explanatory Memorandum, parliamentary counsel involved in 
drafting Bills or amendments, experts responsible for reviewing specific counter-
terrorism laws); or 
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 parliamentary scrutiny of counter-terrorism laws (for example members or staff of 
parliamentary committees who conducted specific inquiries into counter terrorism 
laws). 
Second priority was be given to participants with direct experience in: 
 appearing before parliamentary committees tasked with reviewing counter-terrorism 
laws (for example witnesses or submission makers); and/or  
 responding to or anticipating parliamentary scrutiny (for example public servants 
involved in preparing or applying drafting directions or policy manuals or 
commentators writing on the impact of parliamentary scrutiny on counterterrorism 
laws). 
Within these groups, participants were not sampled through a representative selection.  This 
was for practical and qualitative reasons.  As Chapter 2 explains, my intention was not to 
interview a representative sample of parliamentarians, parliamentary staff or public servants 
but rather to obtain insights and perspectives from a range of key participants in the 
parliamentary committee system that could be used to supplement, test or add value to other 
(documentary-based) tiers of impact being evaluated in my research.   
In this way, my research methods were qualitative, rather than statistical or representative.  My 
sample selection was purposive2 or conceptually driven3 rather than random.4  As Cho explains: 
A qualitative researcher, through Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) tends to follow a holistic, 
interpretivist approach of the notion that, the nature and existence of every object of the social 
world depend solely on peoples’ subjective awareness and understanding of it. … Qualitative 
research conducted by these subjectivists researchers produce rich and descriptive data that 
                                                 
 
2 Matthew B Miles and A Michael Huberman, An Expanded Sourcebook: Qualitative Data Analysis (Sage 
Publications, 2nd ed, 1994) 27; see also A J Kuzel ‘Sampling in Qualitative Inquiry’ in B F Crabtree and W L 
Miller (eds) Doing qualitative research (Sage Publications, 2nd ed, 1992) 31-44. 
3 Ibid, 27. 
4 Ibid; see also Kuzel, above n 2, 31-44. 
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are interpreted through identification, coding, sorting, and sifting of themes and texts leading 
to significant findings that can contribute to theoretical knowledge and practical use.5 
This purposive sampling approach also allowed me to ‘cycle back and forth between thinking 
about the existing data and generating strategies for collecting new, often better, data’6 and to 
regularly compare and reflect on any commonalities and contrasts that were emerging from the 
interview based material and the documentary-based evidence I was relying upon as part of my 
broader methodology.7 Purposive sampling also allowed me to obtain participants with a 
diversity of attributes that would allow me to draw important contextual comparisons across 
my data.  For example, within the sample, a combination of male and female participants were 
approached, as were participants with a cross section of political perspectives and different 
levels of experience and expertise. 
As my interviews progressed, my sampling became more targeted.  This was for two reasons.  
First, it was necessary to ensure that I maintained an appropriate balance in terms of political 
representation (for example, every time I received a positive response from a past or current 
member of the Coalition, I undertook efforts to also secure a positive response from a past or 
current member of the Australian Labor Party).  Second, as my data analysis progressed, it 
became clear that the participant group that was most critical in terms of interview material 
was public servants.  This due to the comparative absence of alternative sources of information 
about the perspectives of this group on the legitimacy and impact of formal parliamentary 
scrutiny of counter-terrorism law.  By this stage, I had discovered other sources of information 
revealing the perspective of other participant groups (such as public commentators, 
parliamentarians and submission makers) as to the legitimacy and impact of the parliamentary 
committee system and the process of developing and enacting counterterrorism law. 
As noted in Chapter 2, there were certain limitations within my participant sample 
predominantly relating to location and availability and familiarity with the author.  I was based 
in Adelaide during the conduct of this research, and while I was readily able to travel to 
Melbourne, Sydney and Canberra, limited funding meant that I was unable to visit other 
                                                 
 
5 Muhammad Faisol Cho ‘Coding, Sorting and Sifting of Qualitative Data Analysis: Debates and Discussion’ 
(2015) 49 (3) Quality and Quantity 1135, 1135, references omitted. 
6 Miles and Huberman, above n 2, 50. 
7 Cho, above n 5, 1137, references omitted. 
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jurisdictions in person.  However, given many of my sample groups were Canberra based, these 
limitations did not prove problematic when recruiting participants.  In addition, interviews were 
conducted via telephone with participants in Western Australia and the Northern Territory.   
As discussed further below, some sample groups were more difficult to reach than others, 
particularly those working in senior roles in national security related positions, such as ASIO 
officers and current Secretariat staff of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security.  This group of potential participants have a range of specific professional and legal 
obligations preventing them from publicly discussing aspects of their work.  To overcome these 
challenges I adopted a range of strategies, including approaching former PJCIS committee 
members and law enforcement policy officers that were more readily able to share insights into 
this aspect of law making without transgressing any relevant professional or statutory 
obligations.  I also received valuable assistance from publicly available information, such as 
information contained in the PJCIS’s Annual Report and the range of regular reports issued by 
the Department of the Senate.  I also presented my research at two public conferences involving 
current and former Commonwealth parliamentary staff, which provided an opportunity for me 
to receive informal feedback on my preliminary conclusions relevant to this sample group.8  In 
addition, as noted above, I was able to verify and confirm my conclusions with other sources 
documentary evidence, including transcripts of committee hearings and Hansards debates, 
giving greater depth to my research.  
C Recruitment of Interview Participants 
The recruitment of participants was based on publicly available information in Hansard, 
Parliamentary Committee Reports, the Australian Parliament House website, Commonwealth 
Department Annual Reports, law journals, conference papers and published independent 
reviews of Australia's counter-terrorism laws.  Names and contact details were obtained from 
                                                 
 
8 Sarah Moulds, ‘Committees of Influence:  Parliamentary Committees with the Capacity to Change Australia’s 
Counter-terrorism laws’, Presentation at the Australasian Parliamentary Study Group’s Annual Conference, The 
Restoration and Enhancement of Parliaments’ Reputation (October 2016, Adelaide); Sarah Moulds ‘How does 
the Commonwealth Parliament Engage with “Rights” and “Justice”? The Case of Australia’s Counter-terrorism 
Laws.’ Presentation to the Australian Political Studies Association Conference -The Politics of Justice and Rights: 
challenges and future directions 2016, (September 2016, Sydney). 
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publicly available sources, including online government directories and departmental and 
parliamentary Annual Reports.  Potential participants were approached by telephone or email.   
In order to achieve a balanced coverage of the participant groups identified above, I initially 
anticipated that I would require a sample size of around 15-25 interviews.  When approaching 
participants from the sample group, I anticipated that I would receive a relatively high rate of 
negative responses due to the some of the limitations described above and below.  For this 
reason, I prepared a spread sheet identifying participants in three categories: ‘first approaches’ 
(for those participants that I had identified as highest priority), ‘second approaches’ (to try if I 
received negative responses to the first approaches category) and ‘third approaches’ (to try as 
a last resort).  This totalled just over 60 potential participants. 
I was pleased to receive a relatively high rate of positive responses to my ‘first approaches’ 
category, securing around 20 interviews from this cohort.  The vast majority of negative 
responses received were from participants who no longer held professional positions relevant 
to my research, current parliamentarians who had policies of not assisting with research 
requests of any nature, and parliamentary staff that cited their professional obligations not to 
disclose information relating to their committee work.   
A number of these first 20 participants were instrumental in providing suggestions and contacts 
for further interview participants.  With this information, combined with approaches to a 
number of participants in the ‘second approaches category, I was readily able to exceed my 
initial target of 25 interviews. 
By the end of the interview process, I had conducted a total of 40 interviews.  Two interviewees 
did not consent to be listed as participants in my research.  A further participant withdrew from 
my research following review of a draft Thesis, having expressed support for my research 
objectives but reconsidered their willingness to be quoted or listed as a participant.  The other 
37 participants are listed or described at Appendix B. 
When approaching participants by email, or when following up telephone approaches, 
participants were provided with an overview of the project and its goals, together with a 
package of Participant Information (extracted below) which included the key themes and topic 
areas that I intended to cover in the interviews.  In this package of information I emphasised 
that I was not looking to ascertain any confidential information. 
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Once I received a positive response from a potential participant, I arranged a time and place 
for the interview to take place.  I also offered to provide further detail of the type of questions 
I intended to ask at the interview.  On a number of occasions, participants requested this further 
detail, which I provided well advance of the interview date. 
Most interviews lasted approximately one hour.  Interviews were conducted at the place most 
convenient to the participant, which was often their workplace, although a small number were 
conducted elsewhere.  Nine interviews were conducted via telephone. 
D Development of Interview Topics 
A noted below, the interviews were conducted on a semi-structured basis, with the consistent 
use of key interview topics, coupled with a more flexible strategy to explore the particular 
experiences and insights of the interviewee. 
The key interview topics were initially developed having regard to the broader methodology 
employed in my research and described in Chapter 2.  In particular, the interview topics were 
developed having careful regard to the Dickson Poon School of Law’s Effectiveness 
Framework,9 that includes a specific focus on the ‘hidden’ or ‘behind-the-scenes’ impact of 
human rights scrutiny10 and explicitly enquires into whether or not key participants in human 
rights oversight mechanisms consider the mechanism to be ‘legitimate’ or not.11   On this basis, 
the interview topics included: 
 Professional biographical information about the participant’s involvement in either (a) 
the development or review of counter-terrorism laws or (b) parliamentary scrutiny 
functions; 
                                                 
 
9 Webb and Roberts, above n 1, Executive Summary. 
10 Such as the development of formal processes for identifying rights compatibility issues early in the policy or 
legislative development process; awareness raising of rights scrutiny principles among public servants, and 
general perspectives about the legitimacy of parliamentary scrutiny in debates on public policy or the legislative 
process. 
11 The Dickson Poon Effectiveness Framework also draws upon methods of assessing effectiveness deriving from 
organisational effectiveness theory, as well experience from a range of jurisdictions that have undertaken 
assessments of existing parliamentary oversight mechanisms.   
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 Specific instances of parliamentary scrutiny that the participant has been involved in, 
with a focus on the development, scrutiny or review of counter-terrorism law;  
 The impact the work of parliamentary committees on the participant's professional role;  
 The participant's perspective as to the legitimacy effectiveness of the parliamentary 
committee system in terms of (a) legislative impact (b) other visible impacts and (c) 
hidden impacts ;  
 The participant's perspective as to which particular features of the current parliamentary 
scrutiny system work well and why. 
E Conduct of Interviews 
The interviews took between 25 minutes and 1.5 hours.  They were conducted in a semi-
structured manner around those topics that had been provided to the participants in the 
Information Sheet (extracted below).  As noted above, nine interviews were conducted over 
the telephone and the remaining 31 were conducted in person.  The in person interviews were 
audio recorded through the use of a discrete dictaphone recorder and with the explicitly consent 
of the interviewee.  The in person interviews generally allowed for a stronger level of rapport 
to be built between myself and the interviewee however, I did not feel that the telephone 
interviews suffered in any significant way as a result.  In addition, with respect to a number of 
the telephone interviews, I had previous met with and established a professional rapport with 
the interviewee that was readily re-established on the phone. 
Reflecting on the Dickson Poon Effectiveness Framework and the past evaluations of 
parliamentary committees discussed in Chapter 2, I made a deliberate decision to adopt a semi-
structured approach to the interviews.  This allowed me to allow the participant to take the lead 
in terms of describing their perspectives and experiences relevant to the parliamentary 
committee system and/or the development and enactment of counter-terrorism law.  When used 
in conjunction with the more structured interview topics, this technique allowed me to gather 
detailed and unique insights, while ensuring that there was sufficient similarity across subject 
areas to allow data to be compared across relevant variables.  This approach also allowed me 
to question participants about contrasting views that I had obtained from other sources, and to 
test findings I had made through my analysis of documentary based evidence.   
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Each interview began with an explanation of the project, and outlined the participant’s rights 
and choices regarding confidentiality and anonymity.  I explained that they could request 
complete anonymity; confidentiality or anonymity regarding some matters as they arose in the 
course of the interview; or ask for anonymity or confidentiality (whether partial or complete) 
when I provided the participant with the final draft of the Thesis for their review.  I also advised 
participants that in line with the Ethics Approval received for my research, they were free to 
withdraw their participation at any time.  At the time of interview, most participants opted to 
allow me to use their comments subject to any requests as to confidentiality or anonymity made 
during the interview itself.  Some participants also indicated that they would review their 
position of confidentiality/anonymity when they saw the draft thesis.   
Participants were asked about their professional biographical information, as well as what they 
would consider to be the most important features of their job, or those aspects of their job that 
they consider are most relevant to the parliamentary scrutiny system.  
Participants were then asked for their reflections on the overarching purpose of goal of the 
parliamentary committee system from their perspective, and whether they considered the 
system (or a particular component of the system with which they had direct engagement) was 
effective at achieving this goal.  This was an important initial question to elucidate comments 
relevant to ‘legitimacy’, discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
Participants were then asked to provide examples of specific instances of parliamentary 
scrutiny that the participant had been involved in, for example as a member of a parliamentary 
committee or as a witness or submission maker to a parliamentary committee.  This then led to 
questions encouraging reflections on the relevant processes and procedures of the particular 
committee, and the impact their participation in this process had on other aspects of their work 
and/or their decision making regarding the development and enactment of counter-terrorism 
laws.  This was regularly followed by questions relating to how the participant managed 
workloads and time pressures and whether and how the participant may have engaged with 
other participants in the committee system. 
Participants were then asked for their reflections on how to measure the impact of 
parliamentary committees on their role in the law making process, with particular attention 
directed towards any specific experiences with the case study Bills.  Finally, participants were 
asked whether there were any other sources of information, or potential interview participants, 
that I should consult as part of my research. 
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At the end of the interview I asked each participant whether there was any issues I may have 
missed or any weaknesses in my methodology.  I then outlined the next steps in my research, 
noting that I would provide the participant with a copy of the draft Thesis before it was 
submitted, that they would be able to request anonymity or confidentially with respect to any 
of the material used, even where they had not indicated the material was confidential during 
the interview. 
F Data Analysis 
When I was undertaking analysis of the interview material I relied extensively on Dickson 
Poon Effectiveness Framework and the framework contained in An Expanded Sourcebook: 
Qualitative Data Analysis by Miles and Huberman.  As explained in Chapter 2, the Dickson 
Poon Effectiveness Framework provided the template for my tiered approach to measuring the 
impact of parliamentary committees on the development and enactment of the case study Bills.  
The ‘hidden’ tier of impact (described in detail in Chapter 7) was particularly relevant to my 
analysis of the interview material.  I combined this analytical approach with the more specific 
techniques set out by Miles and Huberman, which focus on three ‘flows of activity’: data 
recording (including coding and note taking); data display (organizing and comparing data to 
facilitate analysis); and conclusion drawing and verifications (including noting regularities, 
patterns, explanations, possible configurations, causal flows and propositions).12 
The first of these flows of activity involved transcribing the tape recordings of the in person 
interviews into written form, with the assistance of contemporaneous notes that I had made at 
the time of the interview.  These notes included my initial reflections on the interview as well 
as ideas on the main themes in my Thesis, relationships with previous interviews or any ideas 
where I may find further information on particular examples provided by the participant. 
The process of transcribing the tape recordings into a written form proved to be a highly 
valuable component of my data analysis.  It allowed me to reflect in further detail on the 
responses by participants and provided the starting point for the development of codes that I 
later employed to identify and explore relationships and patterns in my broader data set. 
                                                 
 
12 Miles and Huberman, above n 2, 10-12. 
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Following transcription, I utilised the NVIVO software to develop a set of specific ‘codes’ to 
classify the interview material and to explore relationships, commonalities and contrasts 
between interviews.  As Miles and Huberman describe, coding is an iterative and dynamic 
process, with codes changing and developing as new material is analysed.13  I commenced 
coding my interviews when I had approximately 20 (or 50%) completed.  At this stage, I 
applied the codes I had developed based on my legal analysis and the development of the 
broader methodology for my research.  These included general codes such as ‘evidence of 
hidden impact’, ‘comments on strengths of the committee system’, ‘language used in rights 
based discussions’, as well as more specific codes such as ‘comments on a specific case study 
Bill’ or ‘comments on the Bills drafting process.  When I revisited each code as part of the 
Thesis drafting process, the relationships between these different combinations provided to be 
a highly useful component of my data analysis.  
The NVIVO software allowed me to refine, search and display my coded data quickly and 
easily and to modify existing codes or introduce new codes. 14  I was also able to group my 
codes and add the key ‘attributes’ of each participant (such as whether they were public 
servants, or whether they were current or former parliamentarians).  This allowed for high 
particularised searching and comparison of data.15 
G Data Display 
Miles and Huberman provide a range of useful examples of how to display qualitative research 
data in accessible format, including through the use of matrices16 which I adopted both as a 
                                                 
 
13 Miles and Huberman, above n 2, 61. 
14 For further discussion of the use of NVIVO software for coding and displaying data see P Bazeley, and K 
Jackson, K. (eds.) Qualitative data analysis with NVivo (Sage Publications Limited, 2013,). 
15 As Elaine Welsh has observed, “The searching tools in NVivo allow the researcher to interrogate her or his data 
at a particular level.  This can, in turn, improve the rigour of the analysis process by validating (or not) some of 
the researcher's own impressions of the data.” Elaine Welsh, ‘Dealing with Data: Using NVivo in the Qualitative 
Data Analysis Process’ (2002) 3(2) Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research 1, 
12. 
16 Miles and Huberman, above n 2, 93. 
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data analysis tool and as form of data display in my research.  As the authors note, “[t]his 
display is especially helpful for understanding the flow, location, and connection of events.”17 
I used matrix tables to display both my interview-based data and data obtained through other 
sources such as Hansard debates, media reports and legislative amendments to Bills.  The use 
of matrix tables to display my data was particularly appropriate in light of the three tier 
methodology I employed drawing upon the approach adopted by the Dickson Poon 
Effectiveness Framework.  It allowed me to display data by case study Bill and/or by particular 
parliamentary committee.  It also allowed me to quickly identify trends and contrasts that could 
be explored more fully in the explanatory text.   
My preliminary matrix tables were highly detailed and of great use to me in collating different 
variables to allow for the systematic comparison of responses across the whole data set, and 
within categories of participants, and across particular case study bills.  However, these long 
and detailed tables required significant editing to be accessible as part of the final Thesis.  As 
a result, the matrix tables included in my Thesis are generally ‘summary tables’, supported by 
further detail in the Appendices and in the text of the Thesis itself.  
H Conclusion Drawing and Verification 
My approach to drawing and verifying findings and conclusions in my research was influenced 
heavily by the broad methodology outlined in Chapter 2 and informed by the Dickson Poon 
Effectiveness Framework and other past evaluations of parliamentary committees set out in that 
Chapter.  
When it came to drawing conclusions on questions of legitimacy (described in detail in Chapter 
4) and hidden impact (described in detail in Chapter 7), the interview material proved critical.  
The coding, data displays and memoing techniques described above greatly assisted me to 
identify themes and drawn conclusions from this material.  Revisiting the interview transcripts 
also helped me to verify some of the findings I had developed in these chapters.  The matrix 
displays were particularly useful as they allowed me to find patterns and relationships that 
formed the core of my findings and then verify these through providing substantiating examples 




and repetition.18   They also allowed me to reflect on the interaction between the different ‘tiers 
of impact’ being employed in my research.  For example, I could quickly compare those case 
study bills that received high numbers of parliamentary debates, with those that generated 
strong media commentary, and then use this to help substantiate key findings on public impact.  
I was also able to compare those committees that were considered highly legitimate by a wide 
range of key participants, with those committees most likely to influence the policy 
development and legislative drafting process.   
By the end of this analysis I was confident that, while there were limitations in my study (see 
below and Chapter 2), the key findings I had made were reliable and sound.  In particular, I 
was confident that the individual interviews conducted provided valuable insights into the 
operation of parliamentary committees more generally.   
I Participant Review 
In accordance with my ethics approval, once I had a complete an almost final draft of my Thesis 
I provided anonoymised copies to each participant for their comment.  I decided to provide my 
participants with the full Thesis, so that they would gain an understanding of the context in 
which they were quoted.  I provided each participant with an anonymous number, only 
informing each individual which number they had been allocated and drawing their attention 
to references in their interview (through electronic highlighting). 
This was a very rewarding exercise.  Participants responded with interest to my research and 
some provided additional comments and insights that assisted in the finalisation of my key 
findings and recommendations.  There were only a small number of occasions where 
participants requested that comments be removed or anonymised.  In most instances I was able 
to agree with the participant on alternative wording that sufficiently anonymised them or the 
particular issue they were describing, thus still relying on their views and experiences in my 
analysis.  For example, some interviewees consented to being listed as participants in my 
                                                 
 
18 I used the ‘tactics’ outlined in Miles and Huberman, above n 2, 286, see also Chapter 10.  Tactics include: 
forming patterns, looking at contrasts, clarifying relationships, rigorous testing, looking at exceptions. 
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research, but requested that their comments remain anonymous in the text of the Thesis.  Other 
interviewees asked to be referred to only by position title rather than by name. 
In one instance, a participant asked to withdraw from my research.  In reaching this position, 
this participant provided valuable feedback on my research, and assisted in locating other 
useful sources of information for the material originally provided in the interview.  This 
participant had no concerns with the key findings in my research or my approach to the original 
interview but had reached the view that they no longer wished to be listed as a participant or 
referred to any way in my research. 
J Limitations of Study 
Chapters 1 and 2 discuss the benefits and challenges associated with selecting a case study to 
undertake a qualitative analysis of this kind.  These Chapters explain that the use of the counter-
terrorism case study has many strengths, including its ongoing relevance as one of the most 
significant, rights-engaging areas of Commonwealth legislative activity in recent decades.  
These Chapters also explain that the counter-terrorism case study may have some exceptional 
features that may influence the broad applicability of the findings made in my research.  As 
noted in Chapters 1 and 2, the Thesis employs a range of strategies to guard against this risk.  
However, it is also possible that particular qualities of the counter-terrorism case study had an 
influence on the responses I received to requests for interviews with key participants and on 
the interviews themselves.  For example, some potential participants may have declined my 
request for an interview due to concerns about discussion matters relevant to national security.  
Others may have tempered their answers to my questions having regard to the broader political 
and policy context associated with developing and enacting national security related laws and 
policies.  As noted above, some potential participants (such as current secretariat staff of the 
PJCIS) are subject to strict disclosure and confidentiality requirements which limit their ability 
to discuss certain national security related matters. 
This potential for self-regulation among interview participants is always present in qualitative 
research of this kind.  As Fielding and Thomas explain: 
Qualitative research that relies upon interviews always raises the possibility of a degree of 
(even subconscious) self regulation by participants.  Participants are informed that they will 
be involved in a study about [a certain topic] ……., and there is a tendency to paint the most 
‘proper’ picture – whether that be in accordance with professional ethical standards, their own 
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self-image or attempts to ‘please’ the researcher who may be giving sub-conscious clues 
themselves as to the answers they are seeking.19 
While it is not possible to rule out the potential for this type of self-regulation among the 
participants in my research, there are a number of factors that support the veracity and quality 
of the interview material I obtained.  These factors include: 
 The relatively large sample size for a study of this kind (40 separate interviews); 
 The relatively high acceptance rate for those potential participants in the ‘first 
approaches’ category; 
 My clear intention to focus the interview on the scrutiny experience (rather than the 
detailed national security context) and assurance that I was not seeking any confidential 
or sensitive information; 
 My interest in exploring and documenting the positive contribution parliamentary 
committees make to the law making process at the Commonwealth level; 
 The use of ‘warm referrals’ by other interviewees; 
 The timing of the proposed interviews (which was during the caretaker period between 
the 44th and 45th Parliament); 
 The provision of draft questions and detailed information about the nature of my 
research in advance of the interview;  
 The option of providing comments on an anonymous basis, and the opportunity to 
review my research prior to submission; and 
 The reflective and thoughtful nature of the interview material itself, which suggests that 
participants felt comfortable discussing the key interview topics with me and were 
prepared to offer both positive and critical perspectives on the parliamentary committee 
system and the counter-terrorism law making process. 
                                                 
 
19 Nigel Fielding and Hilary Thomas, ‘Qualitative Interviewing’ in Nigel Gilbert (ed) Researching social life 
(Sage, 2nd ed, 2008) 245. 
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For these reasons, and having regard to the strategies outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, I am 
confident of the quality and reliability of the interview material used in this Thesis and the 
broader applicability of my research to other fields of law making.  However, as discussed in 
Chapter 9, I also recommend further research in this area improve the comprehensiveness of 
our understanding of the impact of the Commonwealth parliamentary committee system.  
It is also important to note that I approached this research as somewhat of an ‘insider’, having 
previously appeared before parliamentary committees in my role as policy officer at the Law 
Council of Australia and obtained insights into the role of committee members as a former 
legal affairs advisor to a Senator.  I was conscious of the need to be transparent about these 
past roles with my interviewees and ensured that I explained these past roles as part of my 
introduction to my research.   
In many ways, these past experiences were beneficial when developing and testing my 
methodology and when identifying possible participants for my research.  As Unluer explains, 
being an ‘insider’ when conducting qualitative research has a number of advantages, including: 
having a greater understanding of the culture being studied; (b) not altering the flow of social 
interaction unnaturally; and (c) having an established intimacy which promotes both the telling 
and the judging of truth. Further, insider-researchers generally know the politics of the 
institution, not only the formal hierarchy but also how it “really works”. They know how to 
best approach people. In general, they have a great deal of knowledge, which takes an outsider 
a long time to acquire.20 
However, being an ‘insider’ when conducting qualitative research can also generate risks.  For 
example, Unluer warns that greater familiarity with the subject matter and the key participants 
can give rise to a ‘loss of objectivity’ or lead the researcher to unconsciously make ‘wrong 
assumptions about the research process based on the researcher’s prior knowledge’.21   
I am confident that these risks did not materialise in the context of my research.  This is evident 
from the fact that, following my analysis of the data I collected, I changed my own views on 
                                                 
 
20 Sema Unluer, ‘Being an Insider Researcher While Conducting Case Study Research’ (2012) 17(29) The 
Qualitative Report, 1-14, 1 (references omitted).  See also A Bonner and G Tolhurst ‘Insider-Outsider Perspectives 
of Participant Observation’ (2002) 9(4) Nurse Researcher 7-19. 
21 Ibid. 
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the rights enhancing impact of parliamentary committees in a number of fundamental respects.  
This is documented in Chapters 1 and 9 of the Thesis.  As noted above, I also employed a range 
of strategies (including openly welcoming challenges to my methodology and draft findings by 
interview participants and others) to ensure that I had not unconsciously allowed my previous 




PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
PROJECT TITLE: Balancing Security and Liberty:  An Evaluation of Australian Parliamentary 
Scrutiny of Counter-Terrorism Laws 
HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL NUMBER: H-2016-083 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR:  Associate Professor Laura Grenfell.  
STUDENT RESEARCHER: Sarah Moulds 
STUDENT’S DEGREE: PhD, Law 
Dear Participant, 
You have been invited to participate in an interview for the purpose of the PhD research project, 
‘Balancing Security and Liberty:  An Evaluation of Australian Parliamentary Scrutiny of Counter-
Terrorism Laws’.  This Information Sheet will provide some background about the larger PhD research 
project of which these interviews form a part.  It will also explain the purpose of the interviews and the 
format they will follow, as well as outlining arrangements relating to confidentiality and use of data.  
You have also been provided with a Consent Form and a sheet with information on the Independent 
Complaints Procedure.  
What is the project about? 
The Australian parliamentary system includes a number of important checks and balances, including 
the parliamentary committee system which serves as a way of reviewing, scrutinising and improving 
proposed laws before they are enacted.  These parliamentary committees can consider whether the 
proposed law is necessary and effective at meeting its objective, as well as its impact on individual 
rights and liberties or on other important Australian values or legal principles.  Parliamentary 
committees are complemented by other mechanisms designed to assist scrutiny of proposed laws, such 
as the requirement to accompany Bills with Explanatory Memorandum and Statements of Compatibility 
with Human Rights.  This formal parliamentary scrutiny system has been considered to be particularly 
critical at the Commonwealth level, where there is no Charter or Bill of Rights, as a mechanism to guard 
against unjustified or disproportionate interference with individual rights. 
 
This project aims to evaluate how well this formal parliamentary scrutiny system is working, and looks 
particularly at the experience of Australia's counter-terrorism laws as a way to highlight the key features 
of parliamentary scrutiny and to identify the impact it has on the content of the law, the way the law is 
publicly debated and discussed and the 'behind the scenes' development of future laws and policies in 
this area. This project also aims to identify and discuss any common themes emerging from the different 
forms of parliamentary scrutiny of Australian counter terrorism laws and draw conclusions as to what 
these themes may mean for improving parliamentary scrutiny in the future. 
Who is undertaking the project? 
This project is being conducted by Sarah Moulds.  
This research will form the basis for Sarah's PhD, at the University of Adelaide under the supervision 
of Associate Professor Laura Grenfell and Dr Adam Webster. 
 
What is the purpose of the interviews? 
There is a wealth of publicly available information about the formal parliamentary scrutiny system that 
will be carefully analysed in this research project.  What is missing from this public record is a clear 
understanding of how this system works in practice, from the perspective of people like you who are 
involved in its day to day operation. 
 
To get a full understanding of how these processes work, I will conduct interviews with past and current 
Senators and Members of Parliament, secretariat staff of relevant parliamentary committees, 
parliamentary counsel, public servants, political advisors, submission makers and witnesses involved 
in relevant parliamentary committee inquires and other experts and public commentators.   
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The interviews will be particular useful for identifying the 'behind the scenes' impacts of parliamentary 
scrutiny on counter-terrorism laws that are otherwise hidden from public view.  For example, interviews 
conducted with those involved in either the development of counter-terrorism laws or the parliamentary 
scrutiny process, or both, may help identify: 
 whether certain parliamentary committees are more effective at undertaking scrutiny of 
counter-terrorism laws and if so, why; 
 whether common themes can be identified as merging from the findings of parliamentary 
committees with respect to counter-terrorism laws; 
 whether the findings of past parliamentary committee inquiries are considered when developing 
proposals of new counter-terrorism laws, or when proposing changes to those laws; 
 whether parliamentarians and their staff find the reports of parliamentary committees helpful 
in their deliberations and decision making; and 
 whether the staff of parliamentary committees have insights into what processes or practices 
are working well or need improvement. 
 
Interviews will be conducted with 20-30 participants. 
 
How will the interview be conducted? 
The interview will take place in your office or at another suitable public venue, such as a quiet cafe.  
The duration of the interview is expected to be no more than one hour, depending on the time you have 
available.  With your permission, the interview will be recorded electronically and will later be 
transcribed by the interviewer.  If you would prefer that the interview not be recorded, the interviewer 
will take handwritten notes.  
 
The interviews will be semi-structured, covering a number of specified general areas.  These will be 
similar for each interview, but will focus on different aspects of the formal parliamentary scrutiny 
process, depending on your experience.  The general areas covered will include:  
 Professional biographical information your involvement in either (a) the development or review 
of counter-terrorism laws or (b) parliamentary scrutiny functions; 
 Specific instances of parliamentary scrutiny that you have been involved in, with a focus on the 
development, scrutiny or review of counter-terrorism laws;  
 The impact of parliamentary scrutiny on your professional role, for example whether findings 
of parliamentary committees have been a relevant factor when voting on a particular Bill or 
amendment, or as a consideration when providing legal or policy advice;  
 Your perspective as to the effectiveness of the parliamentary scrutiny in terms of (a) legislative 
impact (b) other visible impact and (c) hidden impact;  
 Your perspective as to which particular features of the formal parliamentary scrutiny system 
work well and why. 
 
Anonymity and confidentiality 
 
The interviews are not designed to illicit any confidential, security sensitive or politically sensitive 
information, but rather to gain an insight into how the publicly known systems of parliamentary 
scrutiny, such as the parliamentary committee system, work in practice.  For this reason, it is hoped that 
many interviewees will be able to readily consent to having the content they provide attributed to them. 
 
It is possible that when discussing their work or parliamentary processes, interviewees may disclose 
negative information that may impact upon the career.  However, if you agree to participate, you may 
choose to keep all of the information you provide anonymous; or you may choose that certain parts of 
the interview be kept anonymous.  You can also ask that certain information or answers not be used 
directly by the researcher.  It must be noted however, that due to the nature of the project, it is possible 




You have been provided with a consent form, which you can sign when the interview takes place.  If 
you do not sign the consent form, no data from your interview can be used.  You are free to withdraw 
from the study, or to withdraw any information provided through the interviews, at any time before the 
thesis is submitted for examination.   
 
How will the interview information be used? 
All hard copy notes, transcripts and recordings of the interviews will be kept in a locked cabinet at the 
Adelaide Law School.  All electronic data will be stored in a password-protected account on the 
University of Adelaide network.  This data will be accessed only by the PhD candidate and supervisors.  
The data will be kept for the duration of the research project plus five years (in accordance with the 
requirements of the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research), after which time, unless 
further consent is obtained from you, it will be destroyed using confidential destruction methods.  
 
The interview data will be analysed against background research based on documentary sources, in 
order to provide commentary on effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny in the context of Australia's 
counter-terrorism laws.  The findings will be incorporated into a PhD thesis which will be submitted 
for examination and will then be publicly accessible.  
 
It is possible that the PhD thesis will be the basis for further published research such as a book or journal 
article.  If the researchers wish to use any material obtained from your interview in this further research, 
they will seek your written permission.   
 
Further information?   
The study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Adelaide 
(approval number H-2016-083).  If you have questions or problems associated with the practical aspects 
of your participation in the project, or wish to raise a concern or complaint about the project, then you 
should consult the Principal Investigator. Contact the Human Research Ethics Committee’s Secretariat 
on phone +61 8 8313 6028 or by email to hrec@adelaide.edu.au. if you wish to speak with an 
independent person regarding concerns or a complaint, the University’s policy on research involving 
human participants, or your rights as a participant. Any complaint or concern will be treated in 










Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) 
CONSENT FORM 
1. I have read the attached Information Sheet and agree to take part in the following research 
project: 
Title: Balancing Security and Liberty:  An Evaluation of Australian 




2. I have had the project, so far as it affects me, fully explained to my satisfaction by 
researcher Sarah Moulds. My consent is given freely. 
3. I acknowledge that I have read the attached Participant Information Sheet: Balancing 
Security and Liberty:  An Evaluation of Australian Parliamentary Scrutiny of Counter-
Terrorism Laws 
4. I understand that:  
a.  I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any reasons given for 
my withdrawal until the completion of the research project by contacting Sarah 
Moulds. 
b. The information I provide will be used for the purpose of the research project 
named above and the information I provide cannot be used for any other research 
project or by other researchers without my consent.  
c. While I understand that I will not be asked to share confidential information, if I 
request (below), the anonymity and/or confidentiality of the information I provide 
in this interview will be safeguarded subject to any relevant legal requirements.  
d. I request that all of the information I provide in this interview be kept anonymous:  
  Yes / No (please circle).  
e. I request that the answers to particular questions be kept anonymous and/or 
confidential if I indicate this in the course of the interview:  
  Yes / No (please circle).  
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f. Despite the guarantee of anonymity made above, it is nonetheless possible that, 
due to the nature of the project, someone may still be able to identify me as the 
source of information provided to Sarah Moulds.  
5. I will be sent a draft copy of any extract of interview or information attributed to me 
(either expressly or anonymously) before the research project is complete.   
6. The information I provide in this interview will be accessed in the course of the research 
project only by Sarah Moulds and her supervisors.  
7.  I consent to my interview being audio-taped for the purpose of ensuring accuracy of the 
transcript:  
  Yes / No (please circle).  
8. I am aware that I should keep a copy of this Consent Form, when completed, and the 
attached Information Sheet. 
 
Participant to complete: 
Name: ______________________ Signature: ________________________  
Date: _______________________  
Researcher/Witness to complete: 
I have described the nature of the research 
to
___________________________________________________________________________  
  (print name of participant) 
and in my opinion she/he understood the explanation. 
Signature:  ___________________ Position: _________________________  
Date: _______________________  
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The University of Adelaide 
Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) 
CONTACTS FOR INFORMATION ON PROJECT AND INDEPENDENT 
COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE 
The following study has been reviewed and approved by the University of Adelaide Human 
Research Ethics Committee: 
Project Title: Balancing Security and Liberty:  An Evaluation of Australian 
Parliamentary Scrutiny of Counter-Terrorism Laws 
Approval Number: H-2016-083 
The Human Research Ethics Committee monitors all the research projects which it has 
approved. The committee considers it important that people participating in approved projects 
have an independent and confidential reporting mechanism which they can use if they have 
any worries or complaints about that research. 
This research project will be conducted according to the NHMRC National Statement on 
Ethical Conduct in Human Research (see 
http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/publications/synopses/e72syn.htm) 
1. If you have questions or problems associated with the practical aspects of your 
participation in the project, or wish to raise a concern or complaint about the project, then 
you should consult the project co-ordinator: 
Name: Associate Professor Dr Laura Grenfell 
 
Sarah Moulds (Ph D Candidate) 
Phone: (08) 8313 5777  
0401132544 
2. If you wish to discuss with an independent person matters related to:  
  making a complaint, or  
  raising concerns on the conduct of the project, or  
  the University policy on research involving human participants, or  
  your rights as a participant, 
 contact the Human Research Ethics Committee’s Secretariat on phone (08) 8313 6028 or 
by email to hrec@adelaide.edu.au 
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Indicative List of Interview Topics and Questions for ‘Balancing Security and Liberty:  
An Evaluation of Australian Parliamentary Scrutiny of Counter-Terrorism Laws' 
The interviews for this project will be semi-structured.  Similar topics will be covered in each 
interview to allow for comparison of data.  It is expected that most interviews will cover the 
general topics identified in this document.  The specific questions in this document are 
examples of questions that may be asked.  It is possible that, because of the circumstances of a 
particular interview, some of these questions may be omitted and other questions not listed here 
may be asked.  
A.  Professional biographical information 
 Please describe you current professional role. 
 
 Have you had any direct involvement in the development or review of counter-terrorism 
laws in your current role, or in any former professional role?  
 
 Have you had any direct involvement in the formal system of parliamentary scrutiny, 
for example participation in a parliamentary committee inquiry, in your current role, or 
in any former professional role?  
 
B.  Questions about your involvement in the development or review of specific counter-
terrorism laws  
 Please describe the specific counter-terrorism law, or proposed law or amendment, that 
you have been involved in developing or reviewing. 
 
 Thinking about this law or proposed law, please describe your role in the development 
or review process. 
 
 What factors did you consider when undertaking this role? 
 
 Was parliamentary scrutiny - including the prospect of future parliamentary scrutiny or the 
findings of previous parliamentary scrutiny - a relevant factor? 
 
 If so, how was this considered/applied and what impact did it have on the outcome? 
 
C.  Questions about your involvement in specific instances of parliamentary scrutiny 
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 Please describe any specific parliamentary committee inquiry/ies or scrutiny report/s 
relating to counter-terrorism laws that you have participated in. 
 
 Please describe your role in this scrutiny process. 
 
 What were the key issues /most contentious issues arising in this inquiry/scrutiny report, 
and what language was used to describe these issues? 
 
 What considerations were most important to you in your role in this inquiry/scrutiny 
report? 
 What was the outcome of this inquiry/scrutiny report? 
 
D.  The impact of parliamentary scrutiny on your professional role 
 How did you become aware of the formal system of parliamentary scrutiny (including 
the committee system and other related mechanisms such as Statements of 
Compatibility) at the Commonwealth level? 
 
 Have you received any training about the formal system of parliamentary scrutiny? 
 
 Does the work of parliamentary committees, or parliamentary scrutiny of proposed or 
existing laws impact on your professional role?  If so, in what form, and what features 
of this scrutiny have the strongest impact? 
 
 Do the requirements to prepare Explanatory Memorandum and /or Statements of 
Compatibility impact on your professional role? If so, in what form? 
 
 Have any post enactment reviews of counter-terrorism laws impacted on your 
professional role? 
 
E.  Your perspectives on any common themes emerging from the parliamentary scrutiny 
of counter-terrorism law 
 From your perspective, do any common themes emerge from the formal system of 
parliamentary scrutiny of counter-terrorism law 
334 
 
F.  Your perspective as to the effectiveness of the parliamentary scrutiny system 
 How would you describe the goal or objective of the formal system of parliamentary 
scrutiny and do you consider it to be a legitimate and valued part of the Australian 
parliamentary process? 
 
 Thinking of the particular experiences discussed above, can you identify any impacts 
of formal parliamentary scrutiny on: 
 
o the content of Australia's counter-terrorism laws 
o the way Australia's counter-terrorism laws and publicly debated and discussed 
o the way counter-terrorism laws and policies are developed, implemented and 
reviewed 
 
 Which particular features of the formal parliamentary scrutiny system work well and 
why? 
 




ATTACHMENT F:  CONFIDENTIALITY PROTOCOL 
The following study has been reviewed and approved by the University of Adelaide Human Research Ethics Committee: 
Project Title: Balancing Security and Liberty:  An Evaluation of Australian 
Parliamentary Scrutiny of Counter-Terrorism Laws 
Approval Number: H-2016-083 
This research includes interviews with past and current Senators and Members of Parliament, secretariat staff of relevant 
parliamentary committees, parliamentary counsel, public servants, political advisors, submission makers and witnesses 
involved in relevant parliamentary committee inquires and other experts and public commentators.   
Interview participants will have the option of being identified in any publication relating to the research.  Where they 
do not wish to be identified, their names and, where possible, identifying details, will be omitted.  However, due to the 
small sample size and the nature of the participant selection criteria, it may be impossible to guarantee anonymity in all 
cases.  Participants will be advised of this limitation in the Information Sheet and in the Consent Form.      
Anonymity and confidentiality 
The interviews are not designed to illicit any confidential, security sensitive or politically sensitive information, but 
rather to gain an insight into how the publicly known systems of parliamentary scrutiny, such as the parliamentary 
committee system, work in practice.  For this reason, it is hoped that many interviewees will be able to readily consent 
to having the content they provide attributed to them. 
It is possible that when discussing their work or parliamentary processes, interviewees may disclose negative 
information that may impact upon the career.  However, if participants agree to participate, they may choose to keep all 
of the information they provide anonymous; or may choose that only certain parts of the interview be kept anonymous.  
Participants can also ask that certain information or answers not be used by the researcher.   
Consent 
All participants will be provided with a consent form that must be signed prior to the interview taking place.  Participants 
are free to withdraw from the study, or to withdraw any information provided through the interviews, at any time before 
the thesis is submitted for examination.   
How will the interview information be used? 
All hard copy notes, transcripts and recordings of the interviews will be kept in a locked cabinet at the Adelaide Law 
School.  All electronic data will be stored in a password-protected account on the University of Adelaide network.  This 
data will be accessed only by the PhD candidate and supervisors.  The data will be kept for the duration of the research 
project plus five years (in accordance with the requirements of the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of 
Research), after which time, unless further consent is obtained from the participant, it will be destroyed using 
confidential destruction methods.  
The interview data will be analysed against background research based on documentary sources, in order to provide 
commentary on effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny in the context of Australia's counter-terrorism laws.  The 
findings will be incorporated into a PhD thesis which will be submitted for examination and will then be publicly 
accessible.  
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It is possible that the PhD thesis will be the basis for further published research such as a book or journal article.  If the 
researchers wish to use any material obtained from a participant’s interview in this further research, they will seek 
written permission.   
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APPENDIX B:  LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
As noted Appendix A, 40 interviews were conducted as part of my research.  Two interviewees 
requested not to be listed as participants in my research at the time of interview.  One 
interviewee withdrew from my research following consideration of my draft Thesis.  The other 
37 interviewees are listed below, some by name and others by a descriptor agreed in line with 
the options described in Appendix A and provided through the Ethics Approval process.  As 
noted in Appendix A, some of the interviewees listed below elected not to have their comments 
attributed to them by name in the text of the Thesis.   
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A Interviewees  




1 Cameron Gifford* National Security Branch, 
Attorney General’s 
Department  
23 May 16 Canberra 
2 AGD Official A Attorney General’s 
Department 
23 May 16 Canberra 
3 Toni Dawes 
 
Secretary, Senate Standing 
Committee for the Scrutiny of 
Bills 
23 May 16 Canberra 
4 Ivan Powell 
 
Secretary, Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights 








Parliamentary Library 23 May 16 Canberra 
7 Sophie Dunstone Committee Secretary, Senate 
Standing Committee on Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs*   
23 May 16 Canberra 
8 Maureen Weeks Deputy Clerk of Senate, 
Parliament House 
23 May 16 Canberra 
9 Simon Henderson 
 
Senior Policy Officer, Law 
Council of Australia* 
23 May 16 Canberra 
10 Naomi Carde First Assistant Parliamentary 
Counsel 
25 May 16 Canberra 




25 May 16 Canberra 
12 Kris Klugman 
 
President, Civil Liberties 
Australia 
24 May 16 Canberra 
13 Bill Rowlings 
 
Secretary, Civil Liberties 
Australia 
24 May 16 Canberra 





24 May 16 Canberra 
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15 Simon Rice Former Legal Advisor to the 
Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights  
24 May 16 Sydney 
16 Bret Walker SC Barrister and former 
Independent National 
Security Legislation Monitor 
24 May 16 Sydney 




30 May 16 Canberra 
18 Phillip Boulten SC Barrister and former Law 
Council of Australia National 
Criminal Law Committee 
Member 
31 May 16 Sydney 
19 Helen Potts Australian Human Rights 
Commission 
31 May 16 Canberra 
20 Darren Dick Australian Human Rights 
Commission 
31 May 16 Canberra 
19 Nick Cowdery QC Former Law Council of 
Australia Human Rights 
Advisor 
31 May 16 Canberra 
20 Lydia Shelly Muslim Legal Network* 2 June 16 Telephone 
21 Tony Alderman Manager of Government and 
Communications, Australian 
Federal Police 
6 June 16 Telephone 
22 Aruna Sathanpally Legal Advisor, Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Human 
Rights 
23 June 16 Telephone 
23 Andrew Bartlett Former Democrats Senator 
for Queensland 
4 August 16 Telephone 
24 Peter Quiggin First Parliamentary Counsel  3 August 16 Adelaide 
25 Patricia Crossin  Former Labor Senator for the 
Northern Territory and 
former Chair of the Senate 
Standing Committee on Legal 




26 Penny Wright Former Australian Greens 
Senator for South Australia, 
former member of the 
Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, 
former Chair of the Senate 
Standing Committee on Legal 






27 Current Liberal 
Senator 
 
Current Liberal Senator for 




28 Dean Smith  Liberal Senator for Western 
Australia and former Chair of 
the Parliamentary Joint 





29 Jon Stanhope Former Chief Minister of the 





30 Public Servant Employed by multiple 
Government Departments and 











32 Former senior 
member of an 
oversight body 




33 Robert Ray Former Labor Senator for 
Victoria and former member 
of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on ASIO and the 
Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence 





34 John Faulkner 
 
Former Labor Senator for 
New South Wales and former 
member of Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on ASIO 
and the Parliamentary Joint 






35 Roger Gyles QC* 
 
Barrister and Independent 










37 Nicola McGarrity Gilbert and Tobin Centre for 
Public Law, University of 
New South Wales 
 Sydney 
* These individuals held this position at the time of interview, but not at the time of Thesis 
submission   
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APPENDIX C:  PUBLIC COMMENTARY ON THE CASE STUDY BILLS 
A Introduction  
Table 6.4 in Chapter 6 of the Thesis describes in summary form the nature of public 
commentary on the case study Bills by listing the approximate number of media articles 
identified that refer to the case study Bill, the frequency of references to parliamentary scrutiny 
within those articles and the frequency of reference to rights concepts in those articles.  This is 
Table is accompanied by explanatory text that sets out the relevance of this data for the analysis 
of ‘public impact’ being understand in Chapter 6. 
This Appendix provides further detail of the media articles identified and considered with 
respect to each case study Bill.  As noted in Chapter 6, these media articles were located using 
the Newspaper Source Plus EBSCO Host media databased accessed through the University of 
Adelaide library.  This comprehensive database1 allows for targeted searching of Australia 
media articles, including newspapers and television and radio transcripts.  Searches were 
conducted using keywords to (a) indicate discussion of laws (such as ‘bill’, ‘law’, ‘legislation’), 
(b) refer to particular case study Bills (such as ‘control order’) (c) identify references to 
parliamentary committee scrutiny (such as ‘committee’ or ‘review’) and (d) identify references 
to rights (such as ‘rights’ or ‘freedoms’).  Searches were also limited to Australian media 
articles and search results manually vetted to remove repeat references and any irrelevant 
results.  Searches were also limited by period, generally from the date of introduction of a case 
study Bill or announcement of a relevant policy proposal underpinning a case study Bill up 
until the end of the research period (ie December 2015).   
Designed to support Table 6.4, this Appendix contains a list of the total number of media 
articles identified following searches with respect to each case study Bill.   
  
                                                 
 
1 The information provided on the University of Adelaide’s library website explains that: ‘Newspaper Source Plus 
includes more than 860 full-text newspapers, providing more than 35 million full-text articles. In addition, the 
database features more than 857,000 television and radio news transcripts’ (see University of Adelaide, ‘Media 
Databases’ <http://libguides.adelaide.edu.au/media/databases>.  A full list of searchable titles within the 
Newspaper Source Plus database is available at <https://www.ebscohost.com/titleLists/n5h-coverage.pdf>. 
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B Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002  
 
Alan, Ramsey, 'Told to heel, this dog's still got bite' The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) 28 
June 2003, 39 
 
Brendan Nicholson, Political Correspondent, 'Protect our values, Georgio urges' The Sunday 
Age (Melbourne) 22 September 2002, 6  
 
Damon Cronshaw, 'Terror Zone' The Newcastle Herald (Newcastle) 8 January 2003 1  
 
Daryl Williams, 'We'd all be safer if Labor stopped toying with terror' The Australian 
(National) 23 September 2002  
 
George Williams, 'Amended bill hits security target' The Australian (National) 27 June 2003 
 
James Norman, 'EFA alarm over email snoop law'  The Australian (National) 25 June 2002 
 
Linda Kirk, 'Balance terror fight and liberties' The Advertiser (Adelaide) 23 December 2002 
 
'ASIO law fears' The Daily Telegraph, (Sydney) 21 February 2002 
 
'Flaws in terror laws exposed' The Courier Mail (Brisbane) 11 May 2002 
 
'Security vital but so are our liberties' The Australian (National) 16 May 2002 
 
'Terror group outlawed' The Courier Mail, (Brisbane) 01 November 2002 
 
'Wider powers for police to act' The Advertiser (Adelaide) 13 November 2002 
 
'Other threats to freedom', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 28 November 2002, 12  
 
Paul Sheehan, 'PM's double-dissolution trigger finger must be itching over ASIO bill' The 
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) 16 December 2002, 13 
 
Tom Allard, 'Ruddock rebuked over outlaw powers' The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) 8 
May 2006, 1  
 
'Will the terrorism bill allow government terrorism?', The Age (Melbourne) 17 April 2002, 12   
 
 
C ASIO Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bills 2002 and 2003 
 
Alan Ramsey, 'Enjoy your freedom, sweet 16, but keep an eye out for ASIO' The Sydney 
Morning Herald (Sydney) 25 June 2003, 13  
 
Annabel, Crabb, 'Labor holds out against ASIO bill' The Age (Melbourne) 12 November 2002, 
10  
 




Annabel, Crabb, 'ASIO bill stalls as fresh complication is revealed' The Age (Melbourne) 24 
June 2003, 4 
 
Annabel, Crabb, 'Crean welcomes changes weakening ASIO bill' The Age (Melbourne) 13 June 
2003, 4  
 
Annabel, Crabb, 'Government offers Labor a deal on ASIO bill' The Age (Melbourne) 6 
December 2003, 4 
 
Annabel, Crabb, 'Labor gives ASIO powers green light' The Age (Melbourne) 26 June 2003, 4  
 
Annabel, Crabb, 'New snag for ASIO bill' The Age (Melbourne) 24 June 2003, 4  
 
Annabel Crabb, Fergus Shiel, 'Taking liberties' The Age (Melbourne) 21 June 2003, 5  
 
Annabel Crabb, Mark Forbes, 'Williams won't budge on ASIO legislation' The Age 
(Melbourne) 12 May 2002, 2 
 
'ASIO bill is still a threat to freedoms', The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) 16 September 
2002, 12   
 
'ASIO bill stalled', Illawarra Mecury (Illawarra) 25 June 2003, 13  
 
Brendan Nicholson, 'Push for ASIO powers' The Age (Melbourne) 25 October 2004, 4  
 
Brendan Nicholson, Political Correspondent, 'Joint sittings plan to break deadlocks' The 
Sunday Age (Melbourne) 6 August2003, 8  
 
Cosima Marriner and Riley Mark, 'ASIO gets sweeping powers of arrest' The Sydney Morning 
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APPENDIX D: RIGHTS-ENHANCING CHANGES TO CASE STUDY ACTS 
The evidence in Part II suggests that the work of parliamentary committees directly contributed 
to the following rights-enhancing changes to the case study Acts: 
 narrowing the scope of a number of key definitions used in the counter-terrorism 
legislative framework, including the definition of ‘terrorist act’;1  
 removing absolute liability and reverse onus of proof provisions from the terrorist act 
related offences introduced by the SLAT Bills and contained in Division 101 of the 
Criminal Code;2  
 inserting defences within these terrorist act offences for the provision of humanitarian 
aid;3  
 ensuring the power to proscribe terrorist organisations is subject to parliamentary 
review;4  
                                                 
 
1 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 2] (Cth) 
and Related Bills, Items 5 and 8; in response to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 
2002 [No 2] and Related Matters (2002) Recommendation 2. 
2
 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 2] 
(Cth), Items 11, 13, 14; in response to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 
2] and Related Matters (2002) Recommendation 3. 
3 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 2] and 
(Cth), Item 4, in response to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 
2] and Related Matters (2002) Recommendation 1. 
4 See e.g. Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 
2] (Cth).  See also Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 2] and 
Related Matters (2002).   
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 subjecting each major tranche of counter-terrorism reform to mandatory and regular 
parliamentary review, for example through the use of sunset clauses5 or referral to the 
PJCIS or INSLM;6 
 subjecting each new law enforcement and intelligence agency power to a raft of detailed 
reporting requirements and oversight by the Ombudsman and/or the IGIS;7 
 ensuring persons detained under an ASIO questioning and detention warrant are adults, 
have access to legal representation, are protected against self-incrimination and have 
access to judicial review of detention at regular intervals; 8 
 ensuring that pre-charge detention of people thought to have information relevant to 
terrorist investigations is subject to judicial oversight and maximum time limits; 9 
 re-instating the court’s discretion to ensure that a person receives a fair trial when 
certain  national security information is handled in ‘closed court’, and limiting the 
potential to exclude relevant information from the defendant in counter-terrorism 
trials;10 
                                                 
 
5 See e.g. see ASIO Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2003 (Cth) adopting Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 and related matters, (2002) 
Recommendation 27. 
6
 See e.g. George Brandis and Malcolm Turnbull, ‘Government response to committee report on the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014’ (Media Release, 3 April 
2015); George Brandis, ‘Government Response to Committee Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2014’ (Media Release, 25 November 2014). 
7 Ibid, see also Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth). 
8 See Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment 
(Terrorism) Bill 2002 (Cth) and Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Parliament of Australia, 
An Advisory Report on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 
(2002) Recommendations at viii-ix.  See also ASIO Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2003 (Cth). 
9 See e.g. Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism Bill 2004 (Cth) Items 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 which 
implement Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Parliament 
of Australia, Inquiry into the Anti-Terrorism Bill 2004, (2004) Recommendations 1-4.   
10
 Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 2004 
(Cth), ‘General Outline’ and Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) Bill 
2004 and the National Security Information (Criminal Proceedings) (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2004 
(2004). 
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 ensuring people subject to control orders and preventative detention orders can 
understand and challenge the material relied upon to make the order and limiting the 
regime to adults only; 11  
 establishing the position of Independent National Security Legislation Monitor and 
ensuring the Monitor has a specific mandate to consider the human rights implications 
of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws; 12 
 narrowing the scope of terrorist related treason offences;13 
 requiring that telecommunications data be defined in primary legislation, and any data 
retained by authorities be de-identified or destroyed after two years; 14 
 ensuring that detailed public records be kept of the use of retained telecommunications 
data;15 
 protecting the data of journalists from being accessed;16 
 increasing the oversight powers and review functions of the PJCIS, including to 
examine the counter-terrorism activities of the Australian Federal Police;17 
                                                 
 
11 See Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2) 2005 Bill and Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the 
Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005, (2005). 
12 See Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, National Security Legislation Monitor Bill 2009 (Cth) and 
Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Administration, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into National 
Security Legislation Monitor Bill 2009, (2009).  
13 See Explanatory Memorandum, National Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 (Cth) (particularly Item 
15) and Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Inquiry into the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 and Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Law Enforcement Bill 2010 (2010). 
14 See Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data 
Retention) Bill 2014 (Cth), General Outline; Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 (Cth), General Outline and Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, Advisory Report on the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 (2015). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See George Brandis, Attorney General, ‘Government Response to the Committee's report on the Foreign 
Fighters Bill ‘ (Media Release, 22 October 2014); Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Counter-Terrorism 
Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (Cth); Supplementary Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (Cth); and   Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, 
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 narrowing the scope of the proposed ‘declared area’ offences in the Criminal Code and 
ensuring that such declarations are subject to disallowance by parliament;18 
 preserving the safeguards relating to specifying and reviewing the conditions imposed 
as part of a control order or preventive detention order;19 
 narrowing the circumstances in which a dual national can have their citizenship 
‘renounced’ by doing something terrorist-related overseas, including by narrowing the 
range of conduct that can trigger the provisions; and making it clear that the laws cannot 
be applied to children under 14;20 and  
 ensuring that formal guidance materials and drafting directions require law makers to 
turn their mind to the extent to which proposed provisions unjustly interfere with 
individual rights, and/or engage human rights principles.21 
 
                                                 
 
Parliament of Australia, Advisory report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) 
Bill 2014, (2014,) xv. 
18 See George Brandis, Attorney General, ‘Government Response to the Committee's report on the Foreign 
Fighters Bill ‘ (Media Release, 22 October 2014); Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Counter-Terrorism 
Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (Cth); Supplementary Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (Cth); and  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, 
Parliament of Australia, Advisory Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) 
Bill 2014 (2014) Recommendation 18. 
19 George Brandis, Attorney General, ‘Government Response to the Committee's report on the Foreign Fighters 
Bill ‘ (Media Release, 22 October 2014); Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Counter-Terrorism Legislation 
Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (Cth); Supplementary Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment 
(Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (Cth); and Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament 
of Australia, Advisory Report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 
(2014), Recommendations 5 – 9. 
20 See Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) 
Bill 2015 (Cth) amended clause 33AA(1); see also Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) 
Bill 2015 (Cth), and Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, 
Advisory Report on the Provisions of the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 
(2015). 
21 See e.g. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Legislation Handbook, (2017); Office of Parliamentary 
Counsel, Commonwealth Government, Drafting Direction No 3.1 (January 2017); Attorney General’s 
Department, Commonwealth Government, Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Infringement Notices and 
Enforcement Powers (2001) 
<https://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Pages/GuidetoFramingCommonwealthOffencesInfringementNoticesandE
nforcementPowers.aspx>.  See also discussion in Chapter 7. 
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APPENDIX E: EMERGING RIGHTS AND SCRUTINY PRINCIPLES 
The rights and scrutiny principles most commonly discussed during parliamentary 
consideration of the case study Acts can be summarised as follows:1 
 The proposed provisions and Explanatory Memorandum should be clearly drafted so 
the meaning and policy aim is clear to Parliament.2 
 The expansion of executive power must come with procedural fairness guarantees: 
including access to legal representation, preservation of common law privileges and 
access to judicial review.3 
 Parliament should have access to information about how government departments and 
agencies are using their powers.4 
 If the law is designed to respond to an extraordinary set of circumstances, Parliament 
should be required to revisit the law to determine whether it is still needed.5 
                                                 
 
1 This list of rights and scrutiny principles is derived from the detailed analysis set out in Part II of the Thesis, 
including the specific examples provided of rights-enhancing change discussed in Chapters 3 and 5 and 
summarised in Appendix D. 
2 See e.g. Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Inquiry into the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 and Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Law Enforcement Bill 2010 (2010) Recommendations 1 and 2. 
3 See e.g. Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Inquiry into the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 2] and Related Matters 
(2002) Recommendation 4; See Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005, (2005), Chapter 3 [3.22]; 
Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Parliament of Australia, Alert Digest relating to the Counter- 
Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (13 October 2014). 
4 See e.g. Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, Review of Security 
and Counter Terrorism Legislation (2006) vii; Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs 
Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Laws Bill 2008 [No. 2], 
(2008); Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, Advisory Report on 
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 (27 February 2015) 
Recommendation 10. 
5 See e.g. Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, Advisory Report 
on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (2014) Recommendation 13; 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Parliament of Australia, Thirteenth Report of 2014, (28 October 
2014); Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD, Parliament of Australia, An Advisory Report on 
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (2002) Recommendation 12. 
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 New criminal offences should have clearly defined physical and mental elements, 
allocate the burden of proof to the prosecution, ensure access to legal representation, 
and not apply retrospectively.6 
 Any restriction of free speech should be accompanied by exceptions to promote robust 
debate on matters of public interest.7 
 Freedom of association and the right to privacy should not be unduly burdened and any 
restriction should be subject to independent oversight.8 
 The proposed law should not infringe freedom of religion, and should respect 
Australia’s ethnic and cultural diversity.9 
 The rights of children require special protection.10 
                                                 
 
6 See e.g. Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2) 2005 Bill, Schedule of the amendments made by the Senate, Items 68-72; 
Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Parliament of Australia, Alert Digest No 13 of 2005, (9 
November 2005) 8, 14-16; Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Parliament of Australia, Alert 
Digest relating to the Counter- Terrorism Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fighters) Bill 2014 (13 October 
2014). 
7 See e.g. Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Parliament of Australia, Alert Digest No 7 of 2015, 
(12 August 2015) 3, 10; Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005, (2005), Recommendations 27 and 28, 
see also Chapter 5; Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the National Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 and Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Bill 2010 (2010). 
8 See e.g. Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, Advisory Report 
on the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014 (27 February 2015); 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Parliament of Australia, Fifteenth Report of 44th Parliament 
(14 November 2014) 10, 16-17; Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No 
2] and Related Matters (2002) 32-44. 
9 See e.g. Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, Advisory Report 
on the Provisions of the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 (2015); 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Parliament of Australia, Twenty-fifth Report of the 44th 
Parliament, (11 August 2015).  Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Parliament of Australia, 
Alert Digest No 7 of 2015 (12 August 2015). 
10 See e.g. Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, Advisory Report 
on the Provisions of the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Bill 2015 (2015) Chapter 6; 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Parliament of Australia, Twenty-fifth Report of the 44th 
Parliament, (11 August 2015) Part 3; Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs References 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation 
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Mondon, Aurélien, The Mainstreaming of the Extreme Right in France and Australia: A 
Populist Hegemony? (Ashgate, 2013) 
Monk, David, ‘A Framework for Evaluating the Performance of Committees in Westminster 
Parliaments’ (2010) 16 Journal of Legislative Studies 1 
Moran, Michael, The End of British Politics (SpringerLink, 2017)  
Moulds, Sarah, ‘Committees of Influence: Parliamentary Committees with the Capacity to 
Change Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Laws’ (Paper presented at the Australasian 
Parliamentary Study Group’s Annual Conference, ‘The Restoration and Enhancement of 
Parliaments’ Reputation’, Adelaide, October 2016) 
Moulds, Sarah, ‘How does the Commonwealth Parliament Engage with “Rights” and 
“Justice”? The Case of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Laws’ (Paper presented to the Australian 
Political Studies Association Conference, ‘The Politics of Justice and Rights: Challenges and 
Future Directions’, Sydney, September 2016) 
Murphy, Peter, ‘Populism Rising: The New Voice of the “Mad as Hell” Voter’ (2016) 60(5) 
Quadrant 8 
Nagel, Thomas, ‘Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy’ (1987) 16(3) Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 215 
Nairne, Shaun, ‘State Sovereignty, Political Legitimacy and Regional Institutionalism in the 
Asia-Pacific’ (2014) 17(3) Pacific Review 423 
Neville, Richard, ‘The Fever that Swept the West’ (2009) 8(2) Diplomat 14 
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